Source: Project Gutenberg #47110/#31891; Internet Archive cu31924030454387
Source URL: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/47110 ; https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/31891 ; https://archive.org/details/cu31924030454387
Public domain basis: Public-domain nineteenth-century US editions: Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (Brooklyn, 1888); Essays on the Constitution of the United States, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1892); Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, ed. John Bach McMaster and Frederick D. Stone (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1888).
Coverage: Partial: Anti-Federalist pieces only, selected from Ford's Pamphlets (Observations by a Columbian Patriot; the Plebeian's Address; Edmund Randolph's letter of 16 October 1787; the Federal Farmer's Observations; George Mason's Objections) and Ford's Essays (Agrippa; Gerry's replies to a Landholder; William Williams's letter; Cato; Sydney; Luther Martin's letters; A Plain Dealer), each with Ford's headnote; plus the Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention and the Letters of Centinel from McMaster and Stone (Internet Archive OCR). Federalist pieces in these volumes are omitted. Ford's footnotes are not carried over, so bracketed or numbered note markers in his texts are left without their notes. Brutus, the Impartial Examiner, and other series are not in these PD collections and are not included. Author attributions are the 1888-1892 editors'; several are now disputed (the Columbian Patriot is usually credited to Mercy Otis Warren rather than Gerry, and the Federal Farmer and Cato attributions to Richard Henry Lee and George Clinton are uncertain).


# Observations on the New Constitution, by a Columbian Patriot (1788)

Observations / On the new Constitution, and on the Federal / and State
Conventions. / By a Columbian Patriot. / Sic transit gloria Americana.
/ [Boston: 1788.]

  12 mo., pp. 19.

  Written by Elbridge Gerry, member of the Philadelphia Convention
  from Massachusetts, and one of the number who refused to sign the
  Constitution, for reasons given in his letter to the presiding
  officers of the Massachusetts legislature (Elliot I, 494). Gerry
  made himself conspicuous in the contest in Massachusetts over the
  ratification, and though not elected to the State Convention, was
  requested by them to attend and answer questions. His life, by James
  T. Austin, (Boston, 1828), makes no mention of this pamphlet.

  “E. G. has come out as a _Columbian Patriot_—a pitiful performance.
  The author sinks daily in public esteem, and his bantling goes
  unnoticed.”—Rufus King to John Alsop, March 2d, 1788.

  The first edition of this pamphlet was printed without a title page,
  or imprint, and an examination of the Massachusetts newspapers shows
  it was never for sale; making it probable that it was printed for
  Gerry, and not for general circulation. Greenleaf reprinted it in
  New York, for the [Anti] Federal Committee, who distributed sixteen
  hundred and thirty copies to the local county committees of that
  State.

  “We have received yours by a Columbian Patriot—a well composed piece
  but in a style too sublime and florid for the common people in this
  part of the country.”—Albany Committee to N. Y. Committee, April
  12th, 1788.

  P. L. F.


Mankind may amuse themselves with theoretick systems of liberty, and
trace its social and moral effects on sciences, virtue, industry and
every improvement of which the human mind is capable; but we can
only discern its true value by the practical and wretched effects
of slavery; and thus dreadfully will they be realized, when the
inhabitants of the Eastern States are dragging out a miserable
existence, _only_ on the gleanings of their fields; and the Southern,
blessed with a softer and more fertile climate, are languishing in
hopeless poverty; and when asked, what is become of the flower of their
crop, and the rich produce of their farms—they may answer in the
hapless stile of the Man of _La Mancha_,—“The steward of my Lord has
seized and sent it to _Madrid_.”——Or, in the more literal language of
truth, The _exigencies_ of government require that the collectors of
the revenue should transmit it to the _Federal City_.

Animated with the firmest zeal for the interest of this country, the
peace and union of the American States, and the freedom and happiness
of a people who have made the most costly sacrifices in the cause
of liberty,—who have braved the power of Britain, weathered the
convulsions of war, and waded thro’ the blood of friends and foes to
establish their independence and to support the freedom of the human
mind; I cannot silently [2] witness this degradation without calling
on them, before they are compelled to blush at their own servitude,
and to turn back their languid eyes on their lost liberties—to
consider, that the character of nations generally changes at the
moment of revolution.——And when patriotism is discountenanced and
publick virtue becomes the ridicule of the sycophant—when every man
of liberality, firmness and penetration who cannot lick the hand
stretched out to oppress, is deemed an enemy to the State—then is the
gulph of despotism set open, and the grades to slavery, though rapid,
are scarce perceptible—then genius drags heavily its iron chain
—science is neglected, and real merit flies to the shades for security
from reproach—the mind becomes enervated, and the national character
sinks to a kind of apathy with only energy sufficient to curse the
breast that gave it milk, and as an elegant writer observes, “To bewail
every new birth as an increase of misery, under a government where the
mind is necessarily debased, and talents are seduced to become the
panegyrists of usurpation and tyranny.” He adds, “that even sedition
is not the most indubitable enemy to the publick welfare; but that
its most dreadful foe is despotism which always changes the character
of nations for the worse, and is productive of nothing but vice, that
the tyrant no longer excites to the pursuits of glory or virtue; it
is not talents, it is baseness and servility that he cherishes, and
the weight of arbitrary power destroys the spring of emulation.”(1)
If such is the influence of government on the character and manners,
and undoubtedly the observation is just, must we not subscribe to the
opinion of the celebrated _Abbé Mablé_? “That there are disagreeable
seasons in the unhappy situation of human affairs, when policy requires
both the intention and the power of doing mischief to be punished; and
when the senate proscribed the memory of _Cæsar_ they ought to have
put _Anthony_ to death, and extinguished the hopes of _Octavius_.”
Self defence is a primary law of nature, which no subsequent law of
society can abolish; this primæval principle, the immediate gift of
the Creator, obliges every one to remonstrate against the strides of
ambition, and a wanton lust of domination, and to resist the first
approaches of tyranny, which at this day threaten to sweep away
the rights for which the brave sons of America have fought with an
heroism scarcely paralleled even in ancient republicks. [3] It may be
repeated, they have purchased it with their blood, and have gloried
in their independence with a dignity of spirit, which has made them
the admiration of philosophy, the pride of America, and the wonder of
Europe. It has been observed, with great propriety, that “the virtues
and vices of a people when a revolution happens in their government,
are the measure of the liberty or slavery they ought to expect—An
heroic love for the publick good, a profound reverence for the laws,
a contempt of riches, and a noble haughtiness of soul, are the only
foundations of a free government.”(2) Do not their dignified principles
still exist among us? Or are they extinguished in the breasts of
Americans, whose fields have been so recently crimsoned to repel the
potent arm of a foreign Monarch, who had planted his engines of slavery
in every city, with design to erase the vestiges of freedom in this his
last asylum. It is yet to be hoped, for the honour of human nature,
that no combinations either foreign or domestick have thus darkned
this Western hemisphere.—On these shores freedom has planted her
standard, diped in the purple tide that flowed from the veins of her
martyred heroes; and here every uncorrupted American yet hopes to see
it supported by the vigour, the justice, the wisdom and unanimity of
the people, in spite of the deep-laid plots, the secret intrigues, or
the bold effrontery of those interested and avaricious adventurers for
place, who intoxicated with the ideas of distinction and preferment
have prostrated every worthy principle beneath the shrine of ambition.
Yet these are the men who tell us republicanism is dwindled into
theory—that we are incapable of enjoying our liberties—and that we
must have a master.——Let us retrospect the days of our adversity,
and recollect who were then our friends; do we find them among the
sticklers for aristocratick authority? No, they were generally the same
men who now wish to save us from the distractions of anarchy on the one
hand, and the jaws of tyranny on the other; where then were the class
who now come forth importunately urging that our political salvation
depends on the adoption of a system at which freedom spurns?—Were not
some of them hidden in the corners of obscurity, and others wrapping
themselves in the bosom of our enemies for safety? Some of them
were in the arms of infancy; and others speculating for fortune, by
sporting with public money; while a few, a very few of them [4] were
magnanimously defending their country, and raising a character, which I
pray heaven may never be sullied by aiding measures derogatory to their
former exertions. But the revolutions in principle which time produces
among mankind, frequently exhibits the most mortifying instances
of human weakness; and this alone can account for the extraordinary
appearance of a few names, once distinguished in the honourable walks
of patriotism, but now found in the list of the Massachusetts assent to
the ratification of a Constitution, which, by the undefined meaning of
some parts, and the ambiguities of expression in others, is dangerously
adapted to the purposes of an immediate _aristocratic tyranny_; that
from the difficulty, if not impracticability of its operation, must
soon terminate in the most _uncontrouled despotism_.

All writers on government agree, and the feelings of the human mind
witness the truth of these political axioms, that man is born free and
possessed of certain unalienable rights—that government is instituted
for the protection, safety and happiness of the people, and not for
the profit, honour, or private interest of any man, family, or class
of men——That the origin of all power is in the people, and that
they have an incontestible right to check the creatures of their own
creation, vested with certain powers to guard the life, liberty and
property of the community: And if certain selected bodies of men,
deputed on these principles, determine contrary to the wishes and
expectations of their constituents, the people have an undoubted right
to reject their decisions, to call for a revision of their conduct, to
depute others in their room, or if they think proper, to demand further
time for deliberation on matters of the greatest moment: it therefore
is an unwarrantable stretch of authority or influence, if any methods
are taken to preclude this peaceful and reasonable mode of enquiry
and decision. And it is with inexpressible anxiety, that many of the
best friends of the Union of the States—to the peaceable and equal
participation of the rights of nature, and to the glory and dignity of
this country, behold the insiduous arts, and the strenuous efforts of
the partisans of arbitrary power, by their vague definitions of the
best established truths, endeavoring to envelope the mind in darkness
the concomitant of slavery, and to lock the strong chains of domestic
despotism on a country, which by the most glorious and successful
struggles is but newly emancipated from the spectre of foreign
dominion.—— [5] But there are certain seasons in the course of human
affairs, when Genius, Virtue, and Patriotism, seems to nod over the
vices of the times, and perhaps never more remarkably, than at the
present period; or we should not see such a passive disposition prevail
in some, who we must candidly suppose, have liberal and enlarged
sentiments; while a supple multitude are paying a blind and idolatrous
homage to the opinions of those who by the most precipitate steps are
treading down their dear bought privileges; and who are endeavouring
by all the arts of insinuation, and influence, to betray the people
of the United States, into an acceptance of a most complicated system
of government; marked on the one side with the _dark_, _secret_ and
_profound intrigues_, of the statesman, long practised in the purlieus
of despotism; and on the other, with the ideal projects of _young
ambition_, with its wings just expanded to soar to a summit, which
imagination has painted in such gawdy colours as to intoxicate the
_inexperienced votary_, and to send _him_ rambling from State to State,
to collect materials to construct the ladder of preferment.

But as a variety of objections to the _heterogeneous phantom_, have
been repeatedly laid before the public, by men of the best abilities
and intentions; I will not expatiate long on a Republican _form_ of
government, founded on the principles of monarchy—a democratick branch
with the _features_ of aristocracy—and the extravagance of nobility
pervading the minds of many of the candidates for office, with the
poverty of peasantry hanging heavily on them, and insurmountable, from
their taste for expence, unless a general provision should be made
in the arrangement of the civil list, which may enable them with the
champions of their cause to “_sail down the new pactolean channel_.”
Some gentlemen, with laboured zeal, have spent much time in urging the
necessity of government, from the embarrassments of trade—the want
of respectability abroad and confidence of the public engagements at
home:—These are obvious truths which no one denies; and there are few
who do not unite in the general wish for the restoration of public
faith, the revival of commerce, arts, agriculture, and industry,
under a lenient, peaceable and energetick government: But the most
sagacious advocates for the party have not by fair discusion; and
rational argumentation, evinced the necessity of adopting this many
headed monster; of such motley mixture, that its enemies cannot trace a
feature of Democratick or Republican [6] extract; nor have its friends
the courage to denominate a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, or an Oligarchy,
and the favoured bantling must have passed through the short period of
its existence without a name, had not Mr. _Wilson_, in the fertility of
his genius, suggested the happy epithet of a _Federal Republic_.—But
I leave the field of general censure on the secresy of its birth, the
rapidity of its growth, and the fatal consequences of suffering it
to live to the age of maturity, and will particularize some of the
most weighty objections to its passing through this continent in a
gigantic size.—It will be allowed by every one that the fundamental
principle of a free government is the equal representation of a free
people——And I will _first_ observe with a justly celebrated writer,
“That the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the
absolute rights which were vested in them by the immediate laws of
nature, but which could not be preserved in peace, without the mutual
intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social
communities.” And when society has thus deputed a certain number of
their equals to take care of their personal rights, and the interest
of the whole community, it must be considered that responsibility is
the great security of integrity and honour; and that annual election
is the basis of responsibility,—Man is not immediately corrupted, but
power without limitation, or amenability, may endanger the brightest
virtue—whereas a frequent return to the bar of their Constituents is
the strongest check against the corruptions to which men are liable,
either from the intrigues of others of more subtle genius, or the
propensities of their own hearts,—and the gentlemen who have so warmly
advocated in the late Convention of the Massachusetts, the change from
annual to biennial elections; may have been in the same predicament,
and perhaps with the same views that Mr. _Hutchinson_ once acknowledged
himself, when in a letter to _Lord Hillsborough_, he observed, “that
the grand difficulty of making a change in government against the
general bent of the people had caused him to turn his thoughts to a
variety of plans, in order to find one that might be executed in spite
of opposition,” and the first he proposed was that, “instead of annual,
the elections should be only once in three years:” but the Minister
had not the hardiness to attempt such an innovation, even in the
revision of colonial charters: nor has any one ever defended Biennial,
Triennial or Septennial Elections, either in the [7] British House of
Commons, or in the debates of Provincial assemblies, on general and
free principles: but it is unnecessary to dwell long on this article,
as the best political writers have supported the principles of annual
elections with a precision, that cannot be confuted, though they may be
darkned, by the sophistical arguments that have been thrown out with
design, to undermine all the barriers of freedom.

2. There is no security in the profered system, either for the rights
of conscience or the liberty of the Press: Despotism usually while
it is gaining ground, will suffer men to think, say, or write what
they please; but when once established, if it is thought necessary to
subserve the purposes, of arbitrary power, the most unjust restrictions
may take place in the first instance, and an _imprimator_ on the Press
in the next, may silence the complaints, and forbid the most decent
remonstrances of an injured and oppressed people.

3. There are no well defined limits of the Judiciary Powers, they seem
to be left as a boundless ocean, that has broken over the chart of
the Supreme Lawgiver, “_thus far shalt thou go and no further_,” and
as they cannot be comprehended by the clearest capacity, or the most
sagacious mind, it would be an Herculean labour to attempt to describe
the dangers with which they are replete.

4. The Executive and the Legislative are so dangerously blended as to
give just cause of alarm, and everything relative thereto, is couched
in such ambiguous terms—in such vague and indefinite expression, as
is a sufficient ground without any objection, for the reprobation of a
system, that the authors dare not hazard to a clear investigation.

5. The abolition of trial by jury in civil causes.—This mode of
trial the learned Judge Blackstone observes, “has been coeval with the
first rudiments of civil government, that property, liberty and life,
depend on maintaining in its legal force the constitutional trial by
jury.” He bids his readers pauze, and with Sir Matthew Hale observes,
how admirably this mode is adapted to the investigation of truth
beyond any other the world can produce. Even the party who have been
disposed to swallow, without examination, the proposals of the _secret
conclave_, have started on a discovery that this essential right was
curtailed; and shall a privilege, the origin of which may be traced to
our Saxon ancestors—that has been a part of the law of nations, even
in the fewdatory systems of France, [8] Germany and Italy—and from the
earliest records has been held so sacred, both in ancient and modern
Britain, that it could never be shaken by the introduction of Norman
customs, or any other conquests or change of government——shall this
inestimable privilege be relinquished in America—either thro’ the fear
of inquisition for unaccounted thousands of public monies in the hands
of some who have been officious in the fabrication of the _consolidated
system_, or from the apprehension that some future delinquent possessed
of more power than integrity, may be called to a trial by his peers in
the hour of investigation.

6. Though it has been said by Mr. _Wilson_ and many others, that a
Standing-Army is necessary for the dignity and safety of America, yet
freedom revolts at the idea, when the Divan, or the Despot, may draw
out his dragoons to suppress the murmurs of a few, who may yet cherish
those sublime principles which call forth the exertions, and lead to
the best improvements of the human mind. It is hoped this country
may yet be governed by milder methods than are usually displayed
beneath the bannerets of military law.—Standing armies have been the
nursery of vice and the bane of liberty from the Roman legions to the
establishment of the artful Ximenes, and from the ruin of the Cortes
of Spain, to the planting of the British cohorts in the capitals of
America:—By the edicts of an authority vested in the sovereign power
by the proposed constitution, the militia of the country, the bulwark
of defence, and the security of national liberty if no longer under
the controul of civil authority; but at the rescript of the Monarch,
or the aristocracy, they may either be employed to extort the enormous
sums that will be necessary to support the civil list—to maintain
the regalia of power—and the splendour of the most useless part of
the community, or they may be sent into foreign countries for the
fulfilment of treaties, stipulated by the President and two-thirds of
the Senate.

7. Notwithstanding the delusory promise to guarantee a Republican form
of government to every State in the Union—If the most discerning
eye could discover any meaning at all in the engagement, there are
no resources left for the support of internal government, or the
liquidation of the debts of the State. Every source of revenue is in
the monopoly of Congress, and if the several legislatures in their
enfeebled state, should against their own feelings be necessitated to
attempt a dry tax [9] for the payment of their debts, and the support
of internal police, even this may be required for the purposes of the
general government.

8. As the new Congress are empowered to determine their own salaries,
the requisitions for this purpose may not be very moderate, and the
drain for public moneys will probably rise past all calculation: and
it is to be feared when America has consolidated its despotism, the
world will witness the truth of the assertion—“that the pomp of an
Eastern monarch may impose on the vulgar who may estimate the force of
a nation by the magnificence of its palaces; but the wise man judges
differently, it is by that very magnificence he estimates its weakness.
He sees nothing more in the midst of this imposing pomp, where the
tyrant sets enthroned, than a sumptuous and mournful decoration of the
dead; the apparatus of a fastuous funeral, in the centre of which is a
cold and lifeless lump of unanimated earth, a phantom of power ready to
disappear before the enemy, by whom it is despised!”

9. There is no provision for a rotation, nor anything to prevent the
perpetuity of office in the same hands for life; which by a little
well timed bribery, will probably be done, to the exclusion of men of
the best abilities from their share in the offices of government.—By
this neglect we lose the advantages of that check to the overbearing
insolence of office, which by rendering him ineligible at certain
periods, keeps the mind of man in equilibrio, and teaches him the
feelings of the governed, and better qualifies him to govern in his
turn.

10. The inhabitants of the United States, are liable to be dragged from
the vicinity of their own country, or state, to answer the litigious
or unjust suit of an adversary, on the most distant borders of the
Continent: in short the appelate jurisdiction of the Supreme Federal
Court, includes an unwarrantable stretch of power over the liberty,
life, and property of the subject, through the wide Continent of
America.

11. One Representative to thirty thousand inhabitants is a very
inadequate representation; and every man who is not lost to all sense
of freedom to his country, must reprobate the idea of Congress altering
by law, or on any pretence whatever, interfering with any regulations
for time, places, and manner of choosing our own Representatives.

12. If the sovereignty of America is designed to be elective, the
circumscribing the votes to only ten electors in this State, [10] and
the same proportion in all the others, is nearly tantamount to the
exclusion of the voice of the people in the choice of their first
magistrate. It is vesting the choice solely in an aristocratic junto,
who may easily combine in each State to place at the head of the Union
the most convenient instrument for despotic sway.

13. A Senate chosen for six years will, in most instances, be an
appointment for life, as the influence of such a body over the minds
of the people will be coequal to the extensive powers with which they
are vested, and they will not only forget, but be forgotten by their
constituents—a branch of the Supreme Legislature thus set beyond
all responsibility is totally repugnant to every principle of a free
government.

14. There is no provision by a bill of rights to guard against the
dangerous encroachments of power in too many instances to be named: but
I cannot pass over in silence the insecurity in which we are left with
regard to warrants unsupported by evidence—the daring experiment of
granting _writs of assistance_ in a former arbitrary administration
is not yet forgotten in the Massachusetts; nor can we be so ungrateful
to the memory of the patriots who counteracted their operation, as so
soon after their manly exertions to save us from such a detestable
instrument of arbitrary power, to subject ourselves to the insolence
of any petty revenue officer to enter our houses, search, insult, and
seize at pleasure. We are told by a gentleman of too much virtue and
real probity to suspect he has a design to deceive—“that the whole
constitution is a declaration of rights,”—but mankind must think for
themselves, and to many very judicious and discerning characters, the
whole constitution with very few exceptions appears a perversion of
the rights of particular states, and of private citizens.——But the
gentleman goes on to tell us, “that the primary object is the general
government, and that the rights of individuals are only incidentally
mentioned, and that there was a clear impropriety in being very
particular about them.” But, asking pardon for dissenting from such
respectable authority, who has been led into several mistakes, more
from his predilection in favour of certain modes of government, than
from a want of understanding or veracity. The rights of individuals
ought to be the primary object of all government, and cannot be too
securely guarded by the most explicit declarations in their favor.
This has been the opinion of the Hampdens, the Pyms, and [11] many
other illustrious names, that have stood forth in defence of English
liberties; and even the Italian master in politicks, the subtle and
renowned Machiavel acknowledges, that no republic ever yet stood on a
stable foundation without satisfying the common people.

15. The difficulty, if not impracticability, of exercising the equal
and equitable powers of government by a single legislature over an
extent of territory that reaches from the Mississippi to the Western
lakes, and from them to the Atlantic Ocean, is an insuperable objection
to the adoption of the new system.—Mr. _Hutchinson_, the great
champion for arbitrary power, in the multitude of his machinations to
subvert the liberties in this country, was obliged to acknowledge in
one of his letters, that, “from the extent of country from north to
south, the scheme of one government was impracticable.” But if the
authors of the present visionary project, can by the arts of deception,
precipitation and address, obtain a majority of suffrages in the
conventions of the states to try the hazardous experiment, they may
then make the same inglorious boast with this insidious politician, who
may perhaps be their model, that “the union of the colonies was pretty
well broken, “and that he hoped to never see it renewed.”

16. It is an undisputed fact that not one legislature in the United
States had the most distant idea when they first appointed members for
a convention, entirely commercial, or when they afterwards authorized
them to consider on some amendments of the Federal union, that they
would without any warrant from their constituents, presume on so bold
and daring a stride, as ultimately to destroy the state governments,
and offer a _consolidated system_, irreversible but on conditions that
the smallest degree of penetration must discover to be impracticable.

17. The first appearance of the article which declares the ratification
of nine states sufficient for the establishment of the new system,
wears the face of dissension, is a subversion of the union of
Confederated States, and tends to the introduction of anarchy and civil
convulsions, and may be a means of involving the whole country in blood.

18. The mode in which this constitution is recommended to the people to
judge without either the advice of Congress, or the legislatures of the
several states is very reprehensible—it is an attempt to force it upon
them before it could be thoroughly [12] understood, and may leave us in
that situation, that in the first moments of slavery in the minds of
the people agitated by the remembrance of their lost liberties, will be
like the sea in a tempest, that sweeps down every mound of security.

But it is needless to enumerate other instances, in which the proposed
constitution appears contradictory to the first principles which ought
to govern mankind; and it is equally so to enquire into the motives
that induced to so bold a step as the annihilation of the independence
and sovereignty of the thirteen distinct states.——They are but
too obvious through the whole progress of the business, from the
first shutting up the doors of the federal convention and resolving
that no member should correspond with gentlemen in the different
states on the subject under discussion; till the trivial proposition
of _recommending_ a few amendments was artfully ushered into the
convention of the Massachusetts. The questions that were then before
that honorable assembly were profound and important, they were of such
magnitude and extent, that the consequences may run parallel with the
existence of the country; and to see them waved and hastily terminated
by a measure too absurd to require a serious refutation, raises the
honest indignation of every true lover of his country. Nor are they
less grieved that the ill policy and arbitrary disposition of some of
the sons of America has thus precipitated to the contemplation and
discussion of questions that no one could rationally suppose would
have been agitated among us, till time had blotted out the principles
on which the late revolution was grounded; or till the last traits of
the many political tracts, which defended the separation from Britain,
and the rights of men were consigned to everlasting oblivion. After
the severe conflicts this country has suffered, it is presumed that
they are disposed to make every reasonable sacrifice before the altar
of peace.——But when we contemplate the nature of men and consider
them originally on an equal footing, subject to the same feelings,
stimulated by the same passions, and recollecting the struggles
they have recently made, for the security of their civil rights; it
cannot be expected that the inhabitants of the Massachusetts, can be
easily lulled into a fatal security, by the declamatory effusions of
gentlemen, who, contrary to the experience of all ages would persuade
them there is no danger to be apprehended, from vesting discretionary
powers in the hands of man, which he may, or may not abuse. The very
suggestion, that [13] we ought to trust to the precarious hope of
amendments and redress, after we have voluntarily fixed the shackles on
our own necks should have awakened to a double degree of caution.—This
people have not forgotten the artful insinuations of a former
Governor, when pleading the unlimited authority of parliament before
the legislature of the Massachusetts; nor that his arguments were very
similar to some lately urged by gentlemen who boast of opposing his
measures, “_with halters about their necks_.”

We were then told by him, in all the soft language of insinuation,
that no form of government, of human construction can be perfect—that
we had nothing to fear—that we had no reason to complain—that we
had only to acquiesce in their illegal claims, and to submit to
the requisition of parliament, and doubtless the lenient hand of
government would redress all grievances, and remove the oppressions
of the people:—Yet we soon saw armies of mercenaries encamped on
our plains—our commerce ruined—our harbours blockaded—and our
cities burnt. It may be replied that this was in consequence of an
obstinate defence of our privileges; this may be true; and when the
“_ultima ratio_” is called to aid, the weakest must fall. But let the
best informed historian produce an instance when bodies of men were
entrusted with power, and the proper checks relinquished, if they were
ever found destitute of ingenuity sufficient to furnish pretences
to abuse it. And the people at large are already sensible, that the
liberties which America has claimed, which reason has justified, and
which have been so gloriously defended by the swords of the brave; are
not about to fall before the tyranny of foreign conquest: it is native
usurpation that is shaking the foundations of peace, and spreading
the sable curtain of despotism over the United States. The banners of
freedom were erected in the wilds of America by our ancestors, while
the wolf prowled for his prey on the one hand, and more savage man
on the other; they have been since rescued from the invading hand of
foreign power, by the valor and blood of their posterity; and there
was reason to hope they would continue for ages to illumine a quarter
of the globe, by nature kindly separated from the proud monarchies of
Europe, and the infernal darkness of Asiatic slavery.—And it is to
be feared we shall soon see this country rushing into the extremes of
confusion and violence, in consequence of the proceeding of a set of
gentlemen, who disregarding [14] the purposes of their appointment,
have assumed powers unauthorized by any commission, have unnecessarily
rejected the confederation of the United States, and annihilated the
sovereignty and independence of the individual governments.—The causes
which have inspired a few men to assemble for very different purposes
with such a degree of temerity as to break with a single stroke the
union of America, and disseminate the seeds of discord through the land
may be easily investigated, when we survey the partizans of monarchy in
the state conventions, urging the adoption of a mode of government that
militates with the former professions and exertions of this country,
and with all ideas of republicanism, and the equal rights of men.

Passion, prejudice, and error, are characteristics of human nature;
and as it cannot be accounted for on any principles of philosophy,
religion, or good policy; to these shades in the human character
must be attributed the mad zeal of some, to precipitate to a blind
adoption of the measures of the late federal convention, without giving
opportunity for better information to those who are misled by influence
or ignorance into erroneous opinions.——Litterary talents may be
prostituted, and the powers of genius debased to subserve the purposes
of ambition or avarice; but the feelings of the heart will dictate the
language of truth, and the simplicity of her accents will proclaim
the infamy of those, who betray the rights of the people, under the
specious, and popular pretence of _justice_, _consolidation_, and
_dignity_.

It is presumed the great body of the people unite in sentiment with
the writer of these observations, who most devoutly prays that public
credit may rear her declining head, and remunerative justice pervade
the land; nor is there a doubt if a free government is continued, that
time and industry will enable both the public and private debtor to
liquidate their arrearages in the most equitable manner. They wish to
see the Confederated States bound together by the most indissoluble
union, but without renouncing their separate sovereignties and
independence, and becoming tributaries to a consolidated fabrick of
aristocratick tyranny.——They wish to see government established,
and peaceably holding the reins with honour, energy, and dignity;
but they wish for no _federal city_ whose “_cloud cap’t towers_”
may screen the state culprit from the hand of justice; while its
exclusive jurisdiction may [15] protect the riot of armies encamped
within its limits.—They deprecate discord and civil convulsions, but
they are not yet generally prepared with the ungrateful Israelites
to ask a King, nor are their spirits sufficiently broken to yield
the best of their olive grounds to his servants, and to see their
sons appointed to run before his chariots.—It has been observed by
a zealous advocate for the new system, that most governments are the
result of fraud or violence, and this with design to recommend its
acceptance—but has not almost every step towards its fabrication
been fraudulent in the extreme? Did not the prohibition strictly
enjoined by the general Convention, that no member should make any
communication to his Constituents, or to gentlemen of consideration
and abilities in the other States, bear evident marks of fraudulent
designs?—This circumstance is regretted in strong terms by Mr.
Martin, a member from Maryland, who acknowledges “He had no idea that
all the wisdom, integrity, and virtue of the States was contained
in that Convention, and that he wished to have corresponded with
gentlemen of eminent political characters abroad, and to give their
sentiments due weight”—he adds, “so extremely solicitous were they,
that their proceedings should not transpire, that the members were
prohibited from taking copies of their resolutions, or extracts
from the Journals, without express permission, by vote.”——And the
hurry with which it has been urged to the acceptance of the people,
without giving time, by adjournments, for better information, and
more unanimity has a deceptive appearance; and if finally driven to
resistance, as the only alternative between that and servitude, till in
the confusion of discord, the reins should be seized by the violence
of some enterprizing genius, that may sweep down the last barrier of
liberty, it must be added to the score of criminality with which the
fraudulent usurpation at Philadelphia, may be chargeable.——Heaven
avert such a tremendous scence! and let us still hope a more happy
termination of the present ferment:—may the people be calm and wait
a legal redress; may the mad transport of some of our infatuated
capitals subside; and every influential character through the States,
make the most prudent exertions for a new general Convention, who
may vest adequate powers in Congress, for all national purposes,
without annihilating the individual governments, and drawing blood
from every pore by taxes, impositions and illegal restrictions.—This
step might [16] again re-establish the Union, restore tranquility
to the ruffled mind of the inhabitants, and save America from the
distresses, dreadful even in contemplation.——“The great art of
governing is to lay aside all prejudices and attachments to particular
opinions, classes or individual characters to consult the spirit of
the people; to give way to it; and in so doing, to give it a turn
capable of inspiring those sentiments, which may induce them to relish
a change, which an alteration of circumstances may hereafter make
necessary.”——The education of the advocates for monarchy should have
taught them, and their memory should have suggested that “monarchy
is a species of government fit only for a people too much corrupted
by luxury, avarice, and a passion for pleasure, to have any love for
their country, and whose vices the fear of punishment alone is able to
restrain; but by no means calculated for a nation that is poor, and
at the same time tenacious of their liberty—animated with a disgust
to tyranny—and inspired with the generous feeling of patriotism and
liberty, and at the same time, like the ancient Spartans have been
hardened by temperance and manly exertions, and equally despising
the fatigues of the field, and the fear of enemies,”——and while
they change their ground they should recollect, that Aristocracy is
a still more formidable foe to public virtue, and the prosperity
of a nation—that under such a government her patriots become
mercenaries—her soldiers cowards, and the people slaves.——Though
several State Conventions have assented to, and ratified, yet the voice
of the people appears at present strong against the adoption of the
Constitution.——By the chicanery, intrigue, and false colouring of
those who plume themselves, more on their education and abilities,
than their political, patriotic, or private virtues—by the imbecility
of some, and the duplicity of others, a majority of the Convention of
Massachusetts have been flattered with the ideas of amendments, when it
will be too late to complain——While several very worthy characters,
too timid for their situation, magnified the hopeless alternative,
between the dissolution of the bands of all government, and receiving
the proffered system _in toto_, after long endeavouring to reconcile
it to their consciences, swallowed the indigestible panacea, and in a
kind of sudden desperation lent their signature to the dereliction of
the honourable station they held in the Union, and have broken over the
solemn compact, by which they were bound to support their own excellent
constitution till the period [17] of revision. Yet Virginia, equally
large and respectable, and who have done honour to themselves, by
their vigorous exertions from the first dawn of independence, have not
yet acted upon the question; they have wisely taken time to consider
before they introduce innovations of a most dangerous nature:——her
inhabitants are brave, her burgesses are free, and they have a Governor
who dares to think for himself, and to speak his opinion (without first
pouring libations on the altar of popularity) though it should militate
with some of the most accomplished and illustrious characters.

Maryland, who has no local interest to lead her to adopt, will
doubtless reject the system——I hope the same characters still
live, and that the same spirit which dictated to them a wise and
cautious care, against sudden revolutions in government, and made
them the last State that acceded to the independence of America, will
lead them to support what they so deliberately claimed.——Georgia
apprehensive of a war with the Savages, has acceded in order to insure
protection.——Pennsylvania has struggled through much in the same
manner, as the Massachusetts, against the manly feelings, and the
masterly reasonings of a very respectable part of the Convention:
They have adopted the system, and seen some of its authors burnt in
effigy—their towns thrown into riot and confusion, and the minds of
the people agitated by apprehension and discord.

New-Jersey and Delaware have united in the measure, from the locality
of their situation, and the selfish motives which too generally govern
mankind; the Federal City, and the seat of government, will naturally
attract the intercourse of strangers—the youth of enterprise, and the
wealth of the nation to the central States.

Connecticut has pushed it through with the precipitation of her
neighbour, with few dissentient voices;—but more from irritation and
resentment to a sister State, perhaps partiality to herself in her
commercial regulations, than from a comprehensive view of the system,
as a regard to the welfare of all.——But New York has motives, that
will undoubtedly lead her to rejection, without being afraid to appeal
to the understanding of mankind, to justify the grounds of their
refusal to adopt a Constitution, that even the framers dare not to
risque to the hazard of revision, amendment, or reconsideration, least
the whole superstructure should be demolished by more skilful and
discreet architects.——I know not what part the Carolinas [18] will
take; but I hope their determinations will comport with the dignity and
freedom of this country—their decisions will have great weight in the
scale.——But equally important are the small States of New Hampshire
and Rhode Island:—New York, the Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, and
these two lesser States may yet support the liberties of the Continent;
if they refuse a ratification, or postpone their proceedings till the
spirits of the community have time to cool, there is little doubt but
the wise measure of another federal convention will be adopted, when
the members would have the advantage of viewing, at large, through
the medium of truth, the objections that have been made from various
quarters; such a measure might be attended with the most salutary
effects, and prevent the dread consequences of civil feuds.——But
even if some of those large states should hastily accede, yet we have
frequently seen in the story of revolution, relief spring from a
quarter least expected.

Though the virtues of a Cato could not save Rome, nor the abilities of
a Padilla defend the citizens of Castile from falling under the yoke
of Charles; yet a _Tell_ once suddenly rose from a little obscure
city, and boldly rescued the liberties of his country.——Every age
has its Bruti and its Decci, as well as its Cæsars and Sejani:—The
happiness of mankind depends much on the modes of government, and the
virtues of the governors; and America may yet produce characters who
have genius and capacity sufficient to form the manners and correct
the morals of the people, and virtue enough to lead their country to
freedom. Since their dismemberment from the British empire, America
has, in many instances, resembled the conduct of a restless, vigorous,
luxurious youth, prematurely emancipated from the authority of a
parent, but without the experience necessary to direct him to act
with dignity or discretion. Thus we have seen her break the shackles
of foreign dominion, and all the blessings of peace restored on the
most honourable terms: She acquired the liberty of framing her own
laws, choosing her own magistrates, and adopting manners and modes of
government the most favourable to the freedom and happiness of society.
But how little have we availed ourselves of these superior advantages:
The glorious fabric of liberty successfully reared with so much labor
and assiduity totters to the foundation, and may be blown away as
the bubble of fancy by the rude breath of military combinations, and
politicians of yesterday.

[19] It is true this country lately armed in opposition to regal
despotism—impoverished by the expenses of a long war, and unable
immediately to fulfil their public or private engagements that appeared
in some instances, with a boldness of spirit that seemed to set at
defiance all authority, government, or order, on the one hand; while
on the other, there has been, not only a secret wish, but an open
avowal of the necessity of drawing the reins of government much too
taught, not only for a republicanism, but for a wise and limited
monarchy.——But the character of this people is not averse to a degree
of subordination, the truth of this appears from the easy restoration
of tranquility, after a dangerous insurrection in one of the states;
this also evinces a little necessity of a complete revolution of
government throughout the union. But it is a republican principle
that the majority should rule; and if a spirit of moderation should
be cultivated on both sides, till the voice of the people at large
could be fairly heard it should be held sacred.—And if, on such a
scrutiny, the proposed constitution should appear repugnant to their
character and wishes; if they, in the language of a late elegant pen,
should acknowledge that “no confusion in my mind, is more terrible
to them than the stern disciplined regularity and vaunted police of
arbitrary governments, where every heart is depraved by fear, where
mankind dare not assume their natural characters, where the free spirit
must crouch to the slave in office, where genius must repress her
effusions, or like the Egyptian worshippers, offer them in sacrifice
to the calves in power, and where the human mind, always in shackles,
shrinks from every generous effort.” Who would then have the effrontery
to say, it ought not to be thrown out with indignation, however some
respectable names have appeared to support it.——But if after all, on
a dispassionate and fair discussion, the people generally give their
voices for a voluntary dereliction of their privileges, let every
individual who chooses the active scenes of life strive to support the
peace and unanimity of his country, though every other blessing may
expire—And while the statesman is plodding for power, and the courtier
practising the arts of dissimulation without check—while the rapacious
are growing rich by oppression, and fortune throwing her gifts into
the lap of fools, let the sublimer characters, the philosophic lovers
of freedom who have wept over her exit, retire to the calm shades of
contemplation, there they may look down with pity on the inconsistency
of human nature, the revolutions of states, the rise of kingdoms, and
the fall of empires.



# An Address to the People of the State of New-York, by a Plebeian (1788)

An / Address / to the / People / of the / State of New-York: / Showing
the necessity of making / Amendments / to the / Constitution, proposed
for the United States, / previous to its Adoption. / By a Plebeian. /
Printed in the State of New York; / M,DCC,LXXX,VIII.

  8vo., pp. 26.

  Written by Melancthon Smith of New York, a member of the Continental
  Congress, (1785-88), and of the New York State Convention, in which
  he opposed, but ultimately voted for the ratification of the new
  Constitution.

  “This address begins with several assertions that are not
  fully proved. It declares that ‘the advocates for the proposed
  constitution, having been beaten off the field of argument, on its
  merits, have taken new ground—admit that it is liable to well founded
  objections—that a number of its articles ought to be amended—that
  if alterations do not take place a door will be left open for an
  undue administration, and encroachments on the liberties of the
  people—and many of them go so far as to say, if it should continue
  for any considerable period, in its present form, it will lead to a
  subversion of our equal republican forms of government.’

  “These assertions, it is presumed are too general to be true. _Some_
  friends (upon the whole) to the proposed government, may have
  acknowledged all this; but the _most enlightened ones_ declare that,
  in their opinion, the constitution is as little defective as can ever
  be obtained—that it is _not liable to well founded objections_—that
  it will _preserve_ our equal republican forms of government; nay,
  that it is their only firm support, and the guarantee of their
  existence—and if they consent to the additions and alterations
  proposed by the Massachusetts Convention, it is not so much because
  they think the constitution will be _better_ for them; but because
  they think these additions will reconcile the opposition and unite
  all parties in a desirable harmony, without making the constitution
  _worse_.

  “The writer, to show the happy situation of the citizens of this
  State, enquires, ‘_Does not every man sit under his own vine and
  his own fig tree?_’ Yes, it may be answered, and under the rich
  vines and fig trees of his neighbors too, ‘_having none to make him
  afraid?_’ This was probably written before the late riot: And if the
  inhabitants of this State are not afraid of their neighbors, whose
  _vines and fig trees_ they are enjoying, they must be very ignorant
  or very insensible.

  “‘_Does not every one follow his own calling without impediment
  and receive the reward of his well earned industry? The farmer and
  mechanic reap the fruits of their labor. The merchant drives his
  commerce and none can deprive him of the gain he honestly acquires._’
  Had the last assertion been mere queries, the writer might have
  saved his reputation. While the _war-worn veteran_ is paid for his
  services, at a fourth or fifth of their value; while numbers of
  mechanics have no employment; while commerce is restricted abroad,
  and tender laws and depreciated paper money exist at home, the public
  will not be disposed to believe themselves very happy—no, not even in
  this State. In other States, where riots and rebellion have violated
  private property, disturbed government and end in bloodshed, the
  inhabitants will be more incredulous, and wish for the adoption of
  the proposed constitution.”—[Noah Webster] in _American Magazine_ for
  April, 1788.

  P. L. F.


_Friends and Fellow Citizens_,

The advocates for the proposed new constitution, having been beaten off
the field of argument, on its merits, have now taken new ground. They
admit it is liable to well-founded objections—that a number of its
articles ought to be amended; that if alterations do not take place, a
door will be left open for an undue administration, and encroachments
on the liberties of the people; and many of them go so far as to say,
if it should continue for any considerable period, in its present
form, it will lead to a subversion of our equal republican forms of
government.——But still, although they admit this, they urge that
it ought to be adopted, and that we should confide in procuring the
necessary alterations after we have received it. Most of the leading
characters, who advocate its reception, now profess their readiness
to concur with those who oppose, in bringing about the most material
amendments contended for, provided they will first agree to accept the
proffered system as it is. These concessions afford strong evidence,
that the opposers of the constitution have reason on their side, and
that they have not been influenced, in the part they have taken,
by the mean and unworthy motives of selfish and private interests
with which they have been illiberally charged.—As the favourers of
the constitution seem, if their professions are sincere, to be in a
situation similar to that of Agrippa, when he cried out upon Paul’s
preaching—“almost thou persuadest me to be a christian,” I cannot
help indulging myself in expressing the same wish which St. Paul
uttered on that occasion, “Would to God you were not only almost,
but altogether such an one as I am.” But alas, as we hear no more of
Agrippa’s christianity after this interview with Paul, so it is much
to [4] be feared, that we shall hear nothing of amendments from most
of the warm advocates for adopting the new government, after it gets
into operation. When the government is once organized, and all the
offices under it filled, the inducements which our great men will
have to support it, will be much stronger than they are now to urge
its reception. Many of them will then hold places of great honour and
emolument, and others will then be candidates for such places. It is
much harder to relinquish honours or emoluments, which we have in
possession, than to abandon the pursuit of them, while the attainment
is held in a state of uncertainty.—The amendments contended for as
necessary to be made, are of such a nature, as will tend to limit and
abridge a number of the powers of the government. And is it probable,
that those who enjoy these powers will be so likely to surrender
them after they have them in possession, as to consent to have them
restricted in the act of granting them? Common sense says—they will
not.

When we consider the nature and operation of government, the idea of
receiving a form radically defective, under the notion of making the
necessary amendments, is evidently absurd.

Government is a compact entered into by mankind, in a state of society,
for the promotion of their happiness. In forming this compact, common
sense dictates, that no articles should be admitted that tend to defeat
the end of its institution. If any such are proposed, they should be
rejected. When the compact is once formed and put into operation,
it is too late for individuals to object. The deed is executed—the
conveyance is made—and the power of reassuming the right is gone,
without the consent of the parties.——Besides, when a government is
once in operation, it acquires strength by habit, and stability by
exercise. If it is tolerably mild in its administration, the people sit
down easy under it, be its principles and forms ever so repugnant to
the maxims of liberty.——It steals, by insensible degrees, one right
from the people after another, until it rivets its powers so as to put
it beyond the ability of the community to restrict or limit it. The
history of the world furnishes many instances of a people’s increasing
the powers of their rulers by persuasion, but I believe it would be
difficult to produce one in which the rulers have been persuaded to
relinquish their powers to [5] the people. Wherever this has taken
place, it has always been the effect of compulsion. These observations
are so well-founded, that they are become a kind of axioms in politics;
and the inference to be drawn from them is equally evident, which is
this,—that, in forming a government, care should be taken not to
confer powers which it will be necessary to take back; but if you err
at all, let it be on the contrary side, because it is much easier, as
well as safer, to enlarge the powers of your rulers, if they should
prove not sufficiently extensive, than it is too abridge them if they
should be too great.

It is agreed, the plan is defective—that some of the powers granted,
are dangerous—others not well defined—and amendments are necessary.
Why then not amend it? why not remove the cause of danger, and, if
possible, even the apprehension of it? The instrument is yet in the
hands of the people; it is not signed, sealed, and delivered, and they
have power to give it any form they please.

But it is contended, adopt it first, and then amend it. I ask, why not
amend, and then adopt it? Most certainly the latter mode of proceeding
is more consistent with our ideas of prudence in the ordinary concerns
of life. If men were about entering into a contract respecting their
private concerns, it would be highly absurd in them to sign and seal
an instrument containing stipulations which are contrary to their
interests and wishes, under the expectation, that the parties, after
its execution, would agree to make alterations agreeable to their
desire.——They would insist upon the exceptionable clauses being
altered before they would ratify the contract. And is a compact for
the government of ourselves and our posterity of less moment than
contracts between individuals? certainly not. But to this reasoning,
which at first view would appear to admit of no reply, a variety of
objections are made, and a number of reasons urged for adopting the
system, and afterwards proposing amendments.—Such as have come under
my observation, I shall state, and remark upon.

I. It is insisted, that the present situation of our country is such,
as not to admit of a delay in forming a new government, or of time
sufficient to deliberate and agree upon the amendments which are
proper, without involving ourselves in a state of anarchy and confusion.

[6] On this head, all the powers of rhetoric, and arts of description,
are employed to paint the condition of this country, in the most
hideous and frightful colors. We are told, that agriculture is
without encouragement; trade is languishing; private faith and credit
are disregarded, and public credit is prostrate; that the laws
and magistrates are contemned and set at naught; that a spirit of
licentiousness is rampant, and ready to break over every bound set
to it by the government; that private embarrassments and distresses
invade the house of every man of middling property, and insecurity
threatens every man in affluent circumstances: in short, that we are
in a state of the most grievous calamity at home, and that we are
contemptible abroad, the scorn of foreign nations, and the ridicule
of the world. From this high-wrought picture, one would suppose that
we were in a condition the most deplorable of any people upon earth.
But suffer me, my countrymen, to call your attention to a serious
and sober estimate of the situation in which you are placed, while I
trace the embarrassments under which you labor, to their true sources.
What is your condition? Does not every man sit under his own vine and
under his own fig-tree, having none to make him afraid? Does not every
one follow his calling without impediments and receive the reward of
his well-earned industry? The farmer cultivates his land, and reaps
the fruit which the bounty of heaven bestows on his honest toil. The
mechanic is exercised in his art, and receives the reward of his
labour. The merchant drives his commerce, and none can deprive him of
the gain he honestly acquires; all classes and callings of men amongst
us are protected in their various pursuits, and secured by the laws
in the possession and enjoyment of the property obtained in those
pursuits. The laws are as well executed as they ever were, in this or
any other country. Neither the hand of private violence, nor the more
to be dreaded hand of legal oppression, are reached out to distress us.

It is true, many individuals labour under embarrassments, but these are
to be imputed to the unavoidable circumstances of things, rather than
to any defect in our governments. We have just emerged from a long and
expensive war. During its existence few people were in a situation to
increase their fortunes, but many to diminish them. Debts contracted
before the war were left unpaid [7] while it existed, and these were
left a burden too heavy to be borne at the commencement of peace.
Add to these, that when the war was over, too many of us, instead of
reassuming our old habits of frugality, and industry, by which alone
every country must be placed in a prosperous condition, took up the
profuse use of foreign commodities. The country was deluged with
articles imported from abroad, and the cash of the country has been
sent to pay for them, and still left us labouring under the weight of a
huge debt to persons abroad. These are the true sources to which we are
to trace all the private difficulties of individuals: But will a new
government relieve you from these? The advocates for it have not yet
told you how it will do it—And I will venture to pronounce, that there
is but one way in which it can be effected, and that is by industry and
economy; limit your expences within your earnings; sell more than you
buy, and everything will be well on this score. Your present condition
is such as is common to take place after the conclusion of a war.
Those who can remember our situation after the termination of the war
preceding the last, will recollect that our condition was similar to
the present, but time and industry soon recovered us from it. Money was
scare, the produce of the country much lower than it has been since the
peace, and many individuals were extremely embarrassed with debts; and
this happened although we did not experience the ravages, desolations,
and loss of property, that were suffered during the late war.

With regard to our public and national concerns, what is there in our
condition that threatens us with any immediate danger? We are at peace
with all the world; no nation menaces us with war; nor are we called
upon by any cause of sufficient importance to attack any nation. The
state governments answer the purposes of preserving the peace, and
providing for present exigencies. Our condition as a nation is in no
respect worse than it has been for several years past. Our public debt
has been lessened in various ways, and the western territory, which has
been relied upon as a productive fund to discharge the national debt
has at length been brought to market, and a considerable part actually
applied to its reduction. I mention these things to shew, that there is
nothing special, in our present situation, as it respects our national
affairs, that should induce us to accept the prof- [8] fered system,
without taking sufficient time to consider and amend it. I do not mean
by this, to insinuate, that our government does not stand in need of a
reform. It is admitted by all parties, that alterations are necessary
in our federal constitution, but the circumstances of our case do by
no means oblige us to precipitate this business, or require that we
should adopt a system materially defective. We may safely take time to
deliberate and amend, without in the meantime hazarding a condition, in
any considerable degree, worse than the present.

But it is said that if we postpone the ratification of this system
until the necessary amendments are first incorporated, the consequence
will be a civil war among the states. On this head weak minds
are alarmed with being told, that the militia of Connecticut and
Massachusetts, on the one side, and of New Jersey and Pennsylvania on
the other, will attack us with hostile fury; and either destroy us from
the face of the earth, or at best divide us between the two states
adjoining on either side. The apprehension of danger is one of the
most powerful incentives to human action, and is therefore generally
excited on political questions: But still, a prudent man, though he
foreseeth the evil and avoideth it, yet he will not be terrified by
imaginary dangers. We ought therefore to enquire what ground there is
to fear such an event?—There can be no reason to apprehend, that the
other states will make war with us for not receiving the constitution
proposed, until it is amended, but from one of the following causes:
either that they will have just cause to do it, or that they have a
disposition to do it. We will examine each of these:—That they will
have no just cause to quarrel with us for not acceding, is evident,
because we are under no obligation to do it, arising from any existing
compact or previous stipulation. The confederation is the only compact
now existing between the states: By the terms of it, it cannot be
changed without the consent of every one of the parties to it. Nothing
therefore can be more unreasonable than for part of the states to claim
of the others, as matter of right, an accession to a system to which
they have material objections. No war can therefore arise from this
principle, but on the contrary, it is to be presumed, it will operate
strongly the opposite way.—The states will reason on the subject in
the following manner: On this momentous question, every state has an
in- [9] dubitable right to judge for itself: This is secured to it by
solemn compact, and if any of our sister states disagree with us upon
the question, we ought to attend to their objections, and accommodate
ourselves as far as possible to the amendments they propose.

As to the inclination of the states to make war with us, for declining
to accede, until it is amended, this is highly improbable, not only
because such a procedure would be most unjust and unreasonable in
itself, but for various other reasons.

The idea of a civil war among the states is abhorrent to the principles
and feelings of almost every man of every rank in the union. It is so
obvious to every one of the least reflection, that in such an event
we should hazard the loss of all things, without the hope of gaining
anything, that the man who should entertain a thought of this kind,
would be justly deemed more fit to be shut up in Bedlam, than to be
reasoned with. But the idea of one or more states attacking another,
for insisting upon alterations upon the system, before it is adopted,
is more extravagent still; it is contradicting every principle of
liberty which has been entertained by the states, violating the most
solemn compact, and taking from the state the right of deliberation.
Indeed to suppose, that a people, entertaining such refined ideas
of the rights of human nature as to be induced to wage war with the
most powerful nation on earth, upon a speculative point, and from the
mere apprehension of danger only, should be so far lost to their
own feelings and principles as to deny to their brethren, who were
associated with them in the arduous conflict, the right of deliberation
on a question of the first importance to their political happiness and
safety, is equally an insult to the character of the people of America,
and to common sense, and could only be suggested by a vicious heart and
a corrupt mind.

The idea of being attacked by the other states, will appear visionary
and chimerical, if we consider that tho’ several of them have adopted
the new constitution, yet the opposition to it has been numerous and
formidable. The eastern states from whom we are told we have most
to fear, should a civil war be blown up, would have full employ to
keep in awe those who are opposed to it in their own governments.
Massachusetts, after a long and dubious contest [10] in their
convention, has adopted it by an inconsiderable majority, and in the
very act has marked it with a stigma in its present form. No man of
candour, judging from their public proceedings, will undertake to say
on which side the majority of the people are. Connecticut, it is true,
have acceded to it, by a large majority of their convention; but it
is a fact well known, that a large proportion of the yeomanry of the
country are against it:—And it is equally true, that a considerable
part of those who voted for it in the convention, wish to see it
altered. In both these states the body of the common people, who always
do the fighting of a country, would be more likely to fight against
than for it: Can it then be presumed, that a country divided among
themselves, upon a question where even the advocates for it, admit the
system they contend for needs amendments, would make war upon a sister
state, who only insist that that should be done before they receive it,
which it is granted ought to be done after, and where it is confessed
no obligation lies upon them by compact to do it. Can it, I say, be
imagined, that in such a case, they would make war on a sister state?
The idea is preposterous and chimerical.

It is further urged we must adopt this plan because we have no chance
of getting a better. This idea is inconsistent with the principles of
those who advance it. They say, it must be altered, but it should
be left until after it is put in operation. But if this objection is
valid, the proposal of altering, after it is received, is mere delusion.

It is granted, that amendments ought to be made; that the exceptions
taken to the constitution, are grounded on just principles, but it
is still insisted, that alterations are not to be attempted until
after it is received: But why not? Because it is said, there is no
probability of agreeing in amendments previous to the adoption, but
they may be easily made after it. I wish to be informed what there is
in our situation or circumstances that renders it more probable that
we shall agree in amendments better after, than before submitting to
it? No good reason has as yet been given; it is evident none can be
given: On the contrary, there are several considerations which induce
a belief, that alterations may be obtained with more ease before than
after its reception, and if so, every one must agree [11] it is much
the safest. The importance of preserving an union, and of establishing
a government equal to the purpose of maintaining that union, is a
sentiment deeply impressed on the mind of every citizen of America.
It is now no longer doubted, that the confederation, in its present
form, is inadequate to that end: Some reform in our government must
take place: In this, all parties agree: It is therefore to be presumed,
that this object will be pursued with ardour and perseverance, until
it is attained by all parties. But when a government is adopted that
promises to effect this, we are to expect the ardour of many, yea,
of most people, will be abated;—their exertions will cease or be
languid, and they will sit down easy, although they may see that the
constitution which provides for this, does not sufficiently guard the
rights of the people, or secure them against the encroachments of their
rulers. The great end they had in view, the security of the union, they
will consider effected, and this will divert their attention from that
which is equally interesting, safety to their liberties. Besides, the
human mind cannot continue intensely engaged for any great length of
time upon one object. As after a storm, a calm generally succeeds, so
after the minds of a people have been ardently employed upon a subject,
especially upon that of government, we commonly find that they become
cool and inattentive: Add to this that those in the community who urge
the adoption of this system, because they hope to be raised above the
common level of their fellow citizens; because they expect to be among
the number of the few who will be benefitted by it, will more easily
be induced to consent to the amendments before it is received than
afterwards. Before its reception they will be inclined to be pliant and
condescending; if they cannot obtain all they wish, they will consent
to take less. They will yield part to obtain the rest. But when the
plan is once agreed to, they will be tenacious of every power, they
will strenuously contend to retain all they have got; this is natural
to human nature, and it is consonant to the experience of mankind.
For history affords us no examples of persons once possessed of power
resigning it willingly.

The reasonings made use of to persuade us, that no alterations can be
agreed upon previous to the adoption of the system, are as curious as
they are futile. It is alledged [12], that there was great diversity of
sentiments in forming the proposed constitution; that it was the effect
of mutual concessions and a spirit of accommodation, and from hence it
is inferred, that farther changes cannot be hoped for. I should suppose
that the contrary inference was the fair one. If the convention,
who framed this plan, were possessed of such a spirit of moderation
and condescension, as to be induced to yield to each other certain
points, and to accommodate themselves to each other’s opinions, and
even prejudices, there is reason to expect, that this same spirit will
continue and prevail in a future convention, and produce an union of
sentiments on the points objected to. There is more reason to hope for
this, because the subject has received a full discussion, and the minds
of the people much better known than they were when the convention sat.
Previous to the meeting of the convention, the subject of a new form
of government had been little thought of, and scarcely written upon at
all. It is true, it was the general opinion, that some alterations were
requisite in the federal system. This subject had been contemplated by
almost every thinking man in the union. It had been the subject of many
well-written essays, and it was the anxious wish of every true friend
to America. But it was never in the contemplation of one in a thousand
of those who had reflected on the matter, to have an entire change in
the nature of our federal government—to alter it from a confederation
of states, to that of one entire government, which will swallow up that
of the individual states. I will venture to say, that the idea of a
government similar to the one proposed, never entered the minds of the
legislatures who appointed the convention, and of but very few of the
members who composed it, until they had assembled and heard it proposed
in that body: much less had the people any conception of such a plan
until after it was promulgated. While it was agitated, the debates of
the convention were kept an impenetrable secret, and no opportunity
was given for well informed men to offer their sentiments upon the
subject. The system was therefore never publicly discussed, nor indeed
could be, because it was not known to the people until after it was
proposed. Since that, it has been the object of universal attention—it
has been thought of by every reflecting man—been discussed in a
public and private manner, in conversation and in print; [13] its
defects have been pointed out, and every objection to it stated; able
advocates have written in its favour, and able opponents have written
against it. And what is the result? It cannot be denied but that the
general opinion is, that it contains material errors, and requires
important amendments. This then being the general sentiment, both of
the friends and foes of the system, can it be doubted, that another
convention would concur in such amendments as would quiet the fears of
the opposers, and effect a great degree of union on the subject?—An
event most devoutly to be wished. But it is farther said, that there
can be no prospect of procuring alterations before it is acceded to,
because those who oppose it do not agree among themselves with respect
to the amendments that are necessary. To this I reply, that this may
be urged against attempting alterations after it is received, with as
much force as before; and therefore, if it concludes anything, it is
that we must receive any system of government proposed to us, because
those who object to it do not entirely concur in their objections.
But the assertion is not true to any considerable extent. There is
a remarkable uniformity in the objections made to the constitution,
on the most important points. It is also worthy of notice, that very
few of the matters found fault with in it, are of a local nature, or
such as affect any particular state; on the contrary, they are such as
concern the principles of general liberty, in which the people of New
Hampshire, New York and Georgia are equally interested.

It would be easy to shew, that in the leading and most important
objections that have been made to the plan, there has been and is an
entire concurrence of opinion among writers, and in public bodies
throughout the United States.

I have not time to fully illustrate this by a minute narration of
particulars; but to prove that this is the case, I shall adduce a
number of important instances.

It has been objected to that the new system, that it is calculated to,
and will effect such a consolidation of the States, as to supplant and
overturn the state governments. In this the minority of Pennsylvania,
the opposition in Massachusetts, and all the writers of any ability or
note in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston concur. It may be added,
that this appears to have been the opinion of the Massachusetts
convention, and gave rise to that article in [14] the amendments
proposed, which confines the general government to the exercise only of
powers expressly given.

It has been said that the representation in the general legislature
is too small to secure liberty, or to answer the intention of
representation. In this there is an union of sentiments in the opposers.

The constitution has been opposed, because it gives to the legislature
an unlimited power of taxation both with respect to direct and indirect
taxes, a right to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises of
every kind and description, and to any amount. In this there has been
as general a concurrence of opinion as in the former.

The opposers to the constitution have said that it is dangerous,
because the judicial power may extend to many cases which ought to be
reserved to the decision of the State courts, and because the right
of trial by jury is not secured in the judicial courts of the general
government, in civil cases. All the opposers are agreed in this
objection.

The power of the general legislature to alter and regulate the time,
place and manner of holding elections, has been stated as an argument
against the adoption of the system. It has been argued that this power
will place in the hands of the general government, the authority,
whenever they shall be disposed, and a favorable opportunity offers,
to deprive the body of the people in effect, of all share in the
government. The opposers to the constitution universally agree in this
objection, and of such force is it, that most of its ardent advocates
admit its validity, and those who have made attempts to vindicate it,
have been reduced to the necessity of using the most trifling arguments
to justify it.

The mixture of legislative, judicial, and executive powers in the
senate; the little degree of responsibility under which the great
officers of government will be held; and the liberty granted by the
system to establish and maintain a standing army without any limitation
or restriction, are also objected to the constitution; and in these
there is a great degree of unanimity of sentiment in the opposers.

From these remarks it appears, that the opponents to the system accord
in the great and material points on which they wish amendments. For the
truth of the assertion [15], I appeal to the protest of the minority
of the convention of Pennsylvania, to all the publications against the
constitution, and to the debates of the convention of Massachusetts. As
a higher authority than these, I appeal to the amendments proposed by
the Massachusetts; these are to be considered as the sense of that body
upon the defects of the system. And it is a fact, which I will venture
to assert, that a large majority of the convention were of opinion,
that a number of additional alterations ought to be made. Upon reading
the articles which they propose as amendments, it will appear that
they object to indefinite powers in the legislature—to the power of
laying direct taxes—to the authority of regulating elections—to the
extent of the judicial powers, both as it respects the inferior court
and the appellate jurisdiction—to the smallness of the representation,
&c.—It is admitted that some writers have advanced objections that
others have not noticed—that exceptions have been taken by some, that
have not been insisted upon by others, and it is probable, that some
of the opponents may approve what others will reject. But still these
difference are on matters of small importance, and of such a nature
as the persons who hold different opinions will not be tenacious of.
Perfect uniformity of sentiment on so great a political subject is not
to be expected. Every sensible man is impressed with this idea, and is
therefore prepared to make concessions and accommodate on matters of
small importance. It is sufficient that we agree in the great leading
principles, which relate to the preservation of public liberty and
private security. And on these I will venture to affirm we are as well
agreed, as any people ever were on a question of this nature. I dare
pronounce that were the principal advocates for the proposed plan to
write comments upon it, they would differ more in the sense they would
give the constitution, than those who oppose it do, in the amendments
they would wish. I am justified in this opinion, by the sentiments
advanced by the different writers in favour of the constitution.

It is farther insisted, that six states have already adopted the
constitution; that probably nine will agree to it; in which case it
will be put in operation. That it is unreasonable to expect that those
states which have acceded [16] to it will reconsider the subject in
compliance with the wishes of a minority.

To perceive the force of this objection it is proper to review the
conduct and circumstances of the states which have acceded it. It
cannot be controverted, that Connecticut and New Jersey were very
much influenced in their determinations on the questions, by local
considerations. The duty of impost laid by this state, has been a
subject of complaint by those states. The new constitution transfers
the power of imposing these duties from the state to the general
government, and carries the proceeds to the use of the union, instead
of that of those state. This is a popular matter with the people of
those states, and at the same time, is not advanced by the sensible
opposers to the system in this state as an objection to it.—To excite
in the minds of the people of these states an attachment to the new
system, the amount of the revenue arising from our impost has been
magnified to a much larger sum than it produces; it has been stated
to amount to from sixty to eighty thousand pounds lawful money; and a
gentleman of high eminence in Connecticut has lent the authority of his
name to support it. It has been said, that Connecticut pays a third of
this sum annually for impost, and Jersey nearly as much. It has farther
been asserted, that the avails of the impost were applied to the
separate use of the state of New York. By these assertions the people
have been grossly imposed upon, for neither of them are true.

The amount of the revenue from impost for two years past, has
not exceeded fifty thousands pounds currency, per annum, and a
drawback of duties is allowed by law, upon all goods exported to the
beforementioned states, in casks or packages unbroken.

The whole of this sum, and more, has been paid into the federal
treasury for the support of the government of the union. All the states
therefore have actually derived equal benefit with the state of New
York, from the impost. It may be said, I know, that this state has
obtained credit for the amount, upon the requisitions of Congress: It
is admitted, but still it is a fact, that other states, and especially
those who complain, have paid no part of the monies required of them,
and have scarcely made an effort to do it. The fact therefore is, that
they have received [17] as much advantage from the impost of this state
as we ourselves have. The proposed constitution directs to no mode,
in which the deficiencies of states on former requisitions, are to be
collected, but seems to hold out the idea, that we are to start out
anew, and all past payments be forgotten. It is natural to expect, that
selfish motives will have too powerful an influence on men’s minds,
and that too often, they will shut the eyes of a people to their best
and true interest. The people of those states have been persuaded to
believe, that this new constitution will relieve them from the burden
of taxes, by providing for all the exigencies of the union, by duties
which can be raised only in the neighbouring states. When they come to
be convinced, that this promise is a mere delusion, as they assuredly
will, by finding the continental tax-gatherer knocking at their doors,
if not before, they will be among the first to urge amendments, and
perhaps the most violent to obtain them. But notwithstanding the
local prejudices which operate upon the people of these states, a
considerable part of them wish for amendments. It is not to be doubted
that a considerable majority of the people of Connecticut wish for
them, and many in Jersey have the same desires, and their numbers are
increasing. It cannot be disputed, that amendments would accord with
the sentiments of a great majority in Massachusetts, or that they
would be agreeable to the greater part of the people of Pennsylvania:
There is no reason to doubt but that they would be agreeable to
Delaware and Georgia—If then, the states who have already ratified the
constitution, are desirous to have alterations made in it, what reason
can be assigned why they should not cordially meet with overtures for
that purpose from any state, and concur in appointing a convention to
effect it? Mankind are easily induced to fall into measures to obtain
an object agreeable to them. In this case, the states would not only
be moved by this universal principle of human nature, but by the
strong and powerful motive of uniting all the states under a form of
government agreeable to them.

I shall now dismiss the consideration of objections made to attempting
alterations previous to the adoption of the plan, but before I close,
I beg your indulgence, while I make some remarks on the splendid
advantages which the advocates of this system say are to be derived
from it.—Hope and fear are two of the most active principles of [18]
our nature: We have considered how the latter is addressed on this
occasion, and with how little reason: It will appear that the promises
it makes, are as little to be relied upon as its threatenings. We are
amused with the fair prospects that are to open, when this government
is put into operation—Agriculture is to flourish, and our fields to
yield an hundred fold—Commerce is to expand her wings, and bear our
productions to all the ports in the world—Money is to pour into our
country through every channel—Arts and manufactures are to rear their
heads, and every mecanic find full employ—Those who are in debt, are
to find easy means to procure money to pay them—Public burdens and
taxes are to be lightened, and yet all our public debts are soon to
be discharged.—With such vain and delusive hopes are the minds of
many honest and well meaning people fed, and by these means are they
led inconsiderately to contend for a government, which is made to
promise what it cannot perform; while their minds are diverted from
contemplating its true nature, or considering whether is will not
endanger their liberties, and work oppression.

Far be it from me to object to granting the general government the
power of regulating trade, and of laying imposts and duties for that
purpose, as well as for raising a revenue: But it is as far from me
to flatter people with hopes of benefits to be derived from such a
change in our government which can never be realized. Some advantages
may accrue from vesting in one general government, the right to
regulate commerce, but it is a vain delusion to expect anything like
what is promised. The truth is, this country buys more than it sells:
It imports more than it exports. There are too many merchants in
proportion to the farmers and manufacturers. Until these defects are
remedied, no government can relieve us. Common sense dictates, that
if a man buys more than he sells, he will remain in debt; the same is
true of a country.—And as long as this country imports more goods than
the exports——the overplus must be paid for in money or not paid at
all. These few remarks may convince us, that the radical remedy for the
scarcity of cash is frugality and industry. Earn much and spend little,
and you will be enabled to pay your debts, and have money in your
pockets; and if you do not follow [19] this advice, no government that
can be framed, will relieve you.

As to the idea of being relieved from taxes by this government, it
is an affront to common sense, to advance it. There is no complaint
made against the present confederation more justly founded than this,
that it is incompetent to provide the means to discharge our national
debt, and to support the national government. Its inefficacy to these
purposes, which was early seen and felt, was the first thing that
suggested the necessity of changing the government; other things,
it is true, were afterwards found to require alterations; but this
was the most important, and accordingly we find, that while in some
other things the powers of this government seem to be in some measure
limited, on the subject of raising money, no bounds are set to it.
It is authorised to raise money to any amount, and in any way it
pleases. If then, the capital embarrassment in our present government
arises from the want of money, and this constitution effectually
authorises the raising of it, how are the taxes to be lessened by it?
Certainly money can only be raised by taxes of some kind or other;
it must be got either by additional impositions on trade, by excise,
or by direct taxes, or what is more probable, by all together. In
either way, it amounts to the same thing, and the position is clear,
that as the necessities of the nation require more money than is
now raised, the taxes must be enhanced. This you ought to know, and
prepare yourselves to submit to.—Besides, how is it possible that the
taxes can be decreased when the expences of your government will be
greatly advanced? It does not require any great skill in politics, or
ability at calculation to shew, that the new government will cost more
money to administer it, than the present. I shall not descend to an
estimate of the cost of a federal town, the salaries of the president,
vice-president, judges, and other great officers of state, nor
calculate the amount of the pay the legislature will vote themselves,
or the salaries that will be paid the innumerable and subordinate
officers. The bare mention of these things is sufficient to convince
you, that the new government will be vastly more expensive than the
old: And how is the money to answer these purposes to be obtained?
It is obvious, it must be taken out of the pockets of the people, by
taxes, in some mode or other.

[20] Having remarked upon the arguments which have been advanced, to
induce you to accede to this government, without amendments, and I
trust refuted them, suffer me to close with an address dedicated by the
affection of a brother, and the honest zeal of a lover of his country.


  _Friends, countrymen, and fellow-citizens_,

The present is the most important crisis at which you ever have
arrived. You have before you a question big with consequences,
unutterably important to yourselves, to your children, to generations
yet unborn, to the cause of liberty and of mankind; every motive of
religion and virtue, of private happiness and public good, of honour
and dignity, should urge you to consider cooly and determine wisely.

Almost all the governments that have arisen among mankind, have
sprung from force and violence. The records of history inform us of
none that have been the result of cool and dispassionate reason and
reflection: It is reserved for this favoured country to exhibit to
mankind the first example.——This opportunity is now given us, and we
are to exercise our rights in the choice of persons to represent us in
convention, to deliberate and determine upon the constitution proposed:
It will be to our everlasting disgrace to be indifferent on such a
subject; for it is impossible, we can contemplate anything that relates
to the affairs of this life of half the importance.

You have heard that both sides on this great question, agree, that
there are in it great defects; yet the one side tell you, choose such
men as will adopt it, and then amend it——while the other say, amend
previous to its adoption.——I have stated to you my reasons for the
latter, and I think they are unanswerable.—Consider you the common
people the yeomanry of the country, for to such I principally address
myself, you are to be the principal losers, if the constitution should
prove oppressive; When a tyranny is established, there are always
masters as well as slaves; the great and well-born are generally the
former, and the middling class the latter—Attempts have been made,
and will be repeated, to alarm you with the fear of consequences;
but reflect there are consequences on both sides, and none can be
apprehended more dreadful, than entailing on ourselves and posterity
[21] a government which will raise a few to the height of human
greatness and wealth, while it will depress the many to the extreme of
poverty and wretchedness. Consequences are under the controul of that
all-wise and all-powerful being, whose providence conducts the affairs
of all men: Our part is to act right, and we may then have confidence
that the consequences will be favourable. The path in which you should
walk is plain and open before you; be united as one man, and direct
your choice to such men as have been uniform in their opposition to the
proposed system in its present form, or without proper alterations:
In men of this description you have reason to place confidence, while
on the other hand, you have just cause to distrust those who urge
the adoption of a bad constitution, under the delusive expectation
of making amendments after it is acceded to. Your jealousy of such
characters should be the more excited, when you consider that the
advocates for the constitution have shifted their ground. When men are
uniform in their opinions, it affords evidence that they are sincere:
When they are shifting, it gives reason to believe, they do not change
from conviction. It must be recollected, that when this plan was first
announced to the public, its supporters cried it up as the most perfect
production of human wisdom; It was represented either as having no
defects, or if it had, they were so trifling and inconsiderable, that
they served only, as the shades in a fine picture, to set off the
piece to the greater advantage. One gentleman in Philadelphia went so
far in the ardour of his enthusiasm in its favour, as to pronounce,
that the men who formed it were as really under the guidance of Divine
Revelation, as was Moses, the Jewish lawgiver. Their language is now
changed; the question has been discussed; the objections to the plan
ably stated, and they are admitted to be unanswerable. The same men
who held it almost perfect, now admit it is very imperfect; that it is
necessary it should be amended. The only question between us, is simply
this: Shall we accede to a bad constitution, under the uncertain
prospect of getting it amended, after we have received it, or shall we
amend it before we adopt it? Common sense will point out which is the
most rational, which is the most secure line of conduct. May heaven
inspire you with wisdom, union, moderation and firmness [22], and give
you hearts to make a proper estimate of your invaluable privileges, and
preserve them to you, to be transmitted to your posterity unimpaired,
and may they be maintained in this our country, while Sun and Moon
endure.

 A PLEBEIAN.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the foregoing pages have been put to the press, a pamphlet has
appeared, entitled, “An address to the people of the state of New York,
on the subject of the new constitution, &c.” Upon a cursory examination
of this performance (for I have not had time to give it more than a
cursory examination) it appears to contain little more than declamation
and observations that have been often repeated by the advocates of the
new constitution.

An attentive reader will readily perceive, that almost everything
deserving the name of an argument in this publication, has received
consideration, and, I trust, a satisfactory answer in the preceding
remarks, so far as they apply to prove the necessity of an immediate
adoption of the plan, without amendments.

I shall therefore only beg the patience of my readers, while I make a
few very brief remarks on this piece.

The author introduces his observations with a short history of the
revolution, and of the establishment of the present existing federal
government. He draws a frightful picture of our condition under the
present confederation. The whole of what he says on that head, stripped
of its artificial colouring, amounts to this, that the existing system
is rather commendatory than coercive, or that Congress have not in most
cases, the power of enforcing their own resolves. This he calls “a new
and wonderful system.” However “wonderful” it may seem, it certainly
is not “new.” For most of the _federal governments_ that have been in
the world, have been of the same nature.——The united Netherlands
are governed on the same plan. There are other governments also now
existing, which are in a similar condition with our’s, with regard to
several particulars, on account of which this author denominates it
“new and wonderful.”——The king of Great Britain “may make war, but
has not power to raise money to carry it on.” He may borrow money, but
it is without the means of repayment, &c. For these he is dependent on
his parliament. But it is needless to add on [24] this head, because
it is admitted that the powers of the general government ought to be
increased in several of the particulars this author instances. But
these things are mentioned to shew, that the outcry made against the
confederation, as being a system new, unheard of, and absurd, is really
without foundation.

The author proceeds to depicture our present condition in the
high-wrought strains common to his party.——I shall add nothing to
what I have said on this subject in the former part of this pamphlet,
but will only observe, that his imputing our being kept out of the
possession of the western posts, and our want of peace with the
Algerines, to the defects in our present government, is much easier
said than proved. The British keep possession of these posts, because
it subserves their interest, and probably will do so, until they
perceive that we have gathered strength and resources sufficient
to assert our rights with the sword. Let our government be what it
will, this cannot be done without time and patience. In the present
exhausted situation of the country, it would be madness in us, had we
ever so perfect a government, to commence a war for the recovery of
these posts.——With regard to the Algerines, there are but two ways
in which their ravages can be prevented. The one is, by a successful
war against them, and the other is by treaty. The powers of Congress
under the confederation are completely competent either to declare war
against them, or to form treaties. Money, it is true, is necessary to
do both these. This only brings us to this conclusion, that the great
defect in our present government, is the want of powers to provide
money for the public exigencies. I am willing to grant _reasonable_
powers, on this score, but not unlimited ones; commercial treaties may
be made under the present powers of Congress. I am persuaded we flatter
ourselves with advantages which will result from them, that will never
be realized. I know of no benefits that we receive from any that have
yet been formed.

This author tells us, “it is not his design to investigate merits of
the plan, nor of the objections made to it.” It is well he did not
undertake it, for if he had, from the specimen he has given, the cause
he assumes would not have probably gained much strength by it.

He however takes notice of two or three of the many objections brought
against the plan.

“We are told, (says he) among other strange things, that the liberty
of the press is left insecure by the proposed constitution, and yet
that constitution says neither more nor less [25] about it, than the
constitution of the state of New York does. We are told it deprives us
of trial by jury, whereas the fact is, that it expressly secures it in
certain cases, and takes it away in none, &c. it is absurd to construe
the silence of this, or of our own constitution relative to a great
number of our rights into a total extinction of them; silence and a
blank paper neither grant nor take away anything.”

It may be a strange thing to this author to hear the people of America
anxious for the preservation of their rights, but those who understand
the true principles of liberty, are no strangers to their importance.
The man who supposes the constitution, in any part of it, is like a
blank piece of paper, has very erroneous ideas of it. He may be assured
every clause has a meaning, and many of them such extensive meaning,
as would take a volume to unfold. The suggestion, that the liberty of
the press is secure, because it is not in express words spoken of in
the constitution, and that the trial by jury is not taken away, because
it is not said in so many words and letters it is so, is puerile and
unworthy of a man who pretends to reason. We contend, that by the
indefinite powers granted to the general government, the liberty of the
press may be restricted by duties, &c. and therefore the constitution
ought to have stipulated for its freedom. The trial by jury, in all
civil cases is left at the discretion of the general government, except
in the supreme court on the appelate jurisdiction, and in this I affirm
it is taken away, not by express words, but by fair and legitimate
construction and inference; for the supreme court have expressly given
them an appelate jurisdiction, in every case to which their powers
extend (with two or three exceptions) both as to _law and fact_. The
court are the judges; every man in the country, who has served as a
juror, knows, that there is a difference between the court and the
jury, and that the lawyers in their pleading, make the distinction. If
the court, upon appeals, are to determine both the law and the fact,
there is no room for a jury, and the right of trial in this mode is
taken away.

The author manifests levity in referring to the constitution of this
state, to shew that it was useless to stipulate for the liberty of the
press, or to insert a bill of rights in the constitution. With regard
to the first, it is perhaps an imperfection in our constitution that
the liberty of the press is not expressly reserved; but still there was
not equal necessity of making this reservation in our State as in the
general Constitution, for the common and statute law of England, and
the laws of the [26] colony are established, in which this privilege is
fully defined and secured. It is true, a bill of rights is not prefixed
to our constitution, as it is in that of some of the states; but still
this author knows, that many essential rights are reserved in the body
of it; and I will promise, that every opposer of this system will be
satisfied, if the stipulations that they contend for are agreed to,
whether they are prefixed, affixed, or inserted in the body of the
constitution, and that they will not contend which way this is done,
if it be but done. I shall add but one remark, and that is upon the
hackneyed argument introduced by the author, drawn from the character
and ability of the framers of the new constitution. The favourers of
this system are not very prudent in bringing this forward. It provokes
to an investigation of characters, which is an inviduous task. I do
not wish to detract from their merits, but I will venture to affirm,
that twenty assemblies of equal number might be collected, equally
respectable both in point of ability, integrity, and patriotism. Some
of the characters which compose it I revere; others I consider as of
small consequence, and a number are suspected of being great public
defaulters, and to have been guilty of notorious peculation and fraud,
with regard to public property in the hour of our distress. I will not
descend to personalities, nor would I have said so much on the subject,
had it not been in self defence. Let the constitution stand on its own
merits. If it be good, it stands not in need of great men’s names to
support it. If it be bad, their names ought not to sanction it.

  FINIS.



# Edmund Randolph, Letter on the Federal Constitution (16 October 1787)

Letter on the Federal Constitution, October 16, 1787, By Edmund
Randolph [Richmond: Printed by Augustin Davis, 1787.]

  16 mo. pp. 16.

  Edmund Randolph was a member of the Annapolis, Philadelphia, and
  Virginia Conventions, in all of which he took a prominent though
  equivocal position. His letter on the Constitution was widely
  circulated in the newspapers, and was printed in pamphlet form as
  above, a copy of which is in the Library of Congress, but cannot be
  found, so I am compelled to give the title from Sabin’s _Dictionary
  of Books relating to America_.

  “I do not know what impression the letter may make in Virginia. It
  is generally understood here that the arguments contained in it in
  favor of the Constitution are much stronger than the objections which
  prevent his assent. His arguments are forcible in all places, and
  with all persons. His objections are connected with his particular
  way of thinking on the subject, in which many of the adversaries to
  the Constitution do not concur.” _Madison to Washington_, Jan. 25,
  1788.

  P. L. F.

  RICHMOND, Oct. 10, 1787.

  THE HONORABLE THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES:

  _Sir_,—


The constitution which I enclosed to the general assembly in a late
official letter, appears without my signature. This circumstance,
although trivial in its own nature, has been rendered rather important
to myself at least by being misunderstood by some, and misrepresented
by others.—As I disdain to conceal the reasons for withholding my
subscription, I have always been, still am, and ever shall be, ready to
proclaim them to the world. To the legislature, therefore, by whom I
was deputed to the federal convention, I beg leave now to address them;
affecting no indifference to public opinion, but resolved not to court
it by an unmanly sacrifice of my own judgment.

As this explanation will involve a summary, but general review of our
federal situation, you will pardon me, I trust, although I should
transgress the usual bounds of a letter.

Before my departure for the convention, I believed, that the
confederation was not so eminently defective, as it had been supposed.
But after I had entered into a free communication with those who were
best informed of the condition and interest of each State; after I
had compared the intelligence derived from them with the properties
which ought to characterize the government of our union, I became
persuaded, that the confederation was destitute of every energy, which
a constitution of the United States ought to possess.

For the objects proposed by its institution were, that it should be a
shield against foreign hostility, and a firm resort against domestic
commotion; that it should cherish trade, and promote the prosperity of
the States under its care.

But these are not among the attributes of our present union. Severe
experience under the pressure of war—a ruinous weakness manifested
since the return of peace; and the contemplation of those dangers,
which darken the future prospect, have condemned the hope of grandeur
and of safety under the auspices of the confederation.

In the exigencies of war, indeed, the history of its effects is but
short; the final ratification having been delayed until the year
1781. But however short, this period is distinguished by melancholy
testimonies of its inability to maintain in harmony, the social
intercourse of the States, to defend congress against encroachments on
their rights, and to obtain by requisitions, supplies to the federal
treasury, or recruits to the federal armies. I shall not attempt
an enumeration of the particular instances; but leave to your own
remembrance and the records of congress the support of the assertions.

In the season of peace too, not many years have elapsed; and yet each
of them has produced fatal examples of delinquency, and sometimes of
pointed opposition to federal duties. To the various remonstrances of
congress, I appeal, for a gloomy, but unexaggerated narrative of the
injuries which our faith, honor and happiness, have sustained by the
failure of the States.

But these evils are past; and some may be led by an honest zeal to
conclude that they cannot be repeated. Yes, sir, they will be repeated
as long as the confederation exists, and will bring with them other
mischiefs springing from the same source, which cannot yet be foreseen
in their full array of terror.

If we examine the constitution and laws of the several States, it is
immediately discovered that the law of nations is unprovided with
sanctions in many cases, which deeply affect public dignity and public
justice. The letter however of the confederation does not permit
congress to remedy these defects, and such an authority, although
evidently deducible from its spirit, cannot without violation of the
second article, be assumed. Is it not a political phenomenon, that
the head of the confederacy should be doomed to be plunged into war,
from its wretched impotency to check offences against this law; and
sentenced to witness in unavailing anguish the infraction of their
engagements to foreign sovereigns?

And yet this is not the only grievous point of weakness. After a war
shall be inevitable, the requisitions of congress for quotas of men or
money, will again prove unproductive and fallacious. Two causes will
always conspire to this baneful consequence.

1. No government can be stable, which hangs on human inclination alone,
unbiased by the coercion; and 2, from the very connection between
States bound to proportionate contributions, jealousies and suspicions
naturally arise, which at least chill the ardor, if they do not excite
the murmurs of the whole. I do not forget indeed, that by one sudden
impulse our part of the American continent has been thrown into a
military posture, and that in the earlier annals of the war, our armies
marched to the field on the mere recommendations of congress. But ought
we to argue from a contest, thus signalized by the magnitude of its
stake, that as often as a flame shall be hereafter kindled, the same
enthusiasm will fill our legions, or renew them, as they may be filled
by losses?

If not, where shall we find protection? Impressions, like those, which
prevent a compliance with requisitions of regular forces, will deprive
the American republic of the services of militia. But let us suppose
that they are attainable, and acknowledge as I always shall, that they
are the natural support of a free government. When it is remembered,
that in their absence agriculture must languish; that they are not
habituated to military exposures and the rigour of military discipline,
and that the necessity of holding in readiness successive detachments,
carries the expense far beyond that of enlistments—This resource ought
to be adopted with caution.

As strongly too, am I persuaded, that the requisitions for money will
not be more cordially received. For besides the distrust, which would
prevail with respect to them also; besides the opinion, entertained
by each state of its own liberality and unsatisfied demands against
the United States, there is another consideration not less worth of
attention—the first rule for determining each quota of the value of
all lands granted or surveyed, and of the buildings and improvements
thereon. It is no longer doubted that an equitable, uniform mode of
estimating that value is impracticable; and therefore twelve States
have substituted the number of inhabitants under certain limitations,
as the standard according to which money is to be furnished. But under
the subsisting articles of the union, the assent of the thirteenth
State is necessary, and has not yet been given. This does of itself
lessen the hope of procuring a revenue for federal uses; and the
miscarriage of the impost almost rivets our despondency.

Amidst these disappointments, it would afford some consolation, if when
rebellion shall threaten any State, an ultimate asylum could be found
under the wing of congress. But it is at least equivocal whether they
can intrude forces into a State, rent asunder by civil discord, even
with the purest solicitude for our federal welfare, and on the most
urgent entreaties of the State itself. Nay the very allowance of this
power would be pageantry alone, from the want of money and men.

To these defects of congressional power, the history of man has
subjoined others not less alarming. I earnestly pray that the
recollection of common sufferings, which terminated in common glory,
may check the sallies of violence, and perpetuate mutual friendship
between the States. But I cannot presume, that we are superior to
those unsocial passions, which under like circumstances have infested
more ancient nations. I cannot presume, that through all time, in the
daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the conflicts
for commercial advantages, in the discontents which the neighborhood
of territory has been seen to engender in other quarters of the
globe, and in the efforts of faction and intrigue—thirteen distinct
communities under no effective superintending control, (as the United
States confessedly now are, notwithstanding the bold terms of the
confederation) will avoid a hatred to each other deep and deadly.

In the prosecution of this enquiry, we shall find the general
prosperity to decline under a system thus unnerved. No sooner is the
merchant prepared for foreign ports, with the treasures which this
new world kindly offers to his acceptance, than it is announced to
him, that they are shut against American shipping, or opened under
oppressive regulations. He urges congress to a counter-policy, and
is answered only by a condolence on the general misfortune. He is
immediately struck with the conviction, that until exclusion shall be
opposed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction, the American flag
will be disgraced. For who can conceive, that thirteen legislatures,
viewing commerce under different regulations, and fancying themselves
discharged from every obligation to concede the smallest of their
commercial advantages for the benefit of the whole, will be wrought
into a concert of action and defiance of every prejudice? Nor is this
all: Let the great improvements be recounted, which have enriched and
illustrated Europe: Let it be noted, how few those are, which will be
absolutely denied to the United States, comprehending within their
boundaries, the choicest blessings of climate, soil and navigable
waters; then let the most sanguine patriot banish, if he can, the
mortifying belief that all these must sleep, until they shall be roused
by the vigor of a national government.

I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by minute details; because
they are evidently fortified by truth, and the consciousness of the
United States of America. I shall, therefore, no longer deplore the
unfitness of the confederation to secure our peace; but proceed with
a truly unaffected distrust of my own opinions to examine what order
of powers the government of the United States ought to enjoy? How
they ought to be defended against encroachments? Whether they can be
interwoven in the confederation, without an alteration of its very
essence, or must be lodged in new hands? Showing, at the same time, the
convulsions which seem to await us, from a dissolution of the union or
partial confederacies.

To mark the kind and degree of authority which ought to be confided
to the government of the United States, is no more than to reverse
the description which I have already given, of the defects of the
confederation.

From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and war will
be clogged without regular advances of money, and that these will
be slow indeed, if dependent on supplication alone. For what better
name do requisitions deserve, which may be evaded or opposed without
the fear of coercion? But although coercion is an indispensable
ingredient, it ought not to be directed against a State, as a State;
it being impossible to attempt it except by blockading the trade of
the delinquent, or carrying war into its bowels. Even if these violent
schemes were eligible, in other respects, both of them might, perhaps,
be defeated by the scantiness of the public chest; would be tardy in
their complete effect, as the expense of the land and naval equipments
must be first reimbursed; and might drive the proscribed State into
the desperate resolve of inviting foreign alliances. Against each of
them lie separate unconquerable objections. A blockade is not equally
applicable to all the States, they being differently circumstanced
in commerce and in ports; nay an excommunication from the privilege
of the union would be vain, because every regulation or prohibition
may be easily eluded under the rights of American citizenship, or of
foreign nations. But how shall we speak of the intrusion of troops?
Shall we arm citizens against citizens, and habituate them to shed
kindred blood? Shall we risk the inflicting of wounds which will
generate a rancour never to be subdued? Would there be no room to fear,
that an army accustomed to fight for the establishment of authority,
would salute an emperor of their own? Let us not bring these things
into jeopardy. Let us rather substitute the same process by which
individuals are compelled to contribute to the government of their own
States. Instead of making requisitions to the legislatures, it would
appear more proper that taxes should be imposed by the federal head,
under due modifications and guards; that the collectors should demand
from the citizens their respective quotas, and be supported as in the
collection of ordinary taxes.

It follows, too, that, as the general government will be responsible to
foreign nations, it ought to be able to annul any offensive measure, or
enforce any public right. Perhaps among the topics on which they may be
aggrieved or complain, the commercial intercourse, and the manner in
which contracts are discharged, may constitute the principal articles
of clamor.

It follows, too, that the general government ought to be the supreme
arbiter for adjusting every contention among the States. In all their
connections, therefore, with each other, and particularly in commerce,
which will probably create the greatest discord, it ought to hold the
reins.

It follows, too, that the general government ought to protect each
State against domestic as well as external violence.

And lastly, it follows, that through the general government alone, can
we ever assume the rank to which we are entitled by our resources and
situation.

Should the people of America surrender these powers, they can be
paramount to the constitutions and ordinary acts of legislation, only
by being delegated by them. I do not pretend to affirm, but I venture
to believe, that if the confederation had been solemnly questioned in
opposition to our constitution, or even to one of our laws, posterior
to it, it must have given away. For never did it obtain a higher
ratification, than a resolution of assembly in the daily form.

This will be one security against encroachment. But another not less
effectual is, to exclude the individual States from any agency in the
national government, as far as it may be safe, and their interposition
may not be absolutely necessary.

But now, sir, permit me to declare, that in my humbled judgment, the
powers by which alone the blessings of a general government can be
accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the confederation, without a
change in its very essence, or, in other words, that the confederation
must be thrown aside. This is almost demonstrable from the inefficacy
of requisitions, and from the necessity of converting them into acts
of authority. My suffrage, as a citizen, is also for additional
powers. But to whom shall we commit those acts of authority, these
additional powers? To congress? When I formerly lamented the defects
in the jurisdiction of congress, I had no view to indicate any other
opinion, than that the federal head ought not to be so circumscribed.
For free as I am at all times to profess my reverence for that body,
and the individuals who compose it, I am yet equally free to make
known my aversion to repose such a trust in a tribunal so constituted.
My objections are not the visions of theory, but the results of my
own observations in America, and of the experience of others abroad.
1. The legislative and executive are concentred in the same persons.
This, where real power exists, must eventuate in tyranny. 2. The
representation of the States bears no proportion to their importance.
This is an unreasonable subjection of the will of the majority to that
of the minority, 3. The mode of election and the liability of being
recalled, may too often render the delegates rather partizans of their
own States than representatives of the union. 4. Cabal and intrigue
must consequently gain an ascendancy in a course of years. 5. A single
house of legislation will sometimes be precipitate, perhaps passionate.
6. As long as seven States are required for the smallest, and nine
for the greatest votes, may not foreign influence at some future day
insinuate itself, so as to interrupt every active exertion? 7. To
crown the whole, it is scarce within the verge of possibility, that so
numerous an assembly should acquire that secrecy, dispatch, and vigour,
which are the test of excellence in the executive department.

My inference from these facts and principles, is, that the new powers
must be deposited in a new body, growing out of a consolidation of
the union, as far as the circumstances of the State will allow.
Perhaps, however, some may meditate its dissolution, and others partial
confederacies.

The first is an idea awful indeed, and irreconcilable with a very
early, and hitherto uniform conviction, that without union, we must be
undone. For, before the voice of war was heard, the pulse of the then
colonies was tried, and found to beat in unison. The unremitted labor
of our enemies was to divide, and the policy of every congress to bind
us together. But in no example was this truth more clearly displayed,
than in the prudence with which independence was unfolded to the sight,
and in the forbearance to declare it, until America almost unanimously
called for it. After we had thus launched into troubles, never before
explored, and the hour of heavy distress, the remembrance of our social
strength not only forbade despair, but drew from congress the most
illustrious repetition of their settled purpose to depise all terms,
short of independence.

Behold, then, how successful and glorious we have been, while we acted
in fraternal concord. But let us discard the illusion, that by this
success, and this glory, the crest of danger has irrecoverably fallen.
Our governments are yet too youthful to have acquired stability from
habit. Our very quiet depends upon the duration of the union. Among
the upright and intelligent, few can read without emotion the future
fate of the States, if severed from each other. Then shall we learn
the full weight of foreign intrigue. Then shall we hear of partitions
of our country. If a prince, inflamed by the lust of conquest, should
use one State as the instrument of enslaving others—if every State
is to be wearied by perpetual alarms, and compelled to maintain large
military establishments—if all questions are to be decided by an
appeal to arms, where a difference of opinion cannot be removed by
negociation—in a word, if all the direful misfortunes which haunt the
peace of rival nations, are to triumph over the land, for what have
we to contend? why have we exhausted our wealth? why have we basely
betrayed the heroic martyrs of the federal cause?

But dreadful as the total dissolution of the union is to my mind, I
entertain no less horror at the thought of partial confederacies. I
have not the least ground for supposing that an overture of this kind
would be listened to by a single State, and the presumption is, that
the politics of the greater part of the States, flow from the warmest
attachment to an union of the whole. If, however, a lesser confederacy
could be obtained by Virginia, let me conjure my countrymen well to
weigh the probable consequences, before they attempt to form it.

On such an event, the strength of the union would be divided in two,
or perhaps three parts. Has it so increased since the war as to be
divisible—and yet remain sufficient for our happiness?

The utmost limit of any partial confederacy, which Virginia could
expect to form, would comprehend the three southern States, and her
nearest northern neighbour. But they, like ourselves, are diminished in
their real force, by the mixture of an unhappy species of population.

Again, may I ask, whether the opulence of the United States has been
augmented since the war? This is answered in the negative, by a load of
debt, and the declension of trade.

At all times must a southern confederacy support ships of war, and
soldiery? As soon would a navy move from the forest, and an army
from the earth, as such a confederacy, indebted, impoverished in its
commerce, and destitute of men, could, for some years at least, provide
an ample defence for itself.

Let it not be forgotten, that nations which can enforce their rights,
have large claims against the United States, and that the creditor may
insist on payment from any of them. Which of them would probably be
the victim? The most productive and the most exposed. When vexed by
reprisals of war, the southern States will sue for alliance on this
continent or beyond sea. If for the former, the necessity of an union
of the whole is decided; if for the latter, America will, I fear,
re-act the scenes of confusion and bloodshed, exhibited among most of
those nations, which have, too late, repented the folly of relying on
auxiliaries.

Two or more confederacies cannot but be competitors for power. The
ancient friendship between the citizens of America, being thus cut off,
bitterness and hostility will succeed in its place; in order to prepare
against surrounding danger, we shall be compelled to vest some where or
other, power approaching near to military government.

The annals of the world have abounded so much with instances of a
divided people being a prey to foreign influence, that I shall not
restrain my apprehensions of it, should our union be torn asunder. The
opportunity of insinuating it, will be multiplied in proportion to the
parts into which we may be broken.

In short, sir, I am fatigued with summoning up to my imagination the
miseries which will harass the United States, if torn from each other,
and which will not end until they are superseded by fresh mischiefs
under the yoke of a tyrant.

I come, therefore, to the last, and perhaps only refuge in our
difficulties, a consolidation of the union, as far as circumstances
will permit. To fulfil this desirable object, the constitution was
framed by the federal convention. A quorum of eleven States, and the
only member from a twelfth have subscribed it; Mr. Mason, of Virginia,
Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, and myself having refused to subscribe.

Why I refused, will, I hope, be solved to the satisfaction of those
who know me, by saying, that a sense of duty commanded me thus to
act. It commanded me, sir, for believe me, that no event of my life
ever occupied more of my reflection. To subscribe, seemed to offer no
inconsiderable gratification, since it would have presented me to the
world as a fellow laborer with the learned and zealous statesmen of
America.

But it was far more interesting to my feelings, that I was about to
differ from three of my colleagues, one of whom is, to the honor of
the country which he has saved, embosomed in their affections, and can
receive no praise from the highest lustre of language; the other two of
whom have been long enrolled among the wisest and best lovers of the
commonwealth; and the unshaken and intimate friendship of all of whom
I have ever prized, and still do prize, as among the happiest of all
acquisitions.—I was no stranger to the reigning partiality for the
members who composed the convention, and had not the smallest doubt,
that from this cause, and from the ardor of a reform of government, the
first applauses at least would be loud and profuse. I suspected, too,
that there was something in the human breast which for a time would
be apt to construe a temperateness in politics, into an enmity to the
union. Nay, I plainly foresaw, that in the dissensions of parties, a
middle line would probably be interpreted into a want of enterprise
and decision.—But these considerations, how seducing soever, were
feeble opponents to the suggestions of my conscience. I was sent to
exercise my judgment, and to exercise it was my fixed determination;
being instructed by even an imperfect acquaintance with mankind, that
self approbation is the only true reward which a political career
can bestow, and that popularity would have been but another name for
perfidy, if to secure it, I had given up the freedom of thinking for
myself.

It would have been a peculiar pleasure to me to have ascertained
before I left Virginia, the temper and genius of my fellow citizens,
considered relatively to a government, so substantially differing from
the confederation as that which is now submitted. But this was, for
many obvious reasons, impossible; and I was thereby deprived of what I
thought the necessary guides.

I saw, however, that the confederation was tottering from its own
weakness, and that the sitting of a convention was a signal of its
total insufficiency. I was therefore ready to assent to a scheme of
government, which was proposed, and which went beyond the limits of the
confederation, believing, that without being too extensive it would
have preserved our tranquility, until that temper and that genius
should be collected.

But when the plan which is now before the general assembly, was on its
passage through the convention, I moved, that the State conventions
should be at liberty to amend, and that a second general convention
should beholden, to discuss the amendments, which should be suggested
by them. This motion was in some measure justified by the manner in
which the confederation was forwarded originally, by congress to the
State legislatures, in many of which amendments were proposed, and
those amendments were afterwards examined in congress. Such a motion
was doubly expedient here, as the delegation of so much power was
sought for. But it was negatived. I then expressed my unwillingness to
sign. My reasons were the following:

1. It is said in the resolutions which accompany the constitution, that
it is to be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each State
by the people thereof, for their assent and ratification. The meaning
of these terms is allowed universally to be, that the convention must
either adopt the constitution in the whole, or reject it in the whole,
and is positively forbidden to amend. If therefore, I had signed,
I should have felt myself bound to be silent as to amendments, and
to endeavor to support the constitution without the correction of a
letter. With this consequence before my eyes, and with a determination
to attempt an amendment, I was taught by a regard for consistency not
to sign.

2. My opinion always was, and still is, that every citizen of America,
let the crisis be what it may, ought to have a full opportunity to
propose, through his representatives, any amendment which in his
apprehension, tends to the public welfare. By signing, I should have
contradicted this sentiment.

3. A constitution ought to have the hearts of the people on its side.
But if at a future day it should be burdensome after having been
adopted in the whole, and they should insinuate that it was in some
measure forced upon them, by being confined to the single alternative
of taking or rejecting it altogether, under my impressions, and with my
opinions, I should not be able to justify myself had I signed.

4. I was always satisfied, as I have now experienced, that this great
subject would be placed in new lights and attitudes by the criticism
of the world, and that no man can assure himself how a constitution
will work for a course of years, until at least he shall have heard the
observations of the people at large. I also fear more from inaccuracies
in a constitution, than from gross errors in any other composition;
because our dearest interests are to be regulated by it; and power,
if loosely given, especially where it will be interpreted with great
latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution. Had I signed with these
ideas, I should have virtually shut my ears against the information
which I ardently desired.

5. I was afraid that if the constitution was to be submitted to
the people, to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected by them, they
would not only reject it, but bid a lasting farewell to the union.
This formidable event I wished to avert, by keeping myself free to
propose amendments, and thus, if possible, to remove the obstacles
to an effectual government. But it will be asked, whether all these
arguments, were not be well weighed in convention. They were, sir,
with great candor. Nay, when I called to mind the respectability of
those, with whom I was associated, I almost lost confidence in these
principles. On other occasions, I should cheerfully have yielded to a
majority; on this the fate of thousands yet unborn, enjoined me not to
yield until I was convinced.

Again, may I be asked, why the mode pointed out in the constitution
for its amendment, may not be a sufficient security against its
imperfections, without now arresting it in its progress? My answers
are—1. That it is better to amend, while we have the constitution in
our power, while the passions of designing men are not yet enlisted,
and while a bare majority of the States may amend than to wait for
the uncertain assent of three fourths of the States. 2. That a bad
feature in government, becomes more and more fixed every day. 3. That
frequent changes of a constitution, even if practicable, ought not to
be wished, but avoided as much as possible. And 4. That in the present
case, it may be questionable, whether, after the particular advantages
of its operation shall be discerned, three fourths of the States can be
induced to amend.

I confess, that it is no easy task, to devise a scheme which shall
be suitable to the views of all. Many expedients have occurred to
me, but none of them appear less exceptionable than this; that if
our convention should choose to amend, another federal convention be
recommended: that in that federal convention the amendments proposed
by this or any other State be discussed; and if incorporated in the
constitution or rejected, or if a proper number of the other States
should be unwilling to accede to a second convention, the constitution
be again laid before the same State conventions, which shall again
assemble on the summons of the executives, and it shall be either
wholly adopted, or wholly rejected, without a further power of
amendment. I count such a delay as nothing in comparison with so grand
an object; especially too as the privilege of amending must terminate
after the use of it once.

I should now conclude this letter, which is already too long, were it
not incumbent on me, from having contended for amendments, to set forth
the particulars, which I conceive to require correction. I undertake
this with reluctance: because it is remote from my intentions to
catch the prejudices or prepossessions of any man. But as I mean only
to manifest that I have not been actuated by caprice, and now to
explain every objection at full length would be an immense labour,
I shall content myself with enumerating certain heads, in which the
constitution is most repugnant to my wishes.

The two first points are the equality of suffrage in the senate, and
the submission of commerce to a mere majority in the legislature, with
no other check than the revision of the president. I conjecture that
neither of these things can be corrected; and particularly the former,
without which we must have risen perhaps in disorder.

But I am sanguine in hoping that in every other justly obnoxious cause,
Virginia will be seconded by a majority of the States. I hope that she
will be seconded. 1. In causing all ambiguities of expression to be
precisely explained. 2. In rendering the president ineligible after a
given number of years. 3. In taking from him the power of nominating
to the judiciary offices, or of filling up vacancies which may there
happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which
shall expire at the end of their next sessions. 4. In taking from him
the power of pardoning for treason at least before conviction. 5. In
drawing a line between the powers of congress and individual States;
and in defining the former, so as to leave no clashing of jurisdictions
nor dangerous disputes; and to prevent the one from being swallowed
up by the other, under cover of general words, and implication. 6. In
abridging the power of the senate to make treaties supreme laws of
the land. 7. In incapacitating the congress to determine their own
salaries. And 8. In limiting and defining the judicial power.

The proper remedy must be consigned to the wisdom of the convention;
and the final step which Virginia shall pursue, if her overtures shall
be discarded, must also rest with them.

You will excuse me, sir, for having been thus tedious. My feelings
and duty demanded this exposition; for through no other channel could
I rescue my omission to sign from misrepresentation, and no more
effectual way could I exhibit to the general assembly an unreserved
history of my conduct.

I have the honor, sir, to be with great respect, your most obedient
servant,

EDMUND RANDOLPH.



# Observations ... in Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican (1787)

Observation / leading to a fair examination / of the / system of
government, / proposed by the late / Convention; / and to several
essential and neces-/ sary alterations in it. / In a number of /
Letters / from the / Federal Farmer to the Republican. [New York:]
Printed [by Thomas Greenleaf] in the year M,DCC,LXXXVII.

  8vo. pp. 40.

  Written by Richard Henry Lee, who was appointed a member of the
  Philadelphia Convention, but declined to serve. He was one of the
  foremost in opposition to the Constitution, both in the Continental
  Congress and before the people, and was the subject of numerous
  attacks in the press.

  The “Letters of the Federal Farmer” was one of the most popular of
  arguments against the new government, “four editions (and several
  thousands) of the pamphlet ... being in a few months printed and sold
  in the several states,” which induced Lee to write “an additional
  number of Letters,” but it is largely repetitions of the first, and
  I have therefore omitted its republication. A short review will be
  found in the American Magazine for May, 1788, and an elaborate reply
  by Timothy Pickering in Pickering’s Life of Pickering, II, 352.

  P. L. F.


LETTER I.

  October 8th, 1787.

  Dear Sir,

My letters to you last winter, on the subject of a well balanced
national government for the United States, were the result of a
free enquiry; when I passed from that subject to enquiries relative
to our commerce, revenues, past administration, &c. I anticipated
the anxieties I feel, on carefully examining the plan of government
proposed by the convention. It appears to be a plan retaining some
federal features; but to be the first important step, and to aim
strongly at one consolidated government of the United States. It
leaves the powers of government, and the representation of the people,
so unnaturally divided between the general and state governments,
that the operations of our system must be very uncertain. My uniform
federal attachments, and the interest I have in the protection of
property, and a steady execution of the laws, will convince you,
that, if I am under any bias at all, it is in favor of any general
system which shall promise those advantages. The instability of our
laws increases my wishes for firm and steady government; but then, I
can consent to no government, which, in my opinion, is not calculated
equally to preserve the rights of all orders of men in the community.
My object has been to join with those who have endeavoured to supply
the defects in the forms of our governments by a steady and proper
administration of them. Though I have long apprehended that fraudalentd
debtors, and embarrassed men, on the one hand, and men, on the other,
unfriendly to republican equality, would produce an uneasiness among
the people, and prepare the way, not for cool and deliberate reforms in
the governments, but for changes calculated to promote the interests
of particular orders of men. Acquit me, sir, of any agency in the
formation of the new system; I shall be satisfied with seeing, if it
shall be adopted with a prudent administration. Indeed I am so much
convinced of the truth of Pope’s maxim, that “That which is best [4]
administered is best,” that I am much inclined to subscribe to it from
experience. I am not disposed to unreasonably contend about forms. I
know our situation is critical, and it behooves us to make the best of
it. A federal government of some sort is necessary. We have suffered
the present to languish; and whether the confederation was capable
or not originally of answering any valuable purposes, it is now but
of little importance. I will pass by the men, and states, who have
been particularly instrumental in preparing the way for a change, and
perhaps, for governments not very favourable to the people at large.
A constitution is now presented which we may reject, or which we may
accept with or without amendments, and to which point we ought to
direct our exertions is the question. To determine this question with
propriety; we must attentively examine the system itself, and the
probable consequences of either step. This I shall endeavour to do, so
far as I am able, with candor and fairness; and leave you to decide
upon the propriety of my opinions, the weight of my reasons, and how
far my conclusions are well drawn. Whatever may be the conduct of
others, on the present occasion, I do not mean hastily and positively
to decide on the merits of the constitution proposed. I shall be open
to conviction and always disposed to adopt that which, all things
considered, shall appear to me to be most for the happiness of the
community. It must be granted, that if men hastily and blindly adopt
a system of government, they will as hastily and as blindly be led
to alter or abolish it; and changes must ensue, one after another,
till the peaceable and better part of the community will grow weary
with changes, tumults and disorders, and be disposed to accept any
government however despotic, that shall promise stability and firmness.

The first principal question that occurs, is, Whether, considering
our situation, we ought to precipitate the adoption of the proposed
constitution? If we remain cool and temperate, we are in no immediate
danger of any commotions; we are in a state of perfect peace, and in
no danger of invasions; the state governments are in the full exercise
of their powers; and our governments answer all present exigencies,
except the regulation of trade, securing credit, in some cases, and
providing for the interest, in some instances, of the public debts;
and whether we adopt a change three or nine months hence, can make
but little odds with the private circumstances of individuals; their
happiness and prosperity, after all, depend principally upon their own
exertions. We are hardly recovered from a long and distressing war:
The farmers, fishermen, &c. have not fully repaired the waste made by
it. Industry [5] and frugality are again assuming their proper station.
Private debts are lessened, and public debts incurred by the war have
been, by various ways, diminished; and the public lands have now become
a productive source for diminishing them much more. I know uneasy men,
who with very much to precipitate, do not admit all these facts; but
they are facts well known to all men who are thoroughly informed in
the affairs of this country. It must, however, be admitted, that our
federal system is defective, and that some of the state governments
are not well administered; but, then, we impute to the defects in our
governments many evils and embarrassments which are most clearly the
result of the late war. We must allow men to conduct on the present
occasion, as on all similar ones. They will urge a thousand pretences
to answer their purposes on both sides. When we want a man to change
his condition, we describe it as wretched, miserable, and despised;
and draw a pleasing picture of that which we would have him assume.
And when we wish the contrary, we reverse our descriptions. Whenever
a clamor is raised, and idle men get to work, it is highly necessary
to examine facts carefully, and without unreasonably suspecting men of
falsehood, to examine, and enquire attentively, under what impressions
they act. It is too often the case in political concerns that men state
facts not as they are, but as they wish them to be; and almost every
man, by calling to mind past scenes, will find this to be true.

Nothing but the passions of ambitious, impatient, or disorderly men,
I conceive, will plunge us into commotions, if time should be taken
fully to examine and consider the system proposed. Men who feel easy in
their circumstances, and such as are not sanguine in their expectations
relative to the consequences of the proposed change, will remain quiet
under the existing governments. Many commercial and monied men, who are
uneasy, not without just cause, ought to be respected; and by no means,
unreasonably disappointed in their expectations and hopes; but as to
those who expect employments under the new constitution; as to those
weak and ardent men who always expect to be gainers by revolutions, and
whose lot it generally is to get out of one difficulty into another,
they are very little to be regarded; and as to those who designedly
avail themselves of this weakness and ardor, they are to be despised.
It is natural for men, who wish to hasten the adoption of a measure, to
tell us, now is the crisis—now is the critical moment which must be
seized or all will be lost; and to shut the door against free enquiry,
whenever conscious the thing presented has defects in it, which time
and investigation will probably discover. This has been the custom of
tyrants, [6] and their dependants in all ages. If it is true, what
has been so often said, that the people of this country cannot change
their condition for the worse, I presume it still behoves them to
endeavour deliberately to change it for the better. The fickle and
ardent, in any community are the proper tools for establishing despotic
government. But it is deliberate and thinking men, who must establish
and secure governments on free principles. Before they decide on the
plan proposed, they will enquire whether it will probably be a blessing
or a curse to this people.

The present moment discovers a new face in our affairs. Our object
has been all along, to reform our federal system, and to strengthen
our governments—to establish peace, order and justice in the
community—but a new object now presents. The plan of government now
proposed is evidently calculated totally to change, in time, our
condition as a people. Instead of being thirteen republics, under
a federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated
government. Of this, I think, I shall fully convince you, in my
following letters on this subject. This consolidation of the states
has been the object of several men in this country for some time past.
Whether such a change can ever be effected, in any manner; whether it
can be effected without convulsions and civil wars; whether such a
change will not totally destroy the liberties of this country—time
only can determine.

To have a just idea of the government before us, and to shew that
a consolidated one is the object in view, it is necessary not only
to examine the plan, but also its history, and the politics of its
particular friends.

The confederation was formed when great confidence was placed in the
voluntary exertions of individuals, and of the respective states;
and the framers of it, to guard against usurpation, so limited, and
checked the powers, that, in many respects, they are inadequate to the
exigencies of the union. We find, therefore, members of congress urging
alterations in the federal system almost as soon as it was adopted. It
was early proposed to vest congress with powers to levy an impost, to
regulate trade, &c. but such was known to be the caution of the states
in parting with power, that the vestment even of these, was proposed to
be under several checks and limitations. During the war, the general
confusion, and the introduction, of paper money, infused in the minds
of people vague ideas respecting government and credit. We expected too
much from the return of peace, and of course we have been disappointed.
Our governments have been new and unsettled; and several legislatures,
by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, [7] have given just
cause of uneasiness to creditors. By these and other causes, several
orders of men in the community have been prepared, by degrees, for a
change of government; and this very abuse of power in the legislatures,
which in some cases has been charged upon the democratic part of the
community, has furnished aristocratical men with those very weapons,
and those very means, with which, in great measure, they are rapidly
effecting their favourite object. And should an oppressive government
be the consequence of the proposed change, prosperity may reproach not
only a few overbearing, unprincipled men, but those parties in the
states which have misused their powers.

The conduct of several legislatures, touching paper money, and tender
laws, has prepared many honest men for changes in government, which
otherwise they would not have thought of—when by the evils, on the
one hand, and by the secret instigations of artful men, on the other,
the minds of men were become sufficiently uneasy, a bold step was
taken, which is usually followed by a revolution, or a civil war. A
general convention for mere commercial purposes was moved for—the
authors of this measure saw that the people’s attention was turned
solely to the amendment of the federal system; and that, had the idea
of a total change been started, probably no state would have appointed
members to the convention. The idea of destroying ultimately, the state
government, and forming one consolidated system, could not have been
admitted—a convention, therefore, merely for vesting in congress power
to regulate trade was proposed. This was pleasing to the commercial
towns; and the landed people had little or no concern about it.
September, 1786, a few men from the middle states met at Annapolis,
and hastily proposed a convention to be held in May, 1787, for the
purpose, generally, of amending the confederation—this was done before
the delegates of Massachusetts, and of the other states arrived—still
not a word was said about destroying the old constitution, and making
a new one.—The states still unsuspecting, and not aware that they
were passing the Rubicon, appointed members to the new convention,
for the sole and express purpose of revising and amending the
confederation—and, probably, not one man in ten thousand in the United
States, till within these ten or twelve days, had an idea that the old
ship was to be destroyed, and he put to the alternative of embarking
in the new ship presented, or of being left in danger of sinking.—The
States, I believe, universally supposed the convention would report
alterations in the confederation, which would pass an examination in
congress, and after being agreed to there, would be confirmed by all
the legislatures, [8] or be rejected. Virginia made a very respectable
appointment, and placed at the head of it the first man in America.
In this appointment there was a mixture of political characters;
but Pennsylvania appointed principally those men who are esteemed
aristocratical. Here the favourite moment for changing the government
was evidently discerned by a few men, who seized it with address. Ten
other states appointed, and tho’ they chose men principally connected
with commerce and the judicial department yet they appointed many good
republican characters—had they all attended we should now see, I am
persuaded, a better system presented. The non-attendance of eight or
nine men, who were appointed members of the convention, I shall ever
consider as a very unfortunate event to the United States.——Had they
attended, I am pretty clear that the result of the convention would not
have had that strong tendency to aristocracy now discernable in every
part of the plan. There would not have been so great an accumulation of
powers, especially as to the internal police of this country in a few
hands as the constitution reported proposes to vest in them—the young
visionary men, and the consolidating aristocracy, would have been more
restrained than they have been. Eleven states met in the convention,
and after four months close attention presented the new constitution,
to be adopted or rejected by the people. The uneasy and fickle part of
the community may be prepared to receive any form of government; but I
presume the enlightened and substantial part will give any constitution
presented for their adoption a candid and thorough examination; and
silence those designing or empty men, who weakly and rashly attempt to
precipitate the adoption of a system of so much importance—We shall
view the convention with proper respect——and, at the same time, that
we reflect there were men of abilities and integrity in it, we must
recollect how disproportionately the democratic and aristocratic parts
of the community were represented——Perhaps the judicious friends and
opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it
rely solely on its own merits, or be condemned for its own defects.

In the first place, I shall premise, that the plan proposed is a plan
of accommodation—and that it is in this way only, and by giving up a
part of our opinions, that we can ever expect to obtain a government
founded in freedom and compact. This circumstance candid men will
always keep in view, in the discussion of this subject.

The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally
however, calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated
government.

The first interesting question, therefore suggested, is, how [9] far
the states can be consolidated into one entire government on free
principles. In considering this question extensive objects are to be
taken into view, and important changes in the forms of government to be
carefully attended to in all their consequences. The happiness of the
people at large must be the great object with every honest statesman,
and he will direct every movement to this point. If we are so situated
as a people, as not to be able to enjoy equal happiness and advantages
under one government, the consolidation of the states cannot be
admitted.

There are three different forms of free government under which the
United States may exist as one nation; and now is, perhaps, the time
to determine to which we will direct our views. 1. Distinct republics
connected under a federal head. In this case the respective state
governments must be the principal guardians of the peoples rights,
and exclusively regulate their internal police; in them must rest the
balance of government. The congress of the states, or federal head,
must consist of delegates amenable to, and removable by the respective
states: This congress must have general directing powers; powers to
require men and monies of the states; to make treaties; peace and war;
to direct the operations of armies, &c. Under this federal modification
of government, the powers of congress would be rather advisary or
recommendatory than coercive. 2. We may do away the federal state
governments, and form or consolidate all the states into one entire
government, with one executive, one judiciary, and one legislature,
consisting of senators and representatives collected from all parts
of the union: In this case there would be a compleat consolidation of
the states. 3. We may consolidate the states as to certain national
objects, and leave them severally distinct independent republics, as
to internal police generally. Let the general government consist of
an executive, a judiciary, and balanced legislature, and its powers
extend exclusively to all foreign concerns, causes arising on the
seas to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, peace and
war, and to a few internal concerns of the community; to the coin,
post-offices, weights and measures, a general plan for the militia, to
naturalization, _and, perhaps to bankruptcies_, leaving the internal
police of the community, in other respects, exclusively to the state
governments; as the administration of justice in all causes arising
internally, the laying and collecting of internal taxes, and the
forming of the militia according to a general plan prescribed. In this
case there would be a compleat consolidation, _quoad_ certain objects
only.

Touching the first, or federal plan, I do not think much can be said
in its favor: The sovereignity of the nation, without [10] coercive
and efficient powers to collect the strength of it, cannot always be
depended on to answer the purposes of government; and in a congress
of representatives of foreign states, there must necessarily be an
unreasonable mixture of powers in the same hands.

As to the second, or compleat consolidating plan, it deserves to
be carefully considered at this time by every American: If it be
impracticable, it is a fatal error to model our governments, directing
our views ultimately to it.

The third plan, or partial consolidation, is, in my opinion, the only
one that can secure the freedom and happiness of this people. I once
had some general ideas that the second plan was practicable, but from
long attention, and the proceedings of the convention, I am fully
satisfied, that this third plan is the only one we can with safety and
propriety proceed upon. Making this the standard to point out, with
candor and fairness, the parts of the new constitution which appear
to be improper, is my object. The convention appears to have proposed
the partial consolidation evidently with a view to collect all powers
ultimately, in the United States into one entire government; and from
its views in this respect, and from the tenacity of the small states
to have an equal vote in the senate, probably originated the greatest
defects in the proposed plan.

Independent of the opinions of many great authors, that a free elective
government cannot be extended over large territories, a few reflections
must evince, that one government and general legislation alone never
can extend equal benefits to all parts of the United States: Different
laws, customs, and opinions exist in the different states, which by a
uniform system of laws would be unreasonably invaded. The United States
contain about a million of square miles, and in half a century will,
probably, contain ten millions of people; and from the center to the
extremes is about 800 miles.

Before we do away the state governments or adopt measures that
will tend to abolish them, and to consolidate the states into one
entire government several principles should be considered and facts
ascertained:——These, and my examination into the essential parts of
the proposed plan, I shall pursue in my next.

  Your’s, &c.

  THE FEDERAL FARMER.


[11] LETTER II.

  October 9, 1787.

  DEAR SIR,

The essential parts of a free and good government are a full and
equal representation of the people in the legislature, and the jury
trial of the vicinage in the administration of justice—a full and
equal representation, is that which possesses the same interests,
feelings, opinions, and views the people themselves would were
they all assembled—a fair representation, therefore, should be so
regulated, that every order of men in the community, according to the
common course of elections, can have a share in it—in order to allow
professional men, merchants, traders, farmers, mechanics, &c. to bring
a just proportion of their best informed men respectively into the
legislature, the representation must be considerably numerous—We
have about 200 state senators in the United States, and a less number
than that of federal representatives cannot, clearly, be a full
representation of this people, in the affairs of internal taxation
and police, were there but one legislature for the whole union. The
representation cannot be equal, or the situation of the people proper
for one government only—if the extreme parts of the society cannot be
represented as fully as the central—It is apparently impracticable
that this should be the case in this extensive country——it would be
impossible to collect a representation of the parts of the country
five, six, and seven hundred miles from the seat of government.

Under one general government alone, there could be but one judiciary,
one supreme and a proper number of inferior courts. I think it
would be totally impracticable in this case to preserve a due
administration of justice, and the real benefits of the jury trial
of the vicinage——there are now supreme courts in each state in the
union, and a great number of county and other courts subordinate to
each supreme court——most of these supreme and inferior courts are
itinerant, and hold their sessions in different parts every year of
their respective states, counties and districts—with all these moving
courts, our citizens, from the vast extent of the country, must travel
very considerable distances from home to find the place where justice
is administered. I am not for bringing justice so near to individuals
as to afford them any temptation to engage in law suits; though I
think it one of the greatest benefits in a good government, that each
citizen should find a court of justice within a reasonable distance,
perhaps, within a day’s travel of his [12] home; so that, without
great inconveniences and enormous expense, he may have the advantages
of his witnesses and jury—it would be impracticable to derive these
advantages from one judiciary——the one supreme court at most could
only set in the centre of the union, and move once a year into the
centre of the eastern and southern extremes of it—and, in this case,
each citizen, on an average, would travel 150 or 200 miles to find
this court——that, however, inferior courts might be properly placed
in the different counties, and districts of the union, the appellate
jurisdiction would be intolerable and expensive.

If it were possible to consolidate the states, and preserve the
features of a free government, still it is evident that the middle
states, the parts of the union, about the seat of government, would
enjoy great advantages, while the remote states would experience the
many inconveniences of remote provinces. Wealth, offices, and the
benefits of government would collect in the centre: and the extreme
states; and their principal towns, become much less important.

There are other considerations which tend to prove that the idea
of one consolidated whole, on free principles, is ill-founded—the
laws of a free government rest on the confidence of the people, and
operate gently—and never can extend the influence very far—if they
are executed on free principles, about the centre, where the benefits
of the government induce the people to support it voluntarily; yet
they must be executed on the principles of fear and force in the
extremes.—This has been the case with every extensive republic of
which we have any accurate account.

There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming
the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed—a
free and enlightened people, in forming this compact, will not resign
all their rights to those who govern, and they will fix limits to
their legislators and rulers, which will soon be plainly seen by those
who are governed, as well as by those who govern: and the latter will
know they cannot be passed unperceived by the former, and without
giving a general alarm.—These rights should be made the basis of
every constitution; and if a people be so situated, or have such
different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining and fixing
them, it is a very strong argument against their attempting to form
one entire society, to live under one system of laws only.—I confess,
I never thought the people of these states differed essentially in
these respects; they having derived all these rights from one common
source, the British systems; and having in the formation of their state
constitutions, discovered that their ideas [13] relative to these
rights are very similar. However, it is now said that the states
differ so essentially in these respects, and even in the important
article of the trial by jury, that when assembled in convention, they
can agree to no words by which to establish that trial, or by which
to ascertain and establish many other of these rights, as fundamental
articles in the social compact. If so, we proceed to consolidate the
states on no solid basis whatever.

But I do not pay much regard to the reasons given for not bottoming
the new constitution on a better bill of rights. I still believe a
complete federal bill of rights to be very practicable. Nevertheless I
acknowledge the proceedings of the convention furnish my mind with many
new and strong reasons, against a complete consolidation of the states.
They tend to convince me, that it cannot be carried with propriety
very far—that the convention have gone much farther in one respect
than they found it practicable to go in another; that is, they propose
to lodge in the general government very extensive powers—_powers_
nearly, if not altogether, complete and unlimited, over the purse and
the sword. But, in its organization, they furnish the strongest proof
that the proper limbs, or parts of a government, to support and execute
those powers on proper principles (or in which they can be safely
lodged) cannot be formed. These powers must be lodged somewhere in
every society; but then they should be lodged where the strength and
guardians of the people are collected. They can be wielded, or safely
used, in a free country only by an able executive and judiciary, a
respectable senate, and a secure, full, and equal representation of the
people. I think the principles I have premised or brought into view,
are well founded—I think they will not be denied by any fair reasoner.
It is in connection with these, and other solid principles, we are to
examine the constitution. It is not a few democratic phrases, or a
few well formed features, that will prove its merits; or a few small
omissions that will produce its rejection among men of sense; they will
enquire what are the essential powers in a community, and what are
nominal ones; where and how the essential powers shall be lodged to
secure government, and to secure true liberty.

In examining the proposed constitution carefully, we must clearly
perceive an unnatural separation of these powers from the substantial
representation of the people. The state government will exist, with all
their governors, senators, representatives, officers and expences; in
these will be nineteen twentieths of the representatives of the people;
they will have a near connection, and their members an immediate
intercourse with the people; and the probability is, that the state
governments will possess the [14] confidence of the people, and be
considered generally as their immediate guardians.

The general government will consist of a new species of executive,
a small senate, and a very small house of representatives. As many
citizens will be more than three hundred miles from the seat of this
government as will be nearer to it, its judges and officers cannot be
very numerous, without making our governments very expensive. Thus will
stand the state and the general governments, should the constitution
be adopted without any alterations in their organization; but as to
powers, the general government will possess all essential ones, at
least on paper, and those of the states a mere shadow of power. And
therefore, unless the people shall make some great exertions to restore
to the state governments their powers in matters of internal police; as
the powers to lay and collect, exclusively, internal taxes, to govern
the militia, and to hold the decisions of their own judicial courts
upon their own laws final, the balance cannot possibly continue long;
but the state governments must be annihilated, or continue to exist for
no purpose.

It is however to be observed, that many of the essential powers
given the national government are exclusively given; and the general
government may have prudence enough to forbear the exercise of those
which may still be exercised by the respective states. But this cannot
justify the impropriety of giving powers, the exercise of which
prudent men will not attempt, and imprudent men will, or probably can,
exercise only in a manner destructive of free government. The general
government, organized as it is, may be adequate to many valuable
objects, and be able to carry its laws into execution on proper
principles in several cases; but I think its warmest friends will not
contend, that it can carry all the powers proposed to be lodged in it
into effect, without calling to its aid a military force, which must
very soon destroy all elective governments in the country, produce
anarchy, or establish despotism. Though we cannot have now a complete
idea of what will be the operations of the proposed system, we may,
allowing things to have their common course, have a very tolerable
one. The powers lodged in the general government, if exercised by it,
must intimately effect the internal police of the states, as well
as external concerns; and there is no reason to expect the numerous
state governments, and their connections, will be very friendly to the
execution of federal laws in those internal affairs, which hitherto
have been under their own immediate management. There is more reason
to believe, that the general government, far removed from the people,
and none of its members elected oftener than once in two years, will
be forgot [15] or neglected, and its laws in many cases disregarded,
unless a multitude of officers and military force be continually kept
in view, and employed to enforce the execution of the laws, and to
make the government feared and respected. No position can be truer
than this. That in this country either neglected laws, or a military
execution of them, must lead to a revolution, and to the destruction
of freedom. Neglected laws must first lead to anarchy and confusion;
and a military execution of laws is only a shorter way to the same
point—despotic government.

  Your’s, &c.

  THE FEDERAL FARMER.


LETTER III.

  October 10th, 1787.

  DEAR SIR,

The great object of a free people must be so to form their government
and laws, and so to administer them, as to create a confidence in, and
respect for the laws; and thereby induce the sensible and virtuous part
of the community to declare in favor of the laws, and to support them
without an expensive military force. I wish, though I confess I have
not much hope, that this may be the case with the laws of congress
under the new constitution. I am fully convinced that we must organize
the national government on different principals, and make the parts
of it more efficient, and secure in it more effectually the different
interests in the community; or else leave in the state governments some
powers proposed to be lodged in it—at least till such an organization
shall be found to be practicable. Not sanguine in my expectations
of a good federal administration, and satisfied, as I am, of the
impracticability of consolidating the states, and at the same time of
preserving the rights of the people at large, I believe we ought still
to leave some of those powers in the state governments, in which the
people, in fact, will still be represented—to define some other powers
proposed to be vested in the general government, more carefully, and to
establish a few principles to secure a proper exercise of the powers
given it. It is not my object to multiply objections, or to contend
about inconsiderable powers or amendments. I wish the system adopted
with a few alterations; but those, in my mind, are essential ones;
if adopted without, [16] every good citizen will acquiesce, though I
shall consider the duration of our governments, and the liberties of
this people, very much dependant on the administration of the general
government. A wise and honest administration, may make the people
happy under any government; but necessity only can justify even our
leaving open avenues to the abuse of power, by wicked, unthinking, or
ambitious men. I will examine, first, the organization of the proposed
government, in order to judge; 2d, with propriety, what powers are
improperly, at least prematurely lodged in it. I shall examine, 3d, the
undefined powers; and 4th, those powers, the exercise of which is not
secured on safe and proper ground.

First. As to the organization——the house of representatives, the
democrative branch, as it is called, is to consist of 65 members:
that is, about one representative for fifty thousand inhabitants, to
be chosen biennially——the federal legislature may increase this
number to one for each thirty thousand inhabitants, abating fractional
numbers in each state.——Thirty-three representatives will make a
quorum for doing business, and a majority of those present determine
the sense of the house.——I have no idea that the interests, feelings,
and opinions of three or four millions of people, especially touching
internal taxation, can be collected in such a house.——In the nature
of things, nine times in ten, men of the elevated classes in the
community only can be chosen——Connecticut, for instance, will have
five representatives——not one man in a hundred of those who form
the democrative branch in the state legislature, will, on a fair
computation, be one of the five.—The people of this country, in one
sense, may all be democratic; but if we make the proper distinction
between the few men of wealth and abilities, and consider them, as we
ought, as the natural aristocracy of the country, and the great body
of the people, the middle and lower classes, as the democracy, this
federal representative branch will have but very little democracy
in it, even this small representation is not secured on proper
principles.——The branches of the legislature are essential parts
of the fundamental compact, and ought to be so fixed by the people,
that the legislature cannot alter itself by modifying the elections
of its own members. This, by a part of Art. I, Sect. 4, the general
legislature may do, it may evidently so regulate elections as to secure
the choice of any particular description of men.——It may make the
whole state one district—make the capital, or any places in the state,
the place or places of election—it may declare that the five men (or
whatever the number may be the state may chuse) who shall have the
most votes shall be considered as chosen. ——In this [17] case it
is easy to perceive how the people who live scattered in the inland
towns will bestow their votes on different men—and how a few men in a
city, in any order or profession, may unite and place any five men they
please highest among those that may be voted for——and all this may be
done constitutionally, and by those silent operations, which are not
immediately perceived by the people in general.——I know it is urged,
that the general legislature will be disposed to regulate elections on
fair and just principles:——This may be true—good men will generally
govern well with almost any constitution: but why in laying the
foundation of the social system, need we unnecessarily leave a door
open to improper regulations?—This is a very general and unguarded
clause, and many evils may flow from that part which authorises the
congress to regulate elections.——Were it omitted, the regulations
of elections would be solely in the respective states, where the
people are substantially represented; and where the elections ought
to be regulated, otherwise to secure a representation from all parts
of the community, in making the constitutions, we ought to provide
for dividing each state into a proper number of districts, and for
confining the electors in each district to the choice of some men, who
shall have a permanent interest and residence in it; and also for this
essential object, that the representative elected shall have a majority
of the votes of those electors who shall attend and give their votes.

In considering the practicability of having a full and equal
representation of the people from all parts of the union, not only
distances and different opinions, customs and views, common in
extensive tracts of country, are to be taken into view, but many
differences peculiar to Eastern, Middle, and Southern States. These
differences are not so perceivable among the members of congress, and
men of general information in the states, as among the men who would
properly form the democratic branch. The Eastern states are very
democratic, and composed chiefly of moderate freeholders; they have but
few rich men and no slaves; the Southern states are composed chiefly
of rich planters and slaves; they have but few moderate freeholders,
and the prevailing influence, in them is generally a dissipated
aristocracy: The Middle states partake partly of the Eastern and partly
of the Southern character.

Perhaps, nothing could be more disjointed, unwieldly and incompetent
to doing business with harmony and dispatch, than a federal house of
representatives properly numerous for the great objects of taxation,
&c. collected from the federal states; whether such men would ever
act in concert; whether they would not worry along a few years, and
then be the means of [18] separating the parts of the union, is very
problematical?——View this system in whatever form we can, propriety
brings us still to this point, a federal government possessed of
general and complete powers, as to those national objects which cannot
well come under the cognizance of the internal laws of the respective
states, and this federal government, accordingly, consisting of
branches not very numerous.

The house of representatives is on the plan of consolidation, but the
senate is entirely on the federal plan; and Delaware will have as
much constitutional influence in the senate, as the largest state in
the union: and in this senate are lodged legislative, executive and
judicial powers: Ten states in this union urge that they are small
states, nine of which were present in the convention.—They were
interested in collecting large powers into the hands of the senate, in
which each state still will have its equal share of power. I suppose
it was impracticable for the three large states, as they were called,
to get the senate formed on any other principles: But this only
proves, that we cannot form one general government on equal and just
principles—and proves, that we ought not to lodge in it such extensive
powers before we are convinced of the practicability of organizing it
on just and equal principles. The senate will consist of two members
from each state, chosen by the state legislatures, every sixth year.
The clause referred to, respecting the elections of representatives,
empowers the general legislature to regulate the elections of senators
also, “except as to the places of chusing senators.”—There is,
therefore, but little more security in the elections than in those of
representatives: Fourteen senators make a quorum for business, and a
majority of the senators present give the vote of the senate, except
in giving judgment upon an impeachment, or in making treaties, or
in expelling a member, when two-thirds of the senators present must
agree.—The members of the legislature are not excluded from being
elected to any military offices, or any civil offices, except those
created, or the emoluments of which shall be increased by themselves:
two-thirds of the members present, of either house, may expel a member
at pleasure. The senate is an independent branch of the legislature, a
court for trying impeachments, and also a part of the executive, having
a negative in the making of all treaties, and in appointing almost all
officers.

The vice president is not a very important, if not an unnecessary part
of the system—he may be a part of the senate at one period, and act as
the supreme executive magistrate at another.——The election of this
officer, as well as of the president of the United States seems to be
properly secured; but [19] when we examine the powers of the president,
and the forms of the executive, we shall perceive that the general
government, in this part, will have a strong tendency to aristocracy,
or the government of the few. The executive is, in fact, the president
and senate in all transactions of any importance; the president is
connected with, or tied to the senate; he may always act with the
senate, but never can effectually counteract its views: The president
can appoint no officer, civil or military, who shall not be agreeable
to the senate; and the presumption is, that the will of so important a
body will not be very easily controlled, and that it will exercise its
powers with great address.

In the judicial department, powers ever kept distinct in well balanced
governments, are no less improperly blended in the hands of the same
men—in the judges of the supreme court is lodged the law, the equity
and the fact. It is not necessary to pursue the minute organical parts
of the general government proposed.—There were various interests in
the convention, to be reconciled, especially of large and small states;
of carrying and non-carrying states; and of states more and states
less democratic—vast labour and attention were by the convention
bestowed on the organization of the parts of the constitution offered;
still it is acknowledged there are many things radically wrong in the
essential parts of this constitution—but it is said that these are
the result of our situation: On a full examination of the subject,
I believe it; but what do the laborious inquiries and determination
of the convention prove? If they prove any thing, they prove that we
cannot consolidate the states on proper principles: The organization
of the government presented proves, that we cannot form a general
government in which all power can be safely lodged; and a little
attention to the parts of the one proposed will make it appear very
evident, that all the powers proposed to be lodged in it, will not be
then well deposited, either for the purposes of government, or the
preservation of liberty. I will suppose no abuse of power in those
cases, in which the abuse of it is not well guarded against—I will
suppose the words authorizing the general government to regulate the
elections of its own members struck out of the plan, or free district
elections, in each state, amply secured.—That the small representation
provided for shall be as fair and equal as it is capable of being
made—I will suppose the judicial department regulated on pure
principles, by future laws, as far as it can be by the constitution,
and consist with the situation of the country—still there will be an
unreasonable accumulation of powers in the general government if all be
granted, enumerated in the plan proposed. The plan does not present a
well balanced government: The senatorial [20] branch of the legislative
and the executive are substantially united, and the president, or
the state executive magistrate, may aid the senatorial interest when
weakest, but never can effectually support the democratic, however
it may be opposed;—the excellency, in my mind, of a well-balanced
government is that it consists of distinct branches, each sufficiently
strong and independant to keep its own station, and to aid either of
the other branches which may occasionally want aid.

The convention found that any but a small house of representatives
would be expensive, and that it would be impracticable to assemble
a large number of representatives. Not only the determination of the
convention in this case, but the situation of the states, proves
the impracticability of collecting, in any one point, a proper
representation.

The formation of the senate, and the smallness of the house, being,
therefore, the result of our situation, and the actual state of things,
the evils which may attend the exercise of many powers in this national
government may be considered as without a remedy.

All officers are impeachable before the senate only—before the men
by whom they are appointed, or who are consenting to the appointment
of these officers. No judgment of conviction, on an impeachment,
can be given unless two thirds of the senators agree. Under these
circumstances the right of impeachment, in the house, can be of but
little importance; the house cannot expect often to convict the
offender; and, therefore, probably, will but seldom or never exercise
the right. In addition to the insecurity and inconveniences attending
this organization beforementioned, it may be observed, that it is
extremely difficult to secure the people against the fatal effects of
corruption and influence. The power of making any law will be in the
president, eight senators, and seventeen representatives, relative to
the important objects enumerated in the constitution. Where there is
a small representation a sufficient number to carry any measure, may,
with ease, be influenced by bribes, offices and civilities; they easily
form private juntoes, and out-door meetings, agree on measures, and
carry them by silent votes.

Impressed, as I am, with a sense of the difficulties there are in the
way of forming the parts of a federal government on proper principles,
and seeing a government so unsubstantially organized, after so arduous
an attempt has been made, I am led to believe, that powers ought to be
given to it with great care and caution.

In the second place it is necessary, therefore, to examine the extent,
and the probable operations of some of those ex- [21] tensive powers
proposed to be vested in this government. These powers, legislative,
executive, and judicial, respect internal as well as external objects.
Those respecting external objects, as all foreign concerns, commerce,
imposts, all causes arising on the seas, peace and war, and Indian
affairs, can be lodged no where else, with any propriety, but in this
government. Many powers that respect internal objects ought clearly to
be lodged in it; as those to regulate trade between the states, weights
and measures, the coin or current monies, post-offices, naturalization,
&c. These powers may be exercised without essentially effecting the
internal police of the respective states: But powers to lay and collect
internal taxes, to form the militia, to make bankrupt laws, and to
decide on appeals, questions arising on the internal laws of the
respective states, are of a very serious nature, and carry with them
almost all other powers. These taken in connection with the others, and
powers to raise armies and build navies, proposed to be lodged in this
government, appear to me to comprehend all the essential powers in this
community, and those which will be left to the states will be of no
great importance.

A power to lay and collect taxes at discretion, is, in itself, of very
great importance. By means of taxes, the government may command the
whole or any part of the subject’s property. Taxes may be of various
kinds; but there is a strong distinction between external and internal
taxes. External taxes are import duties, which are laid on imported
goods; they may usually be collected in a few seaport towns, and of a
few individuals, though ultimately paid by the consumer; a few officers
can collect them, and they can be carried no higher than trade will
bear, or smuggling permit—that in the very nature of commerce, bounds
are set to them. But internal taxes, as poll and land taxes, excises,
duties on all written instruments, &c. may fix themselves on every
person and species of property in the community; they may be carried to
any lengths, and in proportion as they are extended, numerous officers
must be employed to assess them, and to enforce the collection of
them. In the United Netherlands the general government has compleat
powers, as to external taxation; but as to internal taxes, it makes
requisitions on the provinces. Internal taxation in this country is
more important, as the country is so very extensive. As many assessors
and collectors of federal taxes will be above three hundred miles from
the seat of the federal government as will be less. Besides, to lay and
collect taxes, in this extensive country, must require a great number
of congressional ordinances immediately operating upon the body of the
people; these must continually interfere with the state laws, [22] and
thereby produce disorder and general dissatisfaction, till the one
system of laws or the other, operating on the same subjects, shall be
abolished. These ordinances alone, to say nothing of those respecting
the militia, coin, commerce, federal judiciary, &c. &c. will probably
soon defeat the operations of the state laws and governments.

Should the general government think it politic, as some administration
(if not all) probably will, to look for a support in a system of
influence, the government will take every occasion to multiply laws,
and officers to execute them, considering these as so many necessary
props for its own support. Should this system of policy be adopted,
taxes more productive than the impost duties will, probably, be wanted
to support the government, and to discharge foreign demands, without
leaving any thing for the domestic creditors. The internal sources of
taxation then must be called into operation, and internal tax laws and
federal assessors and collectors spread over this immense country.
All these circumstances considered, is it wise, prudent, or safe, to
vest the powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in the general
government, while imperfectly organized and inadequate; and to trust
to amending it hereafter, and making it adequate to this purpose? It
is not only unsafe but absurd to lodge power in a government before
it is fitted to receive it. It is confessed that this power and
representation ought to go together. Why give the power first? Why
give the power to the few, who, when possessed of it, may have address
enough to prevent the increase of representation? Why not keep the
power, and, when necessary, amend the constitution, and add to its
other parts this power, and a proper increase of representation at
the same time? Then men who may want the power will be under strong
inducements to let in the people, by their representatives, into the
government, to hold their due proportion of this power. If a proper
representation be impracticable, then we shall see this power resting
in the states, where it at present ought to be, and not inconsiderately
given up.

When I recollect how lately congress, conventions, legislatures, and
people contended in the cause of liberty, and carefully weighed the
importance of taxation, I can scarcely believe we are serious in
proposing to vest the powers of laying and collecting internal taxes
in a government so imperfectly organized for such purposes. Should
the United States be taxed by a house of representatives of two
hundred members, which would be about fifteen members for Connecticut,
twenty-five for Massachusetts, &c. still the middle and lower classes
of people could have no great share, in fact, in taxation. I am
aware it is said, that the representation proposed by the new [23]
constitution is sufficiently numerous; it may be for many purposes;
but to suppose that this branch is sufficiently numerous to guard the
rights of the people in the administration of the government, in which
the purse and sword is placed, seems to argue that we have forgot
what the true meaning of representation is. I am sensible also, that
it is said that congress will not attempt to lay and collect internal
taxes; that it is necessary for them to have the power, though it
cannot probably be exercised.——I admit that it is not probable that
any prudent congress will attempt to lay and collect internal taxes,
especially direct taxes: but this only proves, that the power would be
improperly lodged in congress, and that it might be abused by imprudent
and designing men.

I have heard several gentlemen, to get rid of objections to this part
of the constitution, attempt to construe the powers relative to direct
taxes, as those who object to it would have them; as to these, it is
said, that congress will only have power to make requisitions, leaving
it to the states to lay and collect them. I see but very little colour
for this construction, and the attempt only proves that this part of
the plan cannot be defended. By this plan there can be no doubt,
but that the powers of congress will be complete as to all kinds of
taxes whatever—Further, as to internal taxes, the state governments
will have concurrent powers with the general government, and both may
tax the same objects in the same year; and the objection that the
general government may suspend a state tax, as a necessary measure
for the promoting the collection of a federal tax, is not without
foundation.——As the states owe large debts, and have large demands
upon them individually, there clearly will be a propriety in leaving in
their possession exclusively, some of the internal sources of taxation,
at least until the federal representation shall be properly encreased:
The power in the general government to lay and collect internal taxes,
will render its powers respecting armies, navies and the militia, the
more exceptionable. By the constitution it is proposed that congress
shall have power “to raise and support armies, but no appropriation
of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; to
provide and maintain a navy; to provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the union; suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions: to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the
militia;” reserving to the states the right to appoint the officers,
and to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
congress; congress will have unlimited power to raise armies, and to
engage officers and men for any number of years; but a legislative
act applying money for their support can have operation for no longer
term than two years, and if a subsequent congress, do [24] not within
the two years renew the appropriation, or further appropriate monies
for the use of the army, the army will be left to take care of itself.
When an army shall once be raised for a number of years, it is not
probable that it will find much difficulty in getting congress to pass
laws for applying monies to its support. I see so many men in America
fond of a standing army, and especially among those who probably will
have a large share in administering the federal system; it is very
evident to me, that we shall have a large standing army as soon as
the monies to support them can be possibly found. An army is not a
very agreeable place of employment for the young gentlemen of many
families. A power to raise armies must be lodged some where; still
this will not justify the lodging this power in a bare majority of so
few men without any checks; or in the government in which the great
body of the people, in the nature of things, will be only nominally
represented. In the state governments the great body of the people,
the yeomanry, &c. of the country, are represented: It is true they
will chuse the members of congress, and may now and then chuse a man
of their own way of thinking; but it is not impossible for forty, or
thirty thousand people in this country, one time in ten to find a man
who can possess similar feelings, views, and interests with themselves:
Powers to lay and collect taxes and to raise armies are of the greatest
moment; for carrying them into effect, laws need not be frequently
made, and the yeomanry, &c. of the country ought substantially to have
a check upon the passing of these laws; this check ought to be placed
in the legislatures, or at least, in the few men the common people of
the country, will, probably, have in congress, in the true sense of
the word, “from among themselves.” It is true, the yeomanry of the
country possess the lands, the weight of property, possess arms, and
are too strong a body of men to be openly offended—and, therefore,
it is urged, they will take care of themselves, that men who shall
govern will not dare pay any disrespect to their opinions. It is easily
perceived, that if they have not their proper negative upon passing
laws in congress, or on the passage of laws relative to taxes and
armies, they may in twenty or thirty years be by means imperceptible to
them, totally deprived of that boasted weight and strength: This may be
done in a great measure by congress, if disposed to do it, by modelling
the militia. Should one fifth or one eighth part of the men capable of
bearing arms, be made a select militia, as has been proposed, and those
the young and ardent part of the community, possessed of but little
or no property, and all the others put upon a plan that will render
them of no importance, the former will answer all the purposes of an
[25] army, while the latter will be defenceless. The state must train
the militia in such form and according to such systems and rules as
congress shall prescribe: and the only actual influence the respective
states will have respecting the militia will be in appointing the
officers. I see no provision made for calling out the _posse comitatus_
for executing the laws of the union, but provision is made for congress
to call forth the militia for the execution of them—and the militia
in general, or any select part of it, may be called out under military
officers, instead of the sheriff to enforce an execution of federal
laws, in the first instance, and thereby introduce an entire military
execution of the laws. I know that powers to raise taxes, to regulate
the military strength of the community on some uniform plan, to provide
for its defence and internal order, and for duly executing the laws,
must be lodged somewhere; but still we ought not so to lodge them, as
evidently to give one order of men in the community, undue advantages
over others; or commit the many to the mercy, prudence, and moderation
of the few. And so far as it may be necessary to lodge any of the
peculiar powers in the general government, a more safe exercise of
them ought to be secured, by requiring the consent of two-thirds or
three-fourths of congress thereto—until the federal representation can
be increased, so that the democratic members in congress may stand some
tolerable chance of a reasonable negative, in behalf of the numerous,
important, and democratic part of the community.

I am not sufficiently acquainted with the laws and internal police of
all the states to discern fully, how general bankrupt laws, made by the
union, would effect them, or promote the public good. I believe the
property of debtors, in the several states, is held responsible for
their debts in modes and forms very different. If uniform bankrupt laws
can be made without producing real and substantial inconveniences, I
wish them to be made by congress.

There are some powers proposed to be lodged in the general government
in the judicial department, I think very unnecessarily, I mean
powers respecting questions arising upon the internal laws of the
respective states. It is proper the federal judiciary should have
powers co-extensive with the federal legislature—that is, the power
of deciding finally on the laws of the union. By Art. 3, Sec. 2. the
powers of the federal judiciary are extended (among other things)
to all cases between a state and citizens of another state—between
citizens of different states—between a state or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens or subjects. Actions in all these cases,
except against a state government, are now brought and finally [26]
determined in the law courts of the states respectively and as there
are no words to exclude these courts of their jurisdiction in these
cases, they will have concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior federal
courts in them; and, therefore, if the new constitution be adopted
without any amendment in this respect, all those numerous actions,
now brought in the state courts between our citizens and foreigners,
between citizens of different states, by state governments against
foreigners, and by state governments against citizens of other states,
may also be brought in the federal courts; and an appeal will lay in
them from the state courts or federal inferior courts to the supreme
judicial court of the union. In almost all these cases, either party
may have the trial by jury in the state courts; except paper money
and tender laws, which are wisely guarded against in the proposed
constitution; justice may be obtained in these courts on reasonable
terms; they must be more competent to proper decisions on the laws of
their respective states, than the federal states can possibly be. I do
not, in any point of view, see the need of opening a new jurisdiction
in these causes—of opening a new scene of expensive law suits, of
suffering foreigners, and citizens of different states, to drag each
other many hundred miles into the federal courts. It is true, those
courts may be so organized by a wise and prudent legislature, as to
make the obtaining of justice in them tolerably easy; they may in
general be organized on the common law principles of the country: But
this benefit is by no means secured by the constitution. The trial by
jury is secured only in those few criminal cases, to which the federal
laws will extend—as crimes committed on the seas, against the laws
of nations, treason and counterfeiting the federal securities and
coin: But even in these cases, the jury trial of the vicinage is not
secured—particularly in the large states, a citizen may be tried
for a crime committed in the state, and yet tried in some states 500
miles from the place where it was committed; but the jury trial is
not secured at all in civil causes. Though the convention have not
established this trial, it is to be hoped that congress, in putting
the new system into execution, will do it by a legislative act, in
all cases in which it can be done with propriety. Whether the jury
trial is not excluded the supreme judicial court is an important
question. By Art. 3, Sec. 2, all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, and in those cases in which a state
shall be party, the supreme court shall have jurisdiction. In all the
other cases beforementioned, the supreme court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to _law and fact_, with such exception, and under
such regulations as the congress shall make. By court is understood a
court consisting of judges; and the [27] idea of a jury is excluded.
This court, or the judges, are to have jurisdiction on appeals, in all
the cases enumerated, as to law and fact; the judges are to decide the
law and try the fact, and the trial of the fact being assigned to the
judges by the constitution, a jury for trying the fact is excluded;
however, under the exceptions and powers to make regulations, congress
may, perhaps, introduce the jury, to try the fact in most necessary
cases.

There can be but one supreme court in which the final jurisdiction
will centre in all federal causes—except in cases where appeals by
law shall not be allowed: The judicial powers of the federal courts
extend in law and equity to certain cases: and, therefore, the
powers to determine on the law, in equity, and as to the fact, all
will concentrate in the supreme court:—These powers, which by this
constitution are blended in the same hands, the same judges, are in
Great-Britain deposited in different hands—to wit, the decision of
the law in the law judges, the decision in equity in the chancellor,
and the trial of the fact in the jury. It is a very dangerous thing to
vest in the same judge power to decide on the law, and also general
powers in equity; for if the law restrain him, he is only to step into
his shoes of equity, and give what judgment his reason or opinion may
dictate; we have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate
the divisions in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the
supreme court for many years will be mere discretion. I confess in the
constitution of this supreme court, as left by the constitution, I do
not see a spark of freedom or a shadow of our own or the British common
law.

This court is to have appellate jurisdiction in all the other cases
before mentioned: Many sensible men suppose that cases before mentioned
respect, as well the criminal cases as the civil ones mentioned
antecedently in the constitution, if so an appeal is allowed in
criminal cases—contrary to the usual sense of law. How far it may be
proper to admit a foreigner or the citizen of another state to bring
actions against state governments, which have failed in performing
so many, promises made during the war is doubtful: How far it may be
proper so to humble a state, as to oblige it to answer to an individual
in a court of law, is worthy of consideration; the states are now
subject to no such actions; and this new jurisdiction will subject the
states, and many defendants to actions, and processes, which were not
in the contemplation of the parties, when the contract was made; all
engagements existing between citizens of different states, citizens and
foreigners, states and foreigners; and states and citizens of other
states were made the parties contemplating the remedies then existing
on the laws of the states—— [28] and the new remedy proposed to be
given in the federal courts, can be founded on no principle whatever.

  Your’s, &c.,

  THE FEDERAL FARMER.


LETTER IV.

  OCTOBER 12TH, 1787.

  DEAR SIR,

It will not be possible to establish in the federal courts the jury
trial of the vicinage so well as in the state courts.

Third, there appears to me to be not only a premature deposit of some
important powers in the general government—but many of those deposited
there are undefined, and may be used to good or bad purposes as honest
or designing men shall prevail. By Art. 1, Sec. 2, representatives and
direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states, &c.——same
art. sect. 8, the congress shall have powers to lay and collect taxes,
duties, &c. for the common defence and general welfare, but all duties,
imposts and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States:
By the first recited clause, direct taxes shall be apportioned on the
states. This seems to favour the idea suggested by some sensible men
and writers that congress, as to direct taxes, will only have power
to make requisitions; but the latter clause, power to lay and collect
taxes, &c. seems clearly to favour the contrary opinion, and, in my
mind, the true one, the congress shall have power to tax immediately
individuals, without the intervention of the state legislatures, in
fact the first clause appears to me only to provide that each state
shall pay a certain portion of the tax, and the latter to provide that
congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, that is to assess
upon, and to collect of the individuals in the state, the states quota;
but these still I consider as undefined powers, because judicious men
understand them differently.

It is doubtful whether the vice-president is to have any
qualifications; none are mentioned; but he may serve as president,
and it may be inferred, he ought to be qualified therefore as the
president; but the qualifications of the president are required only
of the person to be elected president. By art. 2, sect. 2, “But the
congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as
they think proper in the president alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads of the departments.” Who are inferior officers? May not
a congress disposed to vest the appointment of all officers in the
president, [29] under this clause, vest the appointment of almost every
officer in the president alone, and destroy the check mentioned in the
first part of the clause, and lodged in the senate. It is true, this
check is badly lodged, but then some check upon the first magistrate in
appointing officers, ought it appears by the opinion of the convention,
and by the general opinion, to be established in the constitution. By
art. 3, sect. 2, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction
as to law and facts with such exceptions, &c. to what extent is it
intended the exceptions shall be carried—Congress may carry them so
far as to annihilate substantially the appellate jurisdiction, and the
clause be rendered of very little importance.

4th. There are certain rights which we have always held sacred in the
United States, and recognized in all our constitutions, and which, by
the adoption of the new constitution in its present form, will be left
unsecured. By article 6, the proposed constitution, and the laws of
the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby; anything in the constitution or laws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

It is to be observed that when the people shall adopt the proposed
constitution it will be their last and supreme act; it will be adopted
not by the people of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, &c., but by the
people of the United States; and wherever this constitution, or any
part of it, shall be incompatible with the ancient customs, rights, the
laws or the constitutions heretofore established in the United States,
it will entirely abolish them and do them away: And not only this, but
the laws of the United States which shall be; made in pursuance of
the federal constitution will be also supreme laws, and wherever they
shall be incompatible with those customs, rights, laws or constitutions
heretofore established, they will also entirely abolish them and do
them away.

By the article before recited, treaties also made under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law: It is not said that
these treaties shall be made in pursuance of the constitution—nor
are there any constitutional bounds set to those who shall make them:
The president and two-thirds of the senate will be empowered to make
treaties indefinitely, and when these treaties shall be made, they will
also abolish all laws and state constitutions incompatible with them.
This power in the president and senate is absolute, and the judges
will be bound to allow full force to whatever rule, article or thing
the president and senate shall establish by treaty, whether it be [30]
practicable to set any bounds to those who make treaties, I am not
able to say; if not, it proves that this power ought to be more safely
lodged.

The federal constitution, the laws of congress made in pursuance of
the constitution, and all treaties must have full force and effect
in all parts of the United States; and all other laws, rights and
constitutions which stand in their way must yield: It is proper the
national laws should be supreme, and superior to state or district
laws; but then the national laws ought to yield to unalienable or
fundamental rights——and national laws, made by a few men, should
extend only to a few national objects. This will not be the case with
the laws of congress: To have any proper idea of their extent, we
must carefully examine the legislative, executive and judicial powers
proposed to be lodged in the general government, and consider them in
connection with a general clause in art. 1, sect. 8, in these words
(after enumerating a number of powers) “To make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”——The
powers of this government as has been observed, extend to internal as
well as external objects, and to those objects to which all others are
subordinate; it is almost impossible to have a just conception of their
powers, or of the extent and number of the laws which may be deemed
necessary and proper to carry them into effect, till we shall come
to exercise those powers and make the laws. In making laws to carry
those powers into effect, it is to be expected, that a wise and prudent
congress will pay respect to the opinions of a free people, and bottom
their laws on those principles which have been considered as essential
and fundamental in the British, and in our government: But a congress
of a different character will not be bound by the constitution to pay
respect to those principles.

It is said that when people make a constitution, and delegate powers,
that all powers are not delegated by them to those who govern, is
reserved in the people; and that the people, in the present case,
have reserved in themselves, and in their state governments, every
right and power not expressly given by the federal constitution to
those who shall administer the national government. It is said, on the
other hand, that the people, when they make a constitution, yield all
power not expressly reserved to themselves. The truth is, in either
case, it is mere matter of opinion, and men usually take either side
of the argument, as will best answer their purposes: But the general
[31] presumption being, that men who govern, will in doubtful cases,
construe laws and constitutions most favourably for increasing their
own powers; all wise and prudent people, in forming constitutions,
have drawn the line, and carefully described the powers parted with
and the powers reserved. By the state constitutions, certain rights
have been reserved in the people; or rather, they have been recognized
and established in such a manner, that state legislatures are bound
to respect them, and to make no laws infringing upon them. The state
legislatures are obliged to take notice of the bills of rights of their
respective states. The bills of rights, and the state constitutions,
are fundamental compacts only between those who govern, and the people
of the same state.

In the year 1788 the people of the United States made a federal
constitution, which is a fundamental compact between them and their
federal rulers; these rulers, in the nature of things, cannot be
bound to take notice of any other compact. It would be absurd for
them, in making laws, to look over thirteen, fifteen, or twenty state
constitutions, to see what rights are established as fundamental, and
must not be infringed upon, in making laws in the society. It is true,
they would be bound to do it if the people, in their federal compact,
should refer to the state constitutions, recognize all parts not
inconsistent with the federal constitution, and direct their federal
rulers to take notice of them accordingly; but this is not the case,
as the plan stands proposed at present; and it is absurd, to suppose
so unnatural an idea is intended or implied. I think my opinion is not
only founded in reason, but I think it is supported by the report of
the convention itself. If there are a number of rights established by
the state constitutions, and which will remain sacred, and the general
government is bound to take notice of them—it must take notice of one
as well as another; and if unnecessary to recognize or establish one
by the federal constitution, it would be unnecessary to recognize or
establish another by it. If the federal constitution is to be construed
so far in connection with the state constitution, as to leave the
trial by jury in civil causes, for instance, secured; on the same
principles it would have left the trial by jury in criminal causes,
the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, &c. secured; they all stand
on the same footing; they are the common rights of Americans, and have
been recognized by the state constitutions: But the convention found
it necessary to recognize or re-establish the benefits of that writ,
and the jury trial in criminal cases. As to _expost facto_ laws, the
convention has done the same in one case, and gone further in another.
It is a part of the com- [32] pact between the people of each state
and their rulers, that no _expost facto_ laws shall be made. But the
convention, by Art. 1, Sect. 10, have put a sanction upon this part
even of the state compacts. In fact, the 9th and 10th Sections in
Art. 1, in the proposed constitution, are no more nor less, than a
partial bill of rights; they establish certain principles as part of
the compact upon which the federal legislators and officers can never
infringe. It is here wisely stipulated, that the federal legislature
shall never pass a bill of attainder, or _expost facto_ law; that no
tax shall be laid on articles exported, &c. The establishing of one
right implies the necessity of establishing another and similar one.

On the whole, the position appears to me to be undeniable, that this
bill of rights ought to be carried farther, and some other principles
established, as a part of this fundamental compact between the people
of the United States and their federal rulers.

It is true, we are not disposed to differ much, at present, about
religion; but when we are making a constitution, it is to be hoped, for
ages and millions yet unborn, why not establish the free exercise of
religion, as a part of the national compact. There are other essential
rights, which we have justly understood to be the rights of freemen;
as freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants
not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution, for searching
and seizing men’s papers, property, and persons. The trials by jury
in civil causes, it is said, varies so much in the several states,
that no words could be found for the uniform establishment of it. If
so, the federal legislation will not be able to establish it by any
general laws. I confess I am of opinion it may be established, but not
in that beneficial manner in which we may enjoy it, for the reasons
beforementioned. When I speak of the jury trial of the vicinage, or
the trial of the fact in the neighborhood, I do not lay so much stress
upon the circumstance of our being tried by our neighbours: in this
enlightened country men may be probably impartially tried by those who
do not live very near them: but the trial of facts in the neighbourhood
is of great importance in other respects. Nothing can be more essential
than the cross examining witnesses, and generally before the triers of
the facts in question. The common people can establish facts with much
more ease with oral than written evidence; when trials of facts are
removed to a distance from the homes of the parties and witnesses, oral
evidence becomes intolerably expensive, and the parties must depend on
written evidence, which to the common people is expensive and almost
[33] useless; it must be frequently taken ex porte, and but very seldom
leads to the proper discovery of truth.

The trial by jury is very important in another point of view. It is
essential in every free country, that common people should have a part
and share of influence, in the judicial as well as in the legislative
department. To hold open to them the offices of senators, judges,
and offices to fill which an expensive education is required, cannot
answer any valuable purposes for them; they are not in a situation to
be brought forward and to fill those offices; these, and most other
offices of any considerable importance, will be occupied by the few.
The few, the well born, &c. as Mr. Adams calls them, in judicial
decisions as well as in legislation, are generally disposed, and very
naturally too, to favour those of their own description.

The trial by jury in the judicial department, and the collection of
the people by their representatives in the legislature, are those
fortunate inventions which have procured for them, in this country,
their true proportion of influence, and the wisest and most fit means
of protecting themselves in the community. Their situation, as jurors
and representatives, enables them to acquire information and knowledge
in the affairs and government of the society; and to come forward,
in turn, as the sentinels and guardians of each other. I am very
sorry that even a few of our countrymen should consider jurors and
representatives in a different point of view, as ignorant, troublesome
bodies, which ought not to have any share in the concerns of government.

I confess I do not see in what cases the congress can, with any
pretence of right, make a law to suppress the freedom of the press;
though I am not clear, that congress is restrained from laying any
duties whatever on printing, and from laying duties particularly heavy
on certain pieces printed, and perhaps congress may require large bonds
for the payment of these duties. Should the printer say, the freedom
of the press was secured by the constitution of the state in which he
lived, congress might, and perhaps, with great propriety, answer, that
the federal constitution is the only compact existing between them
and the people; in this compact the people have named no others, and
therefore congress, in exercising the powers assigned them, and in
making laws to carry them into execution, are restrained by nothing
beside the federal constitution, any more than a state legislature is
restrained by a compact between the magistrates and people of a county,
city, or town of which the people, in forming the state constitution,
have taken no notice.

It is not my object to enumerate rights of inconsiderable [34]
importance; but there are others, no doubt, which ought to be
established as a fundamental part of the national system.

It is worthy of observation, that all treaties are made by foreign
nations with a confederacy of thirteen states—that the western country
is attached to thirteen states—thirteen states have jointly and
severally engaged to pay the public debts.—Should a new government be
formed of nine, ten, eleven, or twelve states, those treaties could
not be considered as binding on the foreign nations who made them.
However, I believe the probability to be, that if nine states adopt the
constitution, the others will.

It may also be worthy our examination, how far the provision for
amending this plan, when it shall be adopted, is of any importance.
No measures can be taken towards amendments, unless two-thirds of the
congress, or two-thirds of the legislature of the several states shall
agree.—While power is in the hands of the people, or democratic part
of the community, more especially as at present, it is easy, according
to the general course of human affairs, for the few influential men in
the community, to obtain conventions, alterations in government, and to
persuade the common people that they may change for the better, and to
get from them a part of the power. But when power is once transferred
from the many to the few, all changes become extremely difficult; the
government, in this case, being beneficial to the few, they will be
exceedingly artful and adroit in preventing any measures which may
lead to a change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions
and severe struggles on the part of the common people. Every man of
reflection must see, that the change now proposed, is a transfer of
power from the many to the few, and the probability is, the artful
and ever active aristocracy, will prevent all peaceful measures for
changes, unless when they shall discover some favorable moment to
increase their own influence. I am sensible, thousands of men in
the United States, are disposed to adopt the proposed constitution,
though they perceive it to be essentially defective, under an idea that
amendments of it, may be obtained when necessary. This is a pernicious
idea, it argues a servility of character totally unfit for the support
of free government; it is very repugnant to that perpetual jealousy
respecting liberty, so absolutely necessary in all free states, spoken
of by Mr. Dickinson.—However, if our countrymen are so soon changed,
and the language of 1774, is become odious to them, it will be in
vain to use the language of freedom, or to attempt to rouse them to
free enquiries: But I shall never believe this is the case with them,
whatever present appearances may be, till I shall have very strong
evidence indeed of it.

  Your’s, &c.

  THE FEDERAL FARMER.


[35] LETTER V.

  OCTOBER 15th, 1787.

  DEAR SIR,

Thus I have examined the federal constitution as far as a few days
leisure would permit. It opens to my mind a new scene; instead of
seeing powers cautiously lodged in the hands of numerous legislators,
and many magistrates, we see all important powers collecting in one
centre, where a few men will possess them almost at discretion. And
instead of checks in the formation of the government, to secure the
rights of the people against the usurpations of those they appoint to
govern, we are to understand the equal division of lands among our
people, and the strong arm furnished them by nature and situation, are
to secure them against those usurpations. If there are advantages in
the equal division of our lands, and the strong and manly habits of our
people, we ought to establish governments calculated to give duration
to them, and not governments which never can work naturally, till
that equality of property, and those free and manly habits shall be
destroyed; these evidently are not the natural basis of the proposed
constitution. No man of reflection, and skilled in the science of
government, can suppose these will move on harmoniously together for
ages, or even for fifty years. As to the little circumstances commented
upon, by some writers, with applause—as the age of a representative,
of the president, &c.—they have, in my mind, no weight in the general
tendency of the system.

There are, however, in my opinion, many good things in the proposed
system. It is founded on elective principles, and the deposits of
powers in different hands, is essentially right. The guards against
those evils we have experienced in some states in legislation are
valuable indeed; but the value of every feature in this system is
vastly lessened for the want of that one important feature in a free
government, a representation of the people. Because we have sometimes
abused democracy, I am not among those men who think a democratic
branch a nuisance; which branch shall be sufficiently numerous to admit
some of the best informed men of each order in the community into the
administration of government.

While the radical defects in the proposed system are not so soon
discovered, some temptations to each state, and to many classes of
men to adopt it, are very visible. It uses the democratic language of
several of the state constitutions, particularly that of Massachusetts;
the eastern states will receive advantages so far as the regulation
of trade, by a bare majority, is committed to it: Connecticut and New
Jersey will receive their share of a [36] general impost: The middle
states will receive the advantages surrounding the seat of government;
The southern states will receive protection, and have their negroes
represented in the legislature, and large back countries will soon have
a majority in it. This system promises a large field of employment
to military gentlemen, and gentlemen of the law; and in case the
government shall be executed without convulsions, it will afford
security to creditors, to the clergy, salary-men and others depending
on money payments. So far as the system promises justice and reasonable
advantages, in these respects, it ought to be supported by all honest
men; but whenever it promises unequal and improper advantages to any
particular states, or orders of men, it ought to be opposed.

I have, in the course of these letters observed, that there are many
good things in the proposed constitution, and I have endeavored to
point out many important defects in it. I have admitted that we want a
federal system—that we have a system presented, which, with several
alterations may be made a tolerable good one—I have admitted there
is a well founded uneasiness among creditors and mercantile men. In
this situation of things, you ask me what I think ought to be done? My
opinion in this case is only the opinion of an individual, and so far
only as it corresponds with the opinions of the honest and substantial
part of the community, is it entitled to consideration. Though I am
fully satisfied that the state conventions ought most seriously to
direct their exertions to altering and amending the system proposed
before they shall adopt it—yet I have not sufficiently examined the
subject, or formed an opinion, how far it will be practicable for those
conventions to carry their amendments. As to the idea, that it will
be in vain for those conventions to attempt amendments, it cannot be
admitted; it is impossible to say whether they can or not until the
attempt shall be made; and when it shall be determined, by experience,
that the conventions cannot agree in amendments, it will then be an
important question before the people of the United States, whether they
will adopt or not the system proposed in its present form. This subject
of consolidating the states is new: and because forty or fifty men
have agreed in a system, to suppose the good sense of this country, an
enlightened nation, must adopt it without examination, and though in a
state of profound peace, without endeavouring to amend those parts they
perceive are defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive of the
valuable principles of republican government—is truly humiliating. It
is true there may be danger in delay; but there is danger in adopting
the system in its present form; and I see the danger in either case
will arise principally from the conduct and views of [37] two very
unprincipled parties in the United States—two fires, between which
the honest and substantial people have long found themselves situated.
One party is composed of little insurgents, men in debt, who want no
law, and who want a share of the property of others; these are called
levellers, Shayites, &c. The other party is composed of a few, but
more dangerous men, with their servile dependents; these avariciously
grasp at all power and property; you may discover in all the actions of
these men, an evident dislike to free and equal government, and they
will go systematically to work to change, essentially, the forms of
government in this country; these are called aristocrats, m——ites,
&c. &c. Between these two parties is the weight of the community; the
men of middling property, men not in debt on the one hand, and men,
on the other, content with republican governments, and not aiming at
immense fortunes, offices, and power. In 1786, the little insurgents,
the levellers, came forth, invaded the rights of others, and attempted
to establish governments according to their wills. Their movements
evidently gave encouragement to the other party, which, in 1787, has
taken the political field, and with its fashionable dependants, and
the tongue and the pen, is endeavoring to establish in a great haste,
a politer kind of government. These two parties, which will probably
be opposed or united as it may suit their interests and views, are
really insignificant, compared with the solid, free, and independent
part of the community. It is not my intention to suggest, that either
of these parties, and the real friends of the proposed constitution,
are the same men. The fact is, these aristocrats support and hasten the
adoption of the proposed constitution, merely because they think it is
a stepping stone to their favorite object. I think I am well founded
in this idea; I think the general politics of these men support it,
as well as the common observation among them, that the proffered plan
is the best that can be got at present, it will do for a few years,
and lead to something better. The sensible and judicious part of the
community will carefully weigh all these circumstances; they will view
the late convention as a respectable body of men—America probably
never will see an assembly of men, of a like number, more respectable.
But the members of the convention met without knowing the sentiments
of one man in ten thousand in these states respecting the new ground
taken. Their doings are but the first attempts in the most important
scene ever opened. Though each individual in the state conventions will
not, probably, be so respectable as each individual in the federal
convention, yet as the state conventions will probably consist of
fifteen hundred or two thousand men of abilities, and versed in the
science of government, [38] collected from all parts of the community
and from all orders of men, it must be acknowledged that the weight of
respectability will be in them.—In them will be collected the solid
sense and the real political character of the country. Being revisers
of the subject, they will possess peculiar advantages. To say that
these conventions ought not to attempt, coolly and deliberately, the
revision of the system, or that they cannot amend it, is very foolish
or very assuming. If these conventions, after examining the system,
adopt it, I shall be perfectly satisfied, and wish to see men make the
administration of the government an equal blessing to all orders of
men. I believe the great body of our people to be virtuous and friendly
to good government, to the protection of liberty and property; and
it is the duty of all good men, especially of those who are placed
as sentinels to guard their rights—it is their duty to examine into
the prevailing politics of parties, and to disclose them—while they
avoid exciting undue suspicions, to lay facts before the people, which
will enable them to form a proper judgment. Men who wish the people of
this country to determine for themselves, and deliberately to fit the
government to their situation, must feel some degree of indignation at
those attempts to hurry the adoption of a system, and to shut the door
against examination. The very attempts create suspicions, that those
who make them have secret views, or see some defects in the system,
which, in the hurry of affairs, they expect will escape the eye of a
free people.

What can be the views of those gentlemen in Pennsylvania, who
precipitated decisions on this subject? What can be the views of
those gentlemen in Boston, who countenanced the Printers in shutting
up the press against a fair and free investigation of this important
system in the usual way. The members of the convention have done their
duty——why should some of them fly to their states——almost forget a
propriety of behaviour, and precipitate measures for the adoption of a
system of their own making? I confess candidly, when I consider these
circumstances in connection with the unguarded parts of the system I
have mentioned, I feel disposed to proceed with very great caution,
and to pay more attention than usual to the conduct of particular
characters. If the constitution presented be a good one, it will stand
the test with a well informed people: all are agreed that there shall
be state conventions to examine it; and we must believe it will be
adopted, unless we suppose it is a bad one, or that those conventions
will make false divisions respecting it. I admit improper measures
are taken against the adoption of the system as well for it——all
who object to the plan proposed ought to point out the defects [39]
objected to, and to propose those amendments with which they can accept
it, or to propose some other system of government, that the public
mind may be known, and that we may be brought to agree in some system
of government, to strengthen and execute the present, or to provide
a substitute. I consider the field of enquiry just opened, and that
we are to look to the state conventions for ultimate decisions on the
subject before us; it is not to be presumed, that they will differ
about small amendments, and lose a system when they shall have made
it substantially good; but touching the essential amendments, it is
to be presumed the several conventions will pursue the most rational
measures to agree in and obtain them; and such defects as they shall
discover and not remove, they will probably notice, keep them in
view as the ground work of future amendments, and in the firm and
manly language which every free people ought to use, will suggest to
those who may hereafter administer the government, that it is their
expectation, that the system will be so organized by legislative
acts, and the government so administered, as to render those defects
as little injurious as possible. Our countrymen are entitled to an
honest and faithful government; to a government of laws and not of
men; and also to one of their chusing—as a citizen of the country,
I wish to see these objects secured, and licentious, assuming, and
overbearing men restrained; if the constitution or social compact be
vague and unguarded, then we depend wholly upon the prudence, wisdom
and moderation of those who manage the affairs of government; or on
what, probably, is equally uncertain and precarious, the success of the
people oppressed by the abuse of government, in receiving it from the
hands of those who abuse it, and placing it in the hands of those who
will use it well.

In every point of view, therefore, in which I have been able, as yet,
to contemplate this subject, I can discern but one rational mode of
proceeding relative to it: and that is to examine it with freedom and
candour, to have state conventions some months hence, which shall
examine coolly every article, clause, and word in the system proposed,
and to adopt it with such amendments as they shall think fit. How
far the state conventions ought to pursue the mode prescribed by the
federal convention of adopting or rejecting the plan in toto, I leave
it to them to determine. Our examination of the subject hitherto has
been rather of a general nature. The republican characters in the
several states, who wish to make this plan more adequate to security of
liberty and property, and to the duration of the principles of a free
government, will, no doubt, collect their opinions to certain points,
and accurately define those [40] alterations and amendments they wish;
if it shall be found they essentially disagree in them, the conventions
will then be able to determine whether to adopt the plan as it is, or
what will be proper to be done.

Under these impressions, and keeping in view the improper and
unadvisable lodgment of powers in the general government, organized
as it at present is, touching internal taxes, armies and militia, the
elections of its own members, causes between citizens of different
states, &c. and the want of a more perfect bill of rights, &c. I
drop the subject for the present, and when I shall have leisure
to revise and correct my ideas respecting it, and to collect into
points the opinions of those who wish to make the system more secure
and safe, perhaps I may proceed to point out particularly for your
consideration, the amendments which ought to be ingrafted into this
system, not only in conformity to my own, but the deliberate opinions
of others—you will with me perceive, that the objections to the plan
proposed may, by a more leisure examination be set in a stronger point
of view, especially the important one, that there is no substantial
representation of the people provided for in a government in which the
most essential powers, even as to the internal police of the country,
is proposed to be lodged.

I think the honest and substantial part of the community will wish
to see this system altered, permanency and consistency given to the
constitution we shall adopt; and therefore they will be anxious
to apportion the powers to the features and organizations of the
government, and to see abuse in the exercise of power more effectually
guarded against. It is suggested, that state officers, from interested
motives will oppose the constitution presented——I see no reason for
this, their places in general will not be effected, but new openings to
offices and places of profit must evidently be made by the adoption of
the constitution in its present form.

  Your’s, &c.

  THE FEDERAL FARMER.

  _To the_ REPUBLICAN.



# George Mason, Objections to the Proposed Federal Constitution (1787)

The Objections of the / Hon. George Mason, / to the proposed Foederal
Constitution. / Addressed to the Citizens of Virginia. /..... / Printed
by Thomas Nicholas.

  Folio, Broadside.

  George Mason was a member of the Federal Convention, but refused to
  sign the Constitution, and was a leader of the opposition to its
  ratification in the Virginia Convention.

  “I take the liberty to enclose to you my objections to the new
  Constitution of government, which a little moderation and temper at
  the end of the convention might have removed.... You will readily
  observe, that my objections are not numerous (the greater part of the
  enclosed paper containing reasonings upon the probable effects of
  the exceptionable parts), though in my mind some of them are capital
  ones.” Mason to Washington, October 7th, 1787.

  Madison’s letter to Washington of October 18th, 1787, contains a
  cursory answer to Mason’s “Objections,” and a more elaborate one by
  James Iredell is printed in this volume.

  P. L. F.


There is no declaration of rights: and the laws of the general
government being paramount to the laws and constitutions of the several
states, the declarations of rights, in the separate states, are no
security. Nor are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the
benefit of the common law, which stands here upon no other foundation
than its having been adopted by the respective acts forming the
constitutions of the several states.

In the House of Representatives there is not the substance, but
the shadow only of representation; which can never produce proper
information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the
people.—The laws will, therefore, be generally made by men little
concerned in, and unacquainted with their effects and consequences.(66)

The Senate have the power of altering all money-bills, and of
originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of the officers
of their appointment, in conjunction with the President of the United
States—Although they are not the representatives of the people, or
amenable to them. These, with their other great powers, (viz. their
powers in the appointment of ambassadors, and all public officers, in
making treaties, and in trying all impeachments) their influence upon,
and connection with, the supreme executive from these causes, their
duration of office, and their being a constant existing body, almost
continually sitting, joined with their being one complete branch of the
legislature, will destroy any balance in the government, and enable
them to accomplish what usurpations they please, upon the rights and
liberties of the people.

The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as
to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby
rendering laws as tedious, intricate, and expensive, and justice as
unattainable by a great part of the community, as in England; and
enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.

The President of the United States has no constitutional council (a
thing unknown in any safe and regular government,) he will therefore
be unsupported by proper information and advice; and will generally
be directed by minions and favorites—or he will become a tool to
the Senate—or a council of state will grow out of the principal
officers of the great departments—the worst and most dangerous of
all ingredients for such a council, in a free country; for they
may be induced to join in any dangerous or oppressive measures, to
shelter themselves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct
in office. Whereas, had a constitutional council been formed (as was
proposed) of six members, viz., two from the eastern, two from the
middle, and two from the southern states, to be appointed by vote of
the states in the House of Representatives, with the same duration
and rotation of office as the Senate, the executive would always have
had safe and proper information and advice; the president of such a
council might have acted as Vice-President of the United States, _pro
tempore_, upon any vacancy or disability of the chief magistrate; and
long continued sessions of the Senate, would in a great measure have
been prevented. From this fatal defect of a constitutional council,
has arisen the improper power of the Senate, in the appointment of the
public officers, and the alarming dependence and connexion between
that branch of the legislature and the supreme executive. Hence, also,
sprung that unnecessary officer, the Vice-President, who, for want of
other employment, is made President of the Senate; thereby dangerously
blending the executive and legislative powers; besides always giving to
some one of the states an unnecessary and unjust pre-eminence over the
others.

The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of
granting pardon for treason; which may be sometimes exercised to screen
from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the
crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt. By declaring
all treaties supreme laws of the land, the executive and the Senate
have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation, which might
have been avoided, by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and
requiring the assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be
done with safety.

By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation
laws, the five southern states (whose produce and circumstances are
totally different from those of the eight northern and eastern states)
will be ruined: for such rigid and premature regulations may be made,
as will enable the merchants of the northern and eastern states not
only to demand an exorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase
of the commodities, at their own price, for many years, to the great
injury of the landed interest, and the impoverishment of the people:
and the danger is the greater, as the gain on one side will be in
proportion to the loss on the other. Whereas, requiring two-thirds
of the members present in both houses, would have produced mutual
moderation, promoted the general interest, and removed an insuperable
objection to the adoption of the government.

Under their own construction of the general clause at the end of
the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade
and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe
punishments, and extend their power as far as they shall think proper;
so that the state legislatures have no security for the powers now
presumed to remain to them; or the people for their rights. There is no
declaration of any kind for preserving the liberty of the press, the
trial by jury in civil cases, nor against the danger of standing armies
in time of peace.

The state legislatures are restrained from laying export duties
on their own produce—the general legislature is restrained from
prohibiting the further importation of slaves for twenty odd years,
though such importations render the United States weaker, more
vulnerable, and less capable of defence. Both the general legislature,
and the state legislatures are expressly prohibited making _ex post
facto_ laws, though there never was, nor can be, a legislature, but
must and will make such laws, when necessity and the public safety
require them, which will hereafter be a breach of all the constitutions
in the union, and afford precedents for other innovations.

This government will commence in a moderate aristocracy; it is at
present impossible to foresee whether it will, in its operation,
produce a monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive aristocracy; it will most
probably vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the
one or the other.

  GEO. MASON.



# The Letters of Agrippa

THE LETTERS OF AGRIPPA, ACCREDITED TO JAMES WINTHROP.


Printed In The Massachusetts Gazette,
November, 1787-January, 1788.


Note.


The letters of Agrippa were the ablest anti-federal publications printed
in Massachusetts, and showed especial ability in arguing the dangers and
defects of a plan of government which was both so peculiarly needed, and
so specially advantageous to the State of Massachusetts, that its adoption
was only endangered by certain questions of local politics, which could
not even enter into the discussion. They were noticed, or replied to, in
the Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 21, 1787, by “Charles James Fox;” Dec. 28,
1787, and Jan. 4, 1788, by “Kempis O’Flanagan,” Jan. 22, and 25, 1788, by
“Junius,” and in the letters of Cassius, printed in this volume.

At the time of publication they were accredited to the pen of James
Winthrop, of Cambridge, and he was repeatedly attacked as the author,
without denying it; while his supposed authorship and general opposition
to the Constitution contributed to defeat his election by Cambridge to the
Massachusetts Convention for considering the proposed government,
receiving only one vote in the whole town. On the contrary, the writer, in
his tenth letter, states that the surmises as to the authorship are not
correct, and in the Massachusetts Gazette of Dec. 21, 1787, the following
appeared:


    I feel myself _greatly hurt_ at the liberties lately taken by
    certain _scribblers_ with the characters of the _hon._ E. Gerry
    and James Winthrop, _esquire_, of Cambridge, two gentlemen, no
    less distinguished for their _honesty_, _patriotism_, and
    _extensive abilities_, than a Washington or a Franklin.

    ... In regard to J. Winthrop, _esquire_, (of said Cambridge) it
    has been insinuated, that that gentleman is the author of the
    pieces in the Massachusetts Gazette, signed Agrippa—but every one
    who can _boast the pleasure of his acquaintance_, must _know that
    insinuation_ is grounded on _falsehood_.

    The heterogenous compound of nonsense and absurdity with which the
    compositions of _Agrippa_ are so replete, are certainly not the
    productions of a man so celebrated for his superior knowledge and
    _understanding_.

    In short, Mr. Printer, I hope you and your brother typographers
    will be very careful how you are _guilty_ of _exposing_ such
    _exalted characters_ in future.

    OCRICO.


Agrippa, I.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 385)

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

Many inconveniences and difficulties in the new plan of government have
been mentioned by different writers on that subject. Mr. Gerry has given
the publick his objections against it, with a manly freedom.(16) The
seceding members from the Pennsylvania Assembly also published theirs.(17)
Various anonymous writers have mentioned reasons of great weight. Among
the many objections have been stated the unlimited right of taxation—a
standing army—an inadequate representation of the people—a right to
destroy the constitution of the separate states, and all the barriers that
have been set up in defence of liberty—the right to try causes between
private persons in many cases without a jury; without trying in the
vicinity of either party; and without any limitation of the value which is
to be tried. To none of these or any other objections has any answer been
given, but such as have acknowledged the truth of the objection while they
insulted the objector. This conduct has much the appearance of trying to
force a general sentiment upon the people.

The idea of promoting the happiness of the people by opposing all their
habits of business, and by subverting the laws to which they are
habituated, appears to me to be at least a mistaken proceeding. If to this
we add the limitations of trade, restraints on its freedom, and the
alteration of its course, and _transfer of the market_, all under the
pretence of regulation for _federal purposes_, we shall not find any
additional reason to be pleased with the plan.

It is now conceded on all sides that the laws relating to civil causes
were never better executed than at present. It is confessed by a warm
federalist in answer to Mr. Gerry’s sensible letter, that the courts are
so arranged at present that no inconvenience is found, and that if the new
plan takes place great difficulties may arise. With this confession before
him, can any reasonable man doubt whether he shall exchange a system,
found by experience to be convenient, for one that is in many respects
inconvenient and dangerous? The expense of the new plan is terrifying, if
there was no other objection. But they are multiplied. Let us consider
that of the representation.

There is to be one representative for every thirty thousand people. Boston
would nearly send one, but with regard to another there is hardly a county
in the state which would have one. The representatives are to be chosen
for two years. In this space, when it is considered that their residence
is from two hundred to five hundred miles from their constituents, it is
difficult to suppose that they will retain any great affection for the
welfare of the people. They will have an army to support them, and may bid
defiance to the clamours of their subjects. Should the people cry aloud
the representative may avail himself of the right to alter the _time of
election_ and postpone it for another year. In truth, the question before
the people is, _whether they will have a limited government or an absolute
one_!

It is a fact justified by the experience of all mankind from the earliest
antiquity down to the present time, that freedom is necessary to industry.
We accordingly find that in absolute governments, the people, be the
climate what it may, are general [sic] lazy, cowardly, turbulent, and
vicious to an extreme. On the other hand, in free countries are found in
general, activity, industry, arts, courage, generosity, and all the manly
virtues.

Can there be any doubt which to choose? He that Hesitates must be base
indeed.

A favourite objection against a free government is drawn from the
irregularities of the Greek and Roman republicks. But it is to be
considered that war was the employment which they considered as most
becoming freemen. Agriculture, arts, and most domestick employment were
committed chiefly to slaves. But Carthage, the great commercial republick
of antiquity, though resembling Rome in the form of its government, and
her rival for power, retained her freedom longer than Rome, and was never
disturbed by sedition during the long period of her duration. This is a
striking proof that the fault of the Greek and Roman republicks was not
owing to the form of their government, and that the spirit of commerce is
the great bond of union among citizens. This furnishes employment for
their activity, supplies their mutual wants, defends the rights of
property, and producing reciprocal dependencies, renders the whole system
harmonious and energetick. Our great object therefore ought to be to
encourage this spirit. If we examine the present state of the world we
shall find that most of the business is done in the freest states, and
that industry decreases in proportion to the rigour of government.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, II.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 386)

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In the Gazette of the 23d instant, I ascertained from the state of other
countries and the experience of mankind, that free countries are most
friendly to commerce and to the rights of property. This produces greater
internal tranquility. For every man, finding sufficient employment for his
active powers in the way of trade, agriculture and manufactures, feels no
disposition to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the government which
protects him, and of which he is a constituent part. Of the truth of these
positions we have abundant evidence in the history of our own country.
Soon after the settlement of Massachusetts, and its formation into a
commonwealth, in the earlier part of the last century, there was a
sedition at Hingham and Weymouth. The governour passing by at that time
with his guard, seized some of the mutineers and imprisoned them. This was
complained of as a violation of their rights, and the governour lost his
election the next year; but the year afterwards was restored and continued
to be re-elected for several years. The government does not appear to have
been disturbed again till the revocation of the charter in 1686, being a
period of about half a century.

Connecticut set out originally on the same principles, and has continued
uniformly to exercise the powers of government to this time.

During the last year,(18) we had decisive evidences of the vigour of this
kind of government. In Connecticut, the treason was restrained while it
existed only in the form of conspiracy. In Vermont, the conspirators
assembled in arms, but were suppressed by the exertions of the militia,
under the direction of their sheriffs. In New-Hampshire, the attack was
made on the legislature, but the insurrection was in a very few hours
suppressed, and has never been renewed. In Massachusetts, the danger was
by delay suffered to increase. One judicial court after another was
stopped, and even the capital trembled. Still, however, when the supreme
executive gave the signal, a force of many thousands of active, resolute
men, took the field, during the severities of winter, and every difficulty
vanished before them. Since that time we have been continually coalescing.
The people have applied with diligence to their several occupations, and
the whole country wears one face of improvement. Agriculture has been
improved, manufactures multiplied, and trade prodigiously enlarged. These
are the advantages of freedom in a growing country. While our resources
have been thus rapidly increasing, the courts have set in every part of
the commonwealth, without any guard to defend them; have tried causes of
every kind, whether civil or criminal, and the sheriffs, have in no case
been interrupted in the execution of their office. In those cases indeed,
where the government was more particularly interested, mercy has been
extended; but in civil causes, and in the case of moral offences, the law
has been punctually executed. Damage done to individuals, during the
tumults, has been repaired, by judgment of the courts of law, and the
award has been carried into effect. This is the present state of affairs,
when we are asked to relinquish that freedom which produces such happy
effects.

The attempt has been made to deprive us of such a beneficial system, and
to substitute a rigid one in its stead, by criminally alarming our fears,
exalting certain characters on one side, and vilifying them on the other.
I wish to say nothing of the merits or demerits of individuals; such
arguments always do hurt. But assuredly my countrymen cannot fail to
consider and determine who are the most worthy of confidence in a business
of this magnitude.

Whether they will trust persons, who have from their cradles been
incapable of comprehending any other principles of government, than those
of absolute power, and who have, in this very affair, tried to deprive
them of their constitutional liberty, by a pitiful trick. They cannot
avoid prefering those who have uniformly exerted themselves to establish a
limited government, and to secure to individuals all the liberty that is
consistent with justice, between man and man, and whose efforts, by the
smiles of Providence, have hitherto been crowned with the most splendid
success. After the treatment we have received, we have a right to be
jealous, and to guard our present constitution with the strictest care. It
is the right of the people to judge, and they will do wisely to give an
explicit instruction to their delegates in the proposed convention, not to
agree to any proposition that will in any degree militate with that happy
system of government under which Heaven has placed them.

AGRIPPA.

_November 24, 1787._


Agrippa, III.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 387)

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

It has been proved from the clearest evidence, in two former papers, that
a free government, I mean one in which the power frequently returns to the
body of the people, is in principle the most stable and efficient of any
kind; that such a government affords the most ready and effectual remedy
for all injuries done to persons and the rights of property. It is true we
have had a tender act.(19) But what government has not some law in favour
of debtors? The difficulty consists in finding one that is not more
unfriendly to the creditors than ours. I am far from justifying such
things. On the contrary, I believe that it is universally true, that acts
made to favour a part of the community are wrong in principle. All that is
now intended is, to remark that we are not worse than other people in that
respect which we most condemn. Probably the inquiry will be made, whence
the complaints arise. This is easily answered. Let any man look round his
own neighbourhood, and see if the people are not, with a very few
exceptions, peaceable and attached to the government; if the country had
ever within their knowledge more appearance of industry, improvement and
tranquillity; if there was ever more of the produce of all kinds together
for the market; if their stock does not rapidly increase; if there was
ever a more ready vent for their surplus; and if the average of prices is
not about as high as was usual in a plentiful year before the war. These
circumstances all denote a general prosperity. Some classes of citizens
indeed suffer greatly. Two descriptions I at present recollect. The
publick creditors form the first of these classes, and they ought to, and
will be provided for.

Let us for a moment consider their situation and prospects. The
embarrassments consequent upon a war, and the usual reduction of prices
immediately after a war, necessarily occasioned a want of punctuality in
publick payments. Still, however, the publick debt has been very
considerably reduced, not by the dirty and delusive scheme of
depreciation, but the nominal sum. Applications are continually making for
purchases in our eastern and western lands. Great exertions are making for
clearing off the arrears of outstanding taxes, so that the
certificates(20) for interest on the state debt have considerably
increased in value. This is a certain indication of returning credit.
Congress this year disposed of a large tract of their lands towards paying
the principal of their debt.(21) Pennsylvania has discharged the whole of
their part of the continental debt. New York has nearly cleared its state
debt, and has located a large part of their new lands towards paying the
continental demands.(22) Other states have made considerable payments.
Every day from these considerations the publick ability and inclination to
satisfy their creditors increases. The exertions of last winter were as
much to support public as private credit. The prospect therefore of the
publick creditors is brightening under the present system. If the new
system should take effect without amendments, which however is hardly
probable, the increase of expense will be death to the hopes of all
creditors, both of the continental and of the state. With respect,
however, to our publick delays of payment we have the precedent of the
best established countries in Europe.

The other class of citizens to which I alluded was the ship-carpenters.
All agree that their business is dull; but as nobody objects against a
system of commercial regulations for the whole continent, that business
may be relieved without subverting all the ancient foundations and laws
which have the respect of the people. It is a very serious question
whether giving to Congress the unlimited right to regulate trade would not
injure them still further. It is evidently for the interest of the state
to encourage our own trade as much as possible. But in a very large
empire, as the whole states consolidated must be, there will always be a
desire of the government to increase the trade of the capital, and to
weaken the extremes. We should in that case be one of the extremes, and
should feel all the impoverishment incident to that situation. Besides, a
jealousy of our enterprising spirit, would always be an inducement to
cramp our exertions. We must then be impoverished or we must rebel. The
alternative is dreadful.

At present this state is one of the most respectable and one of the most
influential in the union. If we alone should object to receiving the
system without amendments, there is no doubt but it would be amended. But
the case is not quite so bad. New York appears to have no disposition even
to call a convention. If they should neglect, are we to lend our
assistance to compel them by arms, and thus to kindle a civil war without
any provocation on their part? Virginia has put off their convention till
May, and appears to have no disposition to receive the new plan without
amendments. Pennsylvania does not seem to be disposed to receive it as it
is. The same objections are made in all the states, that the civil
government which they have adopted and which secures their rights will be
subverted. All the defenders of this system undertake to prove that the
rights of the states and of the citizens are kept safe. The opposers of it
agree that they will receive the least burdensome system which shall
defend those rights.

Both parties therefore found their arguments on the idea that these rights
ought to be held sacred. With this disposition is it not in every man’s
mind better to recommit it to a new convention, or to Congress, which is a
regular convention for the purpose, and to instruct our delegates to
confine the system to the general purposes of the union, than the
endeavour to force it through in its present form, and with so many
opposers as it must have in every state on the continent? The case is not
of such pressing necessity as some have represented. Europe is engaged,
and we are tranquil. Never therefore was an happier time for deliberation.
The supporters of the measure are by no means afraid of insurrections
taking place, but they are afraid that the present government will prove
superiour to their assaults.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, IV.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 388)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE.

Having considered some of the principal advantages of the happy form of
government under which it is our peculiar good fortune to live, we find by
experience, that it is the best calculated of any form hitherto invented,
to secure to us the rights of our persons and of our property, and that
the general circumstances of the people shew an advanced state of
improvement never before known. We have found the shock given by the war,
in a great measure obliterated, and the public debt contracted at that
time to be considerably reduced in the nominal sum. The Congress lands are
full adequate to the redemption of the principal of their debt, and are
selling and populating very fast. The lands of this state, at the west,
are, at the moderate price of eighteen pence an acre, worth near half a
million pounds in our money. They ought, therefore, to be sold as quick as
possible. An application was made lately for a large tract at that price,
and continual applications are made for other lands in the eastern part of
the state. Our resources are daily augmenting.

We find, then, that after the experience of near two centuries our
separate governments are in full vigor. They discover, for all the
purposes of internal regulation, every symptom of strength, and none of
decay. The new system is, therefore, for such purposes, useless and
burdensome.

Let us now consider how far it is practicable consistent with the
happiness of the people and their freedom. It is the opinion of the ablest
writers on the subject, that no extensive empire can be governed upon
republican principles, and that such a government will degenerate to a
despotism, unless it be made up of a confederacy of smaller states, each
having the full powers of internal regulation. This is precisely the
principle which has hitherto preserved our freedom. No instance can be
found of any free government of considerable extent which has been
supported upon any other plan. Large and consolidated empires may indeed
dazzle the eyes of a distant spectator with their splendour, but if
examined more nearly are always found to be full of misery. The reason is
obvious. In large states the same principles of legislation will not apply
to all the parts. The inhabitants of warmer climates are more dissolute in
their manners, and less industrious, than in colder countries. A degree of
severity is, therefore, necessary with one which would cramp the spirit of
the other. We accordingly find that the very great empires have always
been despotick. They have indeed tried to remedy the inconveniences to
which the people were exposed by local regulations; but these contrivances
have never answered the end. The laws not being made by the people, who
felt the inconveniences, did not suit their circumstances. It is under
such tyranny that the Spanish provinces languish, and such would be our
misfortune and degradation, if we should submit to have the concerns of
the whole empire managed by one legislature. To promote the happiness of
the people it is necessary that there should be local laws; and it is
necessary that those laws should be made by the representatives of those
who are immediately subject to the want of them. By endeavouring to suit
both extremes, both are injured.

It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and Massachusetts.
They must, therefore, legislate for themselves. Yet there is, I believe,
not one point of legislation that is not surrendered in the proposed plan.
Questions of every kind respecting property are determinable in a
continental court, and so are all kinds of criminal causes. The
continental legislature has, therefore, a right to make rules in all cases
by which their judicial courts shall proceed and decide causes. No rights
are reserved to the citizens. The laws of Congress are in all cases to be
the supreme law of the land, and paramount to the constitutions of the
individual states. The Congress may institute what modes of trial they
please, and no plea drawn from the constitution of any state can avail.
This new system is, therefore, a consolidation of all the states into one
large mass, however diverse the parts may be of which it is to be
composed. The idea of an uncompounded republick, on an average one
thousand miles in length, and eight hundred in breadth, and containing six
millions of white inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals,
of habits, and of laws, is in itself an absurdity, and contrary to the
whole experience of mankind. The attempt made by Great Britain to
introduce such a system, struck us with horrour, and when it was proposed
by some theorist that we should be represented in parliament, we uniformly
declared that one legislature could not represent so many different
interests for the purposes of legislation and taxation. This was the
leading principle of the revolution, and makes an essential article in our
creed. All that part, therefore, of the new system, which relates to the
internal government of the states, ought at once to be rejected.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, V.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 390)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

In the course of inquiry it has appeared, that for the purposes of
internal regulation and domestick tranquillity, our small and separate
governments are not only admirably suited in theory, but have been
remarkably successful in practice. It is also found, that the direct
tendency of the proposed system, is to consolidate the whole empire into
one mass, and, like the tyrant’s bed, to reduce all to one standard.
Though this idea has been started in different parts of the continent, and
is the most important trait of this draft, the reasoning ought to be
extensively understood. I therefore hope to be indulged in a particular
statement of it.

Causes of all kinds, between citizens of different states, are to be tried
before a continental court. This court is not bound to try it according to
the local laws where the controversies happen; for in that case it may as
well be tried in a state court. The rule which is to govern the new
courts, must, therefore, be made by the court itself, or by its employers,
the Congress. If by the former, the legislative and judicial departments
will be blended; and if by the Congress, though these departments will be
kept separate, still the power of legislation departs from the state in
all those cases. The Congress, therefore, have the right to make rules for
trying all kinds of questions relating to property between citizens of
different states. The sixth article of the new constitution provides, that
the continental laws shall be the supreme law of the land, and that all
judges in the separate states shall be bound thereby, anything in the
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. All the
state officers are also bound by oath to support this constitution. These
provisions cannot be understood otherwise than as binding the state judges
and other officers, to execute the continental laws in their own proper
departments within the state. For all questions, other than those between
citizens of the same state, are at once put within the jurisdiction of the
continental courts. As no authority remains to the state judges, but to
decide questions between citizens of the same state, and those judges are
to be bound by the laws of Congress, it clearly follows, that all
questions between citizens of the same state are to be decided by the
general laws and not by the local ones.

Authority is also given to the continental courts, to try all causes
between a state and its own citizens. A question of property between these
parties rarely occurs. But if such questions were more frequent than they
are, the proper process is not to sue the state before an higher
authority; but to apply to the supreme authority of the state, by way of
petition. This is the universal practice of all states, and any other mode
of redress destroys the sovereignty of the state over its own subjects.
The only case of the kind in which the state would probably be sued, would
be upon the state notes. The endless confusion that would arise from
making the estates of individuals answerable, must be obvious to every
one.

There is another sense in which the clause relating to causes between the
state and individuals is to be understood, and it is more probable than
the other, as it will be eternal in its duration, and increasing in its
extent. This is the whole branch of the law relating to criminal
prosecutions. In all such cases, the state is plaintiff, and the person
accused is defendant. The process, therefore, will be, for the
attorney-general of the state to commence his suit before a continental
court. Considering the state as a party, the cause must be tried in
another, and all the expense of transporting witnesses incurred. The
individual is to take his trial among strangers, friendless and
unsupported, without its being known whether he is habitually a good or a
bad man; and consequently with one essential circumstance wanting by which
to determine whether the action was performed maliciously or accidentally.
All these inconveniences are avoided by the present important restriction,
that the cause shall be tried by a jury of the vicinity, and tried in the
county where the offence was committed. But by the proposed _derangement_,
I can call it by no softer name, a man must be ruined to prove his
innocence. This is far from being a forced construction of the proposed
form. The words appear to me not intelligible, upon the idea that it is to
be a _system_ of government, unless the construction now given, both for
civil and criminal processes, be admitted. I do not say that it is
intended that all these changes should take place within one year, but
they probably will in the course of half a dozen years, if this system is
adopted. In the meantime we shall be subject to all the horrors of a
divided sovereignty, not knowing whether to obey the Congress or the
State. We shall find it impossible to please two masters. In such a state
frequent broils will ensue. Advantage will be taken of a popular
commotion, and even the venerable forms of the state be done away, while
the new system will be enforced in its utmost rigour by an army.—I am the
more apprehensive of a standing army, on account of a clause in the new
constitution which empowers Congress to keep one at all times; but this
constitution is evidently such that it cannot stand any considerable time
without an army. Upon this principle one is very wisely provided. Our
present government knows of no such thing.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, VI.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 391)

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

To prevent any mistakes, or misapprehensions of the argument, stated in my
last paper, to prove that the proposed constitution is an actual
consolidation of the separate states into one extensive commonwealth, the
reader is desired to observe, that in the course of the argument, the new
plan is considered as an entire system. It is not dependent on any other
book for an explanation, and contains no references to any other book. All
the defences of it, therefore, so far as they are drawn from the state
constitutions, or from maxims of the common law, are foreign to the
purpose. It is only by comparing the different parts of it together, that
the meaning of the whole is to be understood. For instance—

We find in it, that there is to be a legislative assembly, with authority
to constitute courts for the trial of all kinds of civil causes, between
citizens of different states. The right to appoint such courts necessarily
involves in it the right of defining their powers, and determining the
rules by which their judgment shall be regulated; and the grant of the
former of those rights is nugatory without the latter. It is vain to tell
us, that a maxim of common law requires contracts to be determined by the
law existing where the contract was made: for it is also a maxim, that the
legislature has a right to alter the common law. Such a power forms an
essential part of legislation. Here, then, a declaration of rights is of
inestimable value. It contains those principles which the government never
can invade without an open violation of the compact between them and the
citizens. Such a declaration ought to have come to the new constitution in
favour of the legislative rights of the several states, by which their
sovereignty over their own citizens within the state should be secured.
Without such an express declaration the states are annihilated in reality
upon receiving this constitution—the forms will be preserved only during
the pleasure of Congress.

The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given to
regulate trade. Though this power under certain limitations would be a
proper one for the department of Congress; it is in this system carried
much too far, and much farther than is necessary. This is, without
exception, the most commercial state upon the continent. Our extensive
coasts, cold climate, small estates, and equality of rights, with a
variety of subordinate and concurring circumstances, place us in this
respect at the head of the Union. We must, therefore, be indulged if a
point which so nearly relates to our welfare be rigidly examined. The new
constitution not only prohibits vessels, bound from one state to another,
from paying any duties, but even from entering and clearing. The only use
of such a regulation is, to keep each state in complete ignorance of its
own resources. It certainly is no hardship to enter and clear at the
custom house, and the expense is too small to be an object.

The unlimited right to regulate trade, includes the right of granting
exclusive charters. This, in all old countries, is considered as one
principal branch of prerogative. We find hardly a country in Europe which
has not felt the ill effects of such a power. Holland has carried the
exercise of it farther than any other state, and the reason why that
country has felt less evil from it is, that the territory is very small,
and they have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the East and
West Indies. In this respect, the whole country is to be considered as a
trading company, having exclusive privileges. The colonies are large in
proportion to the parent state; so that, upon the whole, the latter may
gain by such a system. We are also to take into consideration the industry
which the genius of a free government inspires. But in the British islands
all these circumstances together have not prevented them from being
injured by the monopolies created there. Individuals have been enriched,
but the country at large has been hurt. Some valuable branches of trade
being granted to companies, who transact their business in London, that
city is, perhaps, the place of the greatest trade in the world. But
Ireland, under such influence, suffers exceedingly, and is impoverished;
and Scotland is a mere bye-word. Bristol, the second city in England,
ranks not much above this town in population. These things must be
accounted for by the incorporation of trading companies; and if they are
felt so severely in countries of small extent, they will operate with
ten-fold severity upon us, who inhabit an immense tract; and living
towards one extreme of an extensive empire, shall feel the evil, without
retaining that influence in government, which may enable us to procure
redress. There ought, then, to have been inserted a restraining clause
which might prevent the Congress from making any such grant, because they
consequentially defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also injurious
to the general commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying that rivalship
which is the great stimulus to industry.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, VII.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 392)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this continent remains
free, the activity of our countrymen will secure their full share. All the
estimates for the present year, let them be made by what party they may,
suppose the balance of trade to be largely in our favour. The credit of
our merchants is, therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This
is a sufficient proof, that when business is unshackled, it will find out
that channel which is most friendly to its course. We ought, therefore, to
be exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. Every day
produces fresh proofs, that people, under the immediate pressure of
difficulties, do not, at first glance, discover the proper relief. The
last year, a desire to get rid of embarrassments induced many honest
people to agree to a tender act, and many others, of a different
description, to obstruct the courts of justice. Both these methods only
increased the evil they were intended to cure. Experience has since shown
that, instead of trying to lessen an evil by altering the present course
of things, that every endeavor should have been applied to facilitate the
course of law, and thus to encourage a mutual confidence among the
citizens, which increases the resources of them all, and renders easy the
payment of debts. By this means one does not grow rich at the expense of
another, but all are benefited. The case is the same with the States.
Pennsylvania, with one port and a large territory, is less favourably
situated for trade than the Massachusetts, which has an extensive coast in
proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. Accordingly a much larger
proportion of our people are engaged in maritime affairs. We ought
therefore to be particularly attentive to securing so great an interest.
It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is
only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is
preserved. No man when he enters into society does it from a view to
promote the good of others, but he does it for his own good. All men
having the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of the
whole. To recur then to such a principle as that local interests must be
disregarded, is requiring of one man to do more than another, and is
subverting the foundation of a free government. The Philadelphians would
be shocked with a proposition to place the seat of general government and
the unlimited right to regulate trade in the Massachusetts. There can be
no greater reason for our surrendering the preference to them. Such
sacrifices, however we may delude ourselves with the form of words, always
originate in folly, and not in generosity.

Let me now request your attention a little while to the actual state of
publick credit, that we may see whether it has not been as much
misrepresented as the state of our trade.

At the beginning of the present year, the whole continental debt was about
twelve millions of pounds in our money. About one-quarter part of this sum
was due to our foreign creditors. Of these France was the principal, and
called for the arrears of interest. A new loan of one hundred and twenty
thousand pounds was negotiated in Holland, at five per cent., to pay the
arrears due to France. At first sight this has the appearance of bad
economy, and has been used for the villainous purpose of disaffecting the
people. But in the course of this same year, Congress have negotiated the
sale of as much of their western lands on the Ohio and Mississippi, as
amount nearly to the whole sum of the foreign debt; and instead of a dead
loss by borrowing money at five per cent. to the amount of an hundred and
twenty thousand pounds in one sum, they make a saving of the interest at
six per cent. on three millions of their domestick debt, which is an
annual saving of an hundred and eighty thousand pounds. It is easy to see
how such an immense fund as the western territory may be applied to the
payment of the foreign debt. Purchasers of the land would as willingly
procure any kind of the produce of the United States as they would buy
loan office certificates to pay for the land. The produce thus procured
would easily be negotiated for the benefit of our foreign creditors. I do
not mean to insinuate that no other provision should be made for our
creditors, but only to shew that our credit is not so bad in other
countries as has been represented, and that our resources are fully equal
to the pressure.

The perfection of government depends on the equality of its operation, as
far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the empire, and upon
all the citizens. Some inequalities indeed will necessarily take place.
One man will be obliged to travel a few miles further than another man to
procure justice. But when he has travelled, the poor man ought to have the
same measure of justice as the rich one. Small enqualities [sic] may be
easily compensated. There ought, however, to be no inequality in the law
itself, and the government ought to have the same authority in one place
as in another. Evident as this truth is, the most plausible argument in
favour of the new plan is drawn from the inequality of its operation in
different states. In Connecticut, they have been told that the bulk of the
revenue will be raised by impost and excise, and, therefore, they need not
be afraid to trust Congress with the power of levying a dry tax at
pleasure. New York and Massachusetts are both more commercial states than
Connecticut. The latter, therefore, hopes that the other two will pay the
bulk of the continental expense. The argument is, in itself, delusive. If
the trade is not over-taxed, the consumer pays it. If the trade is
over-taxed, it languishes, and by the ruin of trade the farmer loses his
market. The farmer has, in truth, no other advantage from imposts than
that they save him the trouble of collecting money for the government. He
neither gets nor loses money by changing the mode of taxation. The
government indeed finds it the easiest way to raise the revenue; and the
reason is that the tax is by this means collected where the money
circulates most freely. But if the argument was not delusive, it ought to
conclude against the plan, because it would prove the unequal operation of
it; and if any saving is to be made by the mode of taxing, the saving
should be applied towards our own debt, and not to the payment of that
part of the continental burden which Connecticut ought to discharge. It
would be impossible to refute in writing all the delusions made use of to
force this system through. Those respecting the publick debt, and the
benefit of imposts, are the most important, and these I have taken pains
to explain. In one instance, indeed, the impost does raise money at the
direct expense of the seaports. This is when goods are imported subject to
a duty, and re-exported without a drawback. Whatever benefit is derived
from this source, surely should not be transferred to another state, at
least till our own debts are cleared.

Another instance of unequal operation is, that it establishes different
degrees of authority in different states, and thus creates different
interests. The lands in New Hampshire having been formerly granted by this
state, and afterwards by that state, to private persons, the whole
authority of trying titles becomes vested in a continental court, and that
state loses a branch of authority, which the others retain, over their own
citizens.

I have now gone through two parts of my argument, and have proved the
efficiency of the state governments for internal regulation, and the
disadvantages of the new system, at least some of the principal. The
argument has been much longer than I at first apprehended, or possibly I
should have been deterred from it. The importance of the question has,
however, prevented me from relinquishing it.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, VIII.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 394)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand
principle of union among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that
when this principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering
justice between man and man, it debases the character of individuals, and
renders them less secure in their persons and property. Civil liberty
consists in the consciousness of that security, and is best guarded by
political liberty, which is the share that every citizen has in the
government. Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those empires
which are commonly called despotick, and which comprehend by far the
greatest part of the world, the government is most fluctuating, and
property least secure. In those countries insults are borne by the
sovereign, which, if offered to one of our governours, would fill us with
horrour, and we should think the government dissolving.

The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly unfair one,
that we must then separate, and form distinct confederacies. This would be
true if there was no principle to substitute in the room of power.
Fortunately there is one. This is commerce. All the states have local
advantages, and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are,
therefore, in a situation to supply each other’s wants. Carolina, for
instance, is inhabited by planters, while the Massachusetts is more
engaged in commerce and manufactures. Congress has the power of deciding
their differences. The most friendly intercourse may therefore be
established between them. A diversity of produce, wants and interests,
produces commerce; and commerce, where there is a common, equal and
moderate authority to preside, produces friendship.

The same principles apply to the connection with the new settlers in the
west. Many supplies they want for which they must look to the older
settlements, and the greatness of their crops enables them to make
payments. Here, then, we have a bond of union which applies to all parts
of the empire, and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended
all America.

We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal republick. Each
part has within its own limits the sovereignty over its citizens, while
some of the general concerns are committed to Congress. The complaints of
the deficiency of the Congressional powers are confined to two articles.
They are not able to raise a revenue by taxation, and they have not a
complete regulation of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each
of these complaints there is some foundation, but not enough to justify
the clamour which has been raised. Congress, it is true, owes a debt which
ought to be paid. A considerable part of it has been paid. Our share of
what remains would annually amount to about sixty or seventy thousand
pounds. If, therefore, Congress were put in possession of such branches of
the impost as would raise this sum in our state, we should fairly be
considered as having done our part towards their debt; and our remaining
resources, whether arising from impost, excise, or dry tax, might be
applied to the reduction of our own debt. The principal of this last
amounts to about thirteen hundred thousand pounds, and the interest to
between seventy or eighty thousand. This is, surely, too much property to
be sacrificed; and it is as reasonable that it should be paid as the
continental debt. But if the new system should be adopted, the whole
impost, with an unlimited claim to excise and dry tax, will be given to
Congress. There will remain no adequate found for the state debt, and the
state will still be subject to be sued on their notes. This is, then, an
article which ought to be limited. We can, without difficulty, pay as much
annually as shall clear the interest of our state debt, and our share of
the interest on the continental one. But if we surrender the impost, we
shall still, by this new constitution, be held to pay our full proportion
of the remaining debt, as if nothing had been done. The impost will not be
considered as being paid by this state, but by the continent. The
federalists, indeed, tell us that the state debts will all be incorporated
with the continental debt, and all paid out of one fund. In this as in all
other instances, they endeavour to support their scheme of consolidation
by delusion. Not one word is said in the book in favour of such a scheme,
and there is no reason to think it true. Assurances of that sort are
easily given, and as easily forgotten. There is an interest in forgetting
what is false. No man can expect town debts to be united with that of the
state; and there will be as little reason to expect that the state and
continental debts will be united together.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, IX.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 395)

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

We come now to the second and last article of complaint against the
present confederation, which is, that Congress has not the sole power to
regulate the intercourse between us and foreigners. Such a power extends
not only to war and peace, but to trade and naturalization. This last
article ought never to be given them; for though most of the states may be
willing for certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons
of equal weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to
keep their blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would
come there. Let any indifferent person judge whether that state in point
of morals, education, energy is equal to any of the eastern states; the
small state of Rhode Island only excepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a
century has acquired her present extent and population at the expense of
religion and good morals. The eastern states have, by keeping separate
from the foreign mixtures, acquired their present greatness in the course
of a century and an half, and have preserved their religion and morals.
They have also preserved that manly virtue which is equally fitted for
rendering them respectable in war, and industrious in peace.

The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be safely enough
lodged with Congress under some limitations. Three restrictions appear to
me to be essentially necessary to preserve that equality of rights to the
states, which it is the object of the state governments to secure to each
citizen. 1st. It ought not to be in the power of Congress, either by
treaty or otherwise, to alienate part of any state without the consent of
the legislature. 2d. They ought not to be able, by treaty or other law, to
give any legal preference to one part above another. 3d. They ought to be
restrained from creating any monopolies. Perhaps others may propose
different regulations and restrictions. One of these is to be found in the
old confederation, and another in the newly proposed plan. The third
scenes [sic] to be equally necessary.

After all that has been said and written on this subject, and on the
difficulty of amending our old constitution so as to render it adequate to
national purposes, it does not appear that any thing more was necessary to
be done, than framing two new articles. By one a limited revenue would be
given to Congress with a right to collect it, and by the other a limited
right to regulate our intercourse with foreign nations. By such an
addition we should have preserved to each state its power to defend the
rights of the citizens, and the whole empire would be capable of expanding
and receiving additions without altering its former constitution.
Congress, at the same time, by the extent of their jurisdiction, and the
number of their officers, would have acquired more respectability at home,
and a sufficient influence abroad. If any state was in such a case to
invade the rights of the Union, the other states would join in defence of
those rights, and it would be in the power of Congress to direct the
national force to that object. But it is certain that the powers of
Congress over the citizens should be small in proportion as the empire is
extended; that, in order to preserve the balance, each state may supply by
energy what is wanting in numbers. Congress would be able by such a system
as we have proposed to regulate trade with foreigners by such duties as
should effectually give the preference to the produce and manufactures of
our own country. We should then have a friendly intercourse established
between the states, upon the principles of mutual interest. A moderate
duty upon foreign vessels would give an advantage to our own people, while
it would avoid all the disadvantages arising from a prohibition, and the
consequent deficiency of vessels to transport the produce of the southern
states.

Our country is at present upon an average a thousand miles long from north
to south, and eight hundred broad from the Mississippi to the Ocean. We
have at least six millions of white inhabitants, and the annual increase
is about two hundred and fifty thousand souls, exclusive of emigrants from
Europe. The greater part of our increase is employed in settling the new
lands, while the older settlements are entering largely into manufactures
of various kinds. It is probable that the extraordinary exertions of this
state in the way of industry for the present year only, exceed in value
five hundred thousand pounds. The new settlements, if all made in the same
tract of country, would form a large state annually; and the time seems to
be literally accomplished when a nation shall be born in a day. Such an
immense country is not only capable of yielding all the produce of Europe,
but actually does produce by far the greater part of the raw materials.
The restrictions on our trade in Europe, necessarily oblige us to make use
of those materials, and the high price of labour operates as an
encouragement to mechanical improvements. In this way we daily make rapid
advancements towards independence in resources as well as in empire. If we
adopt the new system of government we shall, by one rash vote, lose the
fruit of the toil and expense of thirteen years, at the time when the
benefits of that toil and expense are rapidly increasing. Though the
imposts of Congress on foreign trade may tend to encourage manufactures,
the excise and dry tax will destroy all the beneficial effects of the
impost, at the same time that they diminish our capital. Be careful then
to give only a limited revenue, and the limited power of managing foreign
concerns. Once surrender the rights of internal legislation and taxation,
and instead of being respected abroad, foreigners will laugh at us, and
posterity will lament our folly.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, X.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 396)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 1, 1788.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

_Friends and Brethren_,

It is a duty incumbent on every man, who has had opportunities for
inquiry, to lay the result of his researches on any matter of publick
importance before the publick eye. No further apology will be necessary
with the generality of my readers, for having so often appeared before
them on the subject of the lately proposed form of government. It has been
treated with that freedom which is necessary for the investigation of
truth, and with no greater freedom. On such a subject, extensive in its
nature, and important in its consequences, the examination has necessarily
been long, and the topicks treated of have been various. We have been
obliged to take a cursory, but not inaccurate view of the circumstances of
mankind under the different forms of government to support the different
parts of our argument. Permit me now to bring into one view the principal
propositions on which the reasoning depends.

It is shewn from the example of the most commercial republick of
antiquity, which was never disturbed by a sedition for above seven hundred
years, and at last yielded after a violent struggle to a foreign enemy, as
well as from the experience of our own country for a century and an half,
that the republican, more than any other form of government is made of
durable materials. It is shewn from a variety of proof, that one
consolidated government is inapplicable to a great extent of country; is
unfriendly to the rights both of persons and property, which rights always
adhere together; and that being contrary to the interest of the extreme of
an empire, such a government can be supported only by power, and that
commerce is the true bond of union for a free state. It is shewn from a
comparison of the different parts of the proposed plan, that it is such a
consolidated government.

By article 3, section 2, Congress are empowered to appoint courts with
authority to try civil causes of every kind, and even offences against
particular states. By the last clause of Article 1, section 8, which
defines their legislative powers, they are authorised to make laws for
carrying into execution all the “powers vested by this constitution in the
government of the United States, or in _any department_ or officer
thereof;” and by article 6, the judges in every state are to be bound by
the laws of Congress. It is therefore a complete consolidation of all the
states into one, however diverse the parts of it may be. It is also shewn
that it will operate unequally in the different states, taking from some
of them a greater share of wealth; that in this last respect it will
operate more to the injury of this commonwealth than of any state in the
union; and that by reason of its inequality it is subversive of the
principles of a free government, which requires every part to contribute
an equal proportion. For all these reasons this system ought to be
rejected, even if no better plan was proposed in the room of it. In case
of a rejection we must remain as we are, with trade extending, resources
opening, settlements enlarging, manufactures increasing, and publick debts
diminishing by fair payment. These are mighty blessings, and not to be
lost by the hasty adoption of a new system. But great as these benefits
are, which we derive from our present system, it has been shewn, that they
may be increased by giving Congress a limited power to regulate trade, and
assigning to them those branches of the impost on our foreign trade only,
which shall be equal to our proportion of their present annual demands.
While the interest is thus provided for, the sale of our lands in a very
few years will pay the principal, and the other resources of the state
will pay our own debt. The present mode of assessing the continental tax
is regulated by the extent of landed property in each state. By this rule
the Massachusetts [sic] has to pay one eighth. If we adopt the new system,
we shall surrender the whole of our impost and excise, which probably
amount to a third of those duties of the whole continent, and must come in
for about a sixth part of the remaining debt. By this means we shall be
deprived of the benefit arising from the largeness of our loans to the
continent, shall lose our ability to satisfy the just demands on the
state. Under the limitations of revenue and commercial regulation
contained in these papers, the balance will be largely in our favour; the
importance of the great states will be preserved, and the publick
creditors both of the continent and state will be satisfied without
burdening the people. For a more concise view of my proposal, I have
thrown it into the form of a resolve, supposed to be passed by the
convention which is shortly to set in this town.

“Commonwealth of Massachusetts. _Resolved_, That the form of government
lately proposed by a federal convention, held in the city of Philadelphia,
is so far injurious to the interests of this commonwealth, that we are
constrained by fidelity to our constituents to reject it; and we do hereby
reject the said proposed form and every part thereof. But in order that
the union of these states may, as far as possible, be promoted, and the
federal business as little obstructed as may be, we do agree on the part
of this commonwealth, that the following addition be made to the present
articles of confederation:

“XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate the intercourse
between these states and foreign dominions, under the following
restrictions; viz.: 1st. No treaty, ordinance, or law shall alienate the
whole or part of any state, without the consent of the legislature of such
state. 2d. The United States shall not by treaty or otherwise give a
preference to the ports of one state over those of another; nor, 3d,
create any monopolies or exclusive companies; nor, 4th, extend the
privileges of citizenship to any foreigner. And for the more convenient
exercise of the powers hereby and by the former articles given, the United
States shall have authority to constitute judicatories, whether supreme or
subordinate, with power to try all piracies and felonies done on the high
seas, and also all civil causes in which a foreign state, or subject
thereof, actually resident in a foreign country and not being British
absentees, shall be one of the parties. They shall also have authority to
try all causes in which ambassadors shall be concerned. All these trials
shall be by jury and in some sea-port town. All imposts levied by Congress
on trade shall be confined to foreign produce or foreign manufactures
imported, and to foreign ships trading in our harbours, and all their
absolute prohibitions shall be confined to the same articles. All imposts
and confiscations shall be to the use of the state in which they shall
accrue, excepting in such branches as shall be assigned by any state as a
fund for defraying their proportion of the continental. And no powers
shall be exercised by Congress but such as are expressly given by this and
the former articles. And we hereby authorize our delegates in Congress to
sign and ratify an article in the foregoing form and words, without any
further act of this state for that purpose, provided the other states
shall accede to this proposition on their part on or before the first day
of January, which will be in the year of our Lord 1790. All matters of
revenue being under the controul of the legislature, we recommend to the
general court of this commonwealth, to devise, as early as may be, such
funds arising from such branches of foreign commerce, as shall be equal to
our part of the current charges of the continent, and to put Congress in
possession of the revenue arising therefrom, with a right to collect it,
during such term as shall appear to be necessary for the payment of the
principal of their debt, by the sale of the western lands.”(23)

By such an explicit declaration of the powers given to Congress, we shall
provide for all federal purposes, and shall at the same time secure our
rights. It is easier to amend the old confederation, defective as it has
been represented, than it is to correct the new form. For with whatever
view it was framed, truth constrains me to say, that it is insidious in
its form, and ruinous in its tendency. Under the pretence of different
branches of the legislature, the members will in fact be chosen from the
same general description of citizens. The advantages of a check will be
lost, while we shall be continually exposed to the cabals and corruption
of a British election. There cannot be a more eligible mode than the
present, for appointing members of Congress, nor more effectual checks
provided than our separate state governments, nor any system so little
expensive, in case of our adopting the resolve just stated, or even
continuing as we are. We shall in that case avoid all the inconvenience of
concurrent jurisdictions, we shall avoid the expensive and useless
establishments of the Philadelphia proposition, we shall preserve our
constitution and liberty, and we shall provide for all such institutions
as will be useful. Surely then you cannot hesitate, whether you will chuse
freedom or servitude. The object is now well defined. By adopting the form
proposed by the convention, you will have the derision of foreigners,
internal misery, and the anathemas of posterity. By amending the present
confederation, and granting limited powers to Congress, you secure the
admiration of strangers, internal happiness, and the blessings and
prosperity of all succeeding generations. Be wise, then, and by preserving
your freedom, prove, that Heaven bestowed it not in vain. Many will be the
efforts to delude the convention. The mode of judging is itself
suspicious, as being contrary to the antient and established usage of the
commonwealth. But since the mode is adopted, we trust, that the members of
that venerable assembly will not so much regard the greatness of their
power, as the sense and interest of their constituents. And they will do
well to remember that even a mistake in adopting it, will be destructive,
while no evils can arise from a total, and much less, probably, from such
a partial rejection as we have proposed.

I have now gone through my reasonings on this momentous subject, and have
stated the facts and deductions from them, which you will verify for
yourselves. Personal interest was not my object, or I should have pursued
a different line of conduct. Though I conceived that a man who owes
allegiance to the state is bound, on all important occasions, to propose
such inquiries as tend to promote the publick good; yet I did not imagine
it to be any part of my duty to present myself to the fury of those who
appear to have other ends in view. For this cause, and for this only, I
have chosen a feigned signature. At present all the reports concerning the
writer of these papers are merely conjectural. I should have been ashamed
of my system if it had needed such feeble support as the character of
individuals. It stands on the firm ground of the experience of mankind. I
cannot conclude this long disquisition better than with a caution derived
from the words of inspiration—_Discern the things of your peace now in the
days thereof, before they be hidden from your eyes_.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, XI.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 398)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1788.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

My last address contained the outlines of a system fully adequate to all
the useful purposes of the union. Its object is to raise a sufficient
revenue from the foreign trade, and the sale of our publick lands, to
satisfy all the publick exigencies, and to encourage, at the same time,
our internal industry and manufactures. It also secures each state in its
own separate rights, while the continental concerns are thrown into the
general department. The only deficiencies that I have been able to
discover in the plan, and in the view of federalists they are very great
ones, are, that it does not allow the interference of Congress in the
domestick concerns of the state, and that it does not render our national
councils so liable to foreign influence. The first of these articles tends
to guard us from that infinite multiplication of officers which the report
of the Convention of Philadelphia proposes. With regard to the second, it
is evidently not of much importance to any foreign nation to purchase, at
a very high price, a majority of votes in an assembly, whose members are
continually exposed to a recall. But give those members a right to sit
six, or even two years, with such extensive powers as the new system
proposes, and their friendship will be well worth a purchase. This is the
only sense in which the Philadelphia system will render us more
respectable in the eyes of foreigners. In every other view they lose their
respect for us, as it will render us more like their own degraded models.
It is a maxim with them, that every man has his price. If, therefore, we
were to judge of what passes in the hearts of the federalists when they
urge us, as they continually do, _to be like other nations_, and when they
assign mercenary motives to the opposers of their plan, we should conclude
very fairly they themselves wish to be provided for at the publick
expense. However that may be, if we look upon the men we shall find some
of their leaders to have formed pretty strong attachments to foreign
nations. Whether those attachments arose from their being educated under a
royal government, from a former unfortunate mistake in politicks, or from
the agencies for foreigners, or any other cause, is not in my province to
determine. But certain it is that some of the principal fomenters of this
plan have never shown themselves capable of that generous system of policy
which is founded in the affections of freemen. Power and high life are
their idols, and national funds are necessary to support them.

Some of the principal powers of Europe have already entered into treaties
with us, and that some of the rest have not done it, is not owing, as is
falsely pretended, to the want of power in Congress. Holland never found
any difficulty of this kind from the multitude of sovereignties in that
country, which must all be consulted on such an occasion. The resentment
of Great Britain for our victories in the late war has induced that power
to restrain our intercourse with their subjects. Probably an hope, the
only solace of the wretched, that their affairs would take a more
favourable turn on this continent, has had some influence on their
proceedings. All their restrictions have answered the end of securing our
independence, by driving us into many valuable manufactures. Their own
colonies in the mean time have languished for want of an intercourse with
these states. The new settlement in Nova Scotia has miserably decayed, and
the West India Islands have suffered for want of our supplies, and by the
loss of our market. This has affected the revenue; and, however
contemptuously some men may affect to speak of our trade, the supply of
six millions of people is an object worth the attention of any nation upon
earth. Interest in such a nation as Britain will surmount their
resentment. However their pride may be stung, they will pursue after
wealth. Increase of revenue to a nation overwhelmed with a debt of near
_two hundred and ninety millions_ sterling is an object to which little
piques must give way; and there is no doubt that their interest consists
in securing as much of our trade as they can.

These are the topicks from which are drawn some of the most plausible
reasons that have been given by the federalists in favour of their plan,
as derived from the sentiments of foreigners. We have weighed them and
found them wanting. That they had not themselves full confidence in their
own reasons at Philadelphia is evident from the method they took to bias
the State Convention. Messrs. Wilson and M’Kean, two Scottish names, were
repeatedly worsted in the argument. To make amends for their own
incapacity, the gallery was filled with a rabble,(24) who shouted their
applause, and these heroes of aristocracy were not ashamed, though modesty
is their national virtue, to vindicate such a violation of decency. Means
not less criminal, but not so flagrantly indecent, have been frequently
mentioned among us to secure a majority. But those who vote for a price
can never sanctify wrong, and treason will still retain its deformity.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, XII.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 399)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 11, 1788.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

Suffer an individual to lay before you his contemplations on the great
subject that now engages your attention. To you it belongs, and may Heaven
direct your judgment to decide on the happiness of all future generations,
as well as the present.

It is universally agreed that the object of every just government is to
render the people happy, by securing their persons and possessions from
wrong. To this end it is necessary that there should be local laws and
institutions; for a people inhabiting various climates will unavoidably
have local habits and different modes of life, and these must be consulted
in making the laws. It is much easier to adapt the laws to the manners of
the people, than to make manners conform to laws. The idle and dissolute
inhabitants of the south require a different regimen from the sober and
active people of the north. Hence, among other reasons, is derived the
necessity of local governments, who may enact, repeal, or alter
regulations as the circumstances of each part of the empire may require.
This would be the case, even if a very great state was to be settled at
once. But it becomes still more needful when the local manners are formed,
and usages sanctified, by the practice of a century and a half. In such a
case, to attempt to reduce all to one standard is absurd in itself and
cannot be done but upon the principle of power, which debases the people
and renders them unhappy till all dignity of character is put away. Many
circumstances render us an essentially different people from the
inhabitants of the southern states. The unequal distribution of property,
the toleration of slavery, the ignorance and poverty of the lower classes,
the softness of the climate and dissoluteness of manners, mark their
character. Among us, the care that is taken of education, small and nearly
equal estates, equality of rights, and the severity of the climate,
renders the people active, industrious and sober. Attention to religion
and good morals is a distinguishing trait in our character. It is plain,
therefore, that we require for our regulation laws which will not suit the
circumstances of our southern brethren, and that laws made for them would
not apply to us. Unhappiness would be the uniform product of such laws;
for no state can be happy when the laws contradict the general habits of
the people, nor can any state retain its freedom while there is a power to
make and enforce such laws. We may go further, and say, that it is
impossible for any single legislature so fully to comprehend the
circumstances of the different parts of a very extensive dominion as to
make laws adapted to those circumstances.

Hence arises in most nations of extensive territory, the necessity of
armies, to cure the defect of the laws. It is actually under the pressure
of such an absurd government, that the Spanish provinces have groaned for
near three centuries; and such will be our misfortune and degradation, if
we ever submit to have all the business of the empire done by one
legislature. The contrary principle of local legislation by the
representatives of the people, who alone are to be governed by the laws,
has raised us to our present greatness; and an attempt on the part of
Great Britain to invade this right, brought on the revolution, which gave
us a separate rank among the nations. We even declared, that we would not
be represented in the national legislature, because one assembly was not
adequate to the purposes of internal legislation and taxation.

AGRIPPA.

[_Remainder next Tuesday._]


Agrippa, XIII.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 400)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1788.

(_Concluded from our last._)

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

The question then arises, what is the kind of government best adapted to
the object of securing our persons and possessions from violence? I
answer, a _Federal Republick_. By this kind of government each state
reserves to itself the right of making and altering its laws for internal
regulation, and the right of executing those laws without any external
restraint, while the general concerns of the empire are committed to an
assembly of delegates, each accountable to his own constituents. This is
the happy form under which we live, and which seems to mark us out as a
people chosen of God. No instance can be produced of any other kind of
government so stable and energetick as the republican. The objection drawn
from the Greek and Roman states does not apply to the question.
Republicanism appears there in its most disadvantageous form. Arts and
domestic employments were generally committed to slaves, while war was
almost the only business worthy of a citizen. Hence arose their internal
dissensions. Still they exhibited proofs of legislative wisdom and
judicial integrity hardly to be found among their monarchick neighbors. On
the other hand we find Carthage cultivating commerce, and extending her
dominions for the long space of seven centuries, during which term the
internal tranquillity was never disturbed by her citizens. Her national
power was so respectable, that for a long time it was doubtful whether
Carthage or Rome should rule. In the form of their government they bore a
strong resemblance to each other. Rome might be reckoned a free state for
about four hundred and fifty years. We have then the true line of
distinction between those two nations, and a strong proof of the hardy
materials which compose a republican government. If there was no other
proof, we might with impartial judges risk the issue upon this alone. But
our proof rests not here. The present state of Europe, and the vigour and
tranquillity of our own governments, after experiencing this form for a
century and an half, are decided proofs in favour of those governments
which encourage commerce. A comparison of our own country, first with
Europe and then with the other parts of the world, will prove, beyond a
doubt, that the greatest share of freedom is enjoyed by the citizens, so
much more does commerce flourish. The reason is, that every citizen has an
influence in making the laws, and thus they are conformed to the general
interests of the state; but in every other kind of government they are
frequently made in favour of a part of the community at the expense of the
rest.

The argument against republicks, as it is derived from the Greek and Roman
states, is unfair. It goes on the idea that no other government is subject
to be disturbed. As well might we conclude, that a limited monarchy is
unstable, because that under the feudal system the nobles frequently made
war upon their king, and disturbed the publick peace. We find, however, in
practice, that limited monarchy is more friendly to commerce, because more
friendly to the rights of the subject, than an absolute government; and
that it is more liable to be disturbed than a republick, because less
friendly to trade and the rights of individuals. There cannot, from the
history of mankind, be produced an instance of rapid growth in extent, in
numbers, in arts, and in trade, that will bear any comparison with our
country. This is owing to what the friends of the new system, and the
enemies of the revolution, for I take them to be nearly the same, would
term _our extreme liberty_. Already, have our ships visited every part of
the world, and brought us their commodities in greater perfection, and at
a more moderate price, than we ever before experienced. The ships of other
nations crowd to our ports, seeking an intercourse with us. All the
estimates of every party make the balance of trade for the present year to
be largely in our favour. Already have some very useful, and some elegant
manufactures got established among us, so that our country every day is
becoming independent in her resources. Two-thirds of the continental debt
has been paid since the war, and we are in alliance with some of the most
respectable powers of Europe. The western lands, won from Britain by the
sword, are an ample fund for the principal of all our public debts; and
every new sale excites that manly pride which is essential to national
virtue. All this happiness arises from the freedom of our institutions and
the limited nature of our government; a government that is respected from
principles of affection, and obeyed with alacrity. The sovereigns of the
old world are frequently, though surrounded with armies, treated with
insult; and the despotick monarchies of the east, are the most
fluctuating, oppressive and uncertain governments of any form hitherto
invented. These considerations are sufficient to establish the excellence
of our own form, and the goodness of our prospects.

Let us now consider the probable effects of a consolidation of the
separate states into one mass; for the new system extends so far. Many
ingenious explanations have been given of it; but there is this defect,
that they are drawn from maxims of the common law, while the system itself
cannot be bound by any such maxims. A legislative assembly has an inherent
right to alter the common law, and to abolish any of its principles, which
are not particularly guarded in the constitution. Any system therefore
which appoints a legislature, without any reservation of the rights of
individuals, surrenders all power in every branch of legislation to the
government. The universal practice of every government proves the justness
of this remark; for in every doubtful case it is an established rule to
decide in favour of authority. The new system is, therefore, in one
respect at least, essentially inferior to our state constitutions. There
is no bill of rights, and consequently a continental law may controul any
of those principles, which we consider at present as sacred; while not one
of those points, in which it is said that the separate governments
misapply their power, is guarded. Tender acts and the coinage of money
stand on the same footing of a consolidation of power. It is a mere
fallacy, invented by the deceptive powers of Mr. Wilson, that what rights
are not given are reserved. The contrary has already been shewn. But to
put this matter of legislation out of all doubt, let us compare together
some parts of the book; for being an independent system, this is the only
way to ascertain its meaning.

In article III, section 2, it is declared, that “the judicial power shall
extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under
their authority.” Among the cases arising under this new constitution are
reckoned, “all controversies between citizens of different states,” which
include all kinds of civil causes between those parties. The giving
Congress a power to appoint courts for such a purpose is as much, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, giving them power to legislate for
such causes, as giving them a right to raise an army, is giving them a
right to direct the operations of the army when raised. But it is not left
to implication. The last clause of article I, section 8, expressly gives
them power “to make all laws which shall be needful and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested
by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof.” It is, therefore, as plain as words can
make it, that they have a right by this proposed form to legislate for all
kinds of causes respecting property between citizens of different states.
That this power extends to all cases between citizens of the same state,
is evident from the sixth article, which declares all continental laws and
treaties to be the _supreme law_ of the land, and that all state judges
are bound thereby, “_anything in the constitution or laws of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding_.” If this is not binding the judges of the
separate states in their own office, by continental rules, it is perfect
nonsense.

There is then a complete consolidation of the legislative powers in all
cases respecting property. This power extends to all cases between a state
and citizens of another state. Hence a citizen, possessed of the notes of
another state, may bring his action, and there is no limitation that the
execution shall be levied on the publick property of the state; but the
property of individuals is liable. This is a foundation for endless
confusion and discord. This right to try causes between a state and
citizens of another state, involves in it all criminal causes; and a man
who has accidentally transgressed the laws of another state, must be
transported, with all his witnesses, to a third state, to be tried. He
must be ruined to prove his innocence. These are necessary parts of the
new system, and it will never be complete till they are reduced to
practice. They effectually prove a consolidation of the states, and we
have before shewn the ruinous tendency of such a measure.

By sect. 8 of article I, Congress are to have the unlimited right to
regulate commerce, external and _internal_, and may therefore create
monopolies which have been universally injurious to all the subjects of
the countries that have adopted them, excepting the monopolists
themselves. They have also the unlimited right to imposts and all kinds of
taxes, as well to levy as to collect them. They have indeed very nearly
the same powers claimed formerly by the British parliament. Can we have so
soon forgot our glorious struggle with that power, as to think a moment of
surrendering it now? It makes no difference in principle whether the
national assembly was elected for seven years or for six. In both cases we
should vote to great disadvantage, and therefore ought never to agree to
such an article. Let us make provision for the payment of the interest of
our part of the debt, and we shall be fairly acquitted. Let the fund be an
impost on our foreign trade, and we shall encourage our manufactures. But
if we surrender the unlimited right to regulate trade, and levy taxes,
imposts will oppress our foreign trade for the benefit of other states,
while excises and taxes will discourage our internal industry. The right
to regulate trade, without any limitations, will, as certainly as it is
granted, transfer the trade of this state to Pennsylvania. That will be
the seat of business and of wealth, while the extremes of the empire will,
like Ireland and Scotland, be drained to fatten an overgrown capital.
Under our present equal advantages, the citizens of this state come in for
their full share of commercial profits. Surrender the rights of taxation
and commercial regulation, and the landed states at the southward will all
be interested in draining our resources; for whatever can be got by impost
on our trade and excises on our manufactures, will be considered as so
much saved to a state inhabited by planters. All savings of this sort
ought surely to be made in favour of our own state; and we ought never to
surrender the unlimited powers of revenue and trade to uncommercial
people. If we do, the glory of the state from that moment departs, never
to return.

The safety of our constitutional rights consists in having the business of
governments lodged in different departments, and in having each part well
defined. By this means each branch is kept within the constitutional
limits. Never was a fairer line of distinction than what may be easily
drawn between the continental and state governments. The latter provide
for all cases, whether civil or criminal, that can happen ashore, because
all such causes must arise within the limits of some state. Transactions
between citizens may all be fairly included in this idea, even although
they should arise in passing by water from one state to another. But the
intercourse between us and foreign nations properly forms the department
of Congress. They should have the power of regulating trade under such
limitations as should render their laws equal. They should have the right
of war and peace, saving the equality of rights, and the territory of each
state. But the power of naturalization and internal regulation should not
be given them. To give my scheme a more systematick appearance, I have
thrown it into the form of a resolve, which is submitted to your wisdom
for amendment, but not as being perfect.

“Resolved, that the form of government proposed by the federal convention,
lately held in Philadelphia, be rejected on the part of this commonwealth;
and that our delegates in Congress are hereby authorised to propose on the
part of this commonwealth, and, if the other states for themselves agree
thereto, to sign an article of confederation, as an addition to the
present articles, in the form following, provided such agreement be made
on or before the first day of January, which will be in the year of our
Lord 1790; the said article shall have the same force and effect as if it
had been inserted in the original confederation, and is to be construed
consistently with the clause in the former articles, which restrains the
United States from exercising such powers as are not expressly given.

“XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate, whether by treaty,
ordinance or law, the intercourse between these states and foreign
dominions and countries, under the following restrictions. No treaty,
ordinance, or law shall give a preference to the ports of one state over
those of another; nor 2d. impair the territory or internal authority of
any state; nor 3d. create any monopolies or exclusive companies; nor 4th.
naturalize any foreigners. All their imposts and prohibitions shall be
confined to foreign produce and manufactures imported, and to foreign
ships trading in our harbours. All imposts and confiscations shall be to
the use of the state where they shall accrue, excepting only such branches
of impost as shall be assigned by the separate states to Congress for a
fund to defray the interest of their debt, and their current charges. In
order the more effectually to execute this and the former articles,
Congress shall have authority to appoint courts, supreme and subordinate,
with power to try all crimes, not relating to state securities, between
any foreign state, or subject of such state, actually residing in a
foreign country, and not being an absentee or person who has alienated
himself from these states on the one part, and any of the United States or
citizens thereof on the other part; also all causes in which foreign
ambassadours or other foreign ministers resident here shall be immediately
concerned, respecting the jurisdiction or immunities only. And the
Congress shall have authority to execute the judgment of such courts by
their own affairs. Piracies and felonies committed on the high seas shall
also belong to the department of Congress for them to define, try, and
punish, in the same manner as the other causes shall be defined, tried,
and determined. All the before-mentioned causes shall be tried by jury and
in some sea-port town. And it is recommended to the general court at their
next meeting to provide and put Congress in possession of funds arising
from foreign imports and ships sufficient to defray our share of the
present annual expenses of the continent.”(25)

Such a resolve, explicitly limiting the powers granted, is the farthest we
can proceed with safety. The scheme of accepting the report of the
Convention, and amending it afterwards, is merely delusive. There is no
intention among those who make the proposition to amend it at all.
Besides, if they have influence enough to get it accepted in its present
form, there is no probability that they will consent to an alteration when
possessed of an unlimited revenue. It is an excellence in our present
confederation, that it is extremely difficult to alter it. An unanimous
vote of the states is required. But this newly proposed form is founded in
injustice, as it proposes that a fictitious consent of only nine states
shall be sufficient to establish it. Nobody can suppose that the consent
of a state is any thing more than a fiction, in the view of the
federalists, after the mobbish influence used over the Pennsylvania
convention. The two great leaders of the plan, with a modesty of Scotsmen,
placed a rabble in the gallery to applaud their speeches, and thus
supplied their want of capacity in the argument. Repeatedly were Wilson
and M’Kean worsted in the argument by the plain good sense of Findly and
Smilie. But reasoning or knowledge had little to do with the federal
party. Votes were all they wanted, by whatever means obtained. Means not
less criminal have been mentioned among us. But votes that are bought can
never justify a treasonable conspiracy. Better, far better, would it be to
reject the whole, and remain in possession of present advantages. The
authority of Congress to decide disputes between states is sufficient to
prevent their recurring to hostility: and their different situation, wants
and produce is a sufficient foundation for the most friendly intercourse.
All the arts of delusion and legal chicanery will be used to elude your
vigilance, and obtain a majority. But keeping the constitution of the
state and the publick interest in view, will be your safety.

[We are obliged, contrary to our intention, to postpone the remainder of
Agrippa till our next.]


Agrippa, XIV.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 401)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1788.

(_Concluded from our last._)

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

To tell us that we ought to look beyond local interests, and judge for the
good of the empire, is sapping the foundation of a free state. The first
principle of a just government is, that it shall operate equally. The
report of the convention is extremely unequal. It takes a larger share of
power from some, and from others, a larger share of wealth. The
Massachusetts will be obliged to pay near three times their present
proportion towards continental charges. The proportion is now ascertained
by the quantity of landed property, then it will be by the number of
persons. After taking the whole of our standing revenue, by impost and
excise, we must still be held to pay a sixth part of the remaining debt.
It is evidently a contrivance to help the other states at our expense. Let
us then be upon our guard, and do no more than the present confederation
obliges. While we make that our beacon we are safe. It was framed by men
of extensive knowledge and enlarged ability, at a time when some of the
framers of the new plan were hiding in the forests to secure their
precious persons. It was framed by men who were always in favor of a
limited government, and whose endeavours Heaven has crowned with success.
It was framed by men whose idols were not power and high life, but
industry and constitutional liberty, and who are now in opposition to this
new scheme of oppression. Let us then cherish the old confederation like
the apple of our eye. Let us confirm it by such limited powers to
Congress, and such an enlarged intercourse, founded on commercial and
mutual want, with the other states, that our union shall outlast time
itself. It is easier to prevent an evil than to cure it. We ought
therefore to be cautious of innovations. The intrigues of interested
politicians will be used to seduce even the elect. If the vote passes in
favour of the plan, the constitutional liberty of our country is gone
forever. If the plan should be rejected, we always have it in our power,
by a fair vote of the people at large, to extend the authority of
Congress. This ought to have been the mode pursued. But our antagonists
were afraid to risk it. They knew that the plan would not bear examining.
Hence we have seen them insulting all who were in opposition to it, and
answering arguments only with abuse. They have threatened and they have
insulted the body of the people. But I may venture to appeal to any man of
unbiassed judgment, whether his feelings tell him, that there is any
danger at all in rejecting the plan. I ask not the palsied or the
jaundiced, nor men troubled with bilious or nervous affections, for they
can see danger in every thing. But I apply to men who have no personal
expectations from a change, and to men in full health. The answer of all
such men will be, that never was a better time for deliberation. Let us
then, while we have it in our power, secure the happiness and freedom of
the present and future ages. To accept of the report of the convention,
under the idea that we can alter it when we please, will be sporting with
fire-brands, arrows and death. It is a system which must have an army to
support it, and there can be no redress but by a civil war. If, as the
federalists say, there is a necessity of our receiving it, for heaven’s
sake let our liberties go without our making a formal surrender. Let us at
least have the satisfaction of protesting against it, that our own hearts
may not reproach us for the meanness of deserting our dearest interests.

Our present system is attended with the inestimable advantage of
preventing unnecessary wars. Foreign influence is assuredly smaller in our
publick councils, in proportion as the members are subject to be recalled.
At present, their right to sit continues no longer than their endeavours
to secure the publick interest. It is therefore not an object for any
foreign power to give a large price for the friendship of a delegate in
Congress. If we adopt the new system, every member will depend upon thirty
thousand people, mostly scattered over a large extent of country, for his
election. Their distance from the seat of government will make it
extremely difficult for the electors to get information of his conduct. If
he is faithful to his constituents, his conduct will be misrepresented, in
order to defeat his influence at home. Of this we have a recent instance,
in the treatment of the dissenting members of the late federal
convention.(26) Their fidelity to their constituents was their whole
fault. We may reasonably expect similar conduct to be adopted, when we
shall have rendered the friendship of the members valuable to foreign
powers, by giving them a secure seat in Congress. We shall too have all
the intrigues, cabals and bribery practiced, which are usual at elections
in Great Britain. We shall see and lament the want of publick virtue; and
we shall see ourselves bought at a publick market, in order to be sold
again to the highest bidder. We must be involved in all the quarrels of
European powers, and oppressed with expense, merely for the sake of being
like the nations round about us. Let us then, with the spirit of freemen,
reject the offered system, and treat as it deserves the proposition of men
who have departed from their commission; and let us deliver to the rising
generation the liberty purchased with our blood.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, XV.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 402)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

Truly deplorable, in point of argument, must be that cause, in whose
defence persons of acknowledged learning and ability can say nothing
pertinent. When they undertake to prove that the person elected is the
safest person in the world to control the exercise of the elective powers
of his constituents, we know what dependence is to be had upon their
reasonings. Yet we have seen attempts to shew, that the fourth section of
the proposed constitution is an additional security to our rights. It may
be such in the view of a Rhode Island family (I think that state is
quoted) who have been of some time in the minority: but it is
extraordinary that an enlightened character(27) in the Massachusetts
[convention] should undertake to prove, that, from a single instance of
abuse in one state, another state ought to resign its liberty. Can an
[sic] man, in the free exercise of his reason, suppose, that he is
perfectly represented in the legislature, when that legislature may at
pleasure alter the time, manner and place of election? By altering the
time they may continue a representive during his whole life; by altering
the manner, they may fill up the vacancies by their own votes without the
consent of the people; and by altering the place, all the elections may be
made at the seat of the federal government. Of all the powers of
government perhaps this is the most improper to be surrendered. Such an
article at once destroys the whole check which the constituents have upon
their rulers. I should be less zealous upon this subject, if the power had
not been often abused. The senate of Venice, the regencies of Holland, and
the British Parliament have all abused it. The last have not yet
perpetuated themselves; but they have availed themselves repeatedly of
popular commotions to continue in power. Even at this day we find attempts
to vindicate the usurpation by which they continued themselves from three
to seven years. All the attempts, and many have been made, to return to
triennial elections, have proved abortive. These instances are abundantly
sufficient to shew with what jealousy this right ought to be guarded. No
sovereign on earth need be afraid to declare his crown elective, while the
possessor has the right to regulate the time, manner, and place of
election.

It is vain to tell us, that the proposed government guarantees to each
state a republican form. Republicks are divided into democraticks, and
aristocraticks. The establishment of an order of nobles, in whom should
reside all the power of the state, would be an aristocratick republick.
Such has been for five centuries the government of Venice, in which all
the energies of government, as well as of individuals, have been cramped
by a distressing jealousy that the rulers have of each other. There is
nothing of that generous, manly confidence that we see in the democratick
republicks of our own country. It is a government of force, attended with
perpetual fear of that force. In Great Britain, since the lengthening of
parliaments, all our accounts agree, that their elections are a continued
scene of bribery, riot and tumult; often a scene of murder. These are the
consequences of choosing seldom, and or extensive districts. When the term
is short nobody will give an high price for a seat. It is an insufficient
answer to these objections to say, that there is no power of government
but may sometimes be applied to bad purposes. Such a power is of no value
unless it is applied to a bad purpose. It ought always to remain with the
people. The framers of our state constitution were so jealous of this
right, that they fixed the days for election, meeting and dissolving of
the legislature, and of the other officers of government. In the proposed
constitution not one of these points is guarded, though more numerous and
extensive powers are given them than to any state legislature upon the
continent. For Congress is at present possessed of the direction of the
national force, and most other national powers, and in addition to them
are to be vested with all the powers of the individual states,
unrestrained by any declarations of right. If these things are for the
security of our constitutional liberty, I trust we shall soon see an
attempt to prove that the government by an army will be more friendly to
liberty than a system founded in consent, and that five states will make a
majority of thirteen. The powers of controuling elections, of creating
exclusive companies in trade, of internal legislation and taxations ought,
upon no account, to be surrendered. I know it is a common complaint, that
Congress want more power. But where is the limited government that does
not want it? Ambition is in a governour what money is to a misar
[sic]—.... he can never accumulate enough. But it is as true in politicks
as in morals, he that is unfaithful in little, will be unfaithful also in
much. He who will not exercise the powers he has, will never properly use
more extensive powers. The framing entirely new systems, is a work that
requires vast attention; and it is much easier to guard an old one. It is
infinitely better to reject one that is unfriendly to liberty, and rest
for a while satisfied with a system that is in some measure defective,
than to set up a government unfriendly to the rights of states, and to the
rights of individuals—one that is undefined in its powers and operations.
Such is the government proposed by the federal convention, and such, we
trust, you will have the wisdom and firmness to reject.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, XV.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 403)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

That the new system, proposed for your adoption, is not founded in
argument, but in party spirit, is evident from the whole behaviour of that
party, who favour it. The following is a short, but genuine specimen of
their reasoning. The South Carolina legislature have established an
unequal representation, and will not alter it: therefore Congress should
be invested with an unrestrained power to alter the time, manner and place
of electing members into that body. Directly the contrary position should
have been inferred. An elected assembly made an improper use of their
right to controul elections, therefore such a right ought not to be lodged
with them. It will be abused in ten instances, for one in which it will
serve any valuable purpose. It is said also that the Rhode Island assembly
_intend_ to abuse their power in this respect, therefore we should put
Congress in a situation to abuse theirs. Surely this is not a kind of
reasoning that, in the opinion of any indifferent person, can vindicate
the fourth section. Yet we have heard it publickly advanced as being
conclusive.

The unlimited power over trade, domestick as well as foreign, is another
power that will more probably be applied to a bad than to a good purpose.
That our trade was for the last year much in favour of the commonwealth is
agreed by all parties. The freedom that every man, whether his capital is
large or small, enjoys of entering into any branch that pleases him,
rouses a spirit of industry and exertion, that is friendly to commerce. It
prevents that stagnation of business which generally precedes publick
commotions. Nothing ought to be done to restrain this spirit. The
unlimited power over trade, however, is exceedingly apt to injure it.

In most countries of Europe, trade has been more confined by exclusive
charters. Exclusive companies are, in trade, pretty much like an
aristocracy in government, and produce nearly as bad effects. An instance
of it we have ourselves experienced. Before the Revolution, we carried on
no direct trade to India. The goods imported from that country came to us
through the medium of an exclusive company. Our trade in that quarter is
now respectable, and we receive several kinds of their goods at about half
the former price. But the evil of such companies does not terminate there.
They always, by the greatness of their capital, have an undue influence on
the government.

In a republick, we ought to guard, as much as possible, against the
predominance of any particular interest. It is the object of government to
protect them all. When commerce is left to take its own course, the
advantage of every class will be nearly equal. But when exclusive
privileges are given to any class, it will operate to the weakening of
some other class connected with them.

AGRIPPA.

(_Remainder next Tuesday._)


Agrippa, XVII.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 404)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

As it is essentially necessary to the happiness of a free people, that the
constitution of government should be established in principles of truth, I
have endeavoured, in a series of papers, to discuss the proposed form with
that degree of freedom which becomes a faithful citizen of the
commonwealth. It must be obvious to the most careless observer that the
friends of the new plan appear to have nothing more in view than to
establish it by a popular current, without any regard to the truth of its
principles. Propositions, novel, erroneous and dangerous, are boldly
advanced to support a system, which does not appear to be founded in, but
in every instance to contradict, the experience of mankind. We are told
that a constitution is in itself a bill of rights; that all power not
expressly given, is reserved; that no powers are given to the new
government which are not already vested in the state governments, and that
it is for the security of liberty that the persons elected should have the
absolute controul over the time, manner and place of election. These, and
an hundred other things of a like kind, though they have gained the hasty
assent of men, respectable for learning and ability, are false in
themselves and invented merely to serve a present purpose. This will, I
trust, clearly appear from the following considerations:

It is common to consider man at first as in a state of nature, separate
from all society. The only historical evidence, that the human species
ever actually existed in this state, is derived from the book of Gen.
There it is said, that Adam remained a while alone. While the whole
species was comprehended in his person was the only instance in which this
supposed state of nature really existed. Ever since the completion of the
first pair, mankind appear as natural to associate with their own species,
as animals of any other kind herd together. Wherever we meet with their
settlements, they are found in clans. We are therefore justified in
saying, that a state of society is the natural state of man. Wherever we
find a settlement of men, we find also some appearance of government. The
state of government is therefore as natural to mankind as a state of
society. Government and society appear to be co-eval. The most rude and
artless form of government is probably the most ancient. This we find to
be practised among the Indian tribes in America. With them the whole
authority of government is vested in the whole tribe. Individuals depend
upon their reputation of valour and wisdom to give them influence. Their
government is genuinely democratical. This was probably the first kind of
government among mankind, as we meet with no mention of any other kind,
till royalty was introduced in the person of Nimrod. Immediately after
that time, the Asiatick nations seem to have departed from the simple
democracy, which is still retained by their American brethren, and
universally adopted the kingly form. We do indeed meet with some vague
rumors of an aristocracy in India so late as the time of Alexander the
Great. But such stories are altogether uncertain and improbable. For in
the time of Abraham, who lived about sixteen hundred years before
Alexander, all the little nations mentioned in the Mosaick history appear
to be governed by kings. It does not appear from any accounts of the
Asiatick kingdoms that they have practised at all upon the idea of a
limited monarchy. The whole power of society has been delegated to the
kings; and though they may be said to have constitutions of government,
because the succession to the crown is limited by certain rules, yet the
people are not benefitted by their constitutions, and enjoy no share of
civil liberty. The first attempt to reduce republicanism to a system,
appears to be made by Moses when he led the Israelites out of Egypt. This
government stood a considerable time, about five centuries, till in a
frenzy the people demanded a king, that they might resemble the nations
about them. They were dissatisfied with their judges, and instead of
changing the administration, they madly changed their constitution.
However they might flatter themselves with the idea, that an high-spirited
people could get the power back again when they pleased; they never did
get it back, and they fared like the nations about them. Their kings
tyrannized over them for some centuries, till they fell under a foreign
yoke. This is the history of that nation. With a change of names, it
describes the progress of political changes in other countries. The people
are dazzled with the splendour of distant monarchies, and a desire to
share their glory induces them to sacrifice their domestick happiness.

From this general view of the state of mankind it appears that all the
powers of government originally reside in the body of the people; and that
when they appoint certain persons to administer the government, they
delegate all the powers of government not expressly reserved. Hence it
appears that a constitution does not in itself imply any more than a
declaration of the relation which the different parts of the government
bear to each other, but does not in any degree imply security to the
rights of individuals. This has been the uniform practice. In all doubtful
cases the decision is in favour of the government. It is therefore
impertinent to ask by what right government exercises powers not expressly
delegated. Mr. Wilson, the great oracle of federalism, acknowledges, in
his speech to the Philadelphians,(28) the truth of these remarks, as they
respect the state governments, but attempts to set up a distinction
between them and the continental government. To anybody who will be at the
trouble to read the new system, it is evidently in the same situation as
the state constitutions now possess. It is a compact among the _people_
for the purposes of government, and not a compact between states. It
begins in the name of the people, and not of the states.

It has been shown in the course of this paper, that when people institute
government, they of course delegate all rights not expressly reserved. In
our state constitution the bill of rights consists of thirty articles. It
is evident therefore that the new constitution proposes to delegate
greater powers than are granted to our own government, sanguine as the
person was who denied it. The complaints against the separate governments,
even by the friends of the new plan, are not that they have not power
enough, but that they are disposed to make a bad use of what power they
have. Surely then they reason badly, when they purpose to set up a
government possess’d of much more extensive powers than the present, and
subjected to much smaller checks.

Bills of rights, reserved by authority of the people, are, I believe,
peculiar to America. A careful observance of the abuse practised in other
countries has had its just effect by inducing our people to guard against
them. We find the happiest consequences to flow from it. The separate
governments know their powers, their objects, and operations. We are
therefore not perpetually tormented with new experiments. For a single
instance of abuse among us there are thousands in other countries. On the
other hand, the people know their rights, and feel happy in the possession
of their freedom, both civil and political. Active industry is the
consequence of their security, and within one year the circumstances of
the state and of individuals have improved to a degree never before known
in this commonwealth. Though our bill of rights does not, perhaps, contain
all the cases in which power might be safely reserved, yet it affords a
protection to the persons and possessions of individuals not known in any
foreign country. In some respects the power of government is a little too
confined. In many other countries we find the people resisting their
governours for exercising their power in an unaccustomed mode. But for
want of a bill of rights the resistance is always, by the principles of
their government, a rebellion which nothing but success can justify. In
our constitution we have aimed at delegating the necessary powers of
government and confining their operation to beneficial purposes. At
present we appear to have come very near the truth. Let us therefore have
wisdom and virtue enough to preserve it inviolate. It is a stale
contrivance, to get the people into a passion, in order to make them
sacrifice their liberty. Repentance always comes, but it comes too late.
Let us not flatter ourselves that we shall always have good men to govern
us. If we endeavour to be like other nations we shall have more bad men
than good ones to exercise extensive powers. That circumstance alone will
corrupt them. While they fancy themselves the viceregents of God, they
will resemble him only in power, but will always depart from his wisdom
and goodness.

AGRIPPA.


Agrippa, XVIII.


The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 406)

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

In my last address I ascertained, from historical records, the following
principles: that, in the original state of government, the whole power
resides in the whole body of the nation, that when a people appoint
certain persons to govern them, they delegate their whole power; that a
constitution is not in itself a bill of rights; and that, whatever is the
form of government, a bill of rights is essential to the security of the
persons and property of the people. It is an idea favourable to the
interest of mankind at large, that government is founded in compact.
Several instances may be produced of it, but none is more remarkable than
our own. In general, I have chosen to apply to such facts as are in the
reach of my readers. For this purpose I have chiefly confined myself to
examples drawn from the history of our own country, and to the Old
Testament. It is in the power of every reader to verify examples thus
substantiated. Even in the remarkable arguments on the fourth section,
relative to the power over election I was far from stating the worst of
it, as it respects the adverse party. A gentleman, respectable in many
points, but more especially for his systematick and perspicuous reasoning
in his profession, has repeatedly stated to the Convention, among his
reasons in favour of that section, that _the Rhode Island assembly have
for a considerable time past had a bill lying on their __ table for
altering the manner of elections for representatives in that state_.(29)
He has stated it with all the zeal of a person who believed his argument
to be a good one. But surely a _bill lying on a table_ can never be
considered as any more than an _intention_ to pass it, and nobody pretends
that it ever actually did pass. It is in strictness only the intention of
a part of the assembly, for nobody can aver that it ever will pass. I
write not with an intention to deceive, but that the whole argument may be
stated fairly. Much eloquence and ingenuity have been employed in shewing
that side of the argument in favor of the proposed constitution, but it
ought to be considered that if we accept it upon mere verbal explanations,
we shall find ourselves deceived. I appeal to the knowledge of every one,
if it does not frequently happen, that a law is interpreted in practice
very differently from the intention of the legislature. Hence arises the
necessity of acts to amend and explain former acts. This is not an
inconvenience in the common and ordinary business of legislation, but is a
great one in a constitution. A constitution is a legislative act of the
whole people. It is an excellence that it should be permanent, otherwise
we are exposed to perpetual insecurity from the fluctuation of government.
We should be in the same situation as under absolute government, sometimes
exposed to the pressure of greater, and sometimes unprotected by the
weaker power in the sovereign.

It is now generally understood that it is for the security of the people
that the powers of the government should be lodged in different branches.
By this means publick business will go on when they all agree, and stop
when they disagree. The advantage of checks in government is thus
manifested where the concurrence of different branches is necessary to the
same act, but the advantage of a division of business is advantageous in
other respects. As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to
suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the
business. All human capacities are limited to a narrow space, and as no
individual is capable of practising a great variety of trades, no single
legislature is capable of managing all the variety of national and state
concerns. Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of the
judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence
arises the necessity of a division of the business into national and
local. Each department ought to have all the powers necessary for
executing its own business, under such limitations as tend to secure us
from any inequality in the operations of government. I know it is often
asked against whom in a government by representation is a bill of rights
to secure us? I answer, that such a government is indeed a government by
ourselves; but as a just government protects all alike, it is necessary
that the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended
from the rapacity and violence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights,
therefore, ought to set forth the purposes for which the compact is made,
and serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of
the majority. It is a just observation of his excellency, doctor Adams, in
his learned defence of the American constitutions that unbridled passions
produce the same effect, whether in a king, nobility, or a mob. The
experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to
use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual
against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy. Our
state constitution has wisely guarded this point. The present
confederation has also done it.

I confess that I have yet seen no sufficient reason for not amending the
confederation, though I have weighed the argument with candour; I think it
would be much easier to amend it than the new constitution. But this is a
point on which men of very respectable character differ. There is another
point in which nearly all agree, and that is, that the new constitution
would be better in many respects if it had been differently framed. Here
the question is not so much what the amendments ought to be, as in what
manner they shall be made; whether they shall be made as conditions of our
accepting the constitution, or whether we shall first accept it, and then
try to amend it. I can hardly conceive that it should seriously be made a
question. If the first question, whether we will receive it as it stands,
be negatived, as it undoubtedly ought to be, while the conviction remains
that amendments are necessary; the next question will be, what amendments
shall be made? Here permit an individual, who glories in being a citizen
of Massachusetts, and who is anxious that her character may remain
undiminished, to propose such articles as appear to him necessary for
preserving the rights of the state. He means not to retract anything with
regard to the expediency of amending the old confederation, and rejecting
the new one totally; but only to make a proposition which he thinks
comprehends the general idea of all parties. If the new constitution means
no more than the friends of it acknowledge, they certainly can have no
objection to affixing a declaration in favor of the rights of states and
of citizens, especially as a majority of the states have not yet voted
upon it.

“Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United States be
received only upon the following conditions:

“1. Congress shall have no power to alter the time, place or manner of
elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such
state as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not
exceeding the expense of supporting its representatives or senators one
year.

“2. Congress shall not have the power of regulating the intercourse
between the states, nor to levy any direct tax on polls or estates, or any
excise.

“3. Congress shall not have power to try causes between a state and
citizens of another state, nor between citizens of different states; nor
to make any laws relative to the transfer of property between those
parties, nor any other matter which shall originate in the body of any
state.

“4. It shall be left to every state to make and execute its own laws,
except laws impairing contracts, which shall not be made at all.

“5. Congress shall not incorporate any trading companies, nor alienate the
territory of any state. And no treaty, ordinance or law of the United
States shall be valid for these purposes.

“6. Each state shall have the command of its own militia.

“7. No continental army shall come within the limits of any state, other
than garrison to guard the publick stores, without the consent of such
states in time of peace.

“8. The president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but one year,
and shall be chosen successively from the different states, changing every
year.

“9. The judicial department shall be confined to cases in which
ambassadours are concerned, to cases depending upon treaties, to offences
committed upon the high seas, to the capture of prizes, and to cases in
which a foreigner residing in some foreign country shall be a party, and
an American state or citizen shall be the other party, provided no suit
shall be brought upon a state note.

“10. Every state may emit bills of credit without making them a tender,
and may coin money, of silver, gold or copper, according to the
continental standard.

“11. No powers shall be exercised by Congress or the president but such as
are expressly given by this constitution and not excepted against by this
declaration. And any officer of the United States offending against an
individual state shall be held accountable to such state, as any other
citizen would be.

“12. No officer of Congress shall be free from arrest for debt [but] by
authority of the state in which the debt shall be due.

“13. Nothing in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any state of
the benefit of the bill of rights established by the constitution of the
state in which he shall reside, and such bill of rights shall be
considered as valid in any court of the United States where they shall be
pleaded.

“14. In all those causes which are triable before the continental courts,
the trial by jury shall be held sacred.”

These at present appear to me the most important points to be guarded. I
have mentioned a reservation of excise to the separate states, because it
is necessary, that they should have some way to discharge their own debts,
and because it is placing them in an humiliating & disgraceful situation
to depute them to transact the business of international government
without the means to carry it on. It is necessary also, as a check on the
national government, for it has hardly been known that any government
having the powers of war, peace, and revenue, has failed to engage in
needless and wanton expense. A reservation of this kind is therefore
necessary to preserve the importance of the state governments: without
this the extremes of the empire will in a very short time sink into the
same degradation and contempt with respect to the middle state as Ireland,
Scotland, & Wales, are in with regard to England. All the men of genius
and wealth will resort to the seat of government, that will be center of
revenue, and of business, which the extremes will be drained to supply.

This is not mere vision, it is justified by the whole course of things. We
shall, therefore, if we neglect the present opportunity to secure
ourselves, only increase the number of proofs already too many, that
mankind are incapable of enjoying their liberty. I have been the more
particular in stating the amendments to be made, because many gentlemen
think it would be preferable to receive the new system with corrections. I
have by this means brought the corrections into one view, and shown
several of the principal points in which it is unguarded. As it is agreed,
at least professedly, on all sides, that those rights should be guarded,
it is among the inferior questions in what manner it is done, provided it
is absolutely and effectually done. For my own part, I am fully of opinion
that it would be best to reject this plan, and pass an explicit resolve,
defining the powers of Congress to regulate the intercourse between us and
foreign nations, under such restrictions as shall render their regulations
equal in all parts of the empire. The impost, if well collected, would be
fully equal to the interest of the foreign debt, and the current charges
of the national government. It is evidently for our interest that the
charges should be as small as possible. It is also for our interest that
the western lands should, as fast as possible, be applied to the purpose
of paying the home debt. Internal taxation and that fund have already paid
two-thirds of the whole debt, notwithstanding the embarrassments usual at
the end of a war.

We are now rising fast above our difficulties; everything at home has the
appearance of improvement, government is well established, manufactures
increasing rapidly, and trade expanding. Till since the peace we never
sent a ship to India, and the present year, it is said, sends above a
dozen vessels from this state only, to the countries round the Indian
ocean. Vast quantities of our produce are exported to those countries. It
has been so much the practice of European nations to farm out this branch
of trade, that we ought to be exceedingly jealous of our right. The
manufactures of the state probably exceed in value one million pounds for
the last year. Most of the useful and some ornamental fabricks are
established. There is great danger of these improvements being injured
unless we practice extreme caution at setting out. It will always be for
the interest of the southern states to raise a revenue from the more
commercial ones. It is said that the consumer pays it. But does not a
commercial state consume more foreign goods than a landed one? The people
are more crowded, and of consequence the land is less able to support
them. We know it is to be a favourite system to raise the money where it
is. But the money is to be expended at another place, and is therefore so
much withdrawn annually from our stock. This is a single instance of the
difference of interest; it would be very easy to produce others.
Innumerable as the differences of manners, and these produce differences
in the laws. Uniformity in legislation is of no more importance than in
religion. Yet the framers of this new constitution did not even think it
necessary that the president should believe that there is a God, although
they require an oath of him. It would be easy to shew the propriety of a
general declaration upon that subject. But this paper is already extended
to so far [sic].

Another reason which I had in stating the amendments to be made, was to
shew how nearly those who are for admitting the system with the necessary
alterations, agree with those who are for rejecting this system and
amending the confederation. In point of convenience, the confederation
amended would be infinitely preferable to the proposed constitution. In
amending the former, we know the powers granted, and are subject to no
perplexity; but in reforming the latter, the business is excessively
intricate, and great part of the checks on Congress are lost. It is to be
remembered too, that if you are so far charmed with eloquence, and misled
by fair representations and charitable constructions, as to adopt an
undefined system, there will be no saying afterwards that you were
mistaken, and wish to correct it. _It will then be the constitution of our
country, and entitled to defence._ If Congress should chuse to avail
themselves of a popular commotion to continue in being, as the fourth
section justifies, and as the British parliament has repeatedly done, the
only answer will be, that it is the constitution of our country, and the
people chose it. It is therefore necessary to be exceedingly critical.
Whatsoever way shall be chosen to secure our rights, the same resolve
ought to contain the whole system of amendment. If it is rejected, the
resolve should contain the amendations of the old system; and if accepted,
it should contain the corrections of the new one.

AGRIPPA.

                  ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

_A writer in the Gazette of 29th January, under the signature of Captain
M__c__Daniel, having with civility and apparent candour, called for an
explanation of what was said in one of my former papers, I have chosen to
mention him with respect, as the only one of my reviewers who deserves an
answer._



# Elbridge Gerry, Replies to the Strictures of a Landholder

REPLIES TO THE STRICTURES OF A LANDHOLDER, BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.


Printed In The Massachusetts Centinel,
And
The American Herald,
January-April 1788.


Note.


The refusal of Gerry to sign or support the Constitution, being the only
northern member of the federal convention to do so, made him the general
target of attack by the federal writers of New England. To most of these
Gerry paid no attention, but the charges of “A Landholder” were so
positive, and so evidently written by a fellow member of the federal
convention, that an answer was necessary.

To neither of the two pieces here printed did Gerry put his name, but the
subject and internal evidence are both conclusive that they were written
by him. Not being able to find a copy of the _American Herald_, I have
been compelled to reprint the second article from the _New York Journal_.
For more on this subject see the letters of A Landholder and of Luther
Martin in this collection.


Reply To A Landholder, I.


The Massachusetts Centinel, (Number 32 of Volume VIII)

SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1788.

MR. RUSSELL:

You are desired to inform the publick from good authority, that Mr. GERRY,
by giving his dissent to the proposed Constitution, could have no motives
for preserving an office, for he holds none under the United States, or
any of them; that he has not, as has been asserted, exchanged Continental
for State Securities, and if he had, it would have been for his interest
to have supported the new system, because thereby the states are
restrained from impairing the obligation of contracts, and by a transfer
of such securities, they may be recovered in the new federal court; that
he never heard, in the Convention, a motion made, much less did make any,
“for the redemption of the old continental money;” but that he proposed
the public debt should be made neither better nor worse by the new system,
but stand precisely on the same ground by the Articles of Confederation;
that had there been such a motion, he was not interested in it, as he did
not then, neither does he now, own the value of ten pounds in continental
money; that he neither was called on for his reasons for not signing, but
stated them fully in the progress of the business. His objections are
chiefly contained in his letter to the Legislature; that he believes his
colleagues men of too much honour to assert what is not truth; that his
reasons in the Convention “were totally different from those which he
published,” that his only motive for dissenting from the Constitution, was
a firm persuasion that it would endanger the liberties of America; that if
the people are of a different opinion, they have a right to adopt; but he
was not authorized to an act, which appeared to him was a surrender of
their liberties; that a representative of a free state, he was bound in
honour to vote according to his idea of her true interest, and that he
should do the same in similar circumstances.

_Cambridge, January 3, 1788._


Reply To A Landholder, II.


The New York Journal, (Number 2282)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1788.

From the American Herald, printed at Boston.

MR. GREENLEAF,

As the Connecticut Landholder’s publications are dispersed throughout the
state, it will be useful for the sake of truth to publish the following.

TO THE PUBLIC.

An elegant writer, under the signature of “A Landholder,” having in a
series of publications, with a modesty and delicacy peculiar to himself,
undertaken to instruct members of legislatures, executives, and
conventions, in their duty respecting the new constitution, is, in stating
facts, unfortunate, in being repeatedly detected in errors; but his
perseverance therein does honor “to his magnanimity,” and reminds me of
Dr. Sangerado (in Gil Blas) who being advised to alter his practice, as it
was founded on false principles and destructive to his patients, firmly
determined to pursue it, because he had written a book in support of it.
Had our learned author, the modern Sangerado, confined himself to facts
and to reasoning on the constitution, he might have continued to write
without interruption from its opposers, until by instructing others, he
had obtained that instruction which he seems to need, or a temporary
relief from the inenviable malady, the cacoethes scribendi; but his
frequent misrepresentations having exposed him to suspicions that as a
disciple of Mandeville he was an advocate for vice, or that to correct his
curiosity some humourist has palmed on him a spurious history of the
proceedings of the federal convention, and exhibited his credulity as a
subject of ridicule, it is proper to set him right in facts, which, in
almost every instance he has misstated.

In a late address to the honorable Luther Martin, Esquire, the Landholder
has asserted, that Mr. Gerry “uniformly opposed Mr. Martin’s principles,”
but this is a circumstance wholly unknown to Mr. Gerry, until he was
informed of it by the Connecticut Landholder; indeed Mr. Gerry from the
first acquaintance with Mr. Martin, has “uniformly had a friendship for
him.”

This writer has also asserted, “that the day Mr. Martin took his seat in
convention, without requesting information, or to be let into the reasons
of the adoption of what he might not approve, he opened against them in a
speech which held during two days.” But the facts are, that Mr. Martin had
been a considerable time in convention before he spoke; that when he
entered into the debates he appeared not to need “information,” as he was
fully possessed of the subject; and that his speech, if published, would
do him great honor.

Another assertion of this famous writer is, that Mr. Gerry in “a
sarcastical reply, admired the strength of Mr. Martin’s lungs, and his
profound knowledge in the first principles of government;” that “this
reply” “left him a prey to the most humiliating reflections; but these did
not teach him to bound his future speeches by the lines of moderation; for
the very next day he exhibited, without a blush, another specimen of
eternal volubility.” This is so remote from the truth, that no such reply
was made by Mr. Gerry to Mr. Martin, or to any member of the convention;
on the contrary, Mr. Martin, on the first day he spoke, about the time of
adjournment, signified to the convention that the heat of the season, and
his indisposition prevented his proceeding, and the house adjourned
without further debate, or a reply to Mr. Martin from any member whatever.

Again, the Landholder has asserted that Mr. Martin voted “an appeal should
lay to the supreme judiciary of the United States for the correction of
all errors both in law and fact,” and “agreed to the clause that declares
nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion;” and in a
note says, “Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions.” Whether
there is any truth in the assertions as they relate to Mr. Martin, he can
best determine; but as they respect Mr. Gerry, they reverse the facts; for
he not only voted against the first proposition (which is not stated by
the Landholder, with the accuracy requisite for a writer on government)
but contended for jury trials in civil cases, and declared his opinion,
that a federal judiciary with the powers above mentioned, would be as
oppressive and dangerous, as the establishment of a star-chamber, and as
to the clause that “declares nine states to be sufficient to put the
government in motion,” Mr. Gerry was so much opposed to it, as to vote
against it in the first instance, and afterwards to move for a
reconsideration of it.

The Landholder having in a former publication asserted “that Mr. Gerry
introduced a motion, respecting the redemption of old continental money”
and the public having been informed by a paragraph in the Massachusetts
Centinel, No. 32, of vol. 8, as well as by the honorable Mr. Martin, that
neither Mr. Gerry, or any other member, had introduced such a proposition,
the Landholder now says that “out of 126 days, Mr. Martin attended only
66,” and then enquires “whether it is to be presumed that Mr. Martin could
have been minutely informed, of all that happened in convention, and
committees of convention, during the sixty days of absence?” and “Why is
it that we do not see Mr. McHenry’s verification of his assertion, who was
of the committee for considering a provision for the debts of the union?”
But if these enquiries were intended for subterfuges, unfortunately for
the Landholder, they will not avail him: for, had Mr. Martin not been
present at the debates on this subject, the fact is, that Mr. Gerry was
not on a committee with Mr. McHenry, or with any other person, for
considering a provision for the debts of the union, or any provision that
related to the subject of old continental money; neither did he make any
proposition, in convention, committee, or on any occasion, to any member
of convention or other person, respecting the redemption of such money;
and the assertions of the Landholder to the contrary, are altogether
destitute of the shadow of truth.

The Landholder addressing Mr. Martin, further says, “Your reply to my
second charge against Mr. Gerry, may be soon dismissed: compare his letter
to the legislature of his state, with your defence, and you will find,
that you have put into his mouth, objections different from anything it
contains, so that if your representation be true, his must be false.” The
objections referred to, are those mentioned by Mr. Martin, as being made
by Mr. Gerry, against the supreme power of Congress over the militia. Mr.
Gerry, in his letter to the legislature, states as an objection, “That
some of the powers of the federal legislature are ambiguous, and others
(meaning the unlimited power of Congress, to keep up a standing army, in
time of peace, and their entire controul of the militia) are indefinite
and dangerous.” Against both these did Mr. Gerry warmly contend, and why
his representations must be false, if Mr. Martin’s are true, which
particularized what Mr. Gerry’s stated generally, can only be discovered
by such a profound reasoner, as the Connecticut Landholder.

The vanity of this writer, in supposing that his charges would be the
subject of constitutional investigation, can only be equalled by his
impertinence, in interfering with the politics of other states, or by his
ignorance, in supposing a state convention could take cognizance of such
matters as he calls charges, and that Mr. Gerry required a formal defence,
or the assistance of his colleagues, to defeat the unprovoked and
libellous attacks of the Landholder, or any other unprincipled reviler.

The landholder says: “That Mr. Martin thought the deputy attorney-general
of the United States, for the state of Maryland, destined for a different
character, and that inspired him with the hope that he might derive from a
desperate opposition, what he saw no prospect of gaining by a contrary
conduct;” but the landholder ventures to predict, “that though Mr. Martin
was to double his efforts he would fail in his object.” By this we may
form some estimate of the patriotism of the landholder, for, whilst he so
readily resolves Mr. Martin’s conduct into a manœuvre for office, he gives
too much reason to suppose, that he himself has no idea of any other
motive in conducting politicks. But how can the landholder ascertain, that
“Mr. Martin thought” the office mentioned “destined for a different
character?” Was the landholder present at the destination? If so, it was
natural for him, knowing there was a combination against Mr. Martin
(however remote this gentleman was from discovering it) to suppose his
accidental opposition to the complotters, proceeded from a discovery of
the plot. Surely the landholder must have some reason for his conjecture
respecting the motives of Mr. Martin’s conduct, or to be subject to the
charge of publishing calumny, knowing it to be such. If then, this great
statesman was in a secret, which has been long impenetrable, he is now
entitled to the honor of giving the public the most important information
they have received, concerning the origin of the new constitution, and
having candidly informed them who is not, he ought to inform who is to
fill that office, and all others of the new federal government. It may
then, in some measure be ascertained, what individuals have supported the
constitution on principles of patriotism, and who under this guise have
been only squabbling for office. Perhaps we shall find that the landholder
is to have the contract for supplying the standing army under the new
government, and that many others, who have recurred to abuse on this
occasion, have some such happy prospects; indeed the landholder puts it
beyond a doubt, if we can believe him, that it was determined in the privy
council of this federal convention, that however Mr. Martin might advocate
the new constitution, he should not have the office mentioned; for if this
was not the case, how can the landholder so roundly assert that Mr. Martin
could have no prospect by a contrary conduct of gaining the office, and so
remarkably sanguine is the landholder, that the members of the privy
council would be senators of the new Congress, in which case the elections
would undoubtedly be made according to the conventional list of
nominations, as that he ventures to predict, though Mr. Martin was to
double his efforts, he would fail in his object. Thus whilst this blazing
star of federalism is taking great pains to hold up Mr. Gerry and Mr.
Mason, as having held private meetings “to aggrandize old Massachusetts
and the antient dominion” he has confessed enough to shew that his private
meetings were solely to aggrandize himself.



# William Williams, A Letter to the Landholder

A LETTER TO THE LANDHOLDER. BY WILLIAM WILLIAMS.


Printed In
The American Mercury,
February 1788.


Note.


This letter was occasioned by the following communication, which was
printed in the _Connecticut Courant_ for Monday, February 4, 1788, (number
1202):

TO THE HON. WILLIAM WILLIAMS, ESQ.

_Sir_:—Whenever one man makes a charge against another, reason and justice
require that he should be able to support the charge. In some late
publications, I have offered my sentiments on the new constitution, have
adduced some arguments in favour of it, and answered objections to it. I
did not wish to enter into a controversy with any man. But I am unwilling
to have accusations publickly thrown out against me, without an
opportunity to answer them. In the late convention, when a _religious
test_ was the subject of debate, you took the liberty of saying _that the
Landholder_ (in treating of the same subject) _had missed the point; that
he had raised up a man of straw, and kicked it over again_. Now, Sir, I
wish this matter may be fairly cleared up. I wish to know, what is the
real point? Who and what the _real_ man is? Or in other words, what a
religious test is? I certainly have a right to expect that you will answer
these questions, and let me know wherein I am in the wrong. Perhaps you
may show that my ideas on the subject are erroneous. In order to do this,
it would not be amiss to offer a few reasons and arguments. You doubtless
had such as were convincing, at least to yourself, though you happen to
omit them at the time of the debate. If you will shew that I am in the
wrong, I will candidly acknowledge my mistake. If on the contrary you
should be unable to prove your assertions, the public will judge, whether
_you or I have missed the point_; and which of us has _committed the crime
of making a man of straw_.

Not doubting but you will have the candour to come to an explanation on
this subject,

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

THE LANDHOLDER.

From The Landholder’s statement printed at page 195 of this volume, it
appears that this signature was employed by another man, in this instance.


Letter Of William Williams.


The American Mercury, (Number 88)

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11TH, 1788.

MR. BABCOCK:

Since the Federal Constitution has had so calm, dispassionate and so happy
an issue, in the late worthy Convention of this State; I did not expect
any members of that hon. body to be challenged in a News-paper, and
especially by name, and by anonymous writers, on account of their opinion,
or decently expressing their sentiments relative to the great subject then
under consideration, or any part of it. Nor do I yet see the propriety, or
happy issue of such a proceeding. However as a gentleman in your Paper
feels uneasy, that every sentiment contained in his publications, (tho’ in
general they are well written) is not received with perfect acquiescence
and submission, I will endeavour to satisfy him, or the candid reader, by
the same channel, that I am not so reprehensible as he supposes, in the
matter refer’d to. When the clause in the 6th article, which provides that
“no religious test should ever be required as a qualification to any
office or trust, &c.” came under consideration, I observed I should have
chose that sentence and anything relating to a religious test, had been
totally omitted rather than stand as it did, but still more wished
something of the kind should have been inserted, but with a reverse sense,
so far as to require an explicit acknowledgment of the being of a God, his
perfections and his providence, and to have been prefixed to, and stand
as, the first introductory words of the Constitution, in the following or
similar terms, viz. _We the people of the United States, in a firm belief
of the being and perfections of the one living and true God, the creator
and supreme Governour of the world, in his universal providence and the
authority of his laws; that he will require of all moral agents an account
of their conduct; that all rightful powers among men are ordained of, and
mediately derived from God; therefore in a dependence on his blessing and
acknowledgment of his efficient protection in establishing our
Independence, whereby it is become necessary to agree upon and settle a
Constitution of federal government for ourselves_, and in order to form a
more perfect union &c., as it is expressed in the present introduction, do
ordain &c., and instead of none, that no other religious test should ever
be required &c., and that supposing, but not granting, this would _be no
security at all_, that it would make hypocrites, &c. yet this would not be
a sufficient reason against it; as it would be a public declaration
against, and disapprobation of men, who did not, even with sincerity, make
such a profession, and they must be left to the searcher of hearts; that
it would however, be the voice of the great body of the people, and an
acknowledgment proper and highly becoming them to express on this great
and only occasion, and according to the course of Providence, one mean of
obtaining blessings from the most high. But that since it was not, and so
difficult and dubious to get inserted, I would not wish to make it a
capital objection; that I had no more idea of a religious test, which
should restrain offices to any particular sect, class, or denomination of
men or Christians in the long list of diversity, than to regulate their
bestowments by the stature or dress of the candidate, nor did I believe
one sensible catholic man in the state wished for such a limitation; and
that therefore the News-Paper observations, and reasonings (I named no
author) against a test, in favour of any one denomination of Christians,
and the sacrilegious injunctions of the test laws of England &c.,
combatted objections which did not exist, and _was building up a man of
straw and knocking him down again_. These are the same and only ideas and
sentiments I endeavoured to communicate on that subject, tho’ perhaps not
precisely in the same terms; as I had not written, nor preconceived them,
except the proposed test, and whether there is any reason in them or not,
I submit to the public.

I freely confess such a test and acknowledgment would have given me great
additional satisfaction; and I conceive the arguments against it, on the
score of hypocrisy, would apply with equal force against requiring an oath
from any officer of the united or individual states; and with little
abatement, to any oath in any case whatever; but divine and human wisdom,
with universal experience, have approved and established them as useful,
and a security to mankind.

I thought it was my duty to make the observations, in this behalf, which I
did, and to bear my testimony for God; and that it was also my duty to say
_the Constitution_, with this, and some other faults of another kind, was
yet too wise and too necessary to be rejected.

W. WILLIAMS.

P. S.—I could not have suspected the Landholder (if I know him) to be the
author of the piece referred to; but if he or any other is pleased to
reply, without the signature of his proper name, he will receive no
further answer or notice from me.

Feb. 2d, 1788.



# The Letters of Cato

THE LETTERS OF CATO, WRITTEN BY GEORGE CLINTON.


Printed In
The New York Journal,
September-January, 1787-8.


Note.


These letters were commonly ascribed to the pen of George Clinton in the
press of the day, and that this ascription was right seems to be proved by
the following letter. Though signed by Hamilton, it is in the handwriting
of John Lamb, a leading anti-federalist of New York, and is in the George
Clinton MSS. in the New York State Library. It thus seems apparent that it
is a copy secured in some way by Hamilton’s political opponents:


    OCTOBER 18, 1787.

    _Dear Sir_:

    Since my last the chief of the state party has declared his
    opposition to the government proposed, both in private
    conversation and in print. That you may judge of the _reason_ and
    _fairness_ of his views, I send you the two essays, with a reply
    by Cæsar. On further consideration it was concluded to abandon
    this personal form, and to take up the principles of the whole
    subject. These will be sent you as published, and might with
    advantage be republished in your gazettes.

    A. HAMILTON.


This copy, so obtained, seems to have been the basis of the following note
in the _New York Journal_:


    “A writer in the state of New-York, under the signature of
    _Cesar_, came forward against the patriotic _Cato_ and endeavoured
    to frighten him from starting any objections and threatened that
    ‘_Cato_ would be followed by _Cesar_ in all his marches;’ but we
    find that as soon as ever _Cato_ came freely to discuss the merit
    of the constitution _Cesar_ retreated and disappeared: and since
    that a publication under the signature of Publius ... has appeared
    in that state.”


Another evidence in confirmation is, that the last of this series was
printed on January 3, 1788, and the New York Assembly met on the 9th of
the same month, after which Governor Clinton was probably too occupied to
write more, though no conclusion was announced in the last essay, and it
is probable no such termination was intended. Following these are the two
essays of _Cæsar_ mentioned above.


Cato, I.


The New York Journal, (Number 2134)

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1787.

For the New York Journal.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

The Convention, who sat at Philadelphia, have at last delivered to
Congress that system of general government, which they have declared best
calculated to promote your safety and happiness as citizens of the United
States. This system, though not handed to you formally by the authority of
government, has obtained an introduction through divers channels; and the
minds of you all, to whose observation it has come, have no doubt been
contemplating it; and alternate joy, hope, or fear have preponderated, as
it conformed to, or differed from, your various ideas of just government.

Government, to an American, is the science of his political safety; this
then is a moment to you the most important—and that in various points—to
your reputation as members of a great nation—to your immediate safety, and
to that of your posterity. In your private concerns and affairs of life
you deliberate with caution, and act with prudence; your public concerns
require a caution and prudence, in a ratio suited to the difference and
dignity of the subject. The disposal of your reputation, and of your lives
and property, is more momentous than a contract for a farm, or the sale of
a bale of goods; in the former, if you are negligent or inactive, the
ambitious and despotic will entrap you in their toils, and bind you with
the cord of power from which you, and your posterity may never be freed;
and if the possibility should exist, it carries along with it consequences
that will make your community totter to its center: in the latter, it is
the mere loss of a little property, which more circumspection or assiduity
may repair.

Without directly engaging as an advocate for this new form of national
government, or as an opponent—let me conjure you to consider this a very
important crisis of your safety and character. You have already, in common
with the rest of your countrymen, the citizens of the other states, given
to the world astonishing evidence of your greatness—you have fought under
peculiar circumstances, and were successful against a powerful nation on a
speculative question, you have established an original compact between you
and your governors, a fact heretofore unknown in the formation of the
governments of the world; your experience has informed you, that there are
defects in the federal system, and, to the astonishment of mankind, your
legislatures have concerted measures for an alteration, with as much ease
as an individual would make a disposition of his ordinary domestic
affairs: this alteration now lies before you, for your consideration; but
beware how you determine—do not, because you admit that something must be
done, adopt anything—teach the members of that convention that ye are
capable of a supervision of their conduct. The same medium that gave you
this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make
amendments, or give you another, if it is required. Your fate, and that of
your posterity, depends on your present conduct; do not give the latter
reason to curse you, nor yourselves cause of reprehension; as individuals
you are ambitious of leaving behind you a good name, and it is the
reflection that you have done right in this life, that blunts the
sharpness of death; the same principles would be a consolation to you, as
patriots, in the hour of dissolution, that you would leave to your
children a fair political inheritance, untouched by the vultures of power,
which you had acquired by an _unshaken perseverance_ in the cause of
liberty; but how miserable the alternative—you would deprecate the ruin
you had brought upon yourselves, be the curse of posterity, and the scorn
and scoff of nations.

Deliberate, therefore, on this new national government with coolness;
analize it with criticism; and reflect on it with candor: if you find that
the influence of a powerful few, or the exercise of a standing army, will
always be directed and exerted for your welfare alone, and not to the
aggrandizement of themselves, and that it will secure to you and your
posterity happiness at home, and national dignity and respect from abroad,
adopt it; if it will not, reject it with indignation—better to be where
you are for the present, than insecure forever afterwards. Turn your eyes
to the United Netherlands, at this moment, and view their situation;
compare it with what yours may be, under a government substantially
similar to theirs.

Beware of those who wish to influence your passions, and to make you dupes
to their resentments and little interests—personal invectives can never
persuade, but they always fix prejudices, which candor might have
removed—those who deal in them have not your happiness at heart. Attach
yourselves to measures, not to men.

This form of government is handed to you by the recommendations of a man
who merits the confidence of the public; but you ought to recollect that
the wisest and best of men may err, and their errors, if adopted, may be
fatal to the community; therefore, in principles of _politics_, as well as
in religious faith, every man ought to think for himself.

Hereafter, when it will be necessary, I shall make such observations on
this new constitution as will tend to promote your welfare and be
justified by reason and truth.

CATO.

_Sept. 26, 1787._


Cato, II.


The New York Journal, (Number 2136)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1787.

For the New York Journal.

_To the_ CITIZENS _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK:


    “Remember, O my friends! the laws, the rights,
    The generous plan of power deliver’d down,
    By your renown’d Forefathers;
    So dearly bought, the price of so much blood!
    O let it never perish in your hands!
    But piously transmit it to your children.”


The object of my last address to you was to engage your dispassionate
consideration of the new Federal government; to caution you against
precipitancy in the adoption of it; to recommend a correction of its
errors, if it contained any; to hint to you the danger of an easy
perversion of some of its powers; to solicit you to separate yourselves
from party, and to be independent of and uninfluenced by any in your
principles of politics; and that address was closed with a promise of
future observations on the same subject, which should be justified by
reason and truth. Here I intended to have rested the introduction; but a
writer under the signature of CÆSAR, in Mr. Child’s paper of the 1st
instant, who treats you with passion, insult, and threat, has anticipated
those observations which would otherwise have remained in silence until a
future period. It would be criminal in me to hesitate a moment to appear
as your advocate in so interesting a cause, and to resist the influence of
such doctrines as this Cæsar holds. I shall take no other cognizance of
his remarks on the _questionable_ shape of my future, or the _equivocal_
appearance of my past reflections, than to declare, that in my past, I did
not mean to be misunderstood (for Cæsar himself declares that it is
obviously the language of distrust), and that in my future there will not
be the semblance of doubt. But what is the language of Cæsar—he ridicules
your prerogative, power, and majesty—he talks of this _proffered
constitution_ as the tender mercy of a benevolent sovereign to deluded
subjects, or, as his tyrant name-sake, of his proffered grace to the
virtuous Cato:—he shuts the door of free deliberation and discussion, and
declares that you must receive this government in manner and form as it is
_proffered_—that you cannot revise or amend it, and lastly, to close the
scene, he insinuates that it will be more healthy for you that the
American Fabius should be induced to accept of the presidency of this new
government than that, in case you do not acquiesce, he should be solicited
to command an army to impose it on you. Is not your indignation roused at
this absolute, imperious style? For what did you open the veins of your
citizens and expend their treasure? For what did you throw off the yoke of
Britain and call yourselves independent? Was it from a disposition fond of
change, or to procure new masters?—if those were your motives, you have
reward before you—go, retire into silent obscurity, and kiss the rod that
scourges you, bury the prospects you had in store, that you and your
posterity would participate in the blessings of freedom, and the
employments of your country—let the rich and insolent alone be your
rulers. Perhaps you are designed by providence as an emphatic evidence of
the mutability of human affairs, to have the show of happiness only, that
your misery may seem the sharper, and if so, you must submit. But if you
had nobler views, and you are not designed by heaven as an example—are you
now to be derided and insulted? Is the power of thinking, on the only
subject important to you, to be taken away? and if per chance you should
happen to differ from Cæsar, are you to have Cæsar’s principles crammed
down your throats with an army? God forbid!

In democratic republics the people collectively are considered as the
sovereign—all legislative, judicial, and executive power, is inherent in
and derived from them. As a people, your power and authority have
sanctioned and established the present government—your executive,
legislative, and judicial acknowledge it by their public acts—you are
again solicited to sanction and establish the future one—yet this Cæsar
mocks your dignity and laughs at the majesty of the people. Cæsar, with
his usual dogmatism, enquires, if I had talents to throw light on the
subject of legislation, why did I not offer them when the Convention was
in session? He is answered in a moment—I thought with him and you, that
the wisdom of America, in that Convention, was drawn as it were to a
Focus. I placed an unbounded confidence in some of the characters who were
members of it, from the services they had rendered their country, without
adverting to the ambitious and interested views of others. I was willingly
led to expect a model of perfection and security that would have
astonished the world. Therefore to have offered observation, on the
subject of legislation, under these impressions, would have discovered no
less arrogance than Cæsar. The Convention, too, when in session, shut
their doors to the observations of the community, and their members were
under an obligation of secrecy. Nothing transpired. To have suggested
remarks on unknown and anticipated principles would have been like a man
groping in the dark, and folly in the extreme. I confess, however, I have
been disappointed, and Cæsar is candid enough to make the same
declaration, for he thinks it _might_ have been more perfect.

But to call in dispute, at this time, and in the manner Cæsar does, the
right of free deliberation on this subject, is like a man’s propounding a
question to another, and telling him at the same that if he does not
answer agreeable to the opinion of the propounder, he will exert force to
make him of the same sentiment: to exemplify this, it will be necessary to
give you a short history of the rise and progress of the Convention, and
the conduct of Congress thereon. The states in Congress suggested, that
the articles of confederation had provided for making alterations in the
confederation—that there were defects therein, and as a means to remedy
which, a Convention of delegates, appointed by the different states, was
resolved expedient to be held for the sole and express purpose of revising
it, and reporting to Congress and the different legislatures such
alterations and provisions therein as should (when agreed to in Congress
and confirmed by the several states) render the federal constitution
adequate to the exigencies of government. This resolution is sent to the
different states, and the legislature of this state, with others, appoint,
in conformity thereto, delegates for the purpose, and in the words
mentioned in that resolve, as by the resolution of Congress, and the
concurrent resolutions of the senate and assembly of this state,
subjoined, will appear. For the sole and express purpose aforesaid a
Convention of delegates is formed at Philadelphia: what have they done?
Have they revised the confederation, and has Congress agreed to their
report?—neither is the fact. This Convention have exceeded the authority
given to them, and have transmitted to Congress a new political fabric,
essentially and fundamentally distinct and different from it, in which the
different states do not retain separately their sovereignty and
independency, united by a confederate league—but one entire sovereignty, a
consolidation of them into one government—in which new provisions and
powers are not made and vested in Congress, but in an assembly, senate,
and president, who are not known in the articles of confederation.
Congress, without agreeing to, or approving of, this system _proffered_ by
the Convention, have sent it to the different legislatures, not for their
confirmation, but to submit it to the people; not in conformity to their
own resolution, but in conformity to the resolution of the Convention made
and provided in that case.(53) Was it, then, from the face of the
foregoing facts, the intention of Congress, and of this and the other
states, that the essence of our present national government should be
annihilated, or that it should be retained and only have an increase of
substantial necessary powers? Congress, sensible of this latter principle,
and that the Convention had taken on themselves a power which neither they
nor the other states had a right to delegate to them, and that they could
not agree to and approve of this consolidated system, nor the states
confirm it—have been silent on its character; and although many have dwelt
on their unanimity, it is no less than the unanimity of opinion that it
originated in an assumption of power, which your voice alone can sanctify.
This new government, therefore, founded in usurpation, is referred to your
opinion as the origin of power not heretofore delegated, and, to this end,
the exercise of the prerogative of free examination is essentially
necessary; and yet you are unhesitatingly to acquiesce, and if you do not,
the American Fabius, if we may believe Cæsar is to command an army to
impose it. It is not my view to rouse your passions. I only wish to excite
you to, and assist you in, a cool and deliberate discussion of the
subject, to urge you to behave like sensible freemen. Think, speak, act,
and assert your opinions and rights—let the same good sense govern you
with respect to the adoption of a future system for the administration of
your public affairs that influenced you in the formation of the present.
Hereafter I do not intend to be diverted by Cæsar, or any other. My object
is to take up this new form of national government—compare it with the
experience and opinions of the most sensible and approved political
authors—and to show that its principles, and the exercise of them, will be
dangerous to your liberty and happiness.

CATO.


Cato, III.


The New York Journal, (Number 2138)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1787.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

In the close of my last introductory address, I told you that my object in
the future would be to take up this new form of national government, to
compare it with the experience and opinions of the most sensible and
approved political authors, and to show you that its principles, and the
exercise of them, will be dangerous to your liberty and happiness.

Although I am conscious that this is an arduous undertaking, yet I will
perform it to the best of my ability.

The freedom, equality and independence which you enjoyed by nature,
induced you to consent to a political power. The same principles led you
to examine the errors and vices of a British superintendence, to divest
yourselves of it, and to reassume a new political shape. It is
acknowledged that there are defects in this, and another is tendered to
you for acceptance; the great question then, that arises on this new
political principle, is, whether it will answer the ends for which it is
said to be offered to you, and for which all men engage in political
society, to wit, the preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates.

The recital, or premises on which the new form of government is erected,
declares a consolidation or union of all the thirteen parts, or states,
into one great whole, under the firm of the United States, for all the
various and important purposes therein set forth. But whoever seriously
considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits
of the United States, together with the variety of its climates,
productions, and commerce, the difference of extent, and number of
inhabitants in all; the dissimilitude of interest, morals, and politics,
in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a
consolidated republican form of government therein, can never _form a
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your
posterity_, for to these objects it must be directed: this unkindred
legislature therefore, composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in
their nature, will in its exercise, emphatically be like a house divided
against itself.

The governments of Europe have taken their limits and form from
adventitious circumstances, and nothing can be argued on the motive of
agreement from them; but these adventitious political principles, have
nevertheless produced effects that have attracted the attention of
philosophy, which have established axioms in the science of politics
therefrom, as irrefragable as any in Euclid. It is natural, says
Montesquieu, _to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it
cannot long subsist: in a large one, there are men of large fortunes, and
consequently of less moderation; there are too great deposits to trust in
the hands of a single subject; an ambitious person soon becomes sensible
that he may be happy, great, and glorious by oppressing his fellow
citizens, and that he might raise himself to grandeur, on the ruins of his
country. In large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand
views; in a small one, the interest of the public is easily perceived,
better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have
a less extent, and of course are less protected_—he also shows you, that
the duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to its having continued
with the same extent of territory after all its wars; and that the
ambition of Athens and Lacedemon to command and direct the union, lost
them their liberties, and gave them a monarchy.

From this picture, what can you promise yourselves, on the score of
consolidation of the United States into one government? Impracticability
in the just exercise of it, your freedom insecure, even this form of
government limited in its continuance, the employments of your country
disposed of to the opulent, to whose contumely you will continually be an
object—you must risk much, by indispensably placing trusts of the greatest
magnitude, into the hands of individuals whose ambition for power, and
aggrandizement, will oppress and grind you—where from the vast extent of
your territory, and the complication of interests, the science of
government will become intricate and perplexed, and too mysterious for you
to understand and observe; and by which you are to be conducted into a
monarchy, either limited or despotic; the latter, Mr. Locke remarks, _is a
government derived from neither nature nor compact_.

_Political liberty_, the great Montesquieu again observes, _consists in
security, or at least in the opinion we have of security_; and this
_security_, therefore, or the _opinion_, is best obtained in moderate
governments, where the mildness of the laws, and the equality of the
manners, beget a confidence in the people, which produces this security,
or the opinion. This moderation in governments depends in a great measure
on their limits, connected with their political distribution.

The extent of many of the states of the Union, is at this time almost too
great for the superintendence of a republican form of government, and must
one day or other revolve into more vigorous ones, or by separation be
reduced into smaller and more useful, as well as moderate ones. You have
already observed the feeble efforts of Massachusetts against their
insurgents; with what difficulty did they quell that insurrection; and is
not the province of Maine at this moment on the eve of separation from
her? The reason of these things is, that for the security of the
_property_ of the community, in which expressive term Mr. Locke makes
life, liberty, and estate, to consist—the wheels of a republic are
necessarily slow in their operation; hence in large free republics, the
evil sometimes is not only begun, but almost completed, before they are in
a situation to turn the current into a contrary progression: the extremes
are also too remote from the usual seat of government, and the laws,
therefore, too feeble to afford protection to all its parts, and insure
_domestic tranquility_ without the aid of another principle. If,
therefore, this state, and that of North Carolina, had an army under their
control, they never would have lost Vermont, and Frankland, nor the state
of Massachusetts suffer an insurrection, or the dismemberment of her
fairest district, but the exercise of a principle which would have
prevented these things, if we may believe the experience of ages, would
have ended in the destruction of their liberties.

Will this consolidated republic, if established, in its exercise beget
such confidence and compliance, among the citizens of these states, as to
do without the aid of a standing army? I deny that it will. The
malcontents in each state, who will not be a few, nor the least important,
will be exciting factions against it—the fear of a dismemberment of some
of its parts, and the necessity to enforce the execution of revenue laws
(a fruitful source of oppression) on the extremes and in the other
districts of the government, will incidentally and necessarily require a
permanent force, to be kept on foot: will not political security, and even
the opinion of it, be extinguished? Can mildness and moderation exist in a
government where the primary incident in its exercise must be force? Will
not violence destroy confidence, and can equality subsist where the
extent, policy, and practice of it will naturally lead to make odious
distinctions among citizens?

The people who may compose this national legislature from the southern
states, in which, from the mildness of the climate, the fertility of the
soil, and the value of its productions, wealth is rapidly acquired, and
where the same causes naturally lead to luxury, dissipation, and a passion
for aristocratic distinction; where slavery is encouraged, and liberty of
course less respected and protected; who know not what it is to acquire
property by their own toil, nor to economize with the savings of
industry—will these men, therefore, be as tenacious of the liberties and
interests of the more northern states, where freedom, independence,
industry, equality and frugality are natural to the climate and soil, as
men who are your own citizens, legislating in your own state, under your
inspection, and whose manners and fortunes bear a more equal resemblance
to your own?

It may be suggested, in answer to this, that whoever is a citizen of one
state is a citizen of each, and that therefore he will be as interested in
the happiness and interest of all, as the one he is delegated from; but
the argument is fallacious, and, whoever has attended to the history of
mankind, and the principles which bind them together as parents, citizens,
or men, will readily perceive it. These principles are, in their exercise,
like a pebble cast on the calm surface of a river—the circles begin in the
center, and are small, active, and forcible, but as they depart from that
point, they lose their force, and vanish into calmness.

The strongest principle of union resides within our domestic walls. The
ties of the parent exceed that of any other; as we depart from home, the
next general principle of union is amongst citizens of the same state,
where acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, nourish affection, and
attachment; enlarge the circle still further, and, as citizens of
different states, though we acknowledge the same national denomination, we
lose in the ties of acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, and thus by
degrees we lessen in our attachments, till, at length, we no more than
acknowledge a sameness of species. Is it, therefore, from certainty like
this, reasonable to believe, that inhabitants of Georgia, or New
Hampshire, will have the same obligations towards you as your own, and
preside over your lives, liberties, and property, with the same care and
attachment? Intuitive reason answers in the negative.

In the course of my examination of the principles of consolidation of the
states into one general government, many other reasons against it have
occurred, but I flatter myself, from those herein offered to your
consideration, I have convinced you that it is both presumptuous and
impracticable, consistent with your safety. To detain you with further
remarks would be useless. I shall, however, continue in my following
numbers to analyse this new government, pursuant to my promise.

CATO.


Cato, IV.


The New York Journal, (Number 2140)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1787.

For the New York Journal.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

Admitting, however, that the vast extent of America, together with the
various other reasons which I offered you in my last number, against the
practicability of the just exercise of the new government are insufficient
to convince; still it is an undesirable truth, that its several parts are
either possessed of principles, which you have heretofore considered as
ruinous and that others are omitted which you have established as
fundamental to your political security, and must in their operation, I
will venture to assert, fetter your tongues and minds, enchain your
bodies, and ultimately extinguish all that is great and noble in man.

In pursuance of my plan I shall begin with observations on the executive
branch of this new system; and though it is not the first in order, as
arranged therein, yet being the _chief_, is perhaps entitled by the rules
of rank to the first consideration. The executive power as described in
the 2d article, consists of a president and vice-president, who are to
hold their offices during the term of four years; the same article has
marked the manner and time of their election, and established the
qualifications of the president; it also provides against the removal,
death, or inability of the president and vice-president—regulates the
salary of the president, delineates his duties and powers; and, lastly,
declares the causes for which the president and vice-president shall be
removed from office.

Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentlemen who
composed the convention, it may be here remarked with deference, that the
construction of the first paragraph of the first section of the second
article is vague and inexplicit, and leaves the mind in doubt as to the
election of a president and vice-president, after the expiration of the
election for the first term of four years; in every other case, the
election of these great officers is expressly provided for; but there is
no explicit provision for their election in case of expiration of their
offices, subsequent to the election which is to set this political machine
in motion; no certain and express terms as in your state constitution,
that _statedly_ once in every four years, and as often as these offices
shall become vacant, by expiration or otherwise, as is therein expressed,
an election shall be held as follows, &c., this inexplicitness perhaps may
lead to an establishment for life.

It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that _in all
magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated by the
brevity of the duration, and that a longer time than a year would be
dangerous_. It is, therefore, obvious to the least intelligent mind to
account why great power in the hands of a magistrate, and that power
connected with considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of
a republic, the deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single
magistrate, enables him in their exercise to create a numerous train of
dependents; this tempts his _ambition_, which in a republican magistrate
is also remarked, _to be pernicious_, and the duration of his office for
any considerable time favors his views, gives him the means and time to
perfect and execute his designs, _he therefore fancies that he may be
great and glorious by oppressing his fellow-citizens, and raising himself
to permanent grandeur on the ruins of his country_. And here it may be
necessary to compare the vast and important powers of the president,
together with his continuance in office, with the foregoing doctrine—his
eminent magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him, and he
will be surrounded by expectants and courtiers, his power of nomination
and influence on all appointments, the strong posts in each state
comprised within his superintendence, and garrisoned by troops under his
direction, his control over the army, militia, and navy, the unrestrained
power of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen from
punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and
thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt, his duration in office for
four years: these, and various other principles evidently prove the truth
of the position, that if the president is possessed of ambition, he has
power and time sufficient to ruin his country.

Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, is assisted
by the senate, yet he is without a constitutional council in their recess;
he will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and
will generally be directed by minions and favorites, or a council of state
will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments, the most
dangerous council in a free country.

The ten miles square, which is to become the seat of government, will of
course be the place of residence for the president and the great officers
of state; the same observations of a great man will apply to the court of
a president possessing the powers of a monarch, that is observed of that
of a monarch—_ambition with idleness_—_baseness with pride_—_the thirst of
riches without labor_—_aversion to
truth_—_flattery_—_treason_—_perfidy_—_violation of engagements_—_contempt
of civil duties_—_hope from the magistrate’s weakness_; _but above all,
the perpetual ridicule of virtue_—these, he remarks, are the
characteristics by which the courts in all ages have been distinguished.

The language and the manners of this court will be what distinguishes them
from the rest of the community, not what assimilates them to it; and in
being remarked for a behavior that shows they are not _meanly born_, and
in adulation to people of fortune and power.

The establishment of a vice-president is as unnecessary as it is
dangerous. This officer, for want of other employment, is made president
of the senate, thereby blending the executive and legislative powers,
besides always giving to some one state, from which he is to come, an
unjust pre-eminence.

It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the people should be
of their immediate choice; but by the manner in which the president is
chosen, he arrives to this office at the fourth or fifth hand, nor does
the highest vote, in the way he is elected, determine the choice, for it
is only necessary that he should be taken from the highest of five, who
may have a plurality of votes.

Compare your past opinions and sentiments with the present proposed
establishment, and you will find, that if you adopt it, that it will lead
you into a system which you heretofore reprobated as odious. Every
American Whig, not long since, bore his emphatic testimony against a
monarchical government, though limited, because of the dangerous
inequality that it created among citizens as relative to their rights and
property; and wherein does this president, invested with his powers and
prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great Britain (save as
to name, the creation of nobility, and some immaterial incidents, the
offspring of absurdity and locality). The direct prerogatives of the
president, as springing from his political character, are among the
following: It is necessary, in order to distinguish him from the rest of
the community, and enable him to keep, and maintain his court, that the
compensation for his services, or in other words, his revenue, should be
such as to enable him to appear with the splendor of a prince; he has the
power of receiving ambassadors from, and a great influence on their
appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, leagues, and
alliances with foreign states, assisted by the Senate, which when made
become the supreme law of land: he is a constituent part of the
legislative power, for every bill which shall pass the House of
Representatives and Senate is to be presented to him for approbation; if
he approves of it he is to sign it, if he disapproves he is to return it
with objections, which in many cases will amount to a complete negative;
and in this view he will have a great share in the power of making peace,
coining money, etc., and all the various objects of legislation, expressed
or implied in this Constitution: for though it may be asserted that the
king of Great Britain has the express power of making peace or war, yet he
never thinks it prudent to do so without the advice of his Parliament,
from whom he is to derive his support, and therefore these powers, in both
president and king, are substantially the same: he is the generalissimo of
the nation, and of course has the command and control of the army, navy
and militia; he is the general conservator of the peace of the union—he
may pardon all offences, except in cases of impeachment, and the principal
fountain of all offices and employments. Will not the exercise of these
powers therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary
aristocracy or monarchy? The safety of the people in a republic depends on
the share or proportion they have in the government; but experience ought
to teach you, that when a man is at the head of an elective government
invested with great powers, and interested in his re-election, in what
circle appointments will be made; by which means an _imperfect
aristocracy_ bordering on monarchy may be established.

You must, however, my countrymen, beware that the advocates of this new
system do not deceive you by a fallacious resemblance between it and your
own state government which you so much prize; and, if you examine, you
will perceive that the chief magistrate of this state is your immediate
choice, controlled and checked by a just and full representation of the
people, divested of the prerogative of influencing war and peace, making
treaties, receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standing armies
and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, and will be
convinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your own
than an Angel of Darkness resembles an Angel of Light.

CATO.


Cato, V.


The New York Journal, (Number 2145)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1787.

For the New York Journal, &c.

_To the_ CITIZENS _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK.

In my last number I endeavored to prove that the language of the article
relative to the establishment of the executive of this new government was
vague and inexplicit; that the great powers of the president, connected
with his duration in office, would lead to oppression and ruin; that he
would be governed by favorites and flatterers, or that a dangerous council
would be collected from the great officers of state; that the ten miles
square, if the remarks of one of the wisest men, drawn from the experience
of mankind, may be credited, would be the asylum of the base, idle,
avaricious and ambitious, and that the court would possess a language and
manners different from yours; that a vice-president is as unnecessary as
he is dangerous in his influence; that the president cannot represent you
because he is not of your own immediate choice; that if you adopt this
government you will incline to an arbitrary and odious aristocracy or
monarchy; that the president, possessed of the power given him by this
frame of government, differs but very immaterially from the establishment
of monarchy in Great Britain; and I warned you to beware of the fallacious
resemblance that is held out to you by the advocates of this new system
between it and your own state governments.

And here I cannot help remarking that inexplicitness seems to pervade this
whole political fabric; certainly in political compacts, which Mr. Coke
calls _the mother and nurse of repose and quietness_ the want of which
induced men to engage in political society, has ever been held by a wise
and free people as essential to their security; as on the one hand it
fixes barriers which the ambitious and tyrannically disposed magistrate
dare not overleap, and on the other, becomes a wall of safety to the
community—otherwise stipulations between the governors and governed are
nugatory; and you might as well deposit the important powers of
legislation and execution in one or a few and permit them to govern
according to their disposition and will; but the world is too full of
examples, which prove that _to live by one man’s will became the cause of
all men’s misery_. Before the existence of express political compacts it
was reasonably implied that the magistrate should govern with wisdom and
justice; but mere implication was too feeble to restrain the unbridled
ambition of a bad man, or afford security against negligence, cruelty or
any other defect of mind. It is alleged that the opinions and manners of
the people of America are capable to resist and prevent an extension of
prerogative or oppression, but you must recollect that opinion and manners
are mutable, and may not always be a permanent obstruction against the
encroachments of government; that the progress of a commercial society
begets luxury, the parent of inequality, the foe to virtue, and the enemy
to restraint; and that ambition and voluptuousness, aided by flattery,
will teach magistrates where limits are not explicitly fixed to have
separate and distinct interests from the people; besides, it will not be
denied that government assimilates the manners and opinions of the
community to it. Therefore, a general presumption that rulers will govern
well is not a sufficient security. You are then under a sacred obligation
to provide for the safety of your posterity, and would you now basely
desert their interests, when by a small share of prudence you may transmit
to them a beautiful political patrimony, which will prevent the necessity
of their travelling through seas of blood to obtain that which your wisdom
might have secured? It is a duty you owe likewise to your own reputation,
for you have a great name to lose; you are characterized as cautious,
prudent and jealous in politics; whence is it therefore that you are about
to precipitate yourselves into a sea of uncertainty, and adopt a system so
vague, and which has discarded so many of your valuable rights? Is it
because you do not believe that an American can be a tyrant? If this be
the case, you rest on a weak basis: Americans are like other men in
similar situations, when the manners and opinions of the community are
changed by the causes I mentioned before; and your political compact
inexplicit, your posterity will find that great power connected with
ambition, luxury and flattery, will as readily produce a Cæsar, Caligula,
Nero and Domitian in America, as the same causes did in the Roman Empire.

But the next thing to be considered, in conformity to my plan, is the
first article of this new government, which comprises the erection of the
house of representatives and the senate, and prescribes their various
powers and objects of legislation. The most general objections to the
first article, that biennial elections for representatives are a departure
from the safe democratic principles of annual ones—that the number of
representatives are too few; that the apportionment and principles of
increase are unjust; that no attention has been paid to either the numbers
or property in each state in forming the senate; that the mode in which
they are appointed and their duration will lead to the establishment of an
aristocracy; that the senate and president are improperly connected, both
as to appointments and the making of treaties, which are to become the
supreme law of the land; that the judicial, in some measure, to wit, as to
the trial of impeachments, is placed in the senate, a branch of the
legislative, and sometimes a branch of the executive; that Congress have
the improper power of making or altering the regulations prescribed by the
different legislatures, respecting the time, place and manner of holding
elections for representatives, and the time and manner of choosing
senators; that standing armies may be established, and appropriation of
money made for their support for two years; that the militia of the most
remote state may be marched into those states situated at the opposite
extreme of this continent; that the slave trade is, to all intents and
purposes, permanently established, and a slavish capitation or poll-tax
may at any time be levied; these are some of the many evils that will
attend the adoption of this government.

But, with respect to the first objection, it may be remarked that a
well-digested democracy has this advantage over all others, to wit: that
it affords to many the opportunity to be advanced to the supreme command,
and the honors they thereby enjoy fill them with a desire of rendering
themselves worthy of them; hence this desire becomes part of their
education, is matured in manhood, and produces an ardent affection for
their country, and it is the opinion of the great Sidney and Montesquieu
that this is, in a great measure, produced by annual election of
magistrates.

If annual elections were to exist in this government, and learning and
information to become more prevalent, you never would want men to execute
whatever you could design. Sidney observes _that a well-governed state is
as fruitful to all good purposes as the seven-headed serpent is said to
have been in evil; when one head is cut off, many rise up in the place of
it_. He remarks further that _it was also thought that free cities, by
frequent election of magistrates, became nurseries of great and able men,
every man endeavoring to excel others, that he might be advanced to the
honor he had no other title to, than what might arise from his merit or
reputation_; but the framers of this _perfect government_, as it is
called, have departed from this democratical principle, and established
biennial elections for the house of representatives, who are to be chosen
by the people, and sextennial for the senate, who are to be chosen by the
legislatures of the different states, and have given to the executive the
unprecedented power of making temporary senators, in case of vacancies by
resignation or otherwise, and so far forth establishing a precedent for
virtual representation (though, in fact, their original appointment is
virtual), thereby influencing the choice of the legislatures, or if they
should not be so complaisant as to conform to his appointment, offence
will be given to the executive, and the temporary members will appear
ridiculous by rejection; this temporary member, during his time of
appointment, will of course act by a power derived from the executive, and
for, and under his immediate influence.

It is a very important objection to this government, that the
representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of
corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments
ought to take precautions—how guarded you have been on this head, in your
own state constitution, and yet the number of senators and representatives
proposed for this vast continent does not equal those of your own state;
how great the disparity, if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in
the United States. The history of representation in England, from which we
have taken our model of legislation, is briefly this: before the
institution of legislating by deputies, the whole free part of the
community usually met for that purpose; when this became impossible, by
the increase of numbers, the community was divided into districts, from
each of which was sent such a number of deputies as was a complete
representation of the various numbers and orders of citizens within them;
but can it be asserted with truth, that six men can be a complete and full
representation of the numbers and various orders of the people in this
state? Another thing that may be suggested against the small number of
representatives is, that but few of you will have a chance of sharing even
in this branch of the legislature; and that the choice will be confined to
a very few. The more complete it is, the better will your interests be
preserved, and the greater the opportunity you will have to participate in
government, one of the principal securities of a free people; but this
subject has been so ably and fully treated by a writer under the signature
of Brutus,(54) that I shall content myself with referring you to him
thereon, reserving further observations on the other objections I have
mentioned, for my future numbers.

CATO.


Cato, VI.


The New York Journal, (Number 2163)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1787.

For the New York Journal, &c.

_To the_ PEOPLE _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK.

The next objection that arises against this proffered constitution is,
that the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes are unjust. The
words, as expressed in this article, are “representatives and direct taxes
shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included in
this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those
bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three-fifths of all other persons.” In order to elucidate this, it will be
necessary to repeat the remark in my last number, that the mode of
legislation in the infancy of free communities was by the collective body,
and this consisted of free persons, or those whose age admitted them to
the right of mankind and citizenship, whose sex made them capable of
protecting the state, and whose birth may be denominated Free Born; and no
traces can be found that ever women, children, and slaves, or those who
were not sui juris, in the early days of legislation, meeting with the
free members of the community to deliberate on public measures; hence is
derived this maxim in free governments, that representation ought to bear
a proportion to the number of free inhabitants in a community; this
principle your own state constitution, and others, have observed in the
establishment of a future census, in order to apportion the
representatives, and to increase or diminish the representation to the
ratio of the increase or diminution of electors. But, what aid can the
community derive from the assistance of women, infants and slaves, in
their deliberation, or in their defence? and what motives, therefore,
could the convention have in departing from the just and rational
principle of representation, which is the governing principle of this
state and of all America?

The doctrine of taxation is a very important one, and nothing requires
more wisdom and prudence than the regulation of that portion, which is
taken from, and of that which is left to the subject—and if you anticipate
what will be the enormous expense of this new government added also to
your own, little will that portion be which will be left to you. I know
there are politicians who believe that you should be loaded with taxes, in
order to make you industrious, and, perhaps, there are some of this
opinion in the convention, but it is an erroneous principle. For, what can
inspire you with industry, if the greatest measure of your labors are to
be swallowed up in taxes? The advocates for this new system hold out an
idea, that you will have but little to pay, for that the revenues will be
so managed as to be almost wholly drawn from the source of trade or duties
on imports, but this is delusive—for this government to discharge all its
incidental expenses, besides paying the interest on the home and foreign
debts, will require more money than its commerce can afford; and if you
reflect one moment, you will find, that if heavy duties are laid on
merchandise, as must be the case if government intends to make this the
prime medium to lighten the people of taxes, that the price of the
commodities, useful as well as luxurious, must be increased; the consumers
will be fewer; the merchants must import less; trade will languish, and
this source of revenue in a great measure be dried up; but if you examine
this a little further you will find that this revenue, managed in this
way, will come out of you, and be a very heavy and ruinous one, at least.
The merchant no more than advances the money for you to the public and
will not, nor cannot pay any part of it himself; and if he pays more
duties, he will sell his commodities at a price portionably raised. Thus
the laborer, mechanic, and farmer must feel it in the purchase of their
utensils and clothing—wages, etc., must rise with the price of things or
they must be ruined; and that must be the case with the farmer, whose
produce will not increase, in the ratio, with labor, utensils and
clothing; for that he must sell at the usual price or lower perhaps,
caused by the decrease of trade; the consequence will be that he must
mortgage his farm, and then comes inevitable bankruptcy.

In what manner then will you be eased, if the expenses of government are
to be raised solely out of the commerce of this country; do you not
readily apprehend the fallacy of this argument? But government will find
that to press so heavily on commerce will not do, and therefore must have
recourse to other objects; these will be a capitation or poll-tax, window
lights, etc., etc., and a long train of impositions which their ingenuity
will suggest; but will you submit to be numbered like the slaves of an
arbitrary despot; and what will be your reflections when the tax-master
thunders at your door for the duty on that light which is the bounty of
heaven. It will be the policy of the great landholders who will chiefly
compose this senate, and perhaps a majority of this house of
representatives, to keep their lands free from taxes; and this is
confirmed by the failure of every attempt to lay a land-tax in this state;
hence recourse must and will be had to the sources I mentioned before. The
burdens on you will be insupportable—your complaints will be
inefficacious—this will beget public disturbances; and I will venture to
predict, without the spirit of prophecy, that you and the government, if
it is adopted, will one day be at issue on this point. The force of
government will be exerted, this will call for an increase of revenue, and
will add fuel to the fire. The result will be that either you will revolve
to some other form, or that government will give peace to the country by
destroying the opposition. If government therefore can, notwithstanding
every opposition, raise a revenue on such things as are odious and
burdensome to you, they can do anything.

But why should the number of individuals be the principle to apportion the
taxes in each state, and to include in that number women, children and
slaves? The most natural and equitable principle of apportioning taxes
would be in a ratio to their property, and a reasonable impost in a ratio
to their trade; but you are told to look for the reason of these things in
accommodation; but this much-admired principle, when stripped of its
mystery, will in this case appear to be no less than a basis for an odious
poll-tax—the offspring of despotic governments, a thing so detestable that
the state of Maryland, in their bill of rights, declares “that the levying
taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be abolished.”
A poll-tax is at all times oppressive to the poor, and their greatest
misfortune will consist in having more prolific wives than the rich.

In every civilized community, even in those of the most democratic kind,
there are principles which lead to an aristocracy—these are superior
talents, fortunes and public employments. But in free governments the
influence of the two former is resisted by the equality of the laws, and
the latter by the frequency of elections, and the chance that every one
has in sharing in public business; but when this natural and artificial
eminence is assisted by principles interwoven in this government; when the
senate, so important a branch of the legislature, is so far removed from
the people as to have little or no connection with them; when their
duration in office is such as to have the resemblance to perpetuity; when
they are connected with the executive, by the appointment of all officers,
and also to become a judiciary for the trial of officers of their own
appointments; added to all this, when none but men of opulence will hold a
seat, what is there left to resist and repel this host of influence and
power? Will the feeble efforts of the house of representatives, in whom
your security ought to subsist, consisting of about seventy-three, be able
to hold the balance against them, when, from the fewness of members in
this house, the senate will have in their power to poison even a majority
of that body by douceurs of office for themselves or friends? From causes
like this both Montesquieu and Hume have predicted the decline of the
British government into that of an absolute one; but the liberties of this
country, it is probable, if this system is adopted, will be strangled in
their birth; for whenever the executive and senate can destroy the
independence of the majority in the house of representatives, then where
is your security? They are so intimately connected, that their interests
will be one and the same; and will the slow increase of numbers be able to
afford a repelling principle? But you are told to adopt this government
first, and you will always be able to alter it afterwards; this would
first be submitting to be slaves and then taking care of your liberty; and
when your chains are on, then to act like freemen.

Complete acts of legislation, which are to become the supreme law of the
land, ought to be the united act of all the branches of government; but
there is one of the most important duties may be managed by the Senate and
executive alone, and to have all the force of the law paramount without
the aid or interference of the House of Representatives; that is the power
of making treaties. This power is a very important one, and may be
exercised in various ways, so as to affect your person and property, and
even the domain of the nation. By treaties you may defalcate part of the
empire; engagements may be made to raise an army, and you may be
transported to Europe, to fight the wars of ambitious princes; money may
be contracted for, and you must pay it; and a thousand other obligations
may be entered into; all which will become the supreme law of the land,
and you are bound by it. If treaties are erroneously or wickedly made who
is there to punish,—the executive can always cover himself with the plea
that he was advised by the senate, and the senate being a collective body
are not easily made accountable for mal-administration. On this account we
are in a worse situation than Great Britain, where they have secured by a
ridiculous fiction, the king from accountability, by declaring that he can
do no wrong, by which means the nation can have redress against his
minister; but with us infallibility pervades every part of the system, and
neither the executive nor his council, who are a collective body, and his
advisers, can be brought to punishment for mal-administration.

CATO.


Cato, VII.


The New York Journal, (Number 2181)

THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1788.

For the New York Journal, &c.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

That the president and senate are further improperly connected will
appear, if it is considered that their dependence on each other will
prevent either from being a check upon the other; they must act in
concert, and whether the power and influence of the one or the other is to
prevail, will depend on the character and abilities of the men who hold
those offices at the time. The senate is vested with such a proportion of
the executive that it would be found necessary that they should be
constantly sitting. This circumstance did not escape the convention, and
they have provided for the event, in the 2d article, which declares that
the executive may, on extraordinary occasions, _convene both houses or
either of them_. No occasion can exist for calling the assembly without
the senate; the words _or either of them_ must have been intended to apply
only to the senate. Their wages are already provided for, and it will be
therefore readily observed that the partition between a perpetuation of
their sessions, and a perpetuation of offices in the progress of the
government, will be found to be but thin and feeble. Besides, the senate,
who have the sole power to try all impeachments, in case of the
impeachment of the president are to determine, as judges, the propriety of
the advice they gave him as senators. Can the senate in this, therefore,
be an impartial judicature? And will they not rather serve as a screen to
great public defaulters?

Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new system of
government is that of congress having the power of making or altering the
regulations prescribed by the different legislatures respecting the time,
place and manner of holding elections for representatives, and the time
and manner of choosing senators. If it is enquired in what manner this
regulation may be exercised to your injury, the answer is easy. By the
first article the house of representatives shall consist of members,
chosen every second year by the people of the several states who are
qualified to vote for members of their several state assemblies; it can
therefore readily be believed, that the different state legislatures,
provided such can exist after the adoption of this government, will
continue those easy and convenient modes for the election of
representatives for the national legislature that are in use for the
election of members of assembly for their own states; but the congress
have, by the constitution, a power to make other regulations or alter
those in practice, prescribed by your own state legislatures; hence,
instead of having the places of elections in the precincts and brought
home almost to your own doors, congress may establish a place, or places,
at either the extremes, center or outer parts of the states; at a time and
season, too, when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these
means destroy the rights of election. But in opposition to this reasoning,
it is asserted, that it is a necessary power, because the states might
omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the existence of
that branch of the government; this is what logicians call _argumentum
absurdum_; for the different states, if they will have any security at all
in this government, will find it in the house of representatives, and
they, therefore, would be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it
dwells, or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution. Besides,
if this was the apprehension of the framers, and the ground of that
provision, why did not they extend this controlling power to the other
duties of the several state legislatures? To exemplify this, the states
are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president; but the
time is to be under the direction of congress. Now, suppose they were to
omit the appointment of senators and electors, though congress was to
appoint the time, which might well be apprehended, as the omission of
regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives,
provided they had that power; or suppose they were not to meet at all; of
course, the government cannot proceed in its exercise. And from this
motive or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties entirely
in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihilated them,
which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support,
or at least resting on their bounty. To this the advocates for this system
oppose the common, empty declamation, that there is no danger that
congress will abuse this power; but such language, as relative to so
important a subject, is mere vapor, and formed without sense. Is it not in
their power, however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to
you? It must be admitted, because the words are unlimited in their sense.
It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to suppose that what
may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to
suppose that in the exercise of this government, a regulation of congress
will be made for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie,
at New York, or, perhaps, at Fort Stanwix; who will then be the actual
electors for the house of representatives? You ought certainly to have as
much or more distrust with respect to the exercise of these powers by
congress, than congress ought to have with respect to the exercise of
those duties which ought to be entrusted to the several states, because
over them congress can have a legislative controlling power.

Hitherto we have tied up our rulers in the exercise of their duties by
positive restrictions; if the cord has been drawn too tight, loosen it to
the necessary extent, but do not entirely unbind them. I am no enemy to
placing a reasonable confidence in them, but such an unbounded one as the
advocates and framers of this new system advise you to, would be dangerous
to your liberties; it has been the ruin of other governments, and will be
yours, if you adopt with all its latitudinal power. Unlimited power in
governors as well as individuals is frequently the parent of deception.
What facilitated the corrupt designs of Philip of Macedon and caused the
ruin of Athens, but the unbounded confidence in their statesmen and
rulers? Such improper confidence Demosthenes was so well convinced had
ruined his country, that in his second Philippic oration he remarks “that
there is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally
provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free
states, against the assaults of tyrants. What is this? Distrust. Of this
be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can
affect you.” Montesquieu observes that “the course of government is
attended with an insensible descent to evil, and there is no reascending
to good without very great efforts.” The plain influence from this
doctrine is, that rulers in all governments will erect an interest
separate from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them. There
is, therefore, no other way of interrupting this insensible descent and
warding off the evil as long as possible, than by establishing principles
of distrust on your constituents, and cultivating the sentiment among
yourselves. But let me inquire of you, my countrymen, whether the freedom
and independence of elections is a point of magnitude? If it is, what kind
of a spirit of amity, deference and concession is that which has put in
the power of congress, at one stroke, to prevent your interference in
government, and do away your liberties forever? Does either the situation
or circumstances of things warrant it?

CATO.



# The Letters of Sydney

THE LETTERS OF SYDNEY. WRITTEN BY ROBERT YATES.


Printed In
The New York Journal,
June, 1788.


Note.


_Sydney_ was a favorite pseudonym of Robert Yates, and was so well known
as his pen name by his contemporaries that it was hardly intended as a
mask. He had already contributed to the New York Journal a very able
series of papers on the Constitution over the signature of _Brutus_,
written to influence the people, but the elections had taken place before
the appearance of _Sydney_, which were therefore intended for the
delegates to the State Convention, soon to assemble. A year later, when
Yates was nominated for governor by the Federalists, quotation from these
articles was one of the favorite modes of attacking him used by the
anti-federalists.


Sydney, I.


The New York Journal, (Number 2320)

Friday, June 13, 1788.

For the Daily Patriotic Register.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

Although a variety of objections to the proposed new constitution for the
government of the United States have been laid before the public by men of
the best abilities, I am led to believe that representing it in a point of
view which has escaped their observation may be of use, that is, by
comparing it with the constitution of the State of New York.

The following contrast is therefore submitted to the public, to show in
what instances the powers of the state government will be either totally
or partially absorbed, and enable us to determine whether the remaining
powers will, from those kind of pillars, be capable of supporting the
mutilated fabric of a government, which even the advocates for the new
constitution admit excels “the boasted models of Greece or Rome, and those
of all other nations, in having precisely marked out the power of the
government and the rights of the people.”

It may be proper to premise that the pressure of necessity and distress
(and not corruption) had a principal tendency to induce the adoption of
the state constitutions and the existing confederation, that power was
even then vested in the rulers with the greatest caution, and that, as
from every circumstance we have reason to infer that the new constitution
does not originate from a pure source, we ought deliberately to trace the
extent and tendency of the trust we are about to repose, under the
conviction that a reassumption of that trust will at least be difficult,
if not impracticable. If we take a retrospective view of the measures of
Congress who have their secret journals, the conduct of their officers, at
home and abroad, acting under an oath of secrecy, as well as of
individuals who were intimately connected with them, from the year 1780 to
the last convention, who also acted under an injunction of secrecy (and
whose journals have not been published even to this day, but will no doubt
continue buried in the dark womb of suspicious secrecy), we can scarcely
entertain a doubt but that a plan has long since been framed to subvert
the confederation; that that plan has been matured with the most
persevering industry and unremitted attention, and that the objects
expressed in the preamble to the constitution, that is “to promote the
general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity,” were merely the ostensible, and not the real reasons of its
framers. That necessity and danger have been the moving causes to the
establishment of the confederation will appear from the words of Congress
recommending its formation to the several legislatures which are “under a
conviction of the absolute necessity of uniting all our councils and all
our strength to maintain our common liberties. Let them be examined with
liberality becoming brethren and fellow-citizens, surrounded by the same
iminent dangers, contending for the same illustrious prize, and deeply
interested in being forever bound and connected together by the ties the
most intimate and indissoluble.”

That these principles equally applied to the formation of our state
constitution no person can seriously doubt who recollects the rapid
progress of the British troops in this state and in Jersey in the year
1776, and the despondence which prevailed among the people on that
occasion. The convention of this state, about that period, in explaining
to the people the justice of the American cause, addressed them as
follows: “You and all men were created free and authorised to establish
civil government for the preservation of our rights against civil
oppression, and the security of that freedom which God had given you,
against the rapacious hand of tyranny and lawless power. If then God hath
given us freedom, are we not responsible to him for that as well as other
talents? If it is our birth-right, let us not sell it for a mess of
pottage, nor suffer it to be torn from us by the hand of violence.”

The omission of a bill of rights in this State has given occasion to an
inference that the omission was equally warrantable in the constitution
for the United States. On this it may be necessary to observe that while
the constitution of this State was in agitation, there appeared doubts
upon the propriety of the measure, from the peculiar situation in which
the country then was; our connection with Britain dissolved, and her
government formally renounced—no substitute devised—all the powers of
government avowedly temporary, and solely calculated for defence; it was
urged by those in favor of a bill of rights that the power of the rulers
ought to be circumscribed, the better to protect the people at large from
the oppression and usurpation of their rulers. The English petition of
rights, in the reign of Charles the First, and the bill of rights in the
reign of king William, were mentioned as examples to support their
opinions. Those in opposition admitted that in established governments,
which had an implied constitution, a declaration of rights might be
necessary to prevent the usurpation of ambitious men, but that was not our
situation, for upon the declaration of independence it had become
necessary that the exercise of every kind of authority “under the former
government should be totally suppressed, and all the power of government
exerted under the authority of the people of the colonies;” that we could
not suppose that we had an existing constitution or form of government,
express or implied, and therefore our situation resembled a people in a
state of nature, who are preparing “to institute a government, laying its
foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,” and
as such, the constitution to be formed would operate as a bill of rights.

These and the like considerations operated to induce the convention of New
York to dismiss the idea of a bill of rights, and the more especially as
the legislative state officers being elected by the people at short
periods, and thereby rendered from time to time liable to be displaced in
case of mal-conduct. But these reasons will not apply to the general
government, because it will appear in the sequel that the state
governments are considered in it as mere dependencies, existing solely by
its toleration, and possessing powers of which they may be deprived
whenever the general government is disposed so to do. If then the powers
of the state governments are to be totally absorbed, in which all agree,
and only differ as to the mode, whether it will be effected by a rapid
progression, or by as certain, but slower, operations: what is to limit
the oppression of the general government? Where are the rights, which are
declared to be incapable of violation? And what security have people
against the wanton oppression of unprincipled governors? No constitutional
redress is pointed out, and no express declaration is contained in it, to
limit the boundaries of their rulers; beside which the mode and period of
their being elected tends to take away their responsibility to the people
over whom they may, by the power of the purse and the sword, domineer at
discretion; nor is there a power on earth to tell them, What dost thou?
or, Why dost thou so?

I shall now proceed to compare the constitution of the state of New York
with the proposed federal government, distinguishing the paragraphs in the
former, which are rendered nugatory by the latter; those which are in a
great measure enervated, and such as are in the discretion of the general
government to permit or not.

The 1st and 37th paragraphs of the constitution of the state of New York.

The 1st “Ordains, determines, and declares that no authority shall on any
pretence whatever be exercised over the people or members of this State,
but such as shall be derived from and granted by them.”

The 37th, “That no purchases or contracts for the sale of lands with or of
the Indians within the limits of this state, shall be binding on the
Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under the authority and with the
consent of the legislature of this state.”

I beg here to observe that the whole history of this spurious constitution
for the government of the United States, from its origin to the present
day, and the measures taken by Congress respecting the Indian affairs in
this state, are a series of violations of these paragraphs, and of the
13th article of the confederation.

It was a violation of the state constitution for the senate and assembly,
on the 19th of February, 1787, to instruct their members to move in
Congress for an act recommending a convention; and it was also a violation
of the 13th article of the confederation for Congress, on the 21st day
February, to recommend a convention to the several legislatures. It was a
further violation of the constitution of this state, by the senate and
assembly, on the 27th day of March, to join and to appoint delegates to
meet in convention, and it being done in that hasty, if not surreptitious
manner, by joint resolutions, when acts of the least consequence, even for
the yoking of hogs, require to be passed under the formalities of a law,
makes it more glaringly so.

It was an outrageous violation in the convention on the 17th of September,
1787, to attempt a consolidation of the union, and utterly destroy the
confederation and the sovereignty of particular states, when their powers
were restricted “to the sole and express purpose of revising and amending
the confederation.”

It was again an infringement of the 13th article in the confederation, for
Congress, on the 28th of September, not to arrest and prevent its being
transmitted to the several legislatures; nor was the legislature of this
state less culpable, in the beginning of February, 1788, who, in the
course of three hours, took up and concluded the measure of calling a
convention without apprising their constituents of the danger.

It is notorious that the right of regulating Indian affairs, especially
with the five nations, has been in the colony of New York since the year
1664, and before that period, from the year 1614, whilst it was called New
Nederland under the Dutch. That by the confederation, although Congress
are invested with the power of regulating the trade and managing all
affairs with the Indians, that they are restricted to those Indians “not
members of any of the states, and a special proviso that the legislative
rights of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated.”
It therefore was a violation of the confederation and of the rights of the
state for the congressional commissioners of Indian affairs to treat, at
fort Stanwix, with and thereat to make a purchase from the five nations
without the authority or consent of the legislature of this state. It was
an infraction of the rights of the citizens of this state, and an insult
on their government, for those commissioners to wrest private property
from individuals, imprison their persons, set at defiance the civil
authority of the county of Montgomery, and violently to resist the
execution of legal process. Nor was the ordinance of the 7th of August,
1786, for the regulation of Indian affairs, less so, namely, that “the
Indian department be divided into two districts, viz.: the southern, which
shall comprehend within its limits all the nations in the territory of the
United States, who reside to the southward of the Ohio; and the northern,
which shall comprehend all the nations within the said territory, and
westward, not of lake Ontario, but of Hudson’s river; that a
superintendent for the northern districts shall have authority to appoint
two deputies to reside in such places as shall best facilitate the
regulation of the Indian trade; that no person, citizen or other, under
the penalty of five hundred dollars, shall reside among or trade with any
Indian or Indian nations within the territory of the United States,
without a licence for that purpose first obtained from the superintendent
of the district, or of one of the deputies, who is hereby directed to give
such licence to every person who shall produce from the supreme executive
of any state a certificate under the seal of the state, that he is of good
character and suitably qualified and provided for that employment, for
which licence he shall pay for one year the sum of fifty dollars to the
said superintendent for the use of the United States.” If this was the
conduct of Congress and their officers, when possessed of powers which
were declared by them to be insufficient for the purposes of government,
what have we reasonably to expect will be their conduct when possessed of
the powers “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes,” when they are armed with
legislative, executive and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme
laws of the land—and when the states are prohibited, without the consent
of Congress, to lay any “imposts or duties on imports,” and if they do
they shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States—and all
such laws subject to the revision and controul of Congress.

It is therefore evident that this state, by adopting the new government,
will enervate their legislative rights, and totally surrender into the
hands of Congress the management and regulation of the Indian trade to an
improper government, and the traders to be fleeced by iniquitous
impositions, operating at one and the same time as a monopoly and a
poll-tax. The deputy by the above ordinance, has a right to exact yearly
fifty dollars from every trader, which Congress may increase to any
amount, and give it all the operation of a monopoly; fifty dollars on a
cargo of 10,000 dollars’ value will be inconsiderable, on a cargo of 1000
dollars burthensome, but on a cargo of 100 dollars will be intolerable,
and amount to a total prohibition, as to small adventurers.

II, III, IX, XII, AND XXXI.

The second paragraph provides “that the supreme legislative power within
this state shall be vested in two separate and distinct bodies of men, the
one to be called the assembly, and the other to be called the senate of
the state of New York, who together shall form the legislature.”

The ninth provides “that the assembly shall be the judge of their own
members, and enjoy the same privileges, and proceed in doing business in
like manner as the assembly of the colony of New York of right formerly
did.”

The twelfth paragraph provides “that the senate shall, in like manner, be
judges of their own members,” etc.

The 31st describes even the stile of laws—that the stile of all laws shall
be as follows: “Be it enacted by the people of the state of New York
represented in senate and assembly,” and that all writs and proceedings
shall run in the name of the people of the state of New York, and tested
in the name of the chancellor or the chief judge from whence they shall
issue.

The third provides against laws that may be hastily and inadvertently
passed, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution and the public
good, and that “the governor, the chancellor and judges of the supreme
court, shall revise all bills about to be passed into laws, by the
legislature.”

The powers vested in the legislature of this state by these paragraphs
will be weakened, for the proposed new government declares that “all
legislative powers therein granted shall be vested in a congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a senate and a house of
representatives,” and it further prescribes, that “this constitution and
the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof;
and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in
every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws
of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; and the members of the
several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both
of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or
affirmation to support this constitution.”

Those who are full of faith, suppose that the words in pursuance thereof
are restrictive, but if they reflect a moment and take into consideration
the comprehensive expressions of the instrument, they will find that their
restrictive construction is unavailing, and this is evinced by 1st art., 8
sect., where this government has a power “to lay and collect all taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States,” and also “to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the
foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the government of the
United States, or in any department or office thereof.”

Art. 1st, sect. 7, provides a qualified negative, that is, that “every
bill which shall be passed [by] the house of representatives and the
senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of
the United States.”

To conclude my observations on this head, it appears to me as impossible
that these powers in the state constitution and those in the general
government can exist and operate together, as it would be for a man to
serve two masters whose interests clash, and secure the approbation of
both. Can there at the same time and place be and operate two supreme
legislatures, executives, and judicials? Will a “guarantee of a republican
form of government to every state in the union” be of any avail, or secure
the establishment and retention of state rights?

If this guarantee had remained, as it was first reported by the committee
of the whole house, to wit, ... “that a republican constitution, and its
existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States,”
it would have been substantial; but the changing the word _constitution_
into the word _form_ bears no favorable appearance.

IV, V, XII, XVI.

The fourth provides, “that the assembly of the state of New York shall
consist of at least seventy members, to be annually chosen in the several
counties in certain proportions.” The 5th, 12th and 16th, declare that a
census shall be taken every seven years, to regulate the augmentation of
the number seventy, so as not to exceed three hundred. Here seventy
members are divided among the several counties, and consequently into at
least as many poles and sets of members to be annually chosen. If this is
contrasted with the constitution for the federal government—the
constitutional assembly or house of representatives will be found to
consist of sixty-five members divided among thirteen states, to be chosen
every second year. Six for the state of New York; not distributed among
the counties, but by all the counties. And, although “the times, places
and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be
prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof,” yet, as it provides
that “Congress may at any time by law, make or alter those regulations,
except as to places of chusing senators”—the power in the state government
to prescribe rules in those cases will be superseded by the executive of
the general government, perhaps to the great inconvenience of the people.

FROM THE VITH TO THE XIITH.

The sixth paragraph recites that an opinion hath long prevailed among
divers of the good people of this state that the voting at the election by
ballot would tend more to preserve the liberty and equal freedom of the
people than voting viva voce; to the end, therefore, that a fair
experiment be made which of these two methods of voting is to be
preferred, it declares that after the war elections shall be by ballot.

The seventh and eighth regulate the freeholds, and what property shall
entitle a man to vote; the ninth, the mode of conducting business in the
assembly, and their privileges; the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, the
number of the senate, and how and by whom they shall be elected.

As these clauses regulate the mode of elections and qualifications of the
voters of senate and assembly, a relation of what gave rise to the
provisions for voting by ballot and that of the value of the freehold,
will help to unravel what otherwise may appear mysterious.

In respect to the first it may be necessary to observe that under the
colonial government there existed violent parties, not known by the name
of whig or tory—republicans and aristocrats. Those who were in the
employments of government, or the _ins_, were for extending the
prerogative of the crown, while the _outs_ were checks to it. Many of the
leaders on both sides were under strong expectations that sooner or later
that branch of colonial government called the king’s council would be
erected into a hereditary house of lords. The _ins_ being nearest to the
disposition of the offices of honor and profit, and in the way of
obtaining patents for vacant lands, and being from time to time joined by
other crown officers and dependents, who flocked to and settled in this
colony since the year 1763, had the means of making use of undue influence
to retain their situations, which made the _outs_ at last dispair of ever
having a turn, unless the elections were by ballot. This opinion was
propagated in every part of the colony before and at the time of the
revolution, and so strongly did it operate upon the committee that were
ordered to consider of and report the constitution, that at one time they
had the whole system interwoven in the draft; but either because it would
have made it too lengthy, or that one of the parties were then reduced,
and not likely to rise again into importance, about the time the draft was
reported, it was struck out and was left by the constitution to the
legislature to decide, as experience on the exercise of both principles
should suggest.

SYDNEY.


Sydney, II.


The New York Journal, (Number 2321)

SATURDAY, JUNE 14, 1788.

For the Daily Patriotic Register.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

(Concluded from yesterday’s paper.)

As to the value of the freeholds, there has been great diversity of
opinions, for notwithstanding all agreed that the rights and liberties of
a country were ever in danger from the rich and poor, and their safety in
the middle sort or yeomanry of the country, still the difficulty occurred
in establishing the mean.

While the convention, in 1776, was setting at Harlem, the outlines of a
constitution were handed about, to try, it was supposed, the temper of the
members, in which it was proposed to have a governor, lieutenant governor,
senate, and assembly; the qualification of the governor, lieutenant
governor, and senate, to be that each should possess real estate to the
value of 10,000 pounds, and to be elected by freeholders possessing
freeholds to the value of 1,000 pounds. Although this was not attended
with bad effects, yet the qualifications of the electors gave rise to
various arguments, and, among others, that as taxation and representation
ought to go together, so the right of electing shall be in proportion to
the value of each man’s estate. To exemplify this, a man of £100 estate
had one vote; a man of £1000 should have ten, and a man of ten thousand
pounds a hundred, and so on in the same ratio. Others on the contrary
supposed that there ought to be no other criterion than the age of
twenty-one, a citizen born and resident in this country; out of the two
extremes was produced the present system of election and qualification,
both admitted to be as secure and consistent rights as any that have been
contrived.

It is apprehended, from the duplicity in the wording of 1st art., 4th
sec., that seemingly to leave in the power of the respective legislatures
to regulate the elections, and still, that Congress may at any time by law
make or alter such regulations; and the undesigned wording of the sixth
article, that the constitution and laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof shall be the law of the land, anything in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding, will
render the whole system ineffectual, if not nugatory, and a new system as
destructive to the liberties of the citizens as that of the ratio of
voices to the ratio of property introduced. Besides being liable to have
the whole State erected into one district, and consequently may give rise
to the inconveniences I mentioned before.

VII, SEC. 6; VIII, SEC. 6; IX, SEC. 6; X, SECTION 6; XI, SEC. 6; XII, SEC.
2, 6; XVI, SEC. 6; XIII, XXXV, XLI.

By the 13th paragraph “no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or
deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to the subjects of the
State by this constitution, unless by the law of the land, or judgment of
its peers.”

The 35th adopts, under certain exceptions and modifications, the common
law of England, the statute law of England and Great Britain, and the acts
of the legislature of the colony, which together formed the law on the
19th of April, 1775.

The 41st provides that the trial by jury remain inviolate forever; that no
acts of attainder shall be passed by the legislature of this State for
crimes other than those committed before the termination of the present
war. And that the legislature shall at no time hereafter institute any new
courts but such as shall proceed according to the course of the common
law.

There can be no doubt that if the new government be adopted in all its
latitude, every one of these paragraphs will become a dead letter: nor
will it solve any difficulties, if the United States guarantee “to every
state in the union a republican form of government;” we may be allowed the
form and not the substance, and that it was so intended will appear from
the changing the word _constitution_ to the word _form_ and the omission
of the words, _and its existing laws_. And I do not even think it
uncharitable to suppose that it was designedly done; but whether it was so
or not, by leaving out these words the jurisprudence of each state is left
to the mercy of the new government. By 1st art., 8th sec., 1st clause,
“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and
general welfare of the United States.”

By the 9th clause of the same section, “To constitute tribunals inferior
to the court.”

By the 18th clause, “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in
any department thereof.”

The 3d art., 1st sec., “The judicial power of the United States shall be
vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”

By sec. 2nd, “The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity.” To have in various instances an original and exclusive, in others
a concurrent jurisdiction, and the supreme court in many cases an
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact. It provides, indeed, that
the trial for crimes shall be by jury, but has left the trial in civil
matters to the mercy of construction and their own legislative sovereign
will and pleasure.

By the 3d art., 3d sec., “The Congress shall have power to declare the
punishment of treason, but no attainder shall work a corruption of blood
or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.” By 1st
art., 9th sec., 3d clause, “No bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed.”

XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIII, XL.

The 17th orders “That the supreme executive power and authority of this
State shall be vested in a governor.” By the 18th he is commander-in-chief
of the militia and admiral of the navy of the State; may grant pardons to
all persons convicted of crimes; he may suspend the execution of the
sentence in treason or murder.

By the 19th paragraph he is to see that the laws and resolutions of the
legislature be faithfully executed.

By the 27th he is president of the council of appointment, and has a
casting vote and the commissioning of all officers.

The 20th and 21st paragraphs give the lieutenant-governor, on the death,
resignation, removal from office, or impeachment of the governor, all the
powers of a governor.

The 40th paragraph orders that the militia at all times, both in peace and
war, shall be armed and disciplined, and kept in readiness; in what manner
the Quakers shall be excused; and that a magazine of warlike stores be
forever kept at the expence of the State, and by act of the legislature,
established, maintained, and continued in every county in the State.

Whoever considers the following powers vested in the government, and
compares them with the above, must readily perceive they are either all
enervated or annihilated.

By the 1st art., 8th sec., 15th, 16th and 17th clauses, Congress will be
empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for organizing,
arming and disciplining the militia, for the governing such part of them
as may be employed in the service of the United States, and for the
erection of forts, magazines, etc.

And by the 2nd art., 2d sec., “The president shall be commander-in-chief
of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States when called into actual service of the United States,
except in cases of impeachment.”

And by the 6th art., “The members of the several state legislatures, and
all the executive and judicial officers; both of the United States, and of
the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the
constitution.” Can this oath be taken by those who have already taken one
under the constitution of this state?

XVIII, SEC. 17; XIX, SEC. 17; XX SEC. 17; XXI, SEC. 17; XXIII, SEC. 17;
XXII TO XXX INCLUSIVE.

These paragraphs regulate the election, appointment, construction and
duration of all the state, county and district officers, including the
delegates to Congress, and how they severally are to be created and
commissioned.

The 22d directs that the treasurer shall be appointed by act of the
legislature to originate with the assembly. The 23d establishes a council
to appoint the officers.

The 24th directs that the military officers shall be, during the pleasure
of the council, the chancellor, judges of the supreme court, the first
judge in every county until the age of 60.

Twenty-five and 28, which offices are incompatible, and the tenure and
duration of such officers.

Twenty-six, that sheriffs and coroners be annually appointed, and shall
not continue more than four years.

Twenty-seven, that the officers of the court be appointed by the
respective courts, except the attorneys, by the first judge of every
court.

Twenty-nine, provides that town clerks, supervisors, assessors, constables
and collectors, and all other officers heretofore elegible by the people,
shall always continue to be so elegible.

Thirty, directs the mode how the delegates to represent this state in the
general Congress of the United States shall be elected.

I apprehend that the paragraphs aforesaid will be compleatly rendered
unoperative by the following articles in the new constitution:

Second article, second section, second clause, the president “shall have
power, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
embassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme
court, and all officers of the United States where appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but
the Congress may by law vest the power of such inferior officers as they
think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the
heads of departments.” By the 1st art., 8 section, 9, 18 clauses, Congress
have power “to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court, to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in
the government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.”

By the third article, 2d section, there is an extensive federal power as
above-mentioned.

By the 2d article, 2d section, the president “shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the
United States.”

From these powers lodged in Congress and the powers vested in the states,
it is clear that there must be a government within a government, two
legislative, executive and judicial powers. The power of raising an army
in time of peace, and to command the militia, will give the president
ample means to enforce the Supreme laws of the land.

XXIII, SEC. 21; XXIV, SEC. 21; XXV, SEC. 21; XXVI, SEC. 21; XXVII, SEC.
21; XXVIII, SEC. 21; XXIX, SEC. 21; XXX, SEC. 21; XXXI, SEC. 2; XXXII,
XXXIII, XXXIV.

The 32d paragraph orders, “That a court shall be instituted for the trial
of impeachments and the correction of errors under the regulations which
shall be established by the legislature, and to consist of the president
of the senate for the time being, and the senators, chancellors and judges
of the supreme court.”

The 33d vests the power of impeaching all officers of the state for mal
and corrupt practice in the representatives of the people in assembly.

The 34th allows the parties impeached or indicted for crimes and
misdemeanors to have counsel.

This system is undermined and rendered nugatory by 1st art., 6th and 7th
clauses, where the senate in the new constitution, have the trial and
judgment on all impeachments.

By 3d art., 2d sec, 3d clause, the trial of all crimes is regulated.

By the 3d art., 3d sec., it is defined what shall be treason, the proof
required, the punishment, and how the judgment in attainder shall operate.

XXXIII, SEC. 32; XXXIV, SEC. 32; XXXV, SEC. 13; XXXVII, SEC. 1; XXXVIII,
XXXIX.

The 38th paragraph provides “that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious procession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind,
provided that the liberty of conscience hereby granted shall not excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the State.”

The 39th provides that “no minister of the gospel, or priest of any
denomination whatsoever, shall at any time hereafter, under any pretence
or description whatever, be eligible to or capable of holding any civil or
military office or place within this state.”

The first of those articles protects us from persecution in religious
matters. The other excludes the clergy from enjoying any office, civil or
military. Two provisions passed by in silence by the framers of the new
constitution; and although possibly the leaders in both have been equally
averse to a democratic system, and have had the same object, the ruin of
state government, in view.

XLII.

This paragraph provides “that it shall be in the discretion of the
legislature to naturalize all such persons and in such manner as they
shall think proper.”

The 1st art., 8 sec., 4th clause, give to the new government power to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization.

And by the 4th art., 2d sec., “the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states,” whereby the clause is rendered entirely nugatory.

From this contrast it appears that the general government, when compleatly
organized, will absorb all those powers of the state which the framers of
its constitution had declared should be only exercised by the
representatives of the people of the state; that the burthens and expence
of supporting a state establishment will be perpetuated; but its
operations to ensure or contribute to any essential measures promotive of
the happiness of the people may be totally prostrated, the general
government arrogating to itself the right of interfering in the most
minute objects of internal police, and the most trifling domestic concerns
of every state, by possessing a power of passing laws “to provide for the
general welfare of the United States,” which may affect life, liberty and
property in every modification they may think expedient, unchecked by
cautionary reservations, and unrestrained by a declaration of any of those
rights which the wisdom and prudence of America in the year 1776 held
ought to be at all events protected from violation.

In a word, the new constitution will prove finally to dissolve all the
power of the several state legislatures, and destroy the rights and
liberties of the people; for the power of the first will be all in all,
and of the latter a mere shadow and form without substance, and if adopted
we may (in imitation of the Carthagenians) say, Delenda vit Americæ.

SYDNEY.



# The Letters of Luther Martin

THE LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN.


Printed In
The Maryland Journal,
January-March, 1788.


Note.


Luther Martin, afterwards nick-named the “bull-dog of federalism,” was at
this time the leading Anti-federalist in Maryland. From his pen came the
pamphlet entitled _Genuine Information ... Relative to the Proceedings of
the General Convention_; and when the “Landholder,” (see _Ante_, page
135), attacked Elbridge Gerry, he began this series of articles in defense
of that gentleman, but eventually, by the replies, was compelled to
continue the series as a personal vindication. According to a letter of
Daniel Carrol, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer replied in the newspapers to
Martin, but I have not been able to identify this.

In the _New York Journal_ for June 17, 1788, is a comparison of the
constitution as agreed upon early in the convention, with that finally
framed, which was probably written by Martin.


Luther Martin, I.


The Maryland Journal, (Number 1004)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1788.

MR. WILLIAM GODDARD:

_Sir_,

As the Publication under the Signature of the Connecticut Landholder is
circulating remote from the place of Mr. Gerry’s residence, and is
calculated not only to injure the honourable gentleman in his private
character, but also to weaken the effect of his opposition to the
government proposed by the late convention, and thereby promote the
adoption of a System which I consider destructive of the rights and
liberties of the respective states and of their citizens, I beg leave,
through the channel of your Paper, to declare to the Public that from the
time I took my seat in convention, which was early in June, until the
fourth day of September, when I left Philadelphia, I am satisfied I was
not ten minutes absent from convention while sitting (excepting only five
days in the beginning of August, immediately after the committee of detail
had reported, during which but little business was done). That during my
attendance I never heard Mr. Gerry or any other member introduce a
proposition for the redemption of continental money according to its
nominal or any other value, nor did I ever hear that such a proposition
had been offered to consideration or had been thought of. I was intimate
with Mr. Gerry, and never heard him express, in private conversation or
otherwise, a wish for the redemption of continental money, or assign the
want of such a provision as a defect. Nor did I ever hear in Convention,
or anywhere else, such a motive of conduct attributed to Mr. Gerry. I also
declare to the Public that a considerable time before I left the
convention Mr. Gerry’s opposition to the System was warm and decided; that
in a particular manner he strenuously opposed that provision by which the
power and authority over the militia is taken away from the States and
given to the general government; that in the debate he declared if that
measure was adopted it would be the most convincing proof that the
destruction of the State governments and the introduction of a king was
designed, and that no declarations to the contrary ought to be credited,
since it was giving the states the last coup de grace by taking from them
the only means of self preservation. The conduct of the advocates and
framers of this system towards the thirteen States, in pretending that it
was designed for their advantage, and gradually obtaining power after
power to the general government, which could not but end in their slavery,
he compared to the conduct of a number of jockeys who had thirteen young
colts to break; they begin with the appearance of kindness, giving them a
lock of hay, or a handful of oats, and stroaking them while they eat,
until being rendered sufficiently gentle they suffer a halter to be put
round their necks; obtaining a further degree of their confidence, the
jockeys slip a curb bridle on their heads and the bit into their mouths,
after which the saddle follows of course, and well booted and spurred,
with good whips in their hands, they mount and ride them at their
pleasure, and although they may kick and flounce a little at first, nor
being able to get rid of their riders, they soon become as tame and
passive as their masters could wish them. In the course of public debate
in the convention Mr. Gerry applied to the system of government, as then
under discussion, the words of Pope with respect to vice, “that it was a
monster of such horrid mien, as to be hated need but to be seen.” And some
time before I left Philadelphia, he in the same public manner declared in
convention that he should consider himself a traitor to his country if he
did not oppose the system there, and also when he left the convention.
These, sir, are facts which I do not fear being contradicted by any member
of the convention, and will, I apprehend, satisfactorily shew that Mr.
Gerry’s opposition proceeded from a conviction in his own mind that the
government, if adopted, would terminate in the destruction of the States
and in the introduction of a kingly government.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

LUTHER MARTIN.

_Baltimore, January 13, 1788._


Luther Martin, II.


The Maryland Journal, (Number 1018)

FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1788.

MR. GODDARD:

_Sir_,

In consequence of the justice I did Mr. Gerry, on a former occasion, I
find myself complimented with an Address in your last Paper. Whether the
Landholder of the Connecticut Courant, and of the Maryland Journal,(57) is
the same person, or different, is not very material; I however incline to
the former opinion, as I hope for the honour of human nature, it would be
difficult to find more than one individual who could be capable of so
total a disregard to the principles of truth and honour. After having made
the most unjust and illiberal attack on Mr. Gerry, and stigmatized him as
an enemy to his country, and the basest of mankind, for no other reason
than a firm and conscientious discharge of an important trust reposed in
that gentleman, had I not come in for a share of his censure, I confess I
should have been both disappointed and mortified. It would have had at
least the appearance, that the Landholder had discovered something in my
principles, which he considered congenial with his own. However great may
be my political sins, to be cursed with his approbation and applause,
would be a punishment much beyond their demerit. But, Sir, at present I
mean to confine myself to the original subject of controversy, the
injustice of the charges made against Mr. Gerry. That my veracity will not
be questioned when giving my negative to anonymous slander, I have the
fullest confidence. I have equal confidence that it will be as little
questioned by any who know me, even should the Landholder vouchsafe to
give the Public his name—a respectable name I am sure it cannot be. His
absolute want of truth and candour in assertions meant to injure the
reputation of individuals, whose names are given to the public, and to
hold them up to the indignation of their fellow citizens, will ever
justify this assertion, even should the name belong to one decorated with
wealth, or dignified by station. But the Landholder wishes it to be
supposed, that though my veracity should not be doubted, yet my evidence
ought to be rejected, and observes, that to comprehend what credit ought
to be given to it, by which I suppose he means its sufficiency if
credited, it ought to be known how long I was absent from Convention, as
well as the time I attended. I believe Sir, whoever will read my former
publication will in a moment perceive, that I there “stated” all the
“information” on this subject that was necessary or material, and that I
left no defect for the Landholder to supply. I there mentioned that “I
took my seat early in June, that I left Philadelphia on the fourth of
September, and during that period was not absent from the convention while
sitting, except only five days in the beginning of August, immediately
after the Committee of Detail had reported.” I did not state the precise
day of June when I took my seat—it was the ninth, not the tenth—a very
inconsiderable mistake of the Landholder. But between that day and the
fourth of September he says that I was absent ten days at Baltimore, and
as many at New York, and thereby insinuates that an absence of twenty days
from the Convention intervened during that period, in which time Mr. Gerry
might have made and failed in his motion concerning continental money. A
short state of facts is all that is necessary to shew the disingenuity of
the Landholder, and that it is very possible to convey a falsehood, or
something very much like it, almost in the words of truth. On the
twenty-fifth of July the Convention adjourned, to meet again on the sixth
of August. I embraced that opportunity to come to Baltimore, and left
Philadelphia on the twenty-seventh; I returned on the fourth of August,
and on the sixth attended the Convention, with such members as were in
town, at which time the Committee of Detail made their report, and many of
the members being yet absent, we adjourned to the next day. Mr. Gerry left
Philadelphia to go to New York the day before I left there to come to
Baltimore; he had not returned on Tuesday, the seventh of August, when I
set out for New York, from whence I returned and took my seat in
Convention on Monday, the thirteenth. It is true that from the
twenty-fifth of July to the thirteenth of August eighteen (not twenty)
days had elapsed, but on one of those days I attended, and on twelve of
them the Convention did not meet. I was, therefore, perfectly correct in
my original statement that from early in June to the fourth of September I
was absent but five days from the Convention while sitting, and in that
statement omitted no “necessary information.” It is also true that of
those eighteen days Mr. Gerry was absent twelve or thirteen, and that one
of those days when he was not absent was Sunday, on which day the
Convention did not meet. Thus, Sir, by relating facts as they really
occurred, we find the only time between early in June and the fourth of
September when such a motion could have been made by Mr. Gerry without my
being present is narrowed down to four, or at most five days, as I
originally stated it, although Landholder wishes it should be supposed
there were twenty days during that period when it might have taken place
without my knowledge, to wit, ten while I was at Baltimore, and as many
more while at New York. The Landholder also states that the Convention
commenced the fourteenth day of May, and that I did not take my seat till
the tenth day of June, by which, if he means anything, I presume he means
to insinuate that within that portion of time Mr. Gerry’s motion might
have been made and rejected. He is here, Sir, equally unfortunate and
disingenuous. Though the Convention was to have met by appointment on the
fourteenth of May, yet no material business was entered upon till on or
about the thirtieth of that month. It was on that day that the Convention,
having had certain propositions laid before them by the Honourable
Governor of Virginia, resolved to go into a consideration of these
propositions. In this fact I am confident I am not mistaken, as I state
the day not merely from my own recollection but from minutes which I
believe to be very correct, in my possession, of the information given by
the Honourable Mr. McHenry to the assembly. The truth is, Sir, that very
little progress had been made by the Convention before I arrived, and that
they had not been more than ten days, or about that time, seriously
engaged in business. The first thing I did after I took my seat was
carefully to examine the journals for information of what had already been
done or proposed. I was also furnished with notes of the debates which had
taken place, and can with truth say that I made myself “minutely informed”
of what had happened before that period. In the same manner, after my
return from New York, I consulted the journals (for we were permitted to
read them, although we were not always permitted to take copies). If the
motion attributed to Mr. Gerry had been made and rejected, either before I
first took my seat or while at New York, it would have there appeared, and
that no such motion was made and rejected during either of these periods I
appeal to the highest possible authority. I appeal to those very journals,
which ought to have been published, and which we are informed are placed
in the possession of our late Honourable President. But why, Sir, should I
appeal to these journals, or to any other authority? Let the Landholder
turn to his eighth number, addressed to the Honourable Mr. Gerry; let him
blush, unless incapable of that sensation, while he reads the following
passage: “Almost the whole time during the sitting of the Convention, and
until the Constitution had received its present form, no man was more
plausible and conciliating on every subject than Mr. Gerry,” &c. Thus
stood Mr. Gerry, till towards the close of the business he introduced a
motion respecting the redemption of paper money. The whole time of the
sitting of the Convention was not almost past. The Constitution had not
received its present form, nor was the business drawing towards a close,
until long after I took my seat in Convention. It is therefore proved by
the Landholder himself that Mr. Gerry did not make this motion at any time
before the ninth day of June. Nay more, in the paper now before me he
acknowledges that in his eighth number he meant (and surely no one ought
to know his meaning better than himself) to fix Mr. Gerry’s apostacy to a
period within the last thirteen days. Why then all this misrepresentation
of my absence at Baltimore and New York? Why the attempt to induce a
belief that the Convention had been engaged in business from the
fourteenth of May, and the insinuation that it might have happened in
those periods? And why the charge that in not stating those facts I had
withheld from the public information necessary to its forming a right
judgment of the credit which ought to be given to my evidence. But, Sir, I
am really at a loss which most to admire—the depravity of this writer’s
heart, or the weakness of his head. Is it possible he should not perceive
that the moment he fixes the time of Mr. Gerry’s motion to the last
thirteen days of the Convention, he proves incontestably the falsehood and
malice of his charges against that gentleman—for he has expressly stated
that this motion and the rejection it received was the cause, and the sole
cause, of his apostacy; that “before, there was nothing in the system, as
it now stands, to which he had any objection, but that afterwards he was
inspired with the utmost rage and intemperate opposition to the whole
system he had formerly praised;” whereas I have shown to the clearest
demonstration, that a considerable time before the last thirteen days, Mr.
Gerry had given the most decided opposition to the system. I have shown
this by recital of facts, which if credited, incontestibly prove it—facts
which, I again repeat, will never be contradicted by any member of the
Convention. I ground this assertion upon the fullest conviction that it is
impossible to find a single person in that number so wicked, as publicly
and deliberately to prostitute his name in support of falsehood, and at
the same time so weak as to do this when he must be sure of detection. But
the Landholder is willing to have it supposed that Mr. Gerry might have
made the motion in a “committee,” and that there it might have happened
without my knowledge; to such wretched subterfuges is he driven. This
evasion, however, will be equally unavailing. The business of the
committees were not of a secret nature, nor were they conducted in a
secret manner; I mean as to the members of the Convention. I am satisfied
that there was no committee while I was there, of whose proceedings I was
not at least “so minutely informed,” that an attempt of so extraordinary a
nature as that attributed to Mr. Gerry, and attended with such an
immediate and remarkable revolution in his conduct, could not have taken
place without my having heard something concerning it. The non-adoption of
a measure by a committee did not preclude its being proposed to the
Convention, and being there adopted. Can it be presumed that a question in
which Mr. Gerry is represented to have been so deeply interested, and by
the fate of which his conduct was entirely influenced, would for want of
success in a committee have been totally relinquished by him, without a
single effort to carry it in Convention! If any other proof is wanting, I
appeal again to the Landholder himself. In his eighth number he states
that the motion was rejected “by the Convention.” Let it be remembered
also, as I have before observed, in the paper now before me, he declares
it was his intention in that number to fix Mr. Gerry’s apostacy to a
period within the last thirteen days; and in the same number he observes
that Mr. Gerry’s resentment could only embarrass and delay the completion
of the business for a few days; all which equally militate against every
idea of the motion being made before he left Philadelphia, whether in
Committee or in Convention. The Landholder hath also asserted, that I have
“put into Mr. Gerry’s mouth, objections different from any thing his
letter to the legislature of his State contains, so that if my
representation is true, his must be false.” In this charge he is just as
well founded as in those I have already noticed. Mr. Gerry has more than
once published to the world, under the sanction of his name, that he
opposed the system from a firm persuasion that it would endanger the
liberties of America, and destroy the freedom of the States and their
citizens. Every word which I have stated as coming from his mouth, so far
from being inconsistent with those declarations, are perfectly
correspondent thereto and direct proofs of their truth. When the
Landholder informed us that Mr. Gerry was “face to face with his
colleagues in the Convention of Massachusetts,” why did he not, unless he
wished to mislead the public, also inform us for what purpose he was
there?

That it was only to answer questions; that might be proposed to him, not
himself to ask questions that he could not consistently interfere in any
manner in the debates, and that he was even prohibited an opportunity of
explaining such parts of his conduct as were censured in his presence? By
the anonymous publication alluded to by the Landholder, and inserted in
the note, Mr. Gerry’s colleagues are not called upon to acquit him: it
only declares “that he believes them to be men of too much honour to
assert that his reasons in Convention were totally different from those he
published;” and in this I presume he was not disappointed for the
Landholder otherwise would have published it with triumph; but if Mr.
Gerry, as it is insinuated, was only prevented by pride, from, in person,
requesting them to acquit him, it amounts to a proof of his consciousness
that, as men of honour, they could not have refused it, had he made the
request. No person who views the absurdities and inconsistencies of the
Landholder, can I think, have a very respectable opinion of his
understanding, but I who am not much prejudiced in his favour, could
scarcely have conceived him so superlatively weak as to expect to deceive
the public and obtain credit to himself by asking “if charges against Mr.
Gerry are not true why do not his colleagues contradict them?” and “why is
it that we do not see Mr. McHenry’s verification of your assertions?” If
these Gentlemen were to do Mr. Gerry that justice, he might as well
inquire “why is it we do not also see the verification of A, B, C and D
and so on to the last letter of the Conventional alphabet.” When the
Landholder in his eighth number addressed himself to Mr. Gerry he
introduces his charges by saying “you doubtless will recollect the
following state of facts; if you do not every member of the Convention
will attest them.” One member of the Convention has had firmness
sufficient to contradict them with his name, although he was well apprised
that he thereby exposed himself as a mark for the arrows of his political
adversaries, and as to some of them, he was not unacquainted with what
kind of men he had to deal. But of all the members who composed that body,
not one has yet stepped forward to make good the Landholder’s prediction;
nor has one been found to “attest” his statement of facts. Many reasons
may be assigned why the members of the Convention should not think
themselves under a moral obligations of involving themselves in
controversy by giving their names in vindication of Mr. Gerry; and I do
not believe any of those who signed the proposed Constitution would
consider themselves bound to do this by any political obligation: But,
Sir, I can hardly suppose that Mr. Gerry is so perfectly esteemed and
respected by every person who had a seat in that body, that not a single
individual could possibly be procured to give his sanction to the
Landholder’s charges, if it could be done with justice and as to myself, I
much question whether it would be easy to convince any person, who was
present at our information to the assembly,(58) that every one of my
honourable colleagues, (to each of whose merit I cordially subscribe,
though compelled to differ from them in political sentiments) would be
prevented by motives of personal delicacy to myself, from contradicting
the facts I have stated relative to Mr. Gerry, if it could be done
consistent with truth. If the Landholder was a member of the Convention,
to facilitate the adoption of a favourite system, or to gratify his
resentment against its opposers, he has originally invented and is now
labouring to support, charges the most unjust and ungenerous, contrary to
his own knowledge of facts. If he was not a member, he is acting the same
part, without any knowledge of the subject, and in this has the merit of
either following his own invention, of dealing out the information he
receives from some person of whom he is the wretched tool and dupe, at the
same time expressing himself with a decision, and making such professions
of being perfectly in every secret, as naturally tends, unless
contradicted, to deceive and delude the unsuspecting multitude. In one of
these predicaments the Landholder must stand, he is welcome to take his
choice, in either case he only wants to be known to be despised. Now sir,
let the Landholder come forward and give his name to the public. It is the
only thing necessary to finish his character, and to convince the world
that he is as dead to shame, as he is lost to truth and destitute of
honour. If I sir, can be instrumental in procuring him to disclose
himself; even in this I shall consider myself as rendering a service to my
country. I flatter myself for the dignity of human kind, there are few
such characters; but there is no situation in life, in which they may not
prove the bane and curse of society; they therefore ought to be known,
that they may be guarded against.

I am, sir, your very humble servant,

LUTHER MARTIN.

_Baltimore, March 3, 1788._


Luther Martin, III.


The Maryland Journal, (Number 1021)

TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1788.

Number I.

TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.

To you my fellow citizens, I hold myself in a particular manner
accountable for every part of my conduct in the exercise of a trust
reposed in me by you, and should consider myself highly culpable if I was
to withhold from you any information in my possession, the knowledge of
which may be material to enable you to form a right judgment on questions
wherein the happiness of yourselves and your posterity are involved. Nor
shall I ever consider it an act of condescention when impeached in my
public conduct, or character, to vindicate myself at your bar, and to
submit myself to your decision. In conformity to these sentiments, which
have regulated my conduct since my return from the Convention, and which
will be the rule of my actions in the sequel, I shall at this time beg
your indulgence, while I make some observations on a publication which the
Landholder has done me the honour to address to me, in the Maryland
Journal of the 29th of February last. In my controversy with that writer,
on the subject of Mr. Gerry, I have already enabled you to decide, without
difficulty, on the credit which ought to be given to his most positive
assertions and should scarce think it worth my time to notice his charges
against myself, was it not for the opportunity it affords me of stating
certain facts and transactions, of which you ought to be informed, some of
which were undesignedly omitted by me when I had the honour of being
called before the House of Delegates. No “extreme modesty” on my part was
requisite to induce me to conceal the “sacrifice of resentments” against
Mr. Gerry, since no such sacrifice had ever been made, nor had any such
resentments ever existed. The principal opposition in sentiment between
Mr. Gerry and myself, was on the subject of representation; but even on
that subject, he was much more conceding than his colleagues, two of whom
obstinately persisted in voting against the equality of representation in
the senate, when the question was taken in Convention upon the adoption of
the conciliatory propositions, on the fate of which depended, I believe,
the continuance of the Convention. In many important questions we
perfectly harmonized in opinion, and where we differed, it never was
attended with warmth or animosity, nor did it in any respect interfere
with a friendly intercourse and interchange of attention and civilities.
We both opposed the extraordinary powers over the militia, given to the
general government. We were both against the re-eligibility of the
president. We both concurred in the attempt to prevent members of each
branch of the legislature from being appointable to offices, and in many
other instances, although the Landholder, with his usual regard to truth
and his usual imposing effrontery, tells me, that I “doubtless must
remember Mr. Gerry and myself never voted alike, except in the instances”
he has mentioned. As little foundation is there in his assertion, that I
“cautioned certain members to be on their guard against his wiles, for
that he and Mr. Mason held private meetings, where the plans were
concerted to aggrandize, at the expence of the small States, old
Massachusetts and the ancient dominion.” I need only state facts to refute
the assertion. Some time in the month of August, a number of members who
considered the system, as then under consideration and likely to be
adopted, extremely exceptionable, and of a tendency to destroy the rights
and liberties of the United States, thought it advisable to meet together
in the evenings, in order to have a communication of sentiments, and to
concert a plan of conventional opposition to, and amendment of that
system, so as, if possible, to render it less dangerous. Mr. Gerry was the
first who proposed this measure to me, and that before any meeting had
taken place, and wished we might assemble at my lodgings, but not having a
room convenient, we fixed upon another place. There Mr. Gerry and Mr.
Mason did hold meetings, but with them also met the Delegates from New
Jersey and Connecticut, a part of the Delegation from Delaware, an
honorable member from South Carolina, one other from Georgia, and myself.
These were the only “private meetings” that ever I knew or heard to be
held by Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mason, meetings at which I myself attended until
I left the Convention, and of which the sole object was not to aggrandize
the great at the expense of the small, but to protect and preserve, if
possible, the existence and essential rights of all the states, and the
liberty and freedom of their citizens. Thus, my fellow citizens, I am
obliged, unless I could accept the compliment at an expence of truth equal
to the Landholder’s, to give up all claim to being “placed beyond the
reach of ordinary panegyrick,” and to that “magnanimity” which he was so
solicitous to bestow upon me, that he has wandered [into] the regions of
falsehood to seek the occasion. When we find such disregard of truth, even
in the introduction, while only on the threshold, we may form judgment
what respect is to be paid to the information he shall give us of what
passed in the Convention when he “draws aside the veil,” a veil which was
interposed between our proceedings and the Public, in my opinion, for the
most dangerous of purposes, and which was never designed by the advocates
of the system to be drawn aside, or if it was, not till it should be too
late for any beneficial purpose, which as far as it is done, or pretended
to be done, on the present occasion, is only for the purpose of deception
and misrepresentation. It was on Saturday that I first took my seat. I
obtained that day a copy of the propositions that had been laid before the
Convention, and which were then the subject of discussion in a committee
of the whole. The Secretary was so polite as, at my request, to wait upon
me at the State House the next day (being Sunday), and there gave me an
opportunity of examining the journals and making myself acquainted with
the little that had been done before my arrival. I was not a little
surprised at the system brought forward, and was solicitous to learn the
reasons which had been assigned in its support; for this purpose the
journals could be of no service; I therefore conversed on the subject with
different members of the Convention, and was favoured with minutes of the
debates which had taken place before my arrival. I applied to history for
what lights it could afford me, and I procured everything the most
valuable I could find in Philadelphia on the subject of governments in
general, and on the American revolution and governments in particular. I
devoted my whole time and attention to the business in which we were
engaged, and made use of all the opportunities I had, and abilities I
possessed, conscientiously to decide what part I ought to adopt in the
discharge of that sacred duty I owed to my country, in the exercise of the
trust you had reposed in me. I attended the Convention many days without
taking any share in the debates, listening in silence to the eloquence of
others, and offering no other proof that I possessed the powers of speech,
than giving my yea or nay when a question was taken, and notwithstanding
my propensity to “endless garrulity,” should have been extremely happy if
I could have continued that line of conduct, without making a sacrifice of
your rights and political happiness. The committee of the whole house had
made but small progress, at the time I arrived, in the discussion of the
propositions which had been referred to them; they completed that
discussion, and made their report. The propositions of the minority were
then brought forward and rejected. The Convention had resumed the report
of the committee, and had employed some days in its consideration. Thirty
days, I believe, or more, had elapsed from my taking my seat before in the
language of the Landholder, I “opened in a speech which held during two
days.” Such, my fellow citizens, is the true state of the conduct I
pursued when I took my seat in Convention, and which the Landholder, to
whom falsehood appears more familiar than truth, with his usual
effrontery, has misrepresented by a positive declaration, that without
obtaining or endeavouring to obtain any information on the subject, I
hastily and insolently obtruded my sentiments on the Convention, and to
the astonishment of every member present, on the very day I took my seat,
began a speech, which continued two days, in opposition to those measures
which, on mature deliberation, had been adopted by the Convention. But I
“alone advocated the political heresy, that the people ought not to be
trusted with the election of representatives.” On this subject, as I would
wish to be on every other, my fellow citizens, I have been perfectly
explicit in the information I gave to the House of Delegates, and which
has since been published. In a state government, I consider all power
flowing immediately from the people in their individual capacity, and that
the people, in their individual capacity, have, and ever ought to have the
right of choosing delegates in a state legislature, the business of which
is to make laws, regulating their concerns, as individuals, and operating
upon them as such; but in a federal government, formed over free states,
the power flows from the people, and the right of choosing delegates
belongs to them only mediately through their respective state governments
which are the members composing the federal government, and from whom all
its power immediately proceeds; to which state governments, the choice of
the federal delegates immediately belongs. I should blush indeed for my
ignorance of the first elements of government, was I to entertain
different sentiments on the subject; and if this is “political heresy,” I
have no ambition to be ranked with those who are orthodox. Let me here, my
fellow citizens, by way of caution, add an observation, which will prove
to be founded in truth: those who are the most liberal in complimenting
you with powers which do not belong to you, act commonly from improper and
interested motives, and most generally have in view thereby to prepare the
way for depriving you of those rights to which you are justly entitled.
Every thing that weakens and impairs the bands of legitimate authority
smooths the road of ambition; nor can there be a surer method of
supporting and preserving the just rights of the people, than by
supporting and protecting the just rights of government. As to the
“jargon” attributed to me of maintaining that “notwithstanding each state
had an equal number of votes in the senate, yet the states were unequally
represented in the senate,” the Landholder has all the merit of its
absurdity; nor can I conceive what sentiment it is that I ever have
expressed, to which he, with his usual perversion and misrepresentation,
could give such a colouring. That I ever suggested the idea of letting
loose an army indiscriminately on the innocent and guilty, in a state
refusing to comply with the requisitions of Congress, or that such an idea
ever had place in my mind, is a falsehood so groundless, so base and
malignant, that it could only have originated or been devised by a heart
which would dishonour the midnight assassin. My sentiments on this subject
are well known; it was only in the case where a state refused to comply
with the requisitions of Congress, that I was willing to grant the general
government those powers which the proposed constitution gives it in every
case.(59) Had I been a greater friend to a standing army, and not quite so
averse to expose your liberties to a soldiery, I do not believe the
Landholder would have chose me for the object on whom to expend his
artillery of falsehood.

That a system may enable government wantonly to exercise power over the
militia, to call out an unreasonable number from any particular state
without its permission, and to march them upon, and continue them in,
remote and improper services; that the same system should enable the
government totally to discard, render useless, and even disarm, the
militia, when it would remove them out of the way of opposing its
ambitious views, is by no means inconsistent, and is really the case in
the proposed constitution. In both these respects it is, in my opinion,
highly faulty, and ought to be amended. In the proposed system the general
government has a power not only without the consent, but contrary to the
will of the state government, to call out the whole of its militia,
without regard to religious scruples, or any other consideration, and to
continue them in service as long as it pleases, thereby subjecting the
freemen of a whole state to martial law and reducing them to the situation
of slaves. It has also, by another clause, the powers by which only the
militia can be organized and armed, and by the neglect of which they may
be rendered utterly useless and insignificant, when it suits the ambitious
purposes of government. Nor is the suggestion unreasonable, even if it had
been made, that the government might improperly oppress and harass the
militia, the better to reconcile them to the idea of regular troops, who
might relieve them from the burthen, and to render them less opposed to
the measures it might be disposed to adopt for the purpose of reducing
them to that state of insignificancy and uselessness. When the Landholder
declared that “I contended the powers and authorities of the new
constitution must destroy the liberties of the people,” he for once
stumbled on the truth, but even this he could not avoid coupling with an
assertion utterly false. I never suggested that “the same powers could be
safely entrusted to the old Congress;” on the contrary, I opposed many of
the powers as being of that nature that, in my opinion, they could not be
entrusted to any government whatever consistent with the freedom of the
states and their citizens, and I earnestly recommended, what I wish my
fellow citizens deeply to impress on your minds, that in altering or
amending our federal government no greater powers ought to be given than
experience has shown to be necessary, since it will be easy to delegate
further power when time shall dictate the expediency or necessity, but
powers once bestowed upon a government, should they be found ever so
dangerous or destructive to freedom, cannot be resumed or wrested from
government but by another revolution.

LUTHER MARTIN.

_Baltimore, March 14, 1788._


Luther Martin, IV.


The Maryland Journal, (Number 1022)

FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1788.

Number II.

TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.

In the recognition which the Landholder professes to make “of what
occurred to my advantage,” he equally deals in the arts of
misrepresentation, as while he was “only the record of the bad,” and I am
equally obliged from a regard to truth to disclaim his pretended
approbation as his avowed censure. He declares that I originated the
clause which enacts that “this Constitution and the laws of the United
States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or the laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding.” To place this matter in a proper point of view,
it will be necessary to state, that as the propositions were reported by
the committee of the whole house, a power was given to the general
government to negative the laws passed by the state legislatures, a power
which I considered as totally inadmissible; in substitution of this I
proposed the following clause, which you will find very materially
different from the clause adopted by the Constitution, “that the
legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of
the articles of the union, and all treaties made and ratified under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective
states, so far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states
or their citizens, and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be
bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
individual states to the contrary notwithstanding.” When this clause was
introduced, it was not established that inferior continental courts should
be appointed for trial of all questions arising on treaties and on the
laws of the general government, and it was my wish and hope that every
question of that kind would have been determined in the first instance in
the courts of the respective states; had this been the case, the propriety
and the necessity that treaties duly made and ratified, and the laws of
the general government, should be binding on the state judiciaries which
were to decide upon them, must be evident to every capacity, while at the
same time, if such treaties or laws were inconsistent with our
constitution and bill of rights, the judiciaries of this state would be
bound to reject the first and abide by the last, since in the form I
introduced the clause, notwithstanding treaties and the laws of the
general government were intended to be superior to the laws of our state
government, where they should be opposed to each other, yet that they were
not proposed nor meant to be superior to our constitution and bill of
rights. It was afterwards altered and amended (if it can be called an
amendment) to the form in which it stands in the system now published, and
as inferior continental, and not state courts, are originally to decide on
those questions, it is now worse than useless, for being so altered as to
render the treaties and laws made under the general government superior to
our constitution, if the system is adopted it will amount to a total and
unconditional surrender to that government, by the citizens of this state,
of every right and privilege secured to them by our constitution, and an
express compact and stipulation with the general government that it may,
at its discretion, make laws in direct violation of those rights. But on
this subject I shall enlarge in a future number.

That I “voted an appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary of the United
States, for the correction of all errors both in law and fact,” in
rendering judgment is most true, and it is equally true that if it had
been so ordained by the Constitution, the supreme judiciary would only
have had an appellate jurisdiction, of the same nature with that possessed
by our high court of appeals, and could not in any respect intermeddle
with any fact decided by a jury; but as the clause now stands, an appeal
being given in general terms from the inferior courts, both as to law and
fact, it not only doth, but is avowedly intended, to give a power very
different from what our court of appeals, or any court of appeals in the
United States or in England enjoys, a power of the most dangerous and
alarming nature, that of setting at nought the verdict of a jury, and
having the same facts which they had determined, without any regard or
respect to their determination, examined and ultimately decided by the
judges themselves, and that by judges immediately appointed by the
government. But the Landholder also says that “I agreed to the clause that
declares nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion.” I
cannot take to myself the merit even of this without too great a sacrifice
of truth. It was proposed that if seven states agreed that should be
sufficient; by a rule of Convention in filling up blanks, if different
numbers were mentioned, the question was always to be taken on the
highest. It was my opinion, that to agree upon a ratification of the
constitution by any less number than the whole thirteen states, is so
directly repugnant to our present articles of confederation, and the mode
therein prescribed for their alteration, and such a violation of the
compact which the states, in the most solemn manner, have entered into
with each other, that those who could advocate a contrary proposition,
ought never to be confided in, and entrusted in public life. I availed
myself of this rule, and had the question taken on thirteen, which was
rejected. Twelve, eleven, ten and nine were proposed in succession; the
last was adopted by a majority of the members. I voted successively for
each of these members, to prevent a less number being agreed on. Had nine
not been adopted, I should on the same principle have voted for eight. But
so far was I from giving my approbation that the assent of a less number
of states than thirteen should be sufficient to put the government in
motion, that I most explicitly expressed my sentiments to the contrary,
and always intended, had I been present when the ultimate vote was taken
on the constitution, to have given it my decided negative, accompanied
with a solemn protest against it, assigning this reason among others for
my dissent. Thus, my fellow citizens, that candour with which I have
conducted myself through the whole of this business obliges me, however
reluctantly, and however “mortifying it may be to my vanity,” to disavow
all “those greater positive virtues” which the Landholder has so
obligingly attributed to me in Convention, and which he was so desirous of
conferring upon me as to consider the guilt of misrepresentation and
falsehood but a trifling sacrifice for that purpose, and to increase my
mortification, you will find I am equally compelled to yield up every
pretence even to those of a negative nature, which a regard to justice
has, as he says, obliged him not to omit. These consist, as he tells us,
in giving my entire approbation to the system as to those parts which are
said to endanger a trial by jury, and as to its want of a bill of rights,
and in having too much candour there to signify that I thought it
deficient in either of these respects. But how, I pray, can the Landholder
be certain that I deserve this encomium? Is it not possible, as I so
frequently exhausted the politeness of the Convention, that some of those
marks of fatigue and disgust, with which he intimates I was mortified as
oft as I attempted to speak, might at that time have taken place, and have
been of such a nature as to attract his attention; or, perhaps, as the
Convention was prepared to slumber whenever I rose, the Landholder, among
others, might have sunk into sleep, and at that very moment might have
been feasting his imagination with the completion of his ambitious views,
and dreams of future greatness. But supposing I never did declare in
Convention that I thought the system defective in those essential points,
will it amount to a positive proof that I approved the system in those
respects, or that I culpably neglected an indispensable duty? Is it not
possible, whatever might have been my insolence and assurance when I first
took my seat, and however fond I might be at that time of obtruding my
sentiments, that the many rebuffs with which I met, the repeated
mortifications I experienced, the marks of fatigue and disgust with which
my eyes were sure to be assailed wherever I turned them—one gaping here,
another yawning there, a third slumbering in this place, and a fourth
snoring in that—might so effectually have put to flight all my original
arrogance, that, as we are apt to run into extremes, having at length
become convinced of my comparative nothingness, in so august an assembly
and one in which the science of government was so perfectly understood, I
might sink into such a state of modesty and diffidence as not to be able
to muster up resolution enough to break the seal of silence and open my
lips even after the rays of light had begun to penetrate my understanding,
and in some measure to chase away those clouds of error and ignorance in
which it was enveloped on my first arrival? Perhaps had I been treated
with a more forbearing indulgence while committing those memorable
blunders, for a want of a sufficient knowledge in the science of
government, I might, after the rays of light had illuminated my mind, have
rendered my country much more important services, and not only assisted in
raising some of the pillars, but have furnished the edifice with a new
roof of my own construction, rather better calculated for the convenience
and security of those who might wish to take shelter beneath it, than that
which it at present enjoys. Or even admitting I was not mortified, as I
certainly ought to have been, from the Landholder’s account of the matter,
into a total loss of speech, was it in me, who considered the system, for
a variety of reasons, absolutely inconsistent with your political welfare
and happiness, a culpable neglect of duty in not endeavouring, and that
against every chance of success, to remove one or two defects, when I had
before ineffectually endeavoured to clear it of the others, which
therefore, I knew must remain? But to be serious, as to what relates to
the appellate jurisdiction in the extent given by the system proposed, I
am positive there were objections made to it, and as far as my memory will
serve me, I think I was in the number of those who actually objected; but
I am sure that the objections met with my approbation. With respect to a
bill of rights, had the government been formed upon principles truly
federal, as I wished it, legislating over and acting upon the states only
in their collective or political capacity, and not on individuals, there
would have been no need of a bill of rights, as far as related to the
rights of individuals, but only as to the rights of states. But the
proposed constitution being intended and empowered to act not only on
states, but also immediately on individuals, it renders a recognition and
a stipulation in favour of the rights both of states and of men, not only
proper, but in my opinion absolutely necessary. I endeavoured to obtain a
restraint on the powers of the general government, as to standing armies,
but it was rejected. It was my wish that the general government should not
have the power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
as it appears to me altogether unnecessary, and that the power given to it
may and will be used as a dangerous engine of oppression, but I could not
succeed. An honorable member from South Carolina most anxiously sought to
have a clause inserted securing the liberty of the Press, and repeatedly
brought this subject before the Convention, but could not obtain it. I am
almost positive he made the same attempt to have a stipulation in favour
of liberty of conscience, but in vain. The more the system advanced the
more was I impressed with the necessity of not merely attempting to secure
a few rights, but of digesting and forming a complete bill of rights,
including those of states and of individuals, which should be assented to,
and prefixed to the Constitution, to serve as a barrier between the
general government and the respective states and their citizens; because
the more the system advanced the more clearly it appeared to me that the
framers of it did not consider that either states or men had any rights at
all, or that they meant to secure the enjoyment of any to either the one
or the other; accordingly, I devoted a part of my time to the actually
preparing and draughting such a bill of rights, and had it in readiness
before I left the Convention, to have laid it before a committee. I
conversed with several members on the subject; they agreed with me on the
propriety of the measure, but at the same time expressed their sentiments
that it would be impossible to procure its adoption if attempted. A very
few days before I left the Convention, I shewed to an honorable member
sitting by me a proposition, which I then had in my hand, couched in the
following words: “Resolved that a committee be appointed to prepare and
report a bill of rights, to be prefixed to the proposed Constitution,” and
I then would instantly have moved for the appointment of a committee for
that purpose, if he would have agreed to second the motion, to do which he
hesitated, not as I understand from any objection to the measure, but from
a conviction in his own mind that the motion would be in vain.

Thus my fellow citizens, you see that so far from having no objections to
the system on this account, while I was at Convention, I not only then
thought a bill of rights necessary, but I took some pains to have the
subject brought forward, which would have been done, had it not been for
the difficulties I have stated. At the same time I declare that when I
drew up the motion, and was about to have proposed it to the Convention, I
had not the most distant hope it would meet with success. The rejection of
the clauses attempted in favour of particular rights, and to check and
restrain the dangerous and exorbitant powers of the general government
from being abused, had sufficiently taught me what to expect. And from the
best judgment I could form while in Convention, I then was, and yet
remained, decidedly of the opinion that ambition and interest had so far
blinded the understanding of some of the principal framers of the
Constitution, that while they were labouring to erect a fabrick by which
they themselves might be exalted and benefited, they were rendered
insensible to the sacrifice of the freedom and happiness of the states and
their citizens, which must, inevitably be the consequence. I most sacredly
believe their object is the total abolition and destruction of all state
governments, and the erection on their ruins of one great and extensive
empire, calculated to aggrandize and elevate its rulers and chief officers
far above the common herd of mankind, to enrich them with wealth, and to
encircle them with honours and glory, and which according to my judgment
on the maturest reflection, must inevitably be attended with the most
humiliating and abject slavery of their fellow citizens, by the sweat of
whose brows, and by the toil of whose bodies, it can only be effected.

And so anxious were its zealous promoters to hasten to a birth this
misshapened heterogenous monster of ambition and interest, that, for some
time before the Convention rose, upon the least attempt to alter its form,
or modify its powers, the most fretful impatience was shown, such as would
not have done much honour to a State Assembly, had they been sitting as
long a time, and their treasury empty; while it was repeatedly urged on
the contrary, but urged in vain, that in so momentous an undertaking, in
forming a system for such an extensive continent, on which the political
happiness of so many millions, even to the latest ages, may depend, no
time could be too long—no thoughts and reflections too great—and that if
by continuing six months, or even as many years, we could free the system
from all its errors and defects, it would be the best use to which we
could possibly devote our time. Thus my fellow citizens am I under
necessity of resigning again into the hands of the Landholder, all those
virtues both of a positive and negative kind, which from an excess of
goodness he bestowed upon me, and give him my full permission to dispose
of them hereafter in favour of some other person, who may be more
deserving, and to whom they will be more acceptable: at the same time, I
must frankly acknowledge, however it may operate as a proof of my dullness
and stupidity, that the “ignorance in the science of government” under
which I laboured at first was not removed by more than two months close
application under those august and enlightened masters of the science with
which the Convention abounded, nor was I able to discover during that
time, either by my own researches, or by any light borrowed from those
luminaries, anything in the history of mankind or in the sentiments of
those who have favoured the world with their ideas on government, to
warrant or countenance the motley mixture of a system proposed: a system
which is an innovation in government of the most extraordinary kind; a
system neither wholly federal, nor wholly national—but a strange
hotch-potch of both—just so much federal in appearance as to give its
advocates in some measure, an opportunity of passing it as such upon the
unsuspecting multitude, before they had time and opportunity to examine
it, and yet so predominantly national as to put it in the power of its
movers, whenever the machine shall be set agoing, to strike out every part
that has the appearance of being federal, and to render it wholly and
entirely a national government: And if the framing and approving the
Constitution now offered to our acceptance, is a proof of knowledge in the
science of government, I not only admit, but I glory in my ignorance; and
if my rising to speak had such a somnific influence on the Convention as
the Landholder represents, I have no doubt the time will come, should this
system be adopted, when my countrymen will ardently wish I had never left
the Convention, but remained there to the last, daily administering to my
associates the salutary opiate. Happy, thrice happy, would it have been
for my country, if the whole of that time had been devoted to sleep, or
been a blank in our lives, rather than employed in forging its chains. As
I fully intended to have returned to the Convention before the completion
of its business, my colleagues very probably might, and were certainly
well warranted to, give that information the Landholder mentions; but
whether the Convention was led to conclude that I “would have honoured the
Constitution with my signature had not indispensable business called me
away,” may be easily determined after stating a few facts. The Landholder
admits I was at first against the system—when the compromise took place on
the subject of representation, I in the most explicit manner declared in
Convention, that though I had concurred in the report, so far as to
consent to proceed upon it that we might see what kind of a system might
be formed, yet I disclaimed every idea of being bound to give it my
assent, but reserved to myself the full liberty of finally giving it my
negative, if it appeared to me inconsistent with the happiness of my
country. In a desultory conversation which long after took place in
Convention, one morning before our honourable president took the chair, he
was observing how unhappy it would be should there be such a diversity of
sentiment as to cause any of the members to oppose the system when they
returned to their states; on that occasion I replied that I was confident
no state in the union would more readily accede to a proper system of
government than Maryland, but that the system under consideration was of
such a nature, that I never could recommend it for acceptance; that I
thought the state never ought to adopt it, and expressed my firm belief
that it never would.

An honourable member from Pennsylvania objected against that part of the
sixth article which requires an oath to be taken by the persons there
mentioned, in support of the constitution, observing (as he justly might
from the conduct the convention was then pursuing) how little such oaths
were regarded. I immediately joined in the objection, but declared my
reason to be, that I thought it such a constitution as no friend of his
country ought to bind himself to support. And not more than two days
before I left Philadelphia, another honourable member from the same state
urged most strenuously that the Convention ought to hasten their
deliberations to a conclusion, assigning as a reason that the Assembly of
Pennsylvania was just then about to meet, and that it would be of the
greatest importance to bring the system before that session of the
legislature, in order that a Convention of the State might be immediately
called to ratify it, before the enemies of the system should have an
opportunity of making the people acquainted with their objections, at the
same time declaring that if the matter should be delayed and the people
have time to hear the variety of objections which would be made to it by
its opposers, he thought it doubtful whether that state or any other state
in the union would adopt it.(60) As soon as the honourable member took his
seat, I rose and observed, that I was precisely of the same opinion, that
the people of America never would, nor did I think they ought to, adopt
the system, if they had time to consider and understand it; whereas a
proneness for novelty and change—a conviction that some alteration was
necessary, and a confidence in the members who composed the
Convention—might possibly procure its adoption, if brought hastily before
them, but that these sentiments induced me to wish that a very different
line of conduct should be pursued from that recommended by the honourable
member. I wished the people to have every opportunity of information, as I
thought it much preferable that a bad system should be rejected at first,
than hastily adopted and afterwards be unavailingly repented of. If these
were instances of my “high approbation,” I gave them in abundance as all
the Convention can testify, and continued so to do till I left them. That
I expressed great regret at being obliged to leave Philadelphia, and a
fixed determination to return if possible before the Convention rose, is
certain. That I might declare that I had rather lose an hundred guineas
than not to be there at the close of the business is very probable—and it
is possible that some who heard me say this, not knowing my reasons, which
could not be expressed without a breach of that secrecy to which we were
enjoined, might erroneously have concluded that my motive was the
gratification of vanity, in having my name enrolled with those of a
Franklin and a Washington. As to the first, I cordially join in the
tribute of praise so justly paid to the enlightened philosopher and
statesman, while the polite, friendly and affectionate treatment myself
and my family received from that venerable sage and the worthy family in
which he is embosomed, will ever endear him to my heart. The name of
Washington is far above my praise. I would to Heaven that on this occasion
one more wreath had been added to the number of those which are twined
around his amiable brow—that those with which it is already surrounded may
flourish with immortal verdure, nor wither or fade till time shall be no
more, is my fervent prayer, and may that glory which encircles his head
ever shine with undiminished rays. To find myself under the necessity of
opposing such illustrious characters, whom I venerated and loved, filled
me with regret; but viewing the system in the light I then did, and yet do
view it, to have hesitated would have been criminal; complaisance would
have been guilt. If it was the idea of my state that whatever a Washington
or Franklin approved, was to be blindly adopted, she ought to have spared
herself the expence of sending any members to the Convention, or to have
instructed them implicitly to follow where they led the way. It was not to
have my “name enrolled with the other labourers,” that I wished to return
to Philadelphia—that sacrifice which I must have made of my principles by
putting my name to the Constitution, could not have been effaced by any
derivative lustre it could possibly receive from the bright constellation
with which it would have been surrounded. My object was in truth the very
reverse; as I had uniformly opposed the system in its progress, I wished
to have been present at the conclusion, to have then given it my solemn
negative, which I certainly should have done, even had I stood single and
alone, being perfectly willing to leave it to the cool and impartial
investigation both of the present and of future ages to decide who best
understood the science of government—who best knew the rights of men and
of states, who best consulted the true interest of America, and who most
faithfully discharged the trust reposed in them, those who agreed to or
those who opposed the new Constitution—and so fully have I made up my own
mind on this subject, that as long as the history of mankind shall record
the appointment of the late Convention, and the system which has been
proposed by them, it is my highest ambition that my name may also be
recorded as one who considered the system injurious to my country, and as
such opposed it. Having shown that I did not “alter my opinion after I
left Philadelphia,” and that I acted no “contradictory parts on the great
political stage,” and therefore that there are none such to reconcile, the
reason assigned by the Landholder for that purpose doth not deserve my
notice, except only to observe that he shrewdly intimates there is already
a Junto established, who are to share in and deal out the offices of this
new government at their will and pleasure, and that they have already
fixed upon the character who is to be “Deputy Attorney General of the
United States for the State of Maryland.” If this is true, it is worth
while to inquire of whom this Junto consists, as it might lead to a
discovery of the persons for the gratification of whose ambition and
interest this system is prepared, and is, if possible, to be enforced, and
from the disposition of offices already allotted in the various and
numerous departments, we possibly might discover whence proceeds the
conviction and zeal of some of its advocates.

LUTHER MARTIN.

_Baltimore, March 19, 1788._


Luther Martin, V.


The Maryland Journal, (Number 1024)

FRIDAY, MARCH 28, 1788.

Number III.

TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.

There is, my fellow citizens, scarcely an individual of common
understanding, I believe, in this state, who is any ways acquainted with
the proposed Constitution, who doth not allow it to be, in many instances,
extremely censurable, and that a variety of alterations and amendments are
essentially requisite, to render it consistent with a reasonable security
for the liberty of the respective states, and their citizens.
Aristides,(61) it is true, is an exception from this observation; he
declares, that “if the whole matter was left to his discretion, he would
not change any part of the proposed Constitution,” whether he meant this
declaration as a proof of his discretion, I will not say; it will however,
readily be admitted, by most, as a proof of his enthusiastic zeal in
favour of the system. But it would be injustice to that writer not to
observe, that if he is as much mistaken in the other parts of the
Constitution, as in that which relates to the judicial department, the
Constitution which he is so earnestly recommending to his countrymen, and
on which he is lavishing so liberally his commendations, is a thing of his
own creation and totally different from that which is offered for your
acceptance.—He has given us an explanation of the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the judiciary of the general government, and of the manner
in which he supposes it is to operate—an explanation so inconsistent with
the intention of its framers, and so different from its true construction
and from the effect which it will have, should the system be adopted, that
I could scarce restrain my astonishment at the error, although I was in
some measure prepared for it, by his previous acknowledgment that he did
not very well understand that part of the system; a circumstance I
apprehended he did not recollect at the time when he was bestowing upon it
his dying benediction. And if one of our judges, possessed of no common
share of understanding, and of extensive acquired knowledge, who, as he
informs us, has long made the science of government his peculiar study, so
little understands the true import and construction of this Constitution,
and that too in a part more particularly within his own province, can it
be wondered at that the people in general, whose knowledge in subjects of
this nature is much more limited and circumscribed, should but imperfectly
comprehend the extent, operation and consequences of so complex and
intricate a system; and is not this of itself a strong proof of the
necessity that it should be corrected and amended, at least so as to
render it more clear and comprehensible to those who are to decide upon
it, or to be affected by it. But although almost every one agrees the
Constitution, as it is, to be both defective and dangerous, we are not
wanting in characters who earnestly advise us to adopt it, in its present
form, with all its faults, and assure us we may safely rely on obtaining
hereafter the amendments that are necessary. But why, I pray you, my
fellow citizens, should we not insist upon the necessary amendments being
made now, while we have the liberty of acting for ourselves, before the
Constitution becomes binding upon us by our assent, as every principle of
reason, common sense and safety would dictate? Because, say they, the
sentiments of men are so different, and the interests of the different
states are so jarring and dissonant, that there is no probability they
would agree if alterations and amendments were attempted. Thus with one
breath they tell us that the obstacles to any alterations and amendments
being agreed to by the states are so insuperable, that it is vain to make
the experiment, while in the next they would persuade us it is so certain
the states will accede to those which shall be necessary, and that they
may be procured even after the system shall be ratified, that we need not
hesitate swallowing the poison, from the ease and security of instantly
obtaining the antidote—and they seem to think it astonishing that any
person should find a difficulty in reconciling the absurdity and
contradiction. If it is easy to obtain proper amendments, do not let us
sacrifice everything that ought to be dear to freemen, for want of
insisting upon its being done, while we have the power. If the obtaining
them will be difficult and improbable, for God’s sake do not accept of
such a form of government as without amendments cannot fail of rendering
you mere beasts of burthen, and reducing you to a level with your own
slaves, with this aggravating distinction, that you once tasted the
blessings of freedom. Those who would wish you to believe that the faults
in the system proposed are wholly or principally owing to the difference
of state interests, and proceed from that cause, are either imposed upon
themselves, or mean to impose upon you. The principal questions, in which
the state interests had any material effect, were those which related to
representation, and the number in each branch of the legislature, whose
concurrence should be necessary for passing navigation acts, or making
commercial regulations. But what state is there in the union whose
interest would prompt it to give the general government the extensive and
unlimited powers it possesses in the executive, legislative and judicial
departments, together with the powers over the militia, and the liberty of
establishing a standing army without any restriction? What state in the
union considers it advantageous to its interest that the President should
be re-eligible—the members of both houses appointable to offices—the
judges capable of holding other offices at the will and pleasure of the
government, and that there should be no real responsibility either in the
President or in the members of either branch of the Legislature? Or what
state is there that would have been averse to a bill of rights, or that
would have wished for the destruction of jury trial in a great variety of
cases, and in a particular manner in every case without exception where
the government itself is interested? These parts of the system, so far
from promoting the interest of any state, or states, have an immediate
tendency to annihilate all the state governments indiscriminately, and to
subvert their rights and the rights of their citizens. To oppose these,
and to procure their alteration, is equally the interest of every state in
the union. The introduction of these parts of the system must not be
attributed to the jarring interests of states, but to a very different
source, the pride, the ambition and the interest of individuals. This
being the case, we may be enabled to form some judgment of the probability
of obtaining a safe and proper system, should we have firmness and wisdom
to reject that which is now offered; and also of the great improbability
of procuring any amendments to the present system, if we should weakly and
inconsiderately adopt it. The bold and daring attempt that has been made
to use, for the total annihilation of the states, that power that was
delegated for their preservation, will put the different states on their
guard. The votaries of ambition and interest being totally defeated in
their attempt to establish themselves on the ruins of the States, which
they will be if this Constitution is rejected, an attempt in which they
had more probability of success from the total want of suspicion in their
countrymen than they can have hereafter, they will not hazard a second
attempt of the same nature, in which they will have much less chance of
success; besides, being once discovered they will not be confided in. The
true interest and happiness of the states and their citizens will,
therefore, most probably be the object which will be principally sought
for by a second Convention, should a second be appointed, which if really
aimed at, I cannot think very difficult to accomplish, by giving to the
federal government sufficient power for every salutary purpose, while the
rights of the states and their citizens should be secure from any imminent
danger. But if the arts and influence of ambitious and interested men,
even in their present situation, while more on a level with yourselves,
and unarmed with any extraordinary powers, should procure you to adopt
this system, dangerous as it is admitted to be to your rights, I will
appeal to the understanding of every one of you, who will on this occasion
give his reason fair play, whether there is not every cause to believe
they will, should this government be adopted, with that additional power,
consequence and influence it will give them, most easily prevent the
necessary alterations which might be wished for, the purpose of which
would be directly opposite to their views, and defeat every attempt to
procure them. Be assured, whatever obstacles or difficulties may be at
this time in the way of obtaining a proper system of government, they will
be increased an hundred fold after this system is adopted. Reflect also, I
entreat you, my fellow citizens, that the alterations and amendments which
are wanted in the present system are of such a nature as to diminish and
lessen, to check and restrain the powers of the general government, not to
increase and enlarge those powers. If they were of the last kind, we might
safely adopt it, and trust to giving greater powers hereafter, like a
physician who administers an emetic ex re nata, giving a moderate dose at
first, and increasing it afterwards as the constitution of the patient may
require. But I appeal to the history of mankind for this truth, that when
once power and authority are delegated to a government, it knows how to
keep it, and is sufficiently and successfully fertile in expedients for
that purpose. Nay more, the whole history of mankind proves that so far
from parting with the powers actually delegated to it, government is
constantly encroaching on the small pittance of rights reserved by the
people to themselves, and gradually wresting them out of their hands until
it either terminates in their slavery or forces them to arms, and brings
about a revolution. From these observations it appears to me, my fellow
citizens, that nothing can be more weak and absurd than to accept of a
system that is admitted to stand in need of immediate amendments to render
your rights secure—for remember, if you fail in obtaining them, you cannot
free yourselves from the yoke you will have placed on your necks, and
servitude must, therefore, be your portion. Let me ask you my fellow
citizens what you would think of a physician who, because you were
slightly indisposed, should bring you a dose which properly corrected with
other ingredients might be a salutary remedy, but of itself was a deadly
poison, and with great appearance of friendship and zeal, should advise
you to swallow it immediately, and trust to accident for those requisites
necessary to qualify its malignity, and prevent its destructive effects?
Would not you reject the advice, in however friendly a manner it might
appear to be given, with indignation, and insist that he should first
procure, and properly attempt, the necessary ingredients, since after the
fatal draught was once received into your bowels, it would be too late
should the antidote prove unattainable, and death must ensue. With the
same indignation ought you, my fellow citizens, to reject the advice of
those political quacks, who under pretence of healing the disorders of our
present government, would urge you rashly to gulp down a constitution,
which in its present form, unaltered and unamended, would be as certain
death to your liberty, as arsenic could be to your bodies.

LUTHER MARTIN.

_Baltimore, March 25, 1788._


Luther Martin, VI.


The Maryland Journal, (Number 1026)

FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1788.

Number IV.

TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.

If those, my fellow citizens, to whom the administration of our government
was about to be committed, had sufficient wisdom never to err, and
sufficient goodness always to consult the true interest of the governed,
and if we could have a proper security that their successors should to the
end of time be possessed of the same qualifications, it would be
impossible that power could be lavished upon them with too liberal a hand.
Power absolute and unlimited, united with unerring wisdom and unbounded
goodness, is the government of the Deity of the universe. But remember, my
fellow citizens, that the persons to whom you are about to delegate
authority are and will be weak, erring mortals, subject to the same
passions, prejudices and infirmities with yourselves; and let it be deeply
engraven on your hearts, that from the first history of government to the
present time, if we begin with Nimrod and trace down the rulers of nations
to those who are now invested with supreme power, we shall find few, very
few, who have made the beneficent Governor of the universe the model of
their conduct, while many are they who, on the contrary, have imitated the
demons of the darkness. We have no right to expect that our rulers will be
more wise, more virtuous, or more perfect than those of other nations have
been, or that they will not be equally under the influence of ambition,
avarice and all that train of baleful passions, which have so generally
proved the curse of our unhappy race. We must consider mankind such as
they really are,—such as experience has shown them to be heretofore, and
bids us expect to find them hereafter,—and not suffer ourselves to be
misled by interested deceivers or enthusiastick visionaries; and therefore
in forming a system of government, to delegate no greater power than is
clearly and certainly necessary, ought to be the first principle with
every people who are influenced by reason and a regard for their safety,
and in doing this, they ought most solicitously to endeavour so to qualify
even that power, by such checks and restraints, as to produce a perfect
responsibility in those who are to exercise it, and prevent them from its
abuse with a chance of impunity;—since such is the nature of man, that he
has a propensity to abuse authority and to tyrannize over the rights of
his fellowmen;—and to whomsoever power is given, not content with the
actual deposit, they will ever strive to obtain an increase. Those who
would wish to excite and keep awake your jealousy and distrust are your
truest friends; while they who speak peace to you when there is no
peace—who would lull you into security, and wish you to repose blind
confidence in your future governors—are your most dangerous enemies;
jealousy and distrust are the guardian angels who watch over
liberty—security and confidence are the forerunners of slavery. But the
advocates of the system tell you that we who oppose it, endeavour to
terrify you with mere possibilities which may never be realized, that all
our objections consist in saying government may do this, and government
may do that—I will for argument sake admit the justice of this remark, and
yet maintain that the objections are insurmountable. I consider it an
incontrovertible truth, that whatever by the constitution government even
may do, if it relates to the abuse of power by acts tyrannical and
oppressive, it some time or other will do. Such is the ambition of man,
and his lust for domination, that no power less than that which fixed its
bounds to the ocean can say to them, “Thus far shall ye go and no
farther.” Ascertain the limits of the may with ever so much precision, and
let them be as extensive as you please, government will speedily reach
their utmost verge; nor will it stop there, but soon will overleap those
boundaries, and roam at large into the regions of the may not. Those who
tell you the government by this constitution may keep up a standing army,
abolish the trial by jury, oppress the citizens of the states by its
powers over the militia, destroy the freedom of the press, infringe the
liberty of conscience, and do a number of other acts injurious and
destructive of your rights, yet that it never will do so; and that you
safely may accept such a constitution and be perfectly at ease and secure
that your rulers will always be so good, so wise, and so virtuous—such
emanations of the Deity—that they will never use their power but for your
interest and your happiness, contradict the uniform experience of ages,
and betray a total ignorance of human nature, or a total want of
ingenuity. Look back, my fellow citizens, to your conduct but a few years
past, and let that instruct you what ought to be your conduct at this
time. Great Britain then claimed the right to pass laws to bind you in all
cases whatever. You were then told in all the soft insinuating language of
the present day, and with all the appearance of disinterested friendship
now used, that those who insisted this claim of power might be abused,
only wandered in the regions of fancy—that you need not be uneasy, but
might safely acquiesce in the claim—that you might have the utmost
possible confidence in your rulers, that they never would use that power
to your injury; but distrustful of government, and jealous of your
liberty, you rejected such counsel with disdain; the bare possibility that
Britain might abuse it, if once conceded, kindled a flame from one end of
this continent to the other, and roused you to arms. Weak and defenseless
as you were, unused to military exertions, and unsupplied with warlike
stores, you braved the strength of a nation the most powerful and best
provided—you chose to risk your lives and property rather than to risque
the possibility that the power claimed by the British government should be
exercised to your injury—a possibility which the minions of power at that
time, with as much confidence as those of the present day, declared to be
absolutely visionary. Heaven wrought a miracle in your favour, and your
efforts were crowned with success. You are not now called upon to make an
equal sacrifice, you are not now requested to beat your ploughshares into
swords, or your pruning hooks into spears, to leave your peaceful
habitations, and exchange domestic tranquillity for the horrors of war;
peaceably, quietly and orderly to give this system of slavery your
negative, is all that is asked by the advocates of freedom—to pronounce
the single monosyllable no, is all they entreat. Shall they entreat you in
vain? When by this it is to be determined, whether our independence, for
obtaining which we have been accustomed to bow the knee with reverential
gratitude to Heaven, shall be our greatest curse; and when on this it
depends whether we shall be subject to a government, of which the little
finger will be thicker than the loins of that of Great Britain. But there
are also persons who pretend that your situation is at present so bad that
it cannot be worse, and urge that as an argument why we should embrace any
remedy proposed, however desperate it may appear. Thus do the poor erring
children of mortality, suffering under the presence of real or imaginary
evils, have recourse to a pistol or halter for relief, and rashly launch
into the untried regions of eternity—nor wake from this delusion, until
they wake in endless woe. Should the citizens of America, in a fit
desperation, be induced to commit this fatal act of political suicide, to
which by such arguments they are stimulated, the day will come when
laboring under more than Egyptian bondage; compelled to finish their quota
of brick, though destitute of straw and of mortar; galled with your
chains, and worn down by oppression, you will, by sad experience, be
convinced (when that conviction shall be too late), that there is a
difference in evils, and that the buzzing of gnats is more supportable
than the sting of a serpent. From the wisdom of antiquity we might obtain
excellent instruction, if we were not too proud to profit by it. Æsop has
furnished us with a history of a nation of frogs, between which and our
own there is a striking resemblance—whether the catastrophe be the same,
rests with ourselves. Jupiter out of pure good nature, wishing to do them
as little injury as possible, on being asked for a king, had thrown down
into their pond a log to rule over them;—under whose government, had they
been wise enough to know their own interest and to pursue it, they might
to this day, have remained happy and prosperous. Terrified with the noise,
and affrighted by the violent undulations of the water, they for some time
kept an awful distance, and regarded their monarch with reverence; but the
first impression being in some measure worn off, and perceiving him to be
of a tame and peaceable disposition, they approached him with familiarity,
and soon entertained for him the utmost contempt. In a little time were
seen the leaders of the frogs croaking to their respective circles on the
weakness and feebleness of the government at home, and of its want of
dignity and respect abroad, till the sentiment being caught by their
auditors, the whole pond resounded with “Oh Jupiter, good Jupiter, hear
our prayers! Take away from us this vile log, and give us a ruler who
shall know how to support the dignity and splendor of government! Give us
any government you please, only let it be energetic and efficient.” The
Thunderer, in his wrath, sent them a crane. With what delight did they
gaze on their monarch, as he came majestically floating on the wings of
the wind. They admired his uncommon shape—it was such as they had never
before seen—his deformities were, in their eyes, the greatest of beauties,
and they were heard like Aristides to declare that, were they on the verge
of eternity, they would not wish a single alteration in his form. His
monstrous beak, his long neck, and his enormous poke, even these, the
future means of their destruction, were subjects of their warm
approbation. He took possession of his new dominions, and instantly began
to swallow down his subjects, and it is said that those who had been the
warmest zealots for crane administration, fared no better than the rest.
The poor wretches were now much more dissatisfied than before, and with
all possible humility applied to Jupiter again for his aid, but in vain—he
dismissed them with this reproof, “that the evil of which they complained
they had foolishly brought upon themselves, and that they had no other
remedy now, but to submit with patience.” Thus forsaken by the god, and
left to the mercy of the crane, they sought to escape his cruelty by
flight; but pursuing them to every place of retreat, and thrusting his
long neck through the water to the bottom, he drew them out with his beak
from their most secret hiding-places, and served them up as a regale for
his ravenous appetite. The present federal government is, my fellow
citizens, the log of the fable—the crane is the system now offered to your
acceptance—I wish you not to remain under the government of the one, nor
to become subjected to the tyranny of the other. If either of these events
take place, it must arise from your being greatly deficient to
yourselves—from your being, like the nation of Frogs, “a discontented,
variable race, weary of liberty and fond of change.” At the same time I
have no hesitation in declaring, that if the one or the other must be our
fate, I think the harmless, inoffensive, though contemptible Log,
infinitely to be preferred to the powerful, the efficient, but
all-devouring Crane.

LUTHER MARTIN.

_Baltimore, March 29, 1788._



# Letter of a Plain Dealer

LETTER OF A PLAIN DEALER, ACCREDITED TO SPENCER ROANE.


Printed In
The Virginia Independent Chronicle,
February, 1788.


Note.


In October, 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph, delegate to the Federal
Convention from Virginia, addressed to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates a letter on the Federal Constitution. This was published in
December, 1787, in both _The Virginia Gazette_ and _The Virginia
Independent Chronicle_, as well as in pamphlet form at the time, and
recently in Ford’s _Pamphlets on the Constitution_. Randolph had declined
to give his assent to the Constitution in the Convention, but had so far
altered his views in the intervening period as to make his letter on the
whole an argument in favor of rather than against its adoption. Uncertain
in exactly what light to regard his utterances, it was one of the few
writings of the time which did not receive replies from one party or the
other.

The essay of “A Plain Dealer” is the only notice I have found of this
letter, and deals rather more with the inconsistencies of Randolph’s
views, than with the arguments advanced in the letter. Of the author,
Randolph himself gives us a clue in his letter to Madison, of February 29,
1788, where he writes:


    A writer calling himself Plain Dealer, who is bitter in principle
    _vs._ the Constitution, has attacked me in the paper. I suspect
    the author to be Mr. Spencer Roane; and the importunities of some
    to me in public and private are designed to throw me unequivocally
    and without condition into the opposition.


A Plain Dealer.


The Virginia Independent Chronicle, (Number 82)

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1788.

_Mans parturiens et ecce nascitur mus._

After a long and general expectancy of some dissertation on the subject of
the proposed Federal Constitution, worthy the first magistrate of the
respectable state of Virginia, a letter of his Excellency Governor
Randolph, of Oct. 10, 1787, is at length presented to the public. Previous
to the appearance of this letter, various opinions were prevailing in
different parts of this country respecting that gentleman’s _real_ opinion
on the subject of the said Constitution; and it became difficult for many
to conjecture how his Excellency would devise a middle course, so as to
catch the spirit of all his countrymen, and to reconcile himself to all
parties. It was not known to me, at least, that his Excellency felt an
“unwillingness to disturb the harmony of the legislature” on this
important subject; nor could I conceive that the sentiments of even the
ablest man among us could “excite a contest unfavorable” to the fairest
discussion of the question. On the other hand, I thought it right that the
adversaries of the Constitution, as well as its framers, should candidly
avow their real sentiments as early and decidedly as possible, for the
information of those who are to determine. It is true, his Excellency was
prevented declaring his opinion sooner, “by motives of delicacy arising
from two questions depending before the General Assembly, one respecting
the Constitution, the other respecting himself;” but I am of opinion that
during the pendency of a question concerning the Constitution, every
information on that subject is most properly to be adduced; and I did not
know that the being or not being Governor of Virginia, (an office in a
great degree nominal) was sufficient to deter a real patriot from speaking
the warning voice of opposition, in behalf of the liberties of his
country.

The letter above-mentioned can derive no aid from panegyric, as to the
brilliancy and elegance of its stile, for unlike the threadbare discourses
of other statesmen on the dry subject of government, it amuses us with a
number of fine words. But how shall I express my dislike of the ultimatum
of his Excellency’s letter, wherein he declares “that if after our best
efforts for amendments, they cannot be obtained, he will adopt the
Constitution as it is.” How is this declaration reconcilable to a former
opinion of his Excellency’s, expressed to the Honorable Richard Henry Lee,
and repeated by the latter gentleman in his letter,(62) as printed in the
public papers, “that either a monarchy or an aristocracy will be generated
from the proposed Constitution.” Good God! how can the first Magistrate
and Father of a free republican government, after a feeble parade of
opposition, and before his desired plan of amendments has been determined
upon, declare that he will accept a Constitution which is to beget a
monarchy or an aristocracy? How can such a determination be reconcilable
to the feelings of Virginia, and to the principles which have prevailed in
almost every legislature of the union, who looked no farther than the
amendment of our present republican confederation? I have charity to
believe that the respectable characters who signed this Constitution did
so, thinking that neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy would ensue, but
that they should thereby preserve and ameliorate the republic of America;
but never until now, that his Excellency has let the cat out of the bag,
did I suppose that any member of the Convention, at least from the
republican state of Virginia, would accept a Constitution, whereby the
republic of his constituents is to be sacrificed in its infancy, and
before it has had a fair trial. But his Excellency will adopt this
Constitution, “BECAUSE HE WOULD REGULATE HIMSELF BY THE SPIRIT OF
AMERICA.” But is his Excellency a prophet as well as a politician—can he
foretell future events? How else can he at this time discover what the
spirit of America is? But admitting his infallibility for a moment, how
far will his principle carry him?—why, that if the dominion of Shays,
instead of that of the new Constitution, should be generally accepted, and
become the spirit of America, his Excellency, too, would turn Shayite!—and
yet this question of the Constitution, is “ONE ON WHICH THE FATE OF
THOUSANDS YET UNBORN DEPENDS.” It is his Excellency’s opinion, as
expressed in the aforesaid letter, that the powers which are acknowledged
necessary for supporting the Union, cannot safely be entrusted to our
Congress as at present constituted; and his vain objection is “that the
representation of the states bears no proportion to their importance.”
This is literally true; but is equally true of the Senate of the proposed
Constitution, which is to be an essential part of the legislature; and yet
his Excellency will accept the latter, and not agree to invest the
necessary powers in the former, although the above objection equally
applies to both. Nay, I am inclined to believe that the injurious
consequences of this unequal representation will operate more strongly
under the new government—for under the present confederation the members
of Congress are removable at the pleasure of their constituents;—whereas
under the proposed Constitution, the only method of removing a wicked,
unskilful or treacherous senator, will be by impeachment before the senate
itself, of which he is a member.

These, Mr. Printer, are some of the inconsistencies which even a slight
observation of the above letter will suggest. It is not my purpose to
oppose now, or to investigate, the merits of the Constitution. This I
leave to abler pens, and to the common sense of my countrymen. The science
of government is _in itself_ simple and plain; and if in the history of
mankind no perfect government can be found, let it be attributed to the
chicane, perfidy and ambition of those who fabricate them; and who are
more or less, in common with all mankind, infected with a lust of power.
It is, however, certainly not consistent with sound sense to accept a
Constitution, knowing it to be imperfect; and his Excellency acknowledges
the proposed one to have radical objections. A Constitution ought to be
like Cæsar’s wife, not only good, but unsuspected, since it is the highest
compact which men are capable of forming, and involves the dearest rights
of life, liberty and property. I fear his Excellency has done no service
to his favorite scheme of amendments (and he too seems to be of the same
opinion) by his very candid declaration at the end of his letter. Subtlety
and chicane in politics, are equally odious and dishonorable; but when it
is considered that the present is not the golden age—the epoch of virtue,
candor and integrity—that the views of ambitious and designing men are
continually working to their own aggrandizement and to the overthrow of
liberty, and that the discordant interests of thirteen different
commonwealths are to be reconciled and promoted by one general government;
common reason will teach us that the utmost caution, secrecy, and
political sagacity is requisite to secure to each the important blessings
of a good government.

I shall now take my leave of his Excellency and the above-mentioned
letter, declaring my highest veneration for his character and abilities;
and it can be no impeachment of the talents of any man who has not served
a regular apprenticeship to politics, to say, that his opinions on an
intricate political question are erroneous. For if, as the celebrated Dr.
Blackstone observes, “in every art, occupation, or science, commercial or
mechanical, some method of instruction or apprenticeship is held
necessary, how much more requisite will such apprenticeship be found to
be, in the science of government, the noblest and most difficult of any!”

A PLAIN DEALER.



# The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania (1787)

The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority 

OF the Convention op the State of Pennsylvania 

TO their Constituents.* 

It was not until after the termination of the late glorious 
contest, which made the people of the United States an inde- 
pendent nation, that any defect was discovered in the present 

*From The Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, Dec. 18, 1787. 

(454) 


WILLIAM FINDLET 
Nat 1750 -Ob 1821. 


Svm, ifif C?rifinai fuUilMn^ lof CWl'mlcitt, 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 455 

confederation. It was formed by some of the ablest patriots 
in America. It carried us successfully through the war, and 
the virtue and patriotism of the people, with their disposition 
to promote the common cause, supplied the want of power 
in Congress. 

The requisition of Congress for the iive per cent, impost 
was made before the peace, so early as the first of February, 
1781, but was prevented taking effect by the refusal of one 
State; yet it is probable every State in the Union would have 
agreed to this measure at that period, had it not been for the 
extravagant terms in which it was demanded. The requisi- 
tion was new moulded in the year 1783, and accompanied 
with an additional demand of certain supplementary funds 
for twenty-five years. Peace had now taken place, and the 
United States found themselves laboring under a considera- 
ble foreign and domestic debt, incurred during the war. The 
requisition of 1783 was commensurate with the interest of the 
debt, as it was then calculated ; but it has been more accu- 
rately ascertained since that time. The domestic debt has 
been found to fall several millions of dollars short of the cal- 
culation, and it has lately been considerably diminished by 
large sales of the Western lands. The States have been called 
on by Congress annually for supplies until the general system 
of finance proposed in 1783 should take place. 

It was at this time that the want of an efiicient federal 
government was first complained of, and that the powers 
vested in Congress were found to be inadequate to the pro- 
curing of the benefits that should result from the union. 
The impost was granted by most of the States, but many re- 
fused the supplementary funds; the annual requisitions were 
set at naught by some of the States, while others complied 
with them by legislative acts, but were tardy in their pay- 
ments, and Congress found themselves incapable of comply- 
ing with their engagements and supporting the federal gov- 
ernment. It was found that our national character was 
sinking in the opinion of foreign nations. The Congress 
could make treaties of commerce, but could not enforce the 
observance of them. We were suffering from the restrictions 


456 After the Convention Rose. 

of foreign nations, who had suckled our commerce while we 
were unable to retaliate, and all now agreed that it would be 
advantageous to the union to enlarge the powers of Congress, 
that they should be enabled in the amplest manner to regu- 
late commerce and to lay and collect duties on the imports 
throughout the United States. With this view, a convention 
was first proposed by Virginia, and finally recommended by 
Congress for the different States to appoint deputies to meet in 
convention, "for the purposes of revising and amending the 
present articles of confederation, so as to make them adequate 
to the exigencies of the union." This recommendation the 
legislatures of twelve States complied with so hastily as not 
to consult their constituents on the subject; and though the 
different legislatures had no authority from their constituents 
for the purpose, they probably apprehended the necessity 
would justify the measure, and none of them extended their 
ideas at that time further than ' ' revising and amending the 
present articles of confederation. ' ' Pennsylvania, by the act 
appointing deputies, expressly confined their powers to this 
object, and though it is probable that some of the members 
of the assembly of this State had at that time in contempla- 
tion to annihilate the present confederation, as well as the 
constitution of Pennsylvania, yet the plan was not sufl&ciently 
matured to communicate it to the public. 

The majority of the legislature of this commonwealth were 
at that time under the influence of the members from the city 
of Philadelphia. They agreed that the deputies sent by them 
, to convention should have no compensation for their services, 
which determination was calculated to prevent the election 
of any member who resided at a distance from the city. It 
was in vain for the minority to attempt electing delegates to 
the convention who understood the circumstances, and the 
feelings of the people, and had a common interest with them. 
They found a disposition in the leaders of the majority of the 
house to choose themselves and some of their dependents. 
The minority attempted to prevent this by agreeing to vote 
for some of the leading members, who they knew had in- 
fluence enough to be appointed at any rate, in hopes of carry- 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 457 

ing with them some respectable citizens of Philadelphia, ii, 
whose principles and integrity they could have more confi- 
dence, but even in this they were disappointed, except in one 
member: the eighth member was added at a subsequent ses- 
sion of the assembly. 

The Continental Convention met in the city of Philadel- 
phia at the time appointed. It was composed of some men 
of excellent character; of others who were more remarkable 
for their ambition and cunning than their patriotism, and of 
some who had been opponents to the independence of the 
United States. The delegates from Pennsylvania were, six 
of them, uniform and decided opponents to the Constitution 
of this commonwealth. The convention sat upwards of four 
months. The doors were kept shut, and the members 
brought under, the most solemn engagements of secrecy.* 
Some ot those who opposed their going so far beyond their 
powers, retired, hopeless, from the convention; others had the 
firmness to refuse signing the plan altogether; and many who 
did sign it, did it not as a system they wholly approved, but 
as the best that could be then obtained, and notwithstanding 
the time spent on this subject, it is agreed on all hands to be 
a work of haste and accommodation. 

Whilst the gilded chains were forging in the secret con- 
clave, the meaner instruments of the despotism without were 
busily employed in alarming the fears of the people with 
dangers which did not exist, and exciting their hopes of 
greater advantages from the expected plan than even the best 
government on earth could produce. The proposed plan had 
not many hours issued forth from the womb of suspicious 
secrecy, until such as were prepared for the purpose, were 
carrying about petitions for people to sign, signifying their 
approbation of the system, and requesting the legislature to 
call a convention. While every measure was taken to intim- 
idate the people against opposing it, the public papers teemed 
with the most violent threats against those who should dare 
to think for themselves, and tar and feathers were liberally 
promised to all those who would not immediately join in sup- 

* The Journals of the conclave are still concealed. 


458 After the Convention Rose. 

porting the proposed government, be it what it would. Under 
such circumstances petitions in favor of calling a Convention 
were signed by great numbers in and about the city, before 
they had leisure to read and examine the system, many of 
whom — now they are better acquainted with it, and have had 
time to investigate its principles — are heartily opposed to it. 
The petitions were speedily handed in to the legislature. 

Affairs were in this situation, when on the 28th of Septem- 
ber last, a resolution was proposed to the assembly by a 
member of the house, who had been also a member of the 
federal convention, for calling a State convention to be 
elected within ten days for the purpose of examining and 
adopting the proposed Constitution of the United States, 
though at this time the house had not received it from Con- 
gress. This attempt was opposed by a minority, who after 
offering every argument in their power to prevent the pre- 
cipitate measure, without effect, absented themselves from 
the house as the only alternative left them, to prevent the 
measures taking place previous to their constituents being 
acquainted with the business. That violence and outrage 
which had been so often threatened was now practised; some 
of the members were seized the next day by a mob collected 
for the purpose, and forcibly dragged to the house, and there 
detained by force whilst the quorum of the legislature so 
formed^ completed their resolution. We shall dwell no 
longer on this subject: the people of Pennsylvania have been 
already acquainted therewith. We would only further ob- 
serve that every member of the legislature, previously to 
taking his seat, by solemn oath or afi&rmation, declares ' ' that 
he will not do or consent to any act or thing whatever, that 
will have a tendency to lessen or abridge their rights and 
privileges, as declared in the constitution of this State." 
And that constitution which they are so solemnly sworn to 
support, cannot legally be altered but by a recommendation 
of the council of censors, who alone are authorized to propose 
alterations and amendments, and even these must be pub- 
lished at least six months for the consideration of the people. 
The proposed system of government for the United States, if 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 459 

adopted, will alter and may annihilate the constitution of 
Pennsylvania; and therefore the legislature had no authority 
whatever to recommend the calling a convention for that 
purpose. This proceeding could not be considered as bind- 
ing on the people of this commonwealth. The house was 
formed by violence, some of the members composing it were 
detained there by force, which alone would have vitiated any 
proceedings to which they were otherwise competent; but 
had the legislature been legally formed, this business was 
absolutely without their power. 

In this situation of affairs were the subscribers elected 
members of the Convention of Pennsylvania — a Convention 
called by a legislature in direct violation of their duty, and 
composed in part of members who were compelled to attend 
for that purpose, to consider of a Constitution proposed by a 
Convention of the United States, who were not appointed for 
the purpose of framing a new form of government, but whose 
powers were expressly confined to altering and amending the 
present articles of confederation. Therefore the members of 
the continental Convention in proposing the plan acted as 
individuals, and not as deputies from Pennsylvania.* The 
assembly who called the State Convention acted as individ- 
uals, and not as the legislature of Pennsylvania; nor could 
they or the Convention chosen on their recommendation have 
authority to do any act or thing that can alter or annihilate 
the Constitution of Pennsylvania (both of which will be done 
by the new Constitution), nor are their proceedings, in our 
opinion, at all binding on the people. 

The election for members of the Convention was held at so 
early a period, and the want of information was so great, that 
some of us did not know of it until after it was over, and we 

* The continential Convention, in direct violation of the 13th article of the 
confederation, have declared "that the ratification of nine States shall be 
sufBcient for the establishment of this Constitution, between the States so 
ratifying the same." Thus has the plighted faith of the States been sported 
with ! They had solemnly engaged that the confederation now subsisting 
should be inviolably preserved by each of them, and the Union thereby 
formed should be perpetual, unless the same should be altered by mutual 
consent. 


460 After the Convention Rose. 

have reason to believe that great numbers of the people of 
Pennsylvania have not yet had an opportunity of sufficiently 
examining the proposed Constitution, We apprehexid that 
no change can take place that will affect the internal govern- 
ment or Constitution of this commonwealth, unless a majority 
of the people should evidence a wish for such a change; but 
on examining the number of votes given for members of the 
present State Convention, we find that of upwards of seventy 
thousand freemen who are entitled to vote in Pennsylvania, 
the whole convention has been elected by about thirteen 
thousand voters, and though two-thirds of the members of the 
Convention have thought proper to ratify the proposed Con- 
stitution, yet those two-thirds were elected by the votes of 
only six thousand and eight hundred freemen. 

In the city of Philadelphia and some of the eastern coun- 
ties the junto that took the lead in the business agreed to 
vote for none but such as would solemnly promise to adopt 
the system in toio, without exercising their judgment. In 
many of the counties the people did not attend the elections, 
as they had not an opportunity of judging of the plan. 
Others did not consider themselves bound by the call of a 
set of men who assembled at the State-house in Philadelphia 
and assumed the name of the legislature of Pennsylvania; 
and some were prevented from voting by the violence of the 
party who were determined at all events to force down the 
measure. To such lengths did the tools of despotism carry 
their outrage, that on the night of the election for members 
of convention, in the city of Philadelphia, several of the sub- 
scribers (being then in the city to transact your business) 
were grossly abused, ill-treated and insulted while they were 
quiet in their lodgings, though they did not interfere nor had 
anything to do with the said election, but, as they apprehend, 
because they were supposed to be adverse to the proposed 
constitution, and would not tamely surrender those sacred 
rights which you had committed to their charge. 

The convention met, and the same disposition was soon 
manifested in considering the proposed constitution, that had 
been exhibited in every other stage of the business. We 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 461 

were prohibited by an express vote of the convention from 
taking any questions on the separate articles of the plan, and 
reduced to the necessity of adopting or rejecting in toto. 
] 'Tis true the majority permitted us to debate on each article, 
but restrained us from proposing amendments. They also 
determined not to permit us to enter on the minutes our rea- 
sons of dissent against any of the articles, nor even on the 
final question our reasons of dissent against the whole. Thus 
situated we entered on the examination of the proposed sys- 
tem of government, and found it to be such as we could not 
adopt, without, as we conceived, surrendering up your dear- 
est rights. We offered our objections to the convention, and 
opposed those parts of the plan which, in our opinion, would 
be injurious to you, in the best manner we were able; and 
closed our arguments by offering the following propositions 
to the convention. 

1. The right of conscience shall be held inviolable; and 
neither the legislative, executive nor judicial powers of the 
United States shall have authority to alter, abrogate or in- 
fringe any part of the constitution of the several States, which 
provide for the preservation of liberty in matters of religion. 

2. That in controversies respecting property, and in suits 
between man and man, trial by jury shall remain as hereto- 
fore, as well in the federal courts as in those of the several 
States. 

3. That in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man has 
a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, as 
well in the federal courts as in those of the several States; to 
be heard by himself and his counsel; to be confronted with 
the accusers and witnesses ; to call for evidence in his favor, 
and a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage, with- 
out whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty, nor 
can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; and, 
that no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of 
the land or jthe judgment of his peers. 

4. That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor ex- 
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel nor unusual punishments in- 
flicted. 


462 After the Convention Rose. 

5. That warrants unsupported by evidence, whereby any 
officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search 
suspected places; or to seize any person or persons, his or 
their property not particularly described, are grievous and 
oppressive, and shall not be granted either by the magistrates 
of the federal government or others. 

6. That the people have a right to the freedom of speech, 
of writing and publishing their sentiments; therefore the 
freedom of the press shall not be restrained by any law of the 
United States. 

7. That the people have a right to bear arms for the de- 
fence of themselves and their own State or the United States, 
or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed 
for disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes 
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; 
and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to 
liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military 
shall be kept under strict subordination to, and be governed 
by the civil powers. 

8. The inhabitants of the several States shall have liberty 
to fowl and hunt in seasonable time on the lands they hold, 
and on all other lands in the United States not inclosed, and 
in like manner to fish in all navigable waters, and others not 
private property, without being restrained therein by any 
laws to be passed by the legislature of the United States. 

9. That no law shall be passed to restrain the legislatures 
of the several States from enacting laws for imposing taxes, 
except imposts and duties on goods imported or exported, and 
that no taxes, except imposts and duties upon goods imported 
and exported, and postage on letters, shall be levied by the 
authority of Congress. 

10. That the house of representatives be properly increased 
in number; that elections shall remain free; that the several 
States shall have power to regulate the elections for senators 
and representatives, without being controlled either directly 
or indirectly by any interference on the part of the Congress; 
and that the elections of representatives be annual. 

11. That the power of organizing, arming and disciplining 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 463 

the militia (the manner of disciplining the militia to be pre- 
scribed by Congress), remain with the individual States, and 
that Congress shall not have authority to call or march any 
of the militia out of their own State, without the consent of 
such State, and for such length of time only as such State 
shall agree. 

That the sovereignty, freedom and independency of the 
several States shall be retained, and every power, jurisdiction 
and right which is not by this Constitution expressly dele- 
gated to the United States in Congress assembled. 

13. That the legislative, executive and judicial powers be 
kept separate; and to this end that a constitutional council be 
appointed to advise and assist the President, who shall be 
responsible for the advice they give — hereby the senators 
would be relieved from almost constant attendance; and also 
that the judges be made completely independent. 

13. That no -treaty which shall be directly opposed to the 
existing laws of the United States in Congress assembled, 
shall be valid until such laws shall be repealed or made con- 
formable to such treaty ; neither shall any treaties be valid 
which are in contradiction to the Constitution of the United 
States, or the constitution of the several States. 

14. That the judiciary power of the United States shall be 
be confined to cases affecting ambassadors, other public min- 
isters and consuls, to cases of admiralty and maritime juris- 
diction ; to controversies to which the United States shall be 
a party; to controversies between two or more States — ^be- 
tween a State and citizens of different States — between citi- 
zens claiming lands under grants of different States, and 
between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign States; 
and in criminal cases to such only as are expressly enumer- 
ated in the constitution; and that the United States in Con- 
gress assembled shall not have power to enact laws which 
shall alter the laws of descent and distribution of the effects 
of deceased persons, the titles of lands or goods, or the regu- 
lation of contracts in the individual States. 

After reading these propositions, we declared our willing- 
ness to agree to the plan, provided it was so amended as 


464 After the Convention Rose. 

to meet those propositions or something similar to them, 
and finally moved the convention to adjourn, to give the 
people of Pennsylvania time to consider the subject and de- 
termine for themselves; but these were all rejected and the 
final vote taken, when our duty to you induced us to vote 
against the proposed plan and to decline signing the ratifica- 
tion of the same. 

During the discussion we met with many insults and some 
personal abuse. We were not even treated with decency, 
during the sitting of the convention, by the persons in the 
gallery of the house. However, we flatter ourselves that in 
contending for the preservation of those invaluable rights 
you have thought proper to commit to our charge, we acted 
with a spirit becoming freemen ; and being desirous that you 
might know the principles which actuated our conduct, and 
being prohibited from inserting our reasons of dissent on the 
minutes of the convention, we have subjoined them for your 
consideration, as to you alone we are accountable. It re- 
mains with you whether you will think those inestimable 
privileges, which you have so ably contended for, should be 
sacrificed at the shrine of despotism, or whether you mean to 
contend for them with the same spirit that has so often 
baffled the attempts of an aristocratic faction to rivet the 
shackles of slavery on you and your unborn posterity. 

Our objections are comprised under three general heads of 
dissent, viz. : 

We dissent, first, because it is the opinion of the most cele- 
brated writers on government, and confirmed by uniform 
experieuce, that a very extensive territory cannot be governed 
on the principles of freedom, otherwise than by a confedera- 
tion of republics, possessing all the powers of internal gov- 
ernment, but united in the management of their general and 
foreign concerns. 

If any doubt could have been entertained of the truth of 
the foregoing principle, it has been fully removed by the con- 
cession oiMr. Wilson^ one of the majority on this question, and 
who was one of the deputies in the late general convention. 
In justice to him, we will give his own words; they are as 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 465 

follows, viz. : "The extent of country for which the new con- 
stitution was required, produced another difficulty in the 
business of the federal convention. It is the opinion of some 
celebrated writers, that to a small territory, the democratical; 
to a middling territory (as Montesquieu has termed it), the 
monarchical; and to an extensive territory, the despotic form 
of government is best adapted. Regarding then the wide 
and almost unbounded jurisdiction of the United States, at 
first view, the hand of despotism seemed necessary to control, 
connect and protect it; and hence the chief embarrassment 
rose. For we know that although our constituents would 
cheerfully submit to the legislative restraints of a free govern- 
ment, they would spurn at every attempt to shackle them 
with despotic power." And again, in another part of his 
speech, he continues : " Is it probable that the dissolution of 
the State governments, and the establishment of one consoli- 
dated empire would be eligible in its nature, and satisfactory 
to the people in its administration ? I think not, as I have 
given reasons to show that so extensive a territory could not 
be governed, connected and preserved, but by the supremacy 
of despotic power. All the exertions of the most potent em- 
perors of Rome were not capable of keeping that empire 
together, which in extent was far inferior to the dominion of 
America. ' ' 

We dissent, secondly, because the powers vested in Con- 
gress by this constitution, must necessarily annihilate and 
absorb the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the 
several States, and produce from their ruins one consolidated 
government, which from the nature of things will be an iron 
handed despotism^ as nothing short of the supremacy of des- 
potic sway could connect and govern these United States 
under one government. 

As the truth of this position is of such decisive importance, 
it ought to be fully investigated, and if it is founded to be 
clearly ascertained; for, should it be demonstrated that the 
powers vested by this constitution in Congress will have 
such an effect as necessarily to produce one consolidated 
government, the question then will be reduced to this short 
30 


466 After the Convention Rose. 

issue, viz.: whether satiated with the blessings of liberty, 
whether repenting of the folly of so recently asserting their 
unalienable rights against foreign despots at the expense of 
so much blood and treasure, and such painful and arduous 
struggles, the people of America are now willing to resign 
every privilege of freemen, and submit to the dominion of an 
absolute government that will embrace all America in one 
chain of despotism; or whether they will, with virtuous in- 
dignation, spurn at the shackles prepared for them, and con- 
firm their liberties by a conduct becoming freemen. 

That the new government will not be a confederacy of 
States, as it ought, but one consolidated government, founded 
upon the destruction of the several governments of the States, 
we shall now show. 

The powers of Congress under the new constitution are 
complete and unlimited over the purse and the sword, and are 
perfectly independent of and supreme over the State govern- 
ments, whose intervention in these great points is entirely 
destroyed. By virtue of their power of taxation. Congress 
may command the whole or any part of the property of the 
people. They may impose what imposts upon commerce, 
they may impose what land taxes, poll taxes, excises, duties 
on all written instruments and duties on every other article, 
that they may judge proper; in short, every species of taxa- 
tion, whether of an external or internal nature, is comprised 
in section the eighth of article the first, viz. : 

' ' The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide 
for the common defence and general welfare of the United 
States." 

As there is no one article of taxation reserved to the State 
governments, the Congress may monopolize every source of 
revenue, and thus indirectly demolish the State governments, 
for without funds they could not exist; the taxes, duties and 
excises imposed by Congress may be so high as to render it 
impracticable to levy farther sums on the same articles; but 
whether this should be the case or not, if the State govern- 
ments should p esume to impose taxes, duties or excises on 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 467 

the same articles with Congress, the latter may abrogate and 
repeal the laws whereby they are imposed, upon the allega- 
tion that they interfere with the due collection of their taxes, 
duties or excises, by virtue of the following clause, part of 
section eighth, article first, viz. : 

"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other 
powers vested by this constitution in the government of the 
United States, or in any department or ofiicer thereof." 

The Congress might gloss over this conduct by construing 
every purpose for which the State legislatures now lay taxes, 
to be for the '''■general welfare^'' ^ and therefore as of their 
jurisdiction. 

And the supremacy of the laws of the United States is 
established by article sixth, viz. : ' ' That this constitution 
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made under the authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby; anything in the constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding. ' ' It has been alleged 
that the words "pursuant to the constitution," are a restric- 
tion upon the authority of Congress; but when it is considered 
that by other sections they are invested with every efficient 
power of government, and which may be exercised to the 
absolute destruction of the State governments, without any 
violation of even the forms of the constitution, this seeming 
restriction, as well as every other restriction in it, appears to 
us to be nugatory and delusive; and only introduced as a 
blind upon the real nature of the government. In our 
opinion, "'pursuant to the constitution " will be co-extensive 
with the will and pleasure of Congress, which, indeed, will 
be the only limitation of their powers. 

We apprehend that two co-ordinate sovereignties would be 
a solecism in politics; that, therefore, as there is no line of 
distinction drawn between the general and State govern- 
ments, as the sphere of their jurisdiction is undefined, it 
would be contrary to the nature of things that both should 


468 After the Convention Rose. 

exist together — one or the other would necessarily triumph in 
the fulness of dominion. However, the contest could not be 
of long continuance, as the State governments are divested 
of every means of defence, and will be obliged by ' ' the su- 
preme law of the land ' ' to yield at discretion. 

It has been objected to this total destruction of the State 
governments that the existence of their legislatures is made 
essential to the organization of Congress; that they must 
assemble for the appointment of the senators and President- 
general of the United States. True, the State legislatures 
may be continued for some years, as boards of appointment 
merely, after they are divested of every other function; but 
the framers of the constitution, foreseeing that the people 
will soon become disgusted with this solemn mockery of a 
government without power and usefulness, have made a pro- 
vision for relieving them from the imposition in section fourth 
of article first, viz. : "The times, places and manner of hold- 
ing elections for senators and representatives shall be pre- 
scribed in each State by the legislature thereof ; but the Con- 
gress may at any time by law m.ake or alter such regulations^ 
except as to the place of choosing senators.^'' 

As Congress have the control over the time of the appoint- 
ment of the President-general, of the senators and of the rep- 
resentatives of the United States, they may prolong their 
existence in office for life by postponing the time of their 
election and appointment from period to period under various 
pretences, such as an apprehension of invasion, the factious 
disposition of the people, or any other plausible pretence 
that the occasion may suggest; and having thus obtained 
life-estates in the government, they may fill up the vacancies 
themselves by their control over the mode of appointment; 
with this exception in regard to the senators that as the place 
of appointment for them must, by the constitution, be in the 
particular State, they may depute some body in the respec- 
tive States, to fill up the vacancies in the senate, occasioned 
by death, until they can venture to assume it themselves. 
In this manner may the only restriction in this clause be 
evaded. By virtue of the foregoing section, when the spirit 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 469 

of the people shall be gradually broken, when the general 
government shall be firmly established, and when a numerous 
standing army shall render opposition vain, the Congress 
may complete the system of despotism, in renouncing all 
dependence on the people by continuing themselves and 
children in the government. 

The celebrated Montesquieu^ in his Spirit of I^aws, vol. i. , 
page 12, says, "That in a democracy there can be no exer- 
cise of sovereignty, but by the suffrages of the people, which 
are their will; now the sovereign's will is the sovereign him- 
self— the laws, therefore, which establish the right of suffrage, 
are fundamental to this government. In fact, it is as im- 
portant to regulate in a republic in what manner, by whom, 
and concerning what suffrages are to be given, as it is in a 
monarchy to know who is the prince, and after what manner 
he ought to govern. ' ' The time^ mode and place of the elec- 
tion of representatives, senators and president-general of the 
United States, ought not to be under the control of Congress, 
but fundamentally ascertained and established. 

The new Constitution, consistently with the plan of con- 
solidation, contains no reservation of the rights and privileges 
of the State governments, which was made in the confedera- 
tion of the year 1778, by article the 2d, viz.: "That each 
State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and 
every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this con- 
federation expressly delegated to the United States in Con- 
gress assembled." 

The legislative power vested in Congress by the foregoing 
recited sections, is so unlimited in its nature, may be so com- 
prehensive and boundless in its exercise, that this alone would 
be amply suflScient to annihilate the State governments, and 
swallow them up in the grand vortex of general empire. 

The judicial powers vested in Congress are also so various 
and extensive, that by legal ingenuity they may be extended 
to every case, and thus absorb the State judiciaries; and when 
we consider the decisive influence that a general judiciary 
would have over the civil polity of the several States, we do 
not hesitate to pronounce that this power, unaided by the 


470 After the Convention Rose. 

legislative, would eflfect a consolidation of the States under 
one government. 

The powers of a court of equity, vested by this constitution 
in the tribunals of Congress — powers which do not exist in 
Pennsylvania, unless so far as they can be incorporated with 
jury trial — would, in this State, greatly contribute to this 
event. The rich and wealthy suitors would eagerly lay hold 
of the infinate mazes,\perplexities and delays, which a court 
of chancery, with the appellate powers of the Supreme Court 
in fact as well as law would furnish him with, and thus the 
poor man being plunged in the bottomless pit of legal discus- 
sion, would drop his demand in despair. 

In short, consolidation pervades the whole constitution. 
It begins with an annunciation that such was the intention. 
The main pillars of the fabric correspond with it, and the 
concluding paragraph is a confirmation of it. The preamble 
begins with the words, "We the people of the United 
States, ' ' which is the style of a compact between individuals 
entering into a state of society, and not that of a confedera- 
tion of States. The other features of consolidation we have 
before noticed. 

Thus we have fully established the position, that the 
powers vested by this constitution in Congi-ess will efiect a 
consolidation of the States under one government, which 
even the advocates of this constitution admit could not be 
done without the sacrifice of all liberty. 

3. We dissent, thirdly, because if it were practicable to 
govern so extensive a territory as these United States in- 
clude, on the plan of a consolidated government, consistent 
with the principles of liberty and the happiness of the people, 
yet the construction of this Constitution is not calculated to 
attain the object; for independent of the nature of the case, 
it would of itself necessarily produce a despotism, and that 
not by the usual gradations, but with the celerity that has 
hitherto only attended revolutions effected by the sword. 

To establish the truth of this position, a cursory investiga- 
tion of the principles and form of this constitution will suffice. 

The first consideration that this review suggests, is the omis- 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 471 

sion of a Bill of Rights ascertaining and fundamentally es- 
tablishing those unalienable and personal rights of men, with- 
out the full, free and secure enjoyment of which there can be 
no liberty, and over which it is not necessary for a good gov- 
ernment to have the control— the principal of which are the 
rig:hts of conscience, personal liberty by the clear and une- 
quivocal establishment of the writ of habeas corpus^ jury trial 
in criminal and civil cases, by an impartial jury of the vicin- 
age or county, with the common law proceedings for the 
safety of the accused in criminal prosecutions; and the liberty 
of the press, that scourge of tyrants, and the grand bulwark 
of every other liberty and privilege. The stipulations hereto- 
fore made in favor of them in the State constitutions, are 
entirely superseded by this Constitution. 

The legislature of a free country should be so formed as to 
have a competent knowledge of its constitutents, and enjoy 
their confidence. To produce these essential requisites, the 
representation ought to be fair, equal and sufficiently numer- 
ous to possess the same interests, feelings, opinions and views 
which the people themselves would possess, were they all 
assembled ; and so numerous as to prevent bribery and undue 
influence, and so responsible to the people, by frequent and 
fair elections, as to prevent their neglecting or sacrificing the 
views and interests of their constituents to their own pur- 
suits. 

We will now bring the legislature under this Constitution 
to the test of the foregoing principles, which will demonstrate 
that it is deficient in every essential quality of a just and safe 
representation. 

The House of Representatives is to consist of sixty-five 
members; that is one for about every 50,000 inhabitants, to 
be chosen every two years. Thirty-three members will form 
a quorum for doing business, and seventeen of these, being 
the majority, determine the sense of the house. 

The Senate, the other constituent branch of the legislature, 
consists of twenty-six members, being two from each State, 
appointed by their legislatures every six years ; fourteen 
senators make a quorum — the majority of whom, eight, de- 


472 After the Convention Rose. 

termines the sense of tliat body, except in judging on im- 
peachments, or in making treaties, or in expelling a member, 
when two-thirds of the senators present must concur. 

The president is to have the control over the enacting of 
laws, so far as to make the concurrence of two-thirds of the 
representatives and senators present necessary, if he should 
object to the laws. 

Thus it appears that the liberties, happiness, interests, and 
great concerns of the whole United States, may be dependent 
upon the integrity, virtue, wisdom, and knowledge of twenty- 
five or twenty-six men. How unadequate and unsafe a 
representation! Inadequate, because the sense and views of 
three or four millions of people, diffused over so extensive a 
territory, comprising such various climates, products, habits, 
interests, and opinions, cannot be collected in so small a body; 
and besides, it is not a fair and equal representation of the 
people even in proportion to its number, for the smallest 
State has as much weight in the Senate as the largest; and 
from the smallness of the number to be chosen for both 
branches of the legislature, and from the mode of election 
and appointment, which is under the control of Congress, 
and from the nature of the thing, men of the most elevated 
rank in life will alone be chosen. The other orders in the 
society, such as farmers, traders, and mechanics, who all 
ought to have a competent number of their best informed 
men in the legislature, shall be totally unrepresented. 

The representation is unsafe, because in the exercise of 
such great powers and trusts, it is so exposed to corruption 
and undue influence, by the gift of the numerous places of 
honor and emolument at the disposal of the executive, by 
the arts and address of the great and designing, and by 
direct bribery. 

The representation is moreover inadequate and unsafe, be- 
cause of the long terms for which it is appointed, and the 
mode of its appointment, by which Congress may not only 
control the choice of the people, but may so manage as to 
divest the people of this fundamental right, and become self- 
elected. 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 473 

The number of members in the House of Representatives 
may be increased to one for every 30,000 inhabitants. But 
when we consider that this cannot be done without the con- 
sent of the Senate, who from their share in the legislative, in 
the executive, and judicial departments, and permanency of 
appointment, will be the great efficient body in this govern- 
ment, and whose weight and predominancy would be 
abridged by an increase of the representatives, we are per- 
suaded that this is a circumstance that cannot be expected. 
On the contrary, the number of representatives will probably 
be continued at sixty-five, although the population of the 
country may swell to treble what it now is, unless a revolu- 
tion should eflFect a change. 

We have before noticed the judicial power as it would 
affect a consolidation of the States into one government; we 
will now examine it as it would affect the liberties and wel- 
fare of the people, supposing such a government were prac- 
ticable and proper. 

The judicial power, under the proposed constitution, is 
founded on well-known principles of the civil law, by which 
the judge determines both on law and fact, and appeals are 
allowed from the inferior tribunals to the superior, upon the 
whole question; so that facts as well as law, would be re- 
examined, and even new facts brought forward in the court of 
appeals; and to use the words of a very eminent civilian — 
"The cause is many times another thing before the court of 
appeals, than what it was at the time of the first sentence. ' ' 
That this mode of proceeding is the one which must be 
adopted under this constitution, is evident from the following 
circumstances: ist. That the trial by jury, which is the 
grand characteristic of the common law, is secured by the 
constitution only in criminal cases. 2d. That the appeal 
from both law and fact is expressly established, which is 
utterly inconsistent with the principles of the common law 
and trials by jury. The only mode in which an appeal from 
law and fact can be established, is by adopting the principles 
and practice of the civil law, unless the United States should 
be drawn into the absurdity of calling and swearing juries, 


474 After the Convention Rose. 

merely for the purpose of contradicting their verdicts, which 
would render juries contemptible and worse than useless. 3d. 
That the courts to be established would decide on all cases oj 
law and equity^ which is a well-known characteristic of the 
civil law, and these courts would have conusance not only of 
the laws of the United States, and of treaties, and of cases 
affecting ambassadors, but of all cases of admiralty and mari- 
time jurisdiction^ which last are matters belonging exclusively 
to the civil law, in every nation in Christendom. 

Not to enlarge upon the loss of the invaluable right of trial 
by an unbiased jury, so dear to every friend of liberty, the 
monstrous expense and inconveniences of the mode of pro- 
ceeding to be adopted, are such as will prove intolerable to 
the people of this country. The lengthy proceedings of the 
civil law courts in the chancery of England, and in the 
courts of Scotland and France, are such that few men of 
moderate fortune can endure the expense of; the poor man 
must therefore submit to the wealthy. Length of purse will 
too often prevail against right and justice. For instance, we 
are told by the learned Judge Blackstone^ that a question only 
on the property of an ox, of the value of .three guineas, origi- 
nating under the civil law proceedings in Scotland, after 
many interlocutory orders and sentences below, was carried 
at length from the court of sessions, the highest court in that 
part of Great Britain, by way of appeal to the House of Lords, 
where the question of law and fact was finally determined. 
He adds, that no pique or spirit could in the court of king's 
bench or common pleas at Westminster, have given con- 
tinuance to such a cause for a tenth part of the time, nor 
have cost a twentieth part of the expense. Yet the costs in 
the courts of king's bench and common pleas in England, 
are infinitely greater than those which the people of this 
country have ever experienced. We abhor the idea of losing 
the transcendent privilege of trial by jury, with the loss of 
which, it is remarked by the same learned author, that in 
Sweden, the liberties of the commons were extinguished by 
an aristocratic Senate; and that trial by jury and the liberty 
of the people went out together. At the same time we regret 


Beasons of Dissent of the Minority. 475 

the intol^able delay, the enormous expense, and infinite 
vexation, ta which the people of this country will be exposed 
from the volumnious proceedings of the courts of civil law, 
and especially from the appellate jurisdiction, by means of 
which a man may be drawn from the utmost boundaries of 
this extensive country to the seat of the Supreme Court of 
the nation to contend, perhaps, with a wealthy and powerful 
adversary. The consequence of this establishment will be an 
absolute confirmation of the power of aristocratical influence 
in the courts of justice; for the common people will not be 
able to contend or struggle against it. 

Trial by jury in criminal cases may also be excluded by 
declaring that the libeller for instance shall be liable to an 
action of debt for a specified sum, thus evading the common 
law prosecution by indictment and trial by jury. And the 
common course of proceeding against a ship for breach of 
revenue laws by informa (which will be classed among civil 
causes) will at the civil law be within the resort of a court, 
where no jury intervenes. Besides, the benefit of jury trial, 
in cases of a criminal nature, which cannot be evaded, will be 
rendered of little value, by calling the accused to answer far 
from home; there being no provision that the trial be by a 
jury of the neighborhood or country. Thus an inhabitant 
of Pittsburgh, on a charge of crime committed on the banks 
of the Ohio, may be obliged to defend himself at the side of 
the Delaware, and so vice versa. To conclude this head: we 
observe that the judges of the courts of Congress would not 
be independent, as they are not debarred from holding other 
ofl&ces, during the pleasure of the President and Senate, and 
as they may derive their support in part from fees, alterable 
by the legislature. 

The next consideration that the constitution presents, is 
the undue and dangerous mixture of the powers of govern- 
ment; the same body possessing legislative, executive and 
judicial powers. The Senate is a constituent branch of the 
legislature, it has judicial power in judging on impeachments, 
and in this case unites in some measure the characters of 
judge and party, as all the principal ofiScers are appointed by 


476 After the Convention Rose. 

the president-general, with the concurrence of the Senate, 
and therefore they derive their offices in part from the Senate. 
This may bias the judgments of the senators, and tend to 
screen great delinquents from punishment. And the Senate 
has, moreover, various and great executive powers, viz., in 
concurrence with the president-general, they form treaties 
with foreign nations, that may control and abrogate the con- 
stitutions and laws of the several States. Indeed, there is no 
power, privilege or liberty of the State governments, or of the 
people, but what may be affected by virtue of this power. 
For all treaties, made by them, are to be the "supreme law 
of the land; anything in the constitution or laws of any State, 
to the contrary notwithstanding." 

And this great power may be exercised by the President 
and ten senators (being two-thirds of fourteen, which is a 
quorum of that body). What an inducement would this offer 
to the ministers of foreign powers to compass by bribery 
such concessions as could not otherwise be obtained. It is the 
unvaried usage of all free States, whenever treaties interfere 
with the positive laws of the land, to make the intervention 
of the legislature necessary to give them operation. This be- 
came necessary, and was afforded by the parliament of Great 
Britain, in consequence of the late commercial treaty between 
that kingdom and France. As the Senate judges on impeach- 
ments, who is to try the members of the Senate for the abuse 
of this power! And none of the great appointments to office 
can be made without the consent of the Senate. 

Such various, extensive, and important powers combined 
in one body of men, are inconsistent with all freedom; the 
celebrated Montesquieu tells us, that "when the legislative 
and executive powers are united in the same person, or in 
the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty, be- 
cause apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or 
senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a 
tyrannical manner." 

"Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not 
separated from the legislative and executive powers. Were 
it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the sub- 


Reasons of Dissent of tke Minority. 477 

ject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge 
would then be legislator. Were it joined to the executive 
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an 
oppressor. There would be an end of everything, were the 
same man, or the same body of the nobles, or of the people, 
to exercise those three powers; that of enacting laws, that 
of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the 
crimes or differences of individuals." 

The president general is dangerously connected with the 
senate; his coincidence with the views of the ruling junto in 
that body, is made essential to his weight and importance in 
the government, which will destroy all independency and 
purity in the executive department; and having the power of 
pardoning without the concurrence of a council, he may 
screen from punishment the most treasonable attempts that 
may be made on the liberties of the people, when instigated 
by his coadjutors in the senate. Instead of Ijhis dangerous 
and improper mixture of the executive with the legislative 
and judicial, the supreme executive powers ought to have 
been placed in the president, with a small independent coun- 
cil, made personally responsible for every appointment to 
office or other act, by having their opinions recorded; and 
that without the concurrence of the majority of the quorum 
of this council, the president should not be capable of taking 
any step. 

We have before considered internal taxation as it would 
effect the destruction of the State governments, and produce 
one consolidated government. We will now consider that 
subject as it affects the personal concerns of the people. 

The power of direct taxation applies to every individual, 
as Congress, under this government, is expressly vested with 
the authority of laying a capitation or poll tax upon every 
person to any amount. This is a tax that, however oppres- 
sive in its nature, and unequal in its operation, is certain 
as to its produce and simple in its collection; it cannot 
be evaded like the objects of imposts or excise, and will be 
paid, because all that a man hath will he give for his head. 
This tax is so congenial to the nature of despotism, that it 


478 After the Convention Rose. 

has ever been a favorite under such governments. Some of 
those who were in the late general convention from this 
State, have labored to introduce a poll tax among us. 

The power of direct taxation will further apply to every 
individual, as Congress may tax land, cattle, trades, occupa- 
tions, etc., to any amount, and every object of internal tax- 
ation is of that nature that however oppressive, the people 
will have but this alternative, either to pay the tax or let 
their property be taken, for all resistance will be vain. The 
standing army and select militia would enforce the collection. 

For the moderate exercise of this power, there is no con- 
trol left in the State governments, whose intervention is 
destroyed. No relief, or redress of grievances, can be ex- 
tended as heretofore by them. There is not even a declara- 
tion of Rights to which the people may appeal for the 
vindication of their wrongs in the court of justice. They 
must therefore, implicitly obey the most arbitrary laws, as 
the most of them will be pursuant to the principles and form 
of the constitution, and that strongest of all checks upon the 
conduct of administration, responsibility to the people^ will not 
exist in this government. The permanency of the appoint- 
ments of senators and representatives, and the control the 
congress have over their election, will place them independ- 
ent of the sentiments and resentment of the people, and the 
administration having a greater interest in the government 
than in the community, there will be no consideration to re- 
strain them from oppression and tyranny. In the govern- 
ment of this State, under the old confederation, the members 
of the legislature are taken from among the people, and their 
interests and welfare are so inseparably connected with those 
of their constituents, that they can derive no advantage from 
oppressive laws and taxes; for they would suflFer in common 
with their fellow-citizens, would participate in the burthens 
they impose on the community, as they must return to the 
common level, after a short period; and notwithstanding 
every exertion of influence, every means of corruption, a 
necessary rotation excludes them from permanency in the 
legislature. 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 479 

This large State is to have but ten members in that Con- 
gress which is to have the liberty, property and dearest con- 
cerns of every individual in this vast country at absolute 
command, and even these ten persons, who are to be our only 
guardians, who are to supersede the legislature of Pennsyl- 
vania, will not be of the choice of the people, nor amenable 
to them. From the mode of their election and appointment 
they will consist of the lordly and high minded; of men who 
will have no congenial feelings with the people, but a perfect 
indifference for, and contempt of them ; they will consist of 
those harpies of power that prey upon the very vitals, that 
riot on the miseries of the community. But we will suppose, 
although in all probability it may never be realized in fact, 
that our deputies in Congress have the welfare of their con- 
stituents at heart, and will exert themselves in their behalf, 
what security could even this afford ? what relief could they 
extend to their oppressed constitutents ? To attain this, the 
majority of the deputies of the twelve other States in Congress 
must be alike well disposed ; must alike forego the sweets of 
power, and relinquish the pursuits of ambition, which, from 
the nature of things, is not to be expected. If the people 
part with a responsible representation in the legislature, 
founded upon fair, certain and frequent elections, they have 
nothing left they can call their own. Miserable is the lot of 
that people whose every concern depends on the will and 
pleasure of their rulers. Our soldiers will become Janissaries, 
and our officers of government Bashaws ; in short, the system 
of despotism will soon be completed. 

From the foregoing investigation, it appears that the Con- 
gress under this constitution will not possess the confidence 
of the people, which is an essential requisite in a good gov- 
ernment; for unless the laws command the confidence and 
respect of the great body of the people, so as to induce them 
to support them when called on by the civil magistrate, they 
must be executed by the aid of a numerous standing army, 
which would be inconsistent with every idea of liberty; for 
the same force that may be employed to compel obedience to 
good laws, might and probably would be used to wrest from 


480 After the Convention Rose. 

the people tlieir constitutional liberties. The framers of this 
constitution appear to have been aware of this great defic- 
iency— to have been sensible that no dependence could be 
placed on the people for their support: but on the contrary, 
that the government must be executed by force. They have 
therefore made a provision for this purpose in a permanent 
standing army and a militia that may be objected to as strict 
discipline and government. 

A standing army in the hands of a government placed so 
independent of the people, may be made a fatal instrument to 
overturn the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce 
the collection of the most oppressive taxes, and to carry into 
execution the most arbitrary measures. An ambitious man 
who may have the army at his devotion, may step up into 
the throne, and seize upon absolute power. 

The absolute unqualified command that Congress have 
over the militia may be made instrumental to the destruction 
of all liberty, both public and private; whether of a personal,, 
civil or religious nature. 

First, the personal liberty of every man, probably from six- 
teen to sixty years of age, may be destroyed by the power 
Congress have in organizing and governing of the militia. 
As militia they may be subjected to fines to any amount, 
levied in a military manner; they may be subjected to cor- 
poral punishments of the most disgraceful and humiliating 
kind; and to death itself, by the sentence of a court martial. 
To this our young men will be more immediately subjected, 
as a select militia, composed of them, will best answer the 
purposes of government. 

Secondly, the rights of conscience may be violated, as 
there is no exemption of those persons who are conscienti- 
ously scrupulous of bearing arras. These compose a respect- 
able proportion of the community in the State. This is the 
more remarkable, because even when the distresses of the late 
war, and the evident disaffection of many citizens of that 
description, inflamed our passions, and when every person 
who was obliged to risk his own life, must have been exas- 
perated against such as on any account kept back from the 


Reasons of Dissent of the Minority. 481 

common danger, yet even then, when outrage and violence 
might have been expected, the rights of conscience were held 
sacred. 

At this momentous crisis, the framers of our State Consti- 
tution made the most express and decided declaration and 
stipulations in favor of the rights of conscience; but now, 
when no necessity exists, those dearest rights of men are left 
insecure. 

Thirdly, the absolute command of Congress over the mil- 
itia may be destructive of public liberty; for under the 
guidance of an arbitrary government, they may be made the 
unwilling instruments of tyranny. The militia of Pennsyl- 
vania may be marched to New England or Virginia to quell 
an insurrection occasioned by the most galling oppression, 
and aided by the standing army, they will no doubt be suc- 
cessful in subduing their liberty and independency; but in so 
doing, although the magnanimity of their minds will be 
extinguished, yet the meaner passions of resentment and 
revenge will be increased, and these in turn will be the ready 
and obedient instruments of despotism to enslave the others; 
and that with an irritated vengeance. Thus may the militia 
be made the instruments of crushing the last efforts of ex- 
piring liberty, of riveting the chains of despotism on their 
fellow-citizens, and on one another. This power can be 
exercised not only without violating the Constitution, but in 
strict conformity with it; it is calculated for this express pur- 
pose, and will doubtless be executed accordingly. 

As this government will not enjoy the confidence of the 
people, but be executed by force, it will be a very expensive 
and burthensome government. The standing army must be 
numerous, and as a further support, it will be the policy of 
this government to multiply ofiicers in every department; 
judges, collectors, tax-gatherers, excisemen and the whole 
host of revenue officers, will swarm over the land, devouring 
the hard earnings of the industrious — like the locusts of old, 
impoverishing and desolating all before them. 

We have not noticed the smaller, nor many of the consid- 
erable blemishes, but have confined our objections to the 
31 


483 


After the Convention Rose. 


great and essential defects, the main pillars of the constitu- 
tion ; which we have shown to be inconsistent with the lib- 
erty and happiness of the people, as its establishment will 
annihilate the State governments, and produce one consoli- 
dated government that will eventually and speedily issue in 
the supremacy of despotism. 

In this investigation we have not confined our views to the 
interests or welfare of this State, in preference to the others. 
We have overlooked all local circumstances — we have consid- 
ered this subject on the broad scale of the general good; we 
have asserted the cause of the present and future ages — the 
cause of liberty and mankind. 


Nathaniel Breading, 
John Smilie, 
Richard Bard, 
Adam Orth, 
John A. Hannah, 
John Whitehill, 
John Harris, 
Robert Whitehill, 
John Reynolds, 
Jonathan Hoge, 


John lyudwig, 
Abraham I/incoln, 
John Bishop, 
Joseph Hiester, 
Joseph Powell, 
James Martin, 
William Findley, 
John Baird, 
James Edgar, 
William Todd. 


Nicholas L,utz,



# The Letters of Centinel (1787-1788)

CHAPTER VII. 

Centinei<, No. I.* 

Mr. Oswald: As the Independent Gazetteer seems free for 
the discussion of all public matters^ I expect you will give the 
following a place in your next. 

To the Freemen of Pennsylvania. Friends., Country- 
men and Fellow Citizens. 

Permit one of yourselves to put you in mind of certain 
liberties and privileges secured to you by the constitution of 
this commonwealth, and to beg your serious attention to his 
uninterested opinion upon the plan of federal government 
submitted to your consideration, before you surrender these 
great and valuable privileges up forever. Your present 
frame of government secures to you a right to hold your- 
selves, houses, papers and possessions free from search and 
seizure, and therefore warrants granted without oaths or 
affirmations first made, affording sufl&cient foundations for 
them, whereby any ofl&cer or messenger may be commanded or 
required to search your houses or seize your persons or prop- 
erty not particularly described in such warrant, shall not be 
granted. Your constitution further provides ' ' that in con- 
troversies respecting property, and in suits between man and 
man, the parties have a right to trial by jury., which ought to 
be held sacred. ' ' It also provides and declares, ' ' that the 
people have a right o/" FREEDOM OF SPEECH, and of writing 
and PUBLISHING their sentiments., therefore THE FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS OUGHT NOT TO BE RESTRAINED." The con- 
stitution of Pennsylvania is yet in existence, as yet you have 
the right to freedom of speech., and of publishing your senti- 
ments. How long those rights will appertain to you, you 
yourselves are called upon to say; whether your houses shall 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom." 
Oct. 5, 1787. 

(565) 


^66 Letters of Centinel. No. I. 

continue to be your castles, whether your papers, yo\xx per- 
sons and your property, are to be held sacred and free from 
general warrants, you are now to determine. Whether the 
trial by jury is to continue as your birth-right, the freemen 
of Pennsylvania, nay, of all America, are now called upon to 
declare. 

Without presuming upon my own judgment, I cannot 
think it an unwarrantable presumption to offer my private 
opinion, and call upon others for theirs; and if I use my pen 
with the boldness of a freeman, it is because I know that the 
liberty of the press yet rejnains unviolated and jziries yet are 
judges. 

The late Convention have submitted to your consideration 
a plan of a new federal government. The subject is highly 
interesting to your future welfare. Whether it be calculated 
to promote the great ends of civil society, viz. , the happiness 
and prosperity of the community, it behoves you well to con- 
sider, uninfluenced by the authority of names. Instead of 
that frenzy of enthusiasm, that has actuated the citizens of 
Philadelphia, in their approbation of the proposed plan, be- 
fore it was possible that it could be the result of a rational 
investigation into its principles, it ought to be dispassion- 
ately and deliberately examined on its own intrinsic merit, 
the only criterion of your patronage. If ever free and un- 
biased discussion was proper or necessary, it is on such an 
occasion. All the blessings of liberty and the dearest privi- 
leges of freemen are now at stake and dependent on your pres- 
ent conduct. Those who are competent to the task of devel- 
oping the principles of government, ought to be encouraged 
to come forward, and thereby the better enable the people to 
make a proper judgment; for the science of government is so 
abstruse, that few are able to judge for themselves. Without 
such assistance the people are too apt to yield an implicit as- 
sent to the opinions of those characters whose abilities are 
held in the highest esteem, and to those in whose integrity 
and patriotism they can confide; not considering that the love 
of domination is generally in proportion to talents, abilities 
and superior requirements, and that the men of the greatest 


ELEAZER OSWALD, 
Lieut, ColoiLel of the R,evolutioJiaryWeir. 
Nat. 1755-^ air,l795. 


J'hfm airint iit, i/i» coUec^n. of C.RffiiiithuntA£s^ 


Letters of Centinel. No. I. 567 

purity of intention may be made instruments of despotism in 
the hands of the artful and designing. If it were not for the 
stability and attachment which time and habit gives to forms 
of government, it would be in the power of the enlightened 
and aspiring few, if they should combine, at any time to de- 
stroy the best establishments, and even make the people the 
instruments of their own subjugation. 

The late revolution having effaced in a great measure all 
former habits, and the present institutions are so recent, that 
there exists not that great reluctance to innovation, so re- 
markable in old communities, and which accords with rea- 
son, for the most comprehensive mind cannot foresee the full 
operation of material changes on civil polity ; it is the genius 
of the common law to resist innovation. 

The wealthy and ambitious, who in every community 
think they have a right to lord it over their fellow creatures, 
have availed themselves very successfully of this favorable 
disposition ; for the people thus unsettled in their sentiments, 
have been prepared to accede to any extreme of government. 
All the distresses and difi5culties they experience, proceeding 
from various causes, have been ascribed to the impotency of 
of the present confederation, and thence they have been led 
to expect full relief from the adoption of the proposed system 
of government; and in the other event, immediately ruin 
and annihilation as a nation. These characters flatter them- 
selves that they have lulled all distrust and jealousy of their 
new plan, by gaining the concurrence of the two men in 
whom America has the highest confidence, and now triumph- 
antly exult in the completion oftheir long meditated schemes 
of power and aggrandizement. I would be very far from in- 
sinuating that the two illustrious personages alluded to, 
have not the welfare of their country at heart; but that the 
unsuspecting goodness and zeal of the one has been imposed 
on, in a subject of which he must be necessarily inexperienced, 
from his other arduous engagements; and that the weakness 
and indecision attendant on old age, has been practiced on in 
the other. 

I am fearful that the principles of government inculcated 


568 Letters of Chitinel. No. I. 

in Mr. Adams' treatise, and enforced in the numerous essays 
and paragraphs in the newspapers, have misled some well 
designing members of the late Convention. But it will ap- 
pear in the sequel, that the construction of the proposed plan 
of government is infinitely more extravagant. 

I have been anxiously expecting that some enlightened 
patriot would, ere this, have taken up the pen to expose the 
futility, and counteract the baneful tendency of such princi- 
ples. Mr. Adams' sine qua nan of a good government is 
three balancing powers; whose repelling qualities are to pro- 
duce an equilibrium of interests, and thereby promote the 
happiness of the whole community. He asserts that the ad- 
ministrators of every government, will ever be actuated by 
views of private interest and ambition, to the prejudice of 
the public good ; that therefore the only effectual method to 
secure the rights of the people and promote their welfare, is 
to create an opposition of interests between the members of 
two distinct bodies, in the exercise of the powers of go\'- 
ernment, and balanced by those of a third. This hypothesis 
supposes human wisdom competent to the task of instituting 
three co-equal orders in government, and a corresponding 
weight in the community to enable them respectively to exer- 
cise their several parts, and whose views and interests should 
be so distinct as to prevent a coalition of any two of them for 
the destruction of the third. Mr. Adams, although he has 
traced the constitution of every form of government that ever 
existed, as far as history affords materials, has not been able 
to adduce a single instance of such a government; he indeed 
says that the British constitution is such in theory, but this 
is rather a confirmation that his principles are chimerical and 
not to be reduced to practice. If such an organization of 
power were practicable, how long would it continue? Not a 
day — for there is so great a disparity in the talents, wisdom 
and industry of mankind, that the scale would presently pre- 
ponderate to one or the other body, and with every accession 
of power the means of further increase would be greatly ex- 
tended. The state of society in England is much more 
favorable to such a scheme of government than that of 


Letters of Centinel. No. I. 569 

America. There they have a powerful hereditary nobility, 
and real distinctions of rank and interests; but even there, 
for want of that perfect equality of power and distinction of 
interests in the three orders of government, they exist but in 
name; the only operative and efficient check upon the con- 
duct of administration, is the sense of the people at large. 

Suppose a government could be formed and supported on 
such principles, would it answer the great purposes of civil 
society ? If the administrators of every government are ac- 
tuated by views of private interest and ambition, how is the 
welfare and happiness of the community to be the result of 
such jarring adverse interests? 

Therefore, as different orders in government will not pro- 
duce the good of the whole, we must recur to other princi- 
ples. I believe it will be found that the form of government, 
which holds those entrusted with power in the greatest re- 
sponsibility to their constituents, the best calculated for free- 
men. A republican, or free government, can only exist 
where the body of the people are virtuous, and where pro- 
perty is pretty equally divided. In such a government the 
people are the sovereign and their sense or opinion is the 
criterion of every public measure ; for when this ceases to be 
the case, the nature of the government is changed, and an 
aristocracy, monarchy or despotism will rise on its ruin. The 
highest responsibility is to be attained in a simple structure 
of government, for the great body of the people never steadily 
attend to the operations of government, and for want of due 
information are liable to be imposed on. If you complicate 
the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed and 
divided in their sentiment about the source of abuses or mis- 
conduct; some will impute it to the senate, others to the 
house of representatives, and so on, that the interposition ot 
the people may be rendered imperfect or perhaps wholly abor- 
tive. But if, imitating the constitution of Pennsylvania, you 
vest all the legislative power in one body of men (separating 
the executive and judicial) elected for a short period, and 
necessarily excluded by rotation from permanency, and 
o-uarded from precipitancy and surprise by delays imposed 


570 Letters of Centinel. No. I. 

on its proceedings, you will create the most perfect responsi- 
bility ; for then, whenever the people feel a grievance, they 
cannot mistake the authors, and will apply the remedy with 
certainty and effect, discarding them at the next election. 
This tie of responsibility will obviate all the dangers appre- 
hended from a single legislatuire, and will the best secure the 
rights of the people. 

Having premised this much, I shall now proceed to the 
examination of the proposed plan of government, and I trust, 
shall make it appear to the meanest capacity, that it has 
none of the essential requisites of a free government; that it is 
neither founded on those balancing restraining powers, re- 
commended by Mr. Adams and attempted in the British con- 
stitution, or possessed of that responsibility to its constitu- 
ents, which, in my opinion, is the only effectual security for 
the liberties and happiness of the people; but on the con- 
trary, that itvis a most daring attempt to establish a despotic 
aristocracy among freemen, that the world has ever wit- 
nessed. 

I shall previously consider the extent of the powers in- 
tended to be vested in Congress, before I examine the con- 
struction of the general government. 

It will not be controverted that the legislative is the high- 
est delegated power in government, and that all others are 
subordinate to it.. The celebrated Montesquieu establishes it 
as a maxim, that legislation necessarily follows the power of 
taxation. By sect. 8, of the first article of the proposed plan 
of government, "the Congress are to have power to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts 
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of 
the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises, shall 
be uniform throughout the United States. ' ' Now what can 
be more comprehensive than these words? Not content by 
other sections of this plan, to grant all the great executive 
powers of a confederation, and a standing army in Time of 
PEACE, that grand engine of oppression, and moreover the 
absolute control over the commerce of the United States and 
all external objects of revenue, such as unlimited imposts 


Letters of Centinel. No. I. 571 

upon imports, etc. , they are to be vested with every species 
of internal taxation ; whatever taxes, duties and excises that 
they njay deem requisite for the general welfare^ may be im- 
posed on the citizens of these states, levied by the officers of 
Congress, distributed through every district in America; and 
the collection would be enforced by the standing army, how- 
ever grievous or improper they may be. The Congress may 
construe every purpose for which the State legislatures now 
lay taxes, to be for the general welfare^ and thereby seize 
upon every object of revenue. 

The judicial power by Article 3d sect, ist shall extend to 
all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, 
the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which 
shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting 
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party, to controversies be- 
tween two or more States, between a State and citizens of 
another State, between citizens of different States, between 
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, citizens or subjects. 

The judicial power to be vested in one Supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish. 

The objects of jurisdiction recited above are so numerous, 
and the shades of distinction between civil causes are often- 
times so slight, that it is more than probable that the State 
judicatories would be wholly superseded; for in contests 
about jurisdiction, the federal court, as the most powerful, 
would ever prevail. Every person acquainted with the his- 
tory of the courts in England, knows by what ingenious 
sophisms they have, at different periods, extended the sphere 
of their jurisdiction over objects out of the line of their in- 
stitution, and contrary to their very nature; courts of a crim- 
inal jurisdiction obtaining cognizance in civil causes. 

To put the omnipotency of Congress over the State gov- 
ernment and judicatories out of all doubt, the 6th article 


572 Letters of Centinel. No. I. 

ordains that ' ' this constitution and the laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all 
treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land^ and 
the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything 
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not- 
withstanding." 

By these sections the all-prevailing power of taxation, and 
such extensive legislative and judicial powers are vested in 
the general government, as must in their operation neces- 
sarily absorb the State legislatures and judicatories; and that 
such was in the contemplation of the framers of it, will ap- 
pear from the provision made for such event, in another part 
of it (but that, fearful of alarming the people by so great an 
innovation, they have suffered the forms of the separate gov- 
ernments to remain, as a blind). By Article ist sect. 
4th, "the times, places and manner of holding elections 
for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any 
time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the 
place of choosing senators.'''' The plain construction of which 
is, that when the State legislatures drop out of sight, from 
the necessary operation of this government, then Congress 
are to provide for the election and appointment of representa- 
tives and senators. 

If the foregoing be a just comment, if the United States 
are to be melted down into one empire, it becomes you to 
consider whether such a government, however constructed, 
would be eligible in so extended a territory ; and whether it 
would be practicable, consistent with freedom? It is the 
opinion of the greatest writers, that a very extensive country 
cannot be governed on democratical principles, on any other 
plan than a confederation of a number of small republics, 
possessing all the powers of internal government, but united 
in the management of their foreign and general concerns. 

It would not be difficult to prove, that anything short of 
despotism could not biud so great a country under one gov- 
ernment; and that whatever plan you might, at the first set- 
ting out, establish, it would issue in a depotism. 


Letters of Ceniine I. No. I. 573 

If one general government could be instituted and main- 
tained on principles of freedom, it would not be so competent 
to attend to the various local concerns and wants, of every 
particular district, as well as the peculiar governments, who 
are nearer the scene, and possessed of superior means of in- 
formation; besides, if the business of the whole union is to be 
managed by one government, there would not be time. Do 
we not already see, that the inhabitants in a number of larger 
States, who are remote from the seat of government, are 
loudly complaining of the inconveniences and disadvantages 
they are subjected to on this account, and that, to enjoy the 
comforts of local government, they are separating into 
smaller divisions ? 

Having taken a review of the powers, I shall now examine 
the construction of the proposed general government. 

Article ist, sect. ist. "All legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, 
which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. ' ' 
By another section, the President (the principal executive 
officer) has a conditional control over their proceedings. 

Sect. 2d. ' ' The house of representatives shall be composed 
of members chosen every second year, by the people of the 
several States. The number of representatives shall not ex- 
ceed one for every 30,000 inhabitants." 

The senate, the other constituent branch of the legislature, 
is formed by the legislature of each State appointing two 
senators, for the term of six years. 

The executive power by Article 2d, sect, ist, is to be vested 
in a President of the United States of America, elected for 
four years: Sec. 2 gives him "power, by and with the consent 
of the senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the sena- 
tors present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with 
the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, 
other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme 
Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose ap- 
pointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by law, etc. And by another section he 
has the absolute power of granting reprieves and pardons for 


574 Letters of Centinel. No. I. 

treason and all other high crimes and misdemeanors, except 
in case of impeachment. 

The foregoing are the outlines of the plan. 

Thus we see, the house of representatives are on the part 
of the people to balance the senate, who I suppose will be 
composed of the better sort, the well born, etc. The number 
of the representatives (being only one for every 30,cxx) inhab- 
itants) appears to be too few, either to communicate the requi- 
site information of the wants, local circumstances and senti- 
ments of so extensive an empire, or to prevent corruption and 
undue influence, in the exercise of such great powers; the 
term for which they are to be chosen, too long to preserve a 
due dependence and accountability to their constituents; and 
the mode and places of their election not sufficiently ascer- 
tained, for as Congress have the control over both, they may 
govern the choice, by ordering the representatives of a whole 
State, to be elected in one place, and that too may be the 
most inconvenient. 

The senate, the great efficient body in this plan of govern- 
ment, is constituted on the most unequal principles. The 
smallest State in the Union has equal weight with the great 
States of Virginia, Massachusetts or Pennsylvania. The 
senate, besides its legislative functions, has a very considera- 
ble share in the executive; none of the principal appointments 
to office can be made without its advice and consent. The 
term and mode of its appointment will lead to permanency ; 
the members are chosen for six years, the mode is under the 
control of Congress, and as there is no exclusion by rotation, 
they may be continued for life, which, from their extensive 
means of influence, would follow of course. The President, 
who would be a mere pageant of State, unless he coincides 
with the views of the senate, would either become the head 
of the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion; besides, 
their influence being the most predominant, could the best 
secure his re-election to office. And from his power of grant- 
ing pardons, he might screen from punishment the most 
treasonable attempts on the liberties of the people, when in- 
stigated by the senate. 


Letters of Centinel. No. I. 575 

From this investigation into the organization of this gov- 
ernment, it appears that it is devoid of all responsibility or 
accountability to the great body of the people, and that so 
far from being a regular balanced government, it would be in 
practice a permanent aristocracy. 

The framers of it, actuated by the true spirit of such a 
government, which ever abominates and suppresses all free 
inquiry and discussion, have made no provision for the lib- 
erty of the press, that granA palladium of freedom, and scourge 
of tyrants; but observed a total silence on that head. It is 
the opinion of some great writers, that if the liberty of the 
press, by an institution of religion or otherwise, could be 
rendered sacred, even in Turkey, that despotism would fly 
before it. And it is worthy of remark that there is no declar- 
ation of personal rights, premised in most free constitutions; 
and that trial hy jury in civil cases is taken away; for what 
other construction can be put on the following, viz : Article 3d, 
sect. 2d, "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be 
party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. 
In all the other cases above mentioned, the Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and factP'' 
It would be a novelty in jurisprudence, as well as evidently 
improper, to allow an appeal from the verdict of a jury, on 
the matter of fact; therefore it implies and allows of a dis- 
mission of the jury in civil cases, and especially when it is 
considered, that jury trial in criminal cases is expressly stip- 
ulated for, but not in civil cases. 

But our situation is represented to be so critically dreadful, 
that, however reprehensible and exceptionable the proposed 
plan of government may be, there is no alternative between 
the adoption of it and absolute ruin. My fellow citizens, 
things are not at that crisis; it is the argument of tyrants; the 
present distracted state of Europe secures us from injury on 
that quarter, and as to domestic dissensions, we have not so 
much to fear from them, as to precipitate us into this form of 
government, without it is a safe and a proper one. For re- 
member, oi z\\ possible ^vWs,, that of despotism is the worst and 
the-most to be dreaded. 


576 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

Besides, it cannot be supposed that the first essay on so 
difficult a subject, is so well digested as it ought to be; if 
the proposed plan, after a mature deliberation, should meet 
the approbation of the respective States, the matter will end ; 
but if it should be found to be fraught with dangers and in- 
conveniences, a future general Convention, being in possession 
of the objections, will be the better enabled to plan a suitable 
government. 

" Who's here so base, that woui,d a bondman be? 
If any, speak; for him have i offended. 
Who's herb so vii,e, that wii,i, not i,ove his country? 
If any, speak ; for him have i offended . " 

CENTINEL. 

Centinei,, No. II.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends.^ Countrymen^ 
and Fellow Citizens. 

As long as the liberty of the press continues unviolated, 
and the people have the right of expressing and publishing 
their sentiments upon every public measure, it is next to im- 
possible to enslave a free nation. The state of society must 
be very corrupt and base indeed, when the people, in posses- 
sion of such a monitor as the press, can be induced to ex- 
change the heaven-born blessings of liberty for the galling 
chains of despotism. Men of an aspiring and tyrannical dis- 
position, sensible of this truth, have ever been inimical to 
the press, and have considered the shackling of it as the 
first step towards the accomplishment of their hateful domi- 
nation, and the entire suppression of all liberty of public 
discussion, as necessary to its support. For even a standing 
army, that grand engine of oppression, if it were as numerous 
as the abilities of any nation could maintain, would not be 
equal to the purposes of despotism over an enlightened people. 

The abolition of that grand palladium of freedom, the 
liberty of the press, in the proposed plan of government, and 
the conduct of its authors and patrons, is a striking exempli- 
fication of these observations. The reason assigned for the 

*From the Freeman' s Journal, Oct., 24, 1787. 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. cjj 

omission of a bill of rights, securing the liberty of the press, 
and other invaluable personal rights, is an insult on the un- 
derstanding of the people. 

The injunction of secrecy imposed on the members of the 
late Convention during their deliberations, was obviously 
dictated by the genius of Aristocracy; it was deemed impo- 
litic to unfold the principles of the intended government to 
the people, as this would have frustrated the object in view. 

The projectors of the new plan, supposed that an ex parte 
discussion of the subject, was more likely to obtain unani- 
mity in the Convention ; which would give it such a sanction 
in the public opinion, as to banish all distrust, and lead the 
people into an implicit adoption of it without examination. 

The greatest minds are forcibly impressed by the immedi- 
ate circumstances with which they are connected; the parti- 
cular sphere men move in, the prevailing sentiments of those 
they converse with, have an insensible and irresistible influ- 
ence on the wisest and best of mankind; so that when we 
consider the abilities, talents, ingenuity and consummate ad- 
dress of a number of the members of the late Convention, 
whose principles are despotic, can we be surprised that men 
of the best intentions have been misled in the difficult science 
of government? Is it derogating from the character of the 
illustrious and highly revered Washington, to suppose him 
fallible on a subject that must be in a great measure novel to 
him? As a patriotic hero, he stands unequalled in the an- 
nals of time. 

The new plan was accordingly ushered to the public with 
such a splendor of names, as inspired the most unlimited 
confidence; the people were disposed to receive upon trust, 
without any examination on their part, what would have 
proved either a blessing or a curse to them and their posterity. 
What astonishing infatuation ! to stake their happiness on 
the wisdom and integrity of any set of men! In matters of 
infinitely smaller concern, the dictates of prudence are not 
disregarded! The celebrated Montesquieu, in his Spirit of 
Laws, says, that "slavery is ever preceded by sleep." And 
again, in his account of the rise and fall of the Roman Em- 
37 


578 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

pire, page 97, ' ' That it may be advanced as a general rule, 
that in a free State, whenever a perfect calm is visible, the 
spirit of liberty no longer subsists. ' ' And Mr. Dickinson., in 
his Farmer's I/Ctters, No. XI., lays it down as a maxim, that 
"A perpetual jealousy respecting liberty is absolutely requi- 
site in all free States. ' ' 

' ' Happy are the men, and happy the people, who grow 
wise by the misfortunes of others. Earnestly, my dear 
countrymen, do I beseech the author of all good gifts, that 
you may grow wise in this manner, and I beg leave to re- 
commend to you in general, as the best method of obtaining 
this wisdom, diligently to study the histories of other coun- 
tries. You will there find all the arts, that can possibly be 
practised by cunning rulers, or false patriots among your- 
selves, so fully delineated, that changing names, the account 
would serve for your own times." 

A few citizens of Philadelphia (too few, for the honor of 
human nature) who had the wisdom to think consideration 
ought to precede approbation., and the fortitude to avow that 
they would take time to judge for themselves on so moment- 
ous an occasion, were stigmatized as enemies to their country; 
as monsters, whose existence ought not to be suffered, and 
the destruction of them and their houses recommended, as 
meritorious. The authors of the new plan, conscious that it 
would not stand the test of enlightened patriotism, tyranni- 
cally endeavored to preclude all investigation. If their views 
were laudable, if they were honest, the contrary would have 
been their conduct, they would have invited the freest dis- 
cussion. Whatever specious reasons may be assigned for 
secrecy during the framing of the plan, no good one can exist 
for leading the people blindfolded into the implicit adoption 
of it. Such an attempt does not augur the public good — it 
carries on the face of it an intention to juggle the people out 
of their liberties. 

The virtuous and spirited exertions of a few patriots have 
at length roused the people from their fatal infatuation to a 
due sense of the importance of the measure before them. The 
glare and fascination of names is rapidly abating, and the 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. 579 

subject begins to be canvassed on its own merits; and so ser- 
ious and general has been the impression of the objection 
urged against the new plan, on the minds of the people, that 
its advocates, finding mere declamation and scurrility will no 
longer avail, are reluctantly driven to defend it on the ground 
of argument. Mr. Wilson, one of the deputies of this State 
in the late Convention, has found it necessary to come for- 
ward. * From so able a lawyer, and so profound a politician, 
what might not be expected, if this act of Convention be the 
heavenly dispensation which some represent it? Its divinity 
would certainly be illustrated by one of the principal instru- 
ments of the Revelation; for this gentleman has that trans- 
cendent merit! But if, on the other hand, this able advo- 
cate has failed to vindicate it from the objections of its 
adversaries, must we not consider it as the production of 
frail and interested men. 

Mr. Wilson has recourse to the most flimsy sophistry in 
his attempt to refute the charge that the new plan of general 
government will supersede and render powerless the state 
governments. His quibble upon the term Corporation, as 
sometimes equivalent to communities which possess sover- 
eignty, is unworthy of him. The same comparison in the 
case of the British parliament assuming to tax the colonies, 
is made in the Xth of the Farmer's I,etters, and was not 
misunderstood in 1768 by any. He says that the existence 
of the proposed federal plan depends on the existence of the 
State governments, as the senators are to be appointed by the 
several legislatures, who are also to nominate the electors 
who choose the President of the United States; and that hence 
all fears of the several States being melted down into one 
empire, are groundless and imaginary. But who is so dull 
as not to comprehend, that the semblance and forms of an 
ancient establishment may remain, after the reality is 
gone. Augustus, by the aid of a great army, assumed des- 
potic power, and notwithstanding this, we find even under 
Tiberius, Caligula and Nero, princes who disgraced human 
nature by their excesses, the shadows of the ancient consti- 

* See speech of James Wilson, Oct. 6, 1787.— Editor. 


580 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

tution held up to amuse the people. The senate sat as 
formerly; consuls, tribunes of the people, censors and other 
officers were annually chosen as before, and the forms of re- 
publican government continued. Yet all this was in appear- 
ance only. — Every senatus consultum was dictated by him or 
his ministers, and every Roman found himself constrained to 
submit in all things to the despot. 

Mr. Wilson asks, "What control can proceed from the 
federal government to shackle or destroy that sacred palla- 
dium of natural freedom, the liberty of the press f"" What! 
Cannot Congress, when possessed of the immense authority 
proposed to be devolved, restrain the printers, and put them 
under regulation? Recollect that the omnipotence of the 
federal legislature over the State establishments, is recognized 
by a special article, viz., — "that this Constitution, and the 
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law 
of the land ; and the judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any thing in the Constitutions or laws of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding." After such a declaration, 
what security do the Constitutions of the several States 
afford for the liberty of the press and other invaluable personal 
rights^ not provided for by the new plan? Does not this 
sweeping clause subject everything to the control of Con- 
gress? 

In the plan of Confederation of 1778, now existing, it was 
thought proper by Article the 2d, to declare that "each 
State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and 
every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this 
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in 
Congress assembled. ' ' Positive grant was not then thought 
sufficiently descriptive and restraining upon Congress, and 
the omission of such a declaration now., when such great de- 
volutions of power are proposed, manifests the design of re- 
ducing the several States to shadows. But Mr. Wilson tells 
you, that every right and power not specially granted to Con- 
gress is considered as withheld. How does this appear ? Is 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. 581 

this principle established by the proper authority? Has the 
Convention made such astipulation? By no means. Quite 
the reverse; the laws of Congress are to be "the supreme 
law of the land, any thing in the Constitutions or laws of 
any State to the contrary notwithstanding;" and conse- 
quently, -WQ\A^\t^ paramount to all State authorities. The 
lust of power is so universal, that a speculative unascertained 
rule of constmiction would be a _^oor security for the liberties 
of the people. 

Such a body as the intended Congress, unless particularly 
inhibited and restrained, must grasp at omnipotence, and be- 
fore long swallow up the legislative, the executive, and the 
judicial powers of the several States. 

In addition to the respectable authorities quoted in my first 
number, to show that the right of taxation includes all the 
powers of government, I beg leave to adduce the Farmer's 
Letters, see particularly letter gth, in which Mr. Dickinson 
has clearly proved, that if the British Parliament assumed 
the power of taxing the colonies, internally^ as well as extern- 
ally^ and it should be submitted to, the several colony legis- 
latures would soon become contemptible, and before long fall 
into disuse. Nothing, says he, would be left for them to do, 
higher than to frame by-laws for empounding of cattle or the 
yoking of hogs. 

By the proposed plan, there are divers cases of judicial au- 
thority to be given to the courts of the United States, besides 
the two mentioned by Mr. Wilson. In maritime causes about 
property, jury trial has not been usual ; but in suits in equity^ 
with all due deference to Mr. Wilson's professional abilities, 
(which he calls to his aid) jury trial, as to facts, is in full ex- 
ercise. Will this jurisperitus say that if the question in equity 
should be, did John Doe make a will, that the chancellor of 
England would decide upon it ? He well knows that in this 
case, there being no mode of jury trial before the chancellor, 
the question would be referred to the court of king's bench 
for discussion according to the common law, and when the 
judge in equity should receive the verdict, the fact so estab- 
lished could never be re-examined or controverted. Mari- 


r82 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

time causes and those appertaining to a court of equity, are, 
however, but two of the many and extensive subjects of fed- 
eral cognizance mentioned in the plan. This jurisdiction will 
embrace all suits arising under' the laws of impost, excise and 
other revenue of the United States. In England if goods be 
seized, if a ship be prosecuted for non-compliance with, or 
breach of the laws of the customs, or those for regulating 
trade, in the courts of exchequer, the claimant is secured of 
the transcedent privilege of Englishmen, trial by a jury of 
his peers. Why not in the United States of America? This 
jurisdiction also goes to all cases under the laws of the United 
States, that is to say, under all statutes and ordinances of 
Congress. How far this may extend, it is easy to forsee; for 
upon the decay of the state powers of legislation, in conse- 
quence of the loss of Wi^ purse-strings^ it will be found neces- 
sary for the federal legislature to make laws upon every 
subject of legislation. Hence the state courts of justice, like 
the barony and hundred courts of England, will be eclipsed 
and gradually fall into disuse. 

The jurisdiction of the federal court goes, likewise, to the 
laws to be created by treaties, made by the President and 
Senate (a species of legislation) with other nations; "to all 
cases affecting foreign ministers and consuls; to controver- 
sies wherein the United States shall be a party; to contro- 
versies between citizens of different states," as when an in- 
habitant of New York has a demand on an inhabitant of New 
fersey. This last is a very invidious jurisdiction, implying 
an improper distrust of the impartiality and justice of the 
tribunals of the states. It will include all legal debates be- 
tween foreigners in Britain, or elsewhere, and the people of 
this country. A reason hath been assigned for it, viz: "That 
large tracts of land, in neighboring states, are claimed under 
royal or other grants, disputed by the states where the 
lands lie, so that justice cannot be expected from the state 
tribunals." Suppose it were proper indeed to provide for 
such cases, why include all cases, and for all time to come? 
Demands as to land for 21 years would have satisfied this. 
A London merchant shall come to America, and sue for his 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. 1583 

supposed debt, and the citizen of this country shall be de- 
prived of jury trial, and subjected to an appeal (tho' nothing 
but the fact is disputed) to a court 500 or 1000 miles from 
home; when if this American has a claim upon an inhabitant 
of England, his adversary is secursd of the privilege of jury 
trial. This jurisdiction goes also to controversies between 
any state and its citizens; which, though probably not in- 
tended, may hereafter be set up as a ground to divest the 
states, severally, of the trial of criminals; inasmuch as every 
charge of felony or misdemeanor, is a controversy between 
the state and a citizen of the same: that is to say, the state is 
plaintiff and the party accused is defendant in the prose- 
cution. In all doubts about jurisprudence, as was observed 
before, the paramount courts of Congress will decide, and the 
judges of the state, being sub graviore lege, under the para- 
mount law, must acquiesce. 

Mr. Wilson says that it would have been impracticable to 
have made a general rule for jury trial in the civil cases as- 
signed to the federal judiciary, because of the want of uni- 
formity in the mode of jury trial, as practiced by the several 
states. This objection proves too much, and therefore 
amounts to nothing. If it precludes the mode of common 
law in civil cases, it certainly does in criminal. Yet in these 
we are told "the oppression of government is effectually 
barred by declaring that in all criminal cases trial by jury 
shall be preserved. ' ' Astonishing that provision could not be 
made for a jury in civil controversies of twelve men, whose 
verdict should be unanimous, to be taken from, the vicinage; a 
precaution which is omitted as to trial of crimes, which may 
be anywhere in the State within which they have been com- 
mitted. So that an inhabitant of Kentucky may be tried for 
treason at Richmond. 

The abolition of jury trial in civil cases, is the more con- 
siderable, as at length the courts of Congress will supersede 
the state courts, when such mode of trial will fall into disuse 
among the people of the United States. 

The northern nations of the European continent have all 
lost this invaluable privilege: Sweden, the last of them, by 


584 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

the artifices of the aristocratic senate, which depressed the 
king and reduced the house of commons to insignificance. 
But the nation a few years ago, preferring the absolute 
authority of a monarch to the vexatious domination of the 
well-born few, an end was suddenly put to their power. 

"The policy of this right of juries, (says Judge Blackstone) 
to decide upon fact^ is founded on this: That if the power of 
judging were entirely trusted with the magistrates, or any 
select body of men, named by the executive authority, their 
decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, would have 
a bias towards those of their own rank and dignity ; for it is 
not to be expected, that the few should be attentive to the 
rights of the many. This therefore preserves in the hands of 
the people, that share which they ought to have in the admin- 
istration of justice, and prevents the encroachments of the 
more powerful and wealthy citizens." 

The attempt of governor Colden, of New York, before the 
Revolution, tore-examine theyac^j and re-consider the dama- 
ges, in the case of Forsey against Cunningham, produced 
about the year 1764 a flame of patriotic and successful opposi- 
tion, that will not be easily forgotten. 

To manage the various and extensive judicial authority, 
proposed to be vested in Congress, there will be one or more 
inferior courts immediately requisite in each State; and laws 
and regulations must be forthwith provided to direct the judges 
— here is a wide door for inconvenience to enter. Contracts 
made under the acts of the States respectively, will come be- 
fore courts acting under new laws and new modes of pro- 
ceedings, not thought of when they were entered into. An 
inhabitant of Pennsylvania residing at Pittsburgh, finds the 
goods of his debtor, who resides in Virginia, within the 
reach of his attachment; but no writ can be had to authorize 
the marshal, sheriff, or other ofiicer of Congress, to seize the 
property, about to be removed, nearer than 200 miles: sup- 
pose that at Carlisle, for instance, such a writ may be had, 
meanwhile the object escapes. Or if an inferior court, 
whose judges have ample salaries, be established in every 
county, would not the expense be enormous? Every reader 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. 585 

can extend in his imagination, the instarifces of difficulty 
which would proceed from this needless interference with the 
judicial rights of the separate States, and which as much as 
any other circumstance in the new plan, implies that the 
dissolution of their forms of government is designed. 

Mr. Wilson skips very lightly over the danger apprehended 
from the standing army allowed by the new plan. This 
grand machine of power and oppression, may be made a fatal 
instrument to overturn the public liberties, especially as the 
funds to support the troops may be granted for two years, 
whereas in Britain, the grants ever since the revolution in 
1688, have been from year to year. A standing army with 
regular provision of pay and contingencies, would afford a 
strong temptation to some ambitious man to step up into the 
throne, and to seize absolute power. The keeping on foot 
a hired military force in time ofpeace^ ought not to be gone 
into, unless two-thirds of the members of the federal legisla- 
ture agree to the necessity of the measure, and adjust the 
numbers employed. Surely Mr. Wilson is not serious when 
he adduces the instance of the troops now stationed on the 
Ohio, as a proof of the propriety of a standing army. They 
are a mere occasional armament for the purpose of restraining 
divers hostile tribes of savages. It is contended that under 
the present confederation, Congress possess the power of rais- 
ing armies at pleasure; but the opportunity which the States 
severally have of withholding the supplies necessary to keep 
these armies on foot, is a sufficient check on the present 
Congress. 

Mr. Wilson asserts, that never was charge made with less 
reason, that that which predicts the institution of a baneful 
aristocracy in the federal Senate. In my first number, I 
stated that this body would be a very unequal representation 
of the several States, that the members being appointed for 
the long term of six years, and there being no exclusion by 
rotation, they might be continued for life, which would fol- 
low of course from their extensive means of influence, and 
that possessing a considerable share in the executive as well 
as legislative^ it would become a permanent aristocracy^ and 
swallow up the other orders in the government. 


586 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

That these fears are not imaginary, a knowledge of the 
history of other nations, where the powers of government 
have been injudiciously placed, will fully demonstrate. Mr. 
Wilson says, "the senate branches into two characters; the 
one legislative and the other executive. In its legislative char- 
acter it can effect no purpose, without the co-operation of the 
house of representatives, and in its executive character it can 
accomplish no object without the concurrence of the presi- 
dent. Thus fettered, I do not know any act which the senate 
can of itself perform, and such dependence necessarily pre- 
cludes every idea of influence and superiority." This I con- 
fess is very specious, but experience demonstrates that checks 
in government, unless accompanied with adequate power and 
independently placed, prove merely nominal^ and will be in- 
operative. Is it probable, that the President of the United 
States, limited as he is in power, and dependent on the will 
of the senate, in appointments to ofHce, will either have the 
firmness or inclination to exercise his prerogative of a condi- 
tional control upon the proceedings of that body, however in- 
jurious they may be to the public welfare? It will be his in- 
terest to coincide with the views of the senate, and thus be- 
come the head of the aristocratic junto. The king of England 
is a constitutent part in the legislature, but although an he- 
reditary monarch, in possession of the whole executive power, 
including the unrestrained appointment to offices, and an im- 
mense revenue, enjoys but in name the prerogative of a nega- 
tive upon the parliament. Even the king of England, cir- 
cumstanced as he is, has not dared to exercise it for near a cen- 
tury past. The check of the house of representatives upon 
the senate will likewise be rendered nugatory for want of due 
weight in the democratic branch, and from their constitution 
they may become so independent of the people as to be indif- 
ferent of its interests: nay, as Congress would have the con- 
trol over the mode and place of their election, by ordering 
the representatives of a whole state to be elected at one place, 
and that too the most inconvenient^ the ruling powers may 
govern the choice^ and thus the house of representatives may 
be composed of the. creatures of the senate. Still the setn- 
blance of checks may remain, but without operation. 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. 587 

Tliis mixture of the legislative and executive moreover 
highly tends to corruption. The chief improvement in 
government, in modern times, has been the complete separ- 
ation of the great distinctions of power; placing the legislative 
in different hands from those which hold the executive; and 
again severing the judicial part from the ordinary admin- 
istrative. "When the legislative and executive powers (says 
Montesquieu) are united in the same person, or in the same 
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty." 

Mr. Wilson confesses himself not satisfied with the organ- 
ization of the federal senate, and apologizes for it, by alleg- 
ing a sort of compromise. It is well known that some mem- 
bers of convention, apprized of the mischiefs of such a com- 
pound of authority, proposed to assign the supreme executive 
powers to the president and a small council, made personally 
responsible for every appointment to office, or other act, by 
having their opinions recorded; and that without the concur- 
rence of the majority of the quorum of this council, the pres- 
ident should not be capable of taking any step. Such a 
check upon the chief magistrate would admirably secure the 
power of pardoning, now proposed to be exercised by the 
president alone, from abuse. For as it is placed he may 
shelter the traitors whom he himself or his coadjutors in the 
senate have excited to plot against the liberties of the nation. 

The delegation of the power of taxation to Congress, as far 
as duties on imported commodities, has not been objected to. 
But to extend this to excises, and every species of internal 
taxation, would necessarily require so many ordinances of 
Congress, affecting the body of the people, as would perpetu- 
ally interfere with the State laws and personal concerns of 
the people. This alone would directly tend to annihilate the 
particular governments; for the people fatigued with the 
operation of two masters would be apt to rid themselves of 
the weaker. But we are cautioned against being alarmed 
with imaginary evils, for Mr. Wilson has predicted that the 
great revenue of the United States will be raised by impost. 
Is there any ground for this ? Will the impost supply the 
sums necessary to pay the interest and principal of the foreign 


588 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

loan, to defray the great additional expense of the new con- 
stitution ; for the policy of the new government will lead it 
to institute numerous and lucrative civil offices, to extend its 
influence and provide for the swarms of expectants (the 
people having in fact no control upon its disbursements), and 
to afford pay and support for the proposed standing army, 
that darling and long-wished for object of the well-born of 
America; and which, if we may judge from the principles of 
the intended government, will be no trifling establishment, 
for cantonments of troops in every district of America will 
be necessary to compel the submission of the people to the 
arbitary dictates of the ruling powers? I say, will the impost 
be adequate? By no means. To answer these there must be 
excises and other indirect duties imposed, and as land taxes 
will operate too equally to be agreeable to the wealthy aris- 
tocracy in the senate who will be possessed of the government, 
poll taxes will be substituted, as provided for in the new plan; 
for the doctrine then will be that slaves ought to pay for 
wearing their heads. 

As the taxes necessary for these purposes will drain your 
pockets of every penny, what is to become of that virtuous 
and meritorious class of citizens, the public creditors? How- 
ever well disposed the people of the United States may be to 
do them justice, it would not be in their power; and, after 
waiting year after year, without prospect of the payment of 
the interest or principal of the debt, they will be constrained 
to sacrifice their certificates in the purchase of waste lands in 
the far distant wilds of the western territory. 

From the foregoing illustration of the powers proposed to 
be devolved to Congress, it is evident that the general 
government would necessarily annihilate the particular gov- 
ernments, and that the security of the personal rights of the 
people by the state constitutions is superseded and destroyed ; 
hence results the necessity of such security being provided 
for by a bill of rights to be inserted in the new plan of federal 
government. What excuse can we then make for the omis- 
sion of this grand palladium, this barrier between liberty and 
oppression? For universal experience demonstrates the 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. 589 

necessity of the most express declarations and restrictions, to 
protect the rights and liberties of mankind from the, silent, 
powerful and ever-active conspiracy of those who govern. 

The new plan, it is true, does propose to secure the people 
of the benefit of personal liberty by the habeas corpus^ and 
trial by jury for all crimes, except in case of impeachment: 
but there is no declaration, that all men have a natural and 
unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the 
dictates of their own consciences and understanding; and 
that no man ought, or of right can be compelled to attend 
any religious worship, or erect or support any place of wor- 
ship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against his 
own free will and consent; and that no authority can or 
ought to be vested in, or assumed by any power whatever, 
that shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner con- 
trol, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious 
worship: that the trial by jury in civil causes as well as 
criminal, and the modes perscribed by the common law for 
safety of life in criminal prosecutions, shall be held sacred; 
that the requiring of excessive bail, imposing of excessive 
fines and cruel and unusual punishments be forbidden; that 
monoplies in trade or arts, other than to authors of books or 
inventors of useful arts for a reasonable time, ought not to 
be suffered; that the right of the people to assemble peace- 
ably for the purpose of consulting about public matters, and 
petitioning or remonstrating to the federal legislature, ought 
not to be prevented; that the liberty of the press be held 
sacred; that the people have a right to hold themselves, 
their houses, papers and possessions free from search or 
seizure ; and that therefore warrants without oaths or affir- 
mations first made affording a sufiicient foundation for them, 
and whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded or 
required to search suspected places, or to seize any person or 
his property, not particularly described, are contrary to that 
right and ought not to be granted; and that standing armies 
in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be 
permitted but when absolutely necessary; all which is 
omitted to be done in the proposed government. 


590 Letters of Centinel. No. II. 

But Mr. Wilson says, the new plan does not arrogate per- 
fection, for it provides a mode of alteration and correction, if 
found necessary. This is one among the numerous deceptions 
attempted on this occasion. True, there is a mode prescribed 
for this purpose. But it is barely possible that amendments 
may be made. The fascination of power must first cease, the 
nature of mankind undergo a revolution, that is hot to be ex- 
pected on this side of eternity. For to eflfect this (Art. 6) it 
is provided, that if two-thirds of both houses of the federal 
legislature shall propose them, or when two thirds of the 
several States by their legislatures shall apply for them, the 
federal assembly shall call a convention for proposing amend- 
ments, which when ratified by three-fourths of the State 
legislatures, or conventions, as Congress shall see best, shall 
control and alter the proposed confederation. Does history 
abound with examples of a voluntary relinquishment of 
power, however injurious to the community? No; it would 
require a general and successful rising of the people to effect 
anything of this nature. The provision therefore is mere 
sound. 

The opposition to the new plan (says Mr. Wilson) proceeds 
from interested men, vis.^ the ofiicers of the state govern- 
ments. He had before denied that the proposed transfer of 
powers to Congress would annihilate the state governments. 
But he here laj's aside the masque, and avows the fact. For, 
the truth of the charge against them must entirely rest on 
such consequence of the new plan. For if the state estab- 
lishments are to remain unimpaired, why should officers 
peculiarly connected with them, be interested to oppose, the 
adoption of the new plan? Except the collector of the im- 
post, judge of the admiralty, and the collectors of excise, 
(none of whom have been reckoned of the opposition) they 
would otherwise have nothing to apprehend. But the charge 
is unworthy and may with more propriety be retorted on the 
expectants of office and emolument under the intended 
government. 

The opposition is not so partial and interested as Mr. 
Wilson asserts. It consists of a respectable yeomanry 


Letters of Centinel. No. II. ^gi 

throughout the union, of characters far removed above the 
reach of his unsupported assertions. It comprises many 
worthy members of the late convention, and a majority of 
the present Congress, for a motion made in that honorable 
body, for their approbation and recommendation of the new 
plan, was after two days' animated discussion, prudently 
withdrawn by its advocates, and a simple transmission* of 
the plan to the several states could only be obtained; yet 
this has been palmed upon the people as the approbation of 
Congress; and to strengthen the deception, the bells of the 
city of Philadelphia were rung for a whole day. 

Are Mr. TV- w, and many of his coadjutors in the late 

C n, the disinterested patriots they would have us be- 
lieve? Is their conduct any recommendation of their plan of 
government? View them the foremost and loudest on the 
floor of Congress, in our assembly, at town meetings, in 
sounding its eulogiums: — view them preventing investi- 
gation and discussion, and in the most despotic manner en- 
deavoring to compel its adoption by the people, with such 
precipitancy as to preclude the possibility of a due consider- 
ation, and then say whether the motives of these men can be 
pure. 

My fellow citizens, such false detestable patriots in every 
nation, have led their blind confiding country, shouting their 
applauses, into the jaws of despotism and ruin. May the 
wisdom and virtue of the people of America save them from 
the usual fate of nations. Centinel. 

* Upon the last motion being made, those who had strenuously and suc- 
cessfully opposed Congress giving any countenance of approbation or rec- 
ommendation to this system of oppression, said: "We have no objection to 
transmit the new plan of government to the several states, that they may 
have an opportunity of judging for themselves on so momentous a subject. ' ' 
Whereupon it was unanimously agreed to, in the following words, viz : 
Congress having received the report of the Convention latety assembled in 
Philadelphia, resolved unanimously, that the said report, with the resolutions 
and letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the several legislatures, 
in order to be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each state 
by the people thereof, in conformity to the resolves of the Convention, made 
and provided in that case." 


592 Letters of Centinel. No. III. 

Cbntinei, No. III. * 
To the People of Pennsylvania. 

John 3d, verse 20th. — "For every one that doeth evil, hateth the light, 
neither Cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved." But " there 
is nothing covered that shall not be revealed ; neithlr hid that shall not be 
known. Therefore whatever ye have spoken in darkness, shall be keard in 
the light : and that which ye have spoken in the ear in closets, shall be pro- 
claimed on the housetops." — St. Luke, chap, xii, 2d and 3d verses. 

Friends, Countrymen.^ and Fellow Citizens I 

The formation of a good government is the greatest effort 
of human wisdom, actuated by disinterested patriotism; but 
such is the cursed nature of ambition, so prevalent among 
men, that it would sacrifice everything to its selfish gratifica- 
tion ; hence the fairest opportunities of advancing the happi- 
ness of humanity, are so far from being properly improved, 
that they are too often converted by the votaries of power and 
domination, into the means of obtaining their nefarious ends. 
It will be the misfortune of America of adding to the number 
of examples of this kind, if the proposed plan of government 
should be adopted; but I trust, short as the time allowed you 
for consideration is, you will be so fully convinced of the 
truth of this, as to escape the impending danger; it is only 
necessary to strip the monster of its assumed garb, and to ex- 
hibit it in its native colours, to excite the universal abhor- 
rence and rejection of every virtuous and patriotic mind. 

For the sake of my dear country, for the honor of human 
nature, I hope and am persuaded that the good sense of the 
people will enable them to rise superior to the most formida- 
ble conspiracy against the liberties of a free and enlightened 
nation, that the world has ever witnessed. How glorious 
would be the triumph! How it would immortalize the pres- 
ent generation in the annals of freedom! 

The establishment of a government, is a subject of such 
momentous and lasting concern, that it should not be gone 
into without the clearest conviction of its propriety, which 
can only be the result of the fullest discussion, the most 

*Froia "The Independent Gazetteer, or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Nov. 8, 1787. 


Letters of Centinel. No. III. 593 

thorough investigation and dispassionate consideration of its 
nature, principles and construction. You are now called 
upon to make this decision, which involves in it not only 
your fate, but that of your posterity for ages to come. Your 
determination will either ensiire the possession of those bless- 
ings which render life desirable, or entail those evils which 
make existence a curse : that such are the consequences of a 
wise or improper organization of government, the history of 
mankind abundantly testifies. If you viewed the magnitude 
of the object in its true light, you would join with me in 
sentiment, that the new government ought not to be implic- 
itly admitted. Consider then duly before you leap, for after 
the Rubicon is once passed, there will be no retreat. 

If you were even well assured that the utmost purity of in- 
tention predominated in the production of the proposed gov- 
ernment, such is the imperfection of human reason and 
knowledge, that it would not be wise in you to adopt it with 
precipitation in toto, for all former experience must teach 
you the propriety of a revision on such occasions, to correct 
the erro'rs, and supply the deficiencies that may appear nec- 
essary. In every government whose object is the public wel- 
fare, the laws are siibjected to repeated revisions, in some by 
different orders in the governments, in others by an appeal to 
the judgment of the people and deliberative forms of proce- 
dure. A knowledge of this, as well as of other states, will 
show that in every instance where a law has been passed 
without the usual precautions, it has been productive of great 
inconvenience and evils, and frequently has not answered the 
end in view, a supplement becoming necessary to supply its 
deficiencies. 

What then are we to think of the motives and designs of 
those men who are urging the implicit and immediate adop- 
tion of the proposed government; are they fearful, that if you 
exercise your good sense and discernment, you will discover 
the masqued aristocracy, that they are attempting to smuggle 
upon you under the suspicious garb of republicanism? When 
we find that the principal agents in this business are the very 
men who fabricated the form of government, it certainly 
38 


594 Letters of Centinel. No. III. 

ought to be conclusive evidence of their invidious design to 
deprive us of our liberties. The circumstances attending this 
matter, are such as should in a peculiar manner excite your 
suspicion; it might not be useless to take a review of some of 
them. 

In many of the states, particularly in this and the northern 
states, there are aristocratic juntos of the well-born few^ who 
had been zealously endeavoring since the establishment of 
their constitutions, to humble that offensive upstart, equal 
liberty ; but all their efforts were unavailing, the ill-bred 
churl obstinately kept his assumed station. 

However, that which could not be accomplished in the 
several states, is now attempting through the medium of the 
future Congress. Experience having shown great defects in 
the present confederation, particularly in the regulation of 
commerce and maritime afiFairs; it became the universal wish 
of America to grant further powers, so as to make the federal 
government adequate to the ends of its institution. The 
anxiety on this head was greatly increased, from the impover- 
ishment and distress occasioned by the excessive importations 
of foreign merchandise and luxuries and consequent drain of 
specie, since the peace: thus the people were in the disposi- 
tion of a drowning man; eager to catch at anything that 
promised relief, however delusory. Such an opportunity for 
the acquisition of undue power has never been viewed with 
indifference by the ambitious and designing in any age or 
nation, and it has accordingly been too successfully improved 
by such men among us. The deputies from this state (with 
the exception of two) and most of those from the other states 
in the union, were unfortunately of this complexion, and 
many of them of such superior endowments, that in an ex parte 
disussion of the subject by specious glosses, they have gained 
the concurrence of some well disposed men, in whom their 
country has great confidence, which has given a great sanc- 
tion to their scheme of power. 

A comparison of the authority under which the convention 
acted, and their form of government, will show that they 
have despised their delegated power, and assumed sove- 


Letters of Centinel. No. III. 595 

reignty ; that they have entirely annihilated the old confedera- 
tion, and the particular governments of the several States, 
and instead thereof have established one general government 
that is to pervade the union; constituted on the most un- 
equal principles, destitute of accountability to its constituents, 
and as despotic in its nature, as the Venetian aristocracy; a 
government that will give full scope to the magnificent 
designs of the well-born^ a government where tyranny may 
glut its vengeance on the low-born.^ unchecked by an odious 
bill of rights .1 as has been fully illustrated in my two preced- 
ing numbers; and yet as a blind upon the understandings of 
the people, they have continued the forms of the particular 
governments, and termed the whole a confederation of the 
United States, pursuant to the sentiments of that profound, 
but corrupt politician Machiavel, who advises any one who 
would change the constitution of a State to keep as much as 
possible to the old forms; for then the people seeing the 
same ofl&cers, the same formalities, courts of justice and other 
outward appearances, are insensible of the alteration, and be- 
lieve themselves in possession of their old government. 
Thus Caesar, when he seized the Roman liberties, caused 
himself to be chosen dictator (which was an ancient office) 
continued the senate, the consuls, the tribunes, the censors, 
and all other offices and forms of the commonwealth; and 
yet changed Rome from the most free, to the most tyrannical 
government in the world. 

The convention, after vesting all the great and efficient 
powers of sovereignty in the general government, insidiously 
declare by section 4th of article 4th, ' ' that the United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this union, a republican 
yorw of government;" but of what avail will be the y^rw, 
without the reality of freedom ? 

The late convention, in the majesty of its assumed omnipo- 
tence, have not even condescended to submit the plan of the 
new government to the confederation of the people, the true 
source of authority; but have called upon them by their sev- 
eral constitutions, to 'assent to and ratify'* in to to, what 

* See resolution of Convention accompanying the instrument of the pro- 
posed government. 


rgS Letters of Centinel. No. III. 

they have been pleased to decree; just as the grand monarque 
of France requires the parliament of Paris to register his 
edicts without revision or alteration, which is necessary pre- 
vious to their execution. 

The authors and advocates of the new plan, conscious that 
its establishment can only be obtained from the ignorance of 
the people of its true nature, and their unbounded confidence 
in some of the men concurring, have hurried on its adoption 
with a precipitation that betrays their design ; before many 
had seen the new plan, and before any had time to examine 
it, they by their ready minions, attended by some well-dis- 
posed but mistaken persons, obtained the subscriptions of the 
people to papers expressing their entire approbation of, and 
their wish to have it established ; thus precluding them from 
any consideration; but lest the people should discover the 
juggle, the elections of the State conventions are urged on 
at very early days: the proposition of electing the convention 
for this State in nine days after the date of the resolution for 
all counties east of Bedford, and supported by three or four 
of the deputies of the convention, and who were also mem- 
bers of the then assembly, is one of the most extravagant in- 
stances of this kind; and even this was only prevented by 
the secession of nineteen virtuous and enlightened members. * 

*The message of the President and Council, sent into tie present General 
Assembly on tlie 27tli of October last, discloses another imposition. The 
Board sent to the House the official transmission of the proposed constitu- 
tion of the United States, inclosed in a letter from the President of Congress, 
which proves that the paper produced to the last House on the day before 
the final rising of the same, was a surreptitious copy of the vote of Congress, 
obtained for the purpose of deluding the Legislature into the extravagance 
of directing an election of Convention within nine days. 

The provision made by the Convention of Pennsylvania, which sat in 1776 
for amending the constitution, is guarded with admirable wisdom and cau- 
tion. A Council of Censors is to be holden every seven years, which shall 
have power (two-thirds of the whole number elected agreeing) to propose 
amendments of the same government, and to call a Convention to adopt and 
establish these propositions; but the alterations must be " promulgated a^ 
least six months before the day appointed for the election of such Conven- 
tion, for the previous consideration of the people, that they may have an 
opportunity of instructing their delegates on the subject." The present 
measures explain the conduct of a certain party of the Censors, who sat in 


Letters of Centinel. No. III. 557 

In order to put the matter beyond all recall, they have 
proceeded a step further; they have made the deputies nom- 
inated for the state convention for this city and elsewhere, 
pledge their sacred honor, previous to their election, that 
they would implicitly adopt the proposed government in 
toto. Thus, short as the period is before the final fiat is to be 
given, consideration is rendered nugatory, and conviction of 
its dangers or impropriety unavailable. A good cause does 
not stand in need of such means; it scorns all indirect ad- 
vantages and borrowed helps, and trusts alone to its own 
native merit and intrinsic strength: the lion is never known 
to make use of cunning, nor can a good cause suffer by a free 
and thorough examination — it is knavery that seeks disguise. 
Actors do not care that any one should look into the tiring 
room, nor jugglers or sharpers into their hands or boxes. 

Every exertion has been made to suppress discussion by 
shackling the press; but as this could not be effected in this 
state, the people were warned not to listen to the adversaries 
of the proposed plan, lest they should impose upon them, and 
thereby prevent the adoption of this blessed government. 
What figure would a lawyer make in a court of justice, if he 
should desire the judges not to hear the counsel of the other 
side, lest they should perplex the cause and mislead the court? 
Would not every bystander take it for granted, that he was 
conscious of the weakness of his client's cause, and that it 
could not otherwise be defended than by not being under- 
stood? 

All who are friends to liberty are friends to reason, the 
champions of liberty; and none are foes to liberty but those 
who have truth and reason for their foes. He who has dark 
purposes to serve, must use dark means: light would discover 
him, and reason expose him: he must endeavor to shut out 
both, and make them look frightful by giving them ill 
names. 1 

Liberty only flourishes where reason and knowledge are 

1784 (much fewer tlian two-thirds of the whole), that proposed to abolish 
the 47th article of the constitution, whereby the manner of amending the 
same was regulated. 


598 Letters of Centinel. No. III. 

encouraged: and whenever the latter are stifled, the former 
is extinguished. In Turkey printing is forbid, enquiry is 
dangerous, and free speaking is capital ; because they are all 
inconsistent with the nature of the government. Hence it is 
that the Turks are all stupidly ignorant and are all slaves. 

I shall now proceed in the consideration of the construction 
of the proposed plan of government. By section 4th of article 
1st of the proposed government it is declared, "that the 
times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators 
and representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the 
legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law 
make or alter such regulations except as to the place of choos- 
ing senators. ' ' Will not this section put it in the power of 
the future Congress to abolish the suffrage by ballot, so indis- 
pensable in a free government? Montesquieu in his Spirit of 
Laws, vol. I, page 12, says "that in a democracy there can be 
no exercise of sovereignty, but by the suffrages of the people, 
which are their will; now the sovereign's will is the sovereign 
himself. The laws therefore which establish the right of 
suffrage, are fundamental to this government. In fact it is 
as important to regulate in a republic, in what manner, by 
whom, and concerning what, suffrages are to be given, as it 
is in a monarchy to know who is the Prince and after what 
manner he ought to govern." This valuable privilege of 
voting by ballot ought not to rest on the discretion of the 
government, but be irrevocably established in the constitu- 
tion. 

Will not the above quoted section also authorize the future 
Congress to lengthen the terms for which the senators and 
representatives are to be elected, from 6 and 2 years respec- 
tively, to any period, even for life ? — as the parliament of 
England voted themselves from triennial to septinnial; and 
as the long parlia-ment under Charles the ist became per- 
petual ? 

Section 8th of article ist, vests Congress with power "to 
provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for 


Letters of Centinel. No. III. ^gg 

governing such part of them as may be employed in the ser- 
vice of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, 
the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training 
the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con- 
gress." This section will subject the citizens of these States 
to the most arbitary military discipline: even death may be 
inflicted on the disobedient; in the character of militia, you 
may be dragged from your families and homes to any part of 
the continent and for any length of time, at the discretion of 
the future Congress; and as militia you may be made the 
unwilling instruments of oppression, under the direction of 
government; there is no exemption upon account of consci- 
entious scruples of bearing arms, no equivalent to be re- 
ceived in lieu of personal services. The militia of Pennsyl- 
vania may be marched to Georgia or New Hampshire, how- 
ever incompatible with their interests or consciences ; in short, 
they may be made as mere machines as Prussian soldiers. 

Section the 9th begins thus: — "The migration or impor- 
tation of such persons as any of the states, now existing, shall 
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress, 
prior to the year 1808, but a duty or tax may be imposed on 
such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person. ' ' 
And by the fifth article this restraint is not to be removed by 
any future convention. We are told that the objects of this 
article are slaves, and that it is inserted to secure to the 
southern states the right of introducing negroes for twenty- 
one years to come, against the declared sense of the other 
states to put an end to an odious traffic in the human species, 
which is especially scandalous and inconsistent in a people, 
who have asserted their own liberty by the sword, and which 
dangerously enfeebles the districts wherein the laborers are 
bondsmen. The words, dark and ambiguous, such as no 
plain man of common sense would have used, are evidently 
chosen to conceal from Europe, that in this enlightened 
country, the practice of slavery has its advocates among men 
in the highest stations. When it is recollected that no poll 
tax can be imposed on five negroes, above what three whites 
shall be charged; when it is considered, that the imposts on 


6oo Letters of Centinel. No. III. 

the consumption of Carolina field negroes must be trifling, 
and the excise nothing, it is plain that the proportion of con- 
tributions, which can be expected from the southern states 
under the new constitution, will be unequal, and yet they are 
to be allowed to enfeeble themselves by the further impor- 
tation of negroes till the year 1808. Has not the concurrence 
of the five southern states (in the convention) to the new 
system, been purchased too dearly by the rest, who have 
undertaken to make good their deficiences of revenue, oc- 
casioned by their wilful incapacity, without an equivalent? 

The general acquiescence of one description of citizens in 
the proposed government, surprises me much; if so many of 
the Quakers have become indifferent to the sacred rights of 
conscience, so amply secured by the constitution of this com- 
monwealth ; if they are satisfied to rest this inestimable priv- 
ilege on the discretion of the future government; yet in a 
political light they are not acting wisely: in the state of 
Pennsylvania, they form so considerable a portion of the 
community, as must ensure them great weight in the govern- 
ment; but in the scale of general empire, they will be lost in 
the balance. 

I intended in this number to have shown from the nature 
of things, from the opinions of the greatest writers and from 
the peculiar circumstances of the United States, the imprac- 
ticability of establishing and maintaining one government on 
the principles of freedom in so extensive a territory; to have 
shown, if practicable, the inadequacy of such government 
to provide for its many and various concerns ; and also to have 
shown that a confederation of small republics, possessing all 
the powers of internal government, and united in the man- 
agement of their general and foreign concerns, is the only 
system of government by which so extensive a country can 
be governed consistent with freedom: but a writer under the 
signature of Brutus, in the New York paper, which has been 
re-published by Messrs. Dunlap and Claypoole, has done this 
in so masterly a manner, that it would be superfluous in me 
to add anything on this subject. 

My fellow citizens, as a lover of my country, as the friend 


Letters of Centinel. No. IV. 6oi 

to mankind, whilst it is yet safe to write, and whilst it is yet 
in your power to avoid it, I warn you of the impending dan- 
ger. To this remote quarter of the world has liberty fled. 
Other countries now subject to slavery, were once as free as 
we yet are; therefore for your own sakes, for the sake of your 
posterity, as well as for that of the oppressed of all nations, 
cherish this remaining asylum of liberty. 

Philadelphia, November 5th, 1787.. 


Centinei.. 


Centinei< No. IV.* 


To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends^ Countrymen 
and Fellow Citizens^ 

That the present confederation is inadequate to the objects 
of the union, seems to be universally allowed. The only 
question is, what additional powers are wanting to give due 
energy to the federal government ? We should, however, be 
careful, in forming our opinion on this subject, not to impute 
the temporary and extraordinary difficulties that have hitherto 
impeded the execution of the confederation, to defects in the 
system itself Taxation is in every government a very deli- 
cate and difficult subject; hence it has been the policy of all 
wise statesmen, as far as circumstances permitted, to lead the 
people by small beginnings and almost imperceptible degrees, 
into the habits of taxation; where the contrary conduct has 
been pursued, it has ever failed of full success, not unfre- 
quently proving the ruin of the projectors. The imposing of 
a burdensome tax at once on a people, without the usual 
gradations, is the severest test that any government can be 
put to; despotism itself has often proved unequal to the at- 
tempt. Under this conviction, let us take a review of our 
situation before and since the revolution. From the first set- 
tlement of this country until the commencement of the late 
war, the taxes were so light and trivial as to be scarcely felt 
by the people ; when we engaged in the expensive contest with 
Great Britain, the Congress, sensible of the difficulty of levy- 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom." 
Nov. 30, 1787. 


6o2 Letters of Centinel. No. IV. 

iiig the moneys necessary to its support, by direct taxation, 
had resource to an anticipation of the public resources, by 
emitting bills of credit, and thus postponed the necessity of 
taxation for several years; this means was pursued to a most 
ruinous length; but about the year 80 or 8i, it was wholly 
exhausted, the bills of credit had suffered such a depreciation, 
from the excessive quantities in circulation, that they ceased 
to be useful as a medium. The country at this period was 
very much impoverished and exhausted ; commerce had been 
suspended for near six years; the husbandman, for want of a 
market, limited his crops to his own subsistence; the frequent 
calls of the militia and long continuance in actual service, 
the devastations of the enemy, the subsistence of our own 
armies, the evils of the depreciation of the paper money, 
which fell chiefly upon the patriotic and virtuous part of the 
community, had all concurred to produce great distress 
throughout America. In this situation of affairs, we still had 
the same powerful enemy to contend with, who had even 
more numerous and better appointed armies in the field than 
at any former time. Our allies were applied to in this exi- 
gence, but the pecuniary assistance that we could procure 
from them was soon exhausted; the only resource now re- 
maining was to obtain by direct taxation, the moneys neces- 
sary for our defence. The history of mankind does not furnish 
a similar instance of an attempt to levy such enormous taxes 
at once, of a people so wholly unprepared and uninured to 
them — the lamp of sacred liberty must indeed have burned 
with unsullied lustre, every sordid principle of the mind must 
have been then extinct, when the people not only submitted 
to the grievous impositions, but cheerfully exerted themselves 
to comply with the calls of their country; their abilities, how- 
ever, were not equal to furnish the necessary sums — indeed 
the requisition of the year 1782, amounted to the whole in- 
come of their farms and other property, including the means 
of their subsistence; perhaps the strained exertions of two 
years, would not have sufficed to the discharge of this requi- 
sition; how then can we impute the difficulties of the people 
to a due compliance with the requisitions of Congress, to a 


Letters of Centinel. No. IV. 603 

defect in the confederation? for any government, however 
energetic, in similar circumstances, would have experienced 
the same fate. If we review the proceedings of the States, we 
shall find that they gave every sanction and authority to the 
requisitions of Congress that their laws could confer, that 
they attempted to collect the sums called for in the same 
manner as is proposed to be done in future by the general 
government, instead of the State legislatures. 

It is a maxim that a government ought to be cautious not 
to govern over much, for when the cord of power is drawn 
too tight, it generally proves its destruction. The impractica- 
bility of complying with the requisitions of Congress has les- 
sened the sense of obligation and duty in the people, and thus 
weakened the ties of the union; the opinion of power in a 
free government is much more efficacious than the exercise of 
it; it requires the maturity of time and repeated practice to 
give due energy and certainty to the operations of govern- 
ment, especially to such as affect the purses of the people. 

The thirteen Swiss Cantons, confederated by more general 
and weaker ties than these United States are by the present 
articles of confederation, have not experienced the necessity 
of strengthening their union by vesting their general diet 
with further or greater powers; this national body, has only 
the management of their foreign concerns, and in case of a 
war can only call by requisition on the several Cantons for 
the necessary supplies, who are sovereign and independent in 
every internal and local exercise of government — and yet 
this rope of sand, as our confederation has been termed, 
which is so similar to that, has held together for ages with- 
out any apparent chasm. 

I am persuaded that a due consideration will evince, that 
the present ineflScacy of the requisitions of Congress is not 
owing to a defect in the confederation, but the peculiar cir- 
cumstances of the times. 

The wheels of the general government having been thus 
clogged, and the arrearages of taxes still accumulating, it 
may be asked what prospect is there of the government re- 
suming its proper tone, unless more compulsory powers are 


6o4 Letters of Centinel. No. IV. 

granted? To this it may be answered, that the produce of 
imposts on commerce, which all agree to vest in Congress, 
together with the immense tracts of land at their disposal, 
will rapidly lessen and eventually discharge the present in- 
cumbrances; when this takes place, the mode by requisition 
will be found perfectly adequate to the extraordinary exigen- 
cies of the union. Congress have lately sold land to the 
amount of eight millions of dollars, which is a considerable 
portion of the whole debt. 

It is to be lamented that the interested and designing have 
availed themselves so successfully of the present crisis, and 
under the specious pretence of having discovered a panacea 
for all the ills of the people, they are about establishing a 
system of government, that will prove more destructive to 
them than the wooden horse filled with soldiers did in 
ancient times to the city of Troy: this horse was introduced 
by their hostile enemy the Grecians, by a prostitution of the 
sacred rites of their religion; in like manner, my fellow 
citizens, are aspiring despots among yourselves prostituting 
the name of a Washington to cloak their designs upon your 
liberties. 

I would ask how is the proposed government to shower 
down those treasures upon every class of citizens, as is so in- 
dustriously inculcated and so fondly believed? Is it by the 
addition of numerous and expensive establishments? Is it 
by doubling our judiciaries, instituting federal courts in 
every county of every State? Is it by a superb presidential 
court ? Is it by a large standing army ? In short, is it by 
putting it in the power of the future government to levy 
money at pleasure, and placing this government so indepen- 
dent of the people as to enable the administration to gratify 
every corrupt passion of the mind, to riot on your spoils, 
without check or control? 

A transfer to Congress of the power of imposing imposts 
on commerce and the unlimited regulation of trade, I believe 
is all that is wanting to render America as prosperous as it is 
in the power of any form of government to render her; this 
properly understood would meet the views of all the honest 
and well-meaning. 


Letters of Centinel. No. IV. 605 

What gave birth to the late Continental Convention? Was 
it not the situation of our commerce, which lay at the mercy 
of every foreign power, who from motives of interest or 
enmity could restrict and control it, without risking a re- 
taliation on the part of America, as Congress was impotent 
on this subject? Such indeed was the case with respect to 
Britain, whose hostile regulations gave such a stab to our 
navigation as to threaten its annihilation: it became the in- 
terest of even the American merchant to give a preference to 
foreign bottoms; hence the distress of our seamen, ship- 
wrights, and every mechanic art dependent on navigation. 

By these regulations too we were limited in markets for 
our produce; our vessels were excluded from their West India 
Islands, many of our staple commodities were denied en- 
trance in Britain; hence the husbandmen were distressed by 
the demand for their crops being lessened and their prices re- 
duced. This is the source to which may be traced every evil 
we experience, that can be relieved by a more energetic gov- 
ernment. Recollect the language of complaint for years 
past, compare the recommendations of Congress founded on 
such complaints, pointing out the remedy, examine the rea- 
sons assigned by the different States for appointing delegates 
to the late Convention, view the powers vested in that body ; 
they all harmonize in one sentiment, that the due regulation 
of trade and navigation was the anxious wish of every class 
of citizens, was the great object of calling the Convention. 

This object being provided for by the proposed Constitu- 
tion, the people overlook and are not sensible of the needless 
sacrifice they are making for it. Of what avail will be a 
prosperous state of commerce, when the produce of it will be 
at the absolute disposal of an arbitrary and unchecked gov- 
ernment, who may levy at pleasure the most oppressive 
taxes; who may destroy every principle of freedom; and may 
even destroy the privilege of complaining. 

If you are in doubt about the nature and principles of the 
proposed government, view the conduct of its authors and 
patrons: that affords the best explanation, the most striking 
comment. 


6o6 Letters of Centinel. No. IV. 

The evil genius of darkness presided at its birth, it came 
forth under the veil of mystery, its true features being care- 
fully concealed, and every deceptive art has been and is 
practising to have this spurious brat received as the genuine 
offspring of heaven-born liberty. So fearful are its patrons 
that you should discern the imposition, that they have 
hurried on its adoption, with the greatest precipitation; they 
have endeavored also to preclude all investigation, they have 
endeavored to intimidate all opposition; by such means as 
these, have they surreptitiously procured a Convention in 
this State, favorable to their views; and here again investi- 
gation and discussion are abridged, the final question is 
moved before the subject has been under consideration, an 
appeal to the people is precluded even in the last resort, lest 
their eyes should be opened ; the Convention have denied the 
minority the privilege of entering the reasons of their dissent 
on its journals. Thus despotism is already triumphant, and 
the genius of liberty is on the eve of her exit, is about bid- 
ding an eternal adieu to this once happy people. 

After so recent a triumph over British despots, after such 
torrents of blood and treasure have been spent, after involving 
ourselves in the distresses of an arduous war, and incurring 
such a debt for the express purpose of asserting the rights of 
humanity; it is truly astonishing that a set of men among 
ourselves should have the effrontery to attempt the destruc- 
tion of our liberties. But in this enlightened age to hope to 
dupe the people by the arts they are practicing is still more 
extraordinary. 

How do the advocates of the proposed government combat 
the objections urged against it ? Not even by an attempt to 
disprove them, for that would the more fully confirm their 
truth ; but by a species of reasoning that is very congenial to 
that contempt of the understandings of the people that they 
so eminently possess, and which policy cannot even prevent 
frequent ebullitions of. They seem to think that the oratory 
and fascination of great names and mere sound will suflSce to 
ensure success ; that the people may be diverted from a con- 
sideration of the merits of the plan by bold assertions and 


Letters of Centinel. No. IV. 607 

mere declamation. Some of their writers, for instance, paint 
the distresses of every class of citizens with all the glowing' 
language of eloquence, as if this was a demonstration of the 
excellence, or even the safety of the new plan, which, not- 
withstanding the reality ot this distress, may be a system of 
tyranny and oppression. Other writers tell you of the great 
men who composed the late convention, and give you a pom- 
pous display of their virtues instead of a justification of the 
plan of government; and others again urge the tyrant's plea, 
they endeavor to make it a case of necessity, now is the crit- 
ical moment, they represent the adoption of this government 
as our only alternative, as the last opportunity we shall have 
of peaceably establishing a government; they assert it to be 
the best system that can be formed, and that if we reject it, 
we will have a worse one or none at all ; nay, that if we pre- 
sume to propose alterations, we shall get into a labyrinth of 
difficulties from which we cannot be extricated, as no two 
states will agree in amendments; that therefore it would in- 
volve us in irreconcilable discord. But they all sedulously 
avoid the fair field of argument, a rational investigation into 
the origination of the proposed government. I hope the 
good sense of the people will detect the fallacy of such con- 
duct, will discover the base juggle, and with becoming reso- 
lution resent the imposition. > 

That the powers of Congress ought to be strengthened, all 
allow: but is this a conclusive proof of the necessity to adopt 
the proposed plan ? is it a proof that because the late conven- 
tion, in the first essay upon so arduous and difficult a subject, 
harmonized in their ideas, that a future convention will not, 
or that after a full investigation and mature consideration of 
the objections, they will not plan a better government and 
one more agreeable to the sentiments of America, or is it any 
proof that they can never again agree in any plan ? The late 
convention must indeed have been inspired, as some of its 
advocates have asserted, to admit the truth of these positions, 
or even to admit the possibility of the proposed government 
being such a one as America ought to adopt; for this body 
went upon original ground, foreign from their intentions or 


6o8 Letters of Centinel. No. V. 

powers ; they must therefore have been wholly uninformed of 
the sentiments of their constituents in respect to this form of 
government, as it was not in their contemplation when the 
convention was appointed to erect a new government, but to 
strengthen the old one. Indeed, thej' seem to have been de- 
termined to monopolize the exclusive merit of the discovery, 
or rather as if darkness was essential to its success they pre- 
cluded all communication with the people, by closing their 
doors; thus the well-disposed members, unassisted by public 
information and opinion, were induced by those arts that are 
now practicing on the people, to give their sanction to this 
system of despotism. 

Is there any reason to presume that a new convention will 
not agree upon a better plan of government ? Quite the con- 
trary, for perhaps there never was such a coincidence on any 
occasion as on the present. The opponents to the proposed 
plan at the same time in every paxt of the continent, har- 
monized in the same objections; such an uniformity of opposi- 
tion is without example, and affords the strongest demonstra- 
tion of its solidity. Their objections too are not local, are 
not confined to the interests of any one particular State to the 
prejudice of the rest, but with a philanthropy and liberality 
that reflects lustre on humanity, that dignifies the character 
of America, they embrace the interests and happiness of the 
whole Union. They do not even condescend to minute blem- 
ishes, but show that the main pillars of the fabric are bad, 
that the essential principles of liberty and safety are not to be 
found in it, that despotism will be the necessary and inevita- 
ble consequence of its establishment. Centinel. 

Centinei,, No. v.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends^ Countrymen, 
and Fellow Citizens. 

Mr. Wilson in a speech delivered in our Convention on 
Saturday the 24th instant, has conceded, nay forcibly 
proved, that one consolidated government will not answer 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer, or The Chronicle of Freedom." 
Dec. 4, 1787. 


Letters of Centinel. No. V. 609 

for so extensive a territory as the United States includes, 
that slavery would be the necessary fate of the people under 
such a government. His words are so remarkable that I can- 
not forbear reciting them: they are as follows, viz., "The 
extent of country for which the new constitution was re- 
quired, produced another difficulty in the business of the 
federal convention. It is the opinion of some celebrated 
writers, that to a small territory the democratical, to a mid- 
dling territory (as Montesquieu has termed it) the monarchi- 
cal, and to an extensive territory the despotic form of govern- 
ment, is best adapted. Regarding then, the wide and 
almost unbounded jurisdiction of the United States, at first 
view, the hand of despotism seemed necessary to control, 
connect, and protect it; and hence the chief embarrassment 
rose. For, we knew that, although our constituents would 
cheerfully submit to the legislative restraints of a free gov- 
ernment, they would spurn at every attempt to shackle them 
with despotic power. ' ' See page 5* of the printed speech. 
And again in page 7,t he says "Is it probable that the disso- 
lution of the State governments, and the establishment of one 
consolidated empire, would be eligible in its nature, and sat- 
isfactory to the people in its administration ? I think not, as 
I have given reasons to show that so extensive a territory 
could not be governed, connected, and preserved, but by the 
supremacy of despotic power. All the exertions of the most 
potent emperors of Rome were not capable of keeping that 
empire together, which, in extent, was far inferior to the 
dominion of America. ' ' 

This great point having been now confirmed by the con- 
cession of Mr. Wilson, though indeed it was self-evident be- 
fore, and the writers against the proposed plan of govern- 
ment having proved to demonstration, that the powers pro- 
posed to be vested in Congress will necessarily annihilate 
and absorb the State Legislatures and judiciaries, and produce 
from their wreck one consolidated government, the question 
is determined. Every man therefore who has the welfare of 

*See page 220 of this volume. 
t Ibid. 
39 


6io Letters of Centinel. No. V. 

his countn' at heart, every man who values his own liberty 
and happiness, in short, every description of persons, except 
those aspiring despots who hope to benefit by the misery 
and vassalage of their countrymen, must now concur in re- 
jecting the proposed system of government, must now unite 
in branding its authors with the stigma of eternal infamy. 
The anniversary of this great escape from the fangs of des- 
potism ought to be celebrated as long as liberty shall con- 
tinue to be dear to the citizens of America. 

I will repeat some of my principal arguments, and add 
some further remarks on the subject of consolidation : 

The Legislature is the highest delegated power in govern- 
ment; all others are subordinate to it. The celebrated 
Montesquieu established it as a maxim, that legislation 
necessarily follows the power of taxation. By the 8th sect, 
of article the ist, of the proposed government, ' ' the Congress 
are to have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, 
and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common 
defence and general welfare of the United States." Now 
what can be more comprehensive than these words? Every 
species of taxation, whether external or internal, is included. 
Whatever taxes, duties, and excises that the Congress may 
deem necessary to the general welfare may be imposed on 
the citizens of these states, and levied by their officers. The 
Congress are to be the absolute judges of the propriety of such 
taxes; in short, they may construe every purpose for which 
the state legislatures now lay taxes, to be for the general wel- 
fare; they may seize upon every source of taxation, and thus 
make it impracticable for the states to have the smallest reve- 
nue, and if a state should presume to impose a tax or excise 
that would interfere with a federal tax or excise. Congress 
may soon terminate the contention by repealing the state law, 
by virtue of the following section: "To make all laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this consti- 
tution in the government of the United States, or in any de- 
partment thereof." Indeed, every law of the states may be 
controlled by this power. The legislative power granted for 


Letters of Ceniinel. No. V. 6ii 

these sections is so unlimited in its nature, may be so compre- 
hensive and boundless in its exercise, that this alone would be 
amply sufficient to carry the coup de grace to the state govern- 
ments, to swallow them up in the grand vortex of general 
empire. But the legislative has an able auxiliary in the judi- 
cial department, for a reference to my second number will 
show that this may be made greatly instrumental in eflfecting 
a consolidation; as the federal judiciary would absorb all 
others. I^est the foregoing powers should not suffice to con- 
solidate the United States into one empire, the Convention, as 
if determined to prevent the possibility of a doubt, as if to 
prevent all clashing by the opposition of state powers, as if to 
preclude all struggle for state importance, as if to level all 
obstacles to the supremacy of universal sway, which in so ex- 
tensive a territory would be an iron-handed despotism, have 
ordained by article the 6th, "That this constitution, and the 
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, shall be the supteme law 
of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby^ anything in the constitution or laws of any state to 
the contrary notwithstanding.'''' 

The words "pursuant to the constitution" will be no re- 
striction to the authority of Congress; for the foregoing sec- 
tions give them unlimited legislation; their unbounded power 
of taxation does alone include all others, as whoever has the 
purse-strings will have full dominion. But the convention 
has superadded another power, by which the Congress may 
stamp with the sanction of the constitution every possible 
law; it is contained in the following clause: "To make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested 
by this constitution in the government of the United States, 
or in any department or officer thereof." Whatever law 
Congress may deem necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution any of the powers vested in them may be enacted;, 
and by virtue of this clause, they may control and abrogate 
any and every of the laws of the State governments, on the 


6i3 Letters of Centinel. No. V. 

allegation that they interfere with the execution of any of 
their powers, and yet these laws will " be made in pursuance 
of the constitution," and of course will "be the supreme 
law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to 
the contrary notwithstanding." 

There is no reservation made in the whole of this plan in 
favor of the rights of the separate States. In the present plan 
of confederation, made in the year 1778, it was thought nec- 
essary by article the 2d to declare that ' ' each State retains 
its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, 
jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation 
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress as- 
sembled." Positive ^sx\X. was not then thought sufficiently 
descriptive and restrictive upon Congress, and the omission 
of such a declaration now, when such great devolutions of 
power are proposed, manifests the design of consolidating the 
States. 

What restriction does Mr. Wilson pretend there is in the 
new constitution to the supremacy of despotic sway over the 
United States ? What barrier does he assign for the security 
of the State governments ? Why truly, a mere cobweb of a 
limit! by interposing the shield of what will become mere 
form, to check the reality of power. He says, that the exis- 
tence of the State governments is essential to the organiza- 
tion of Congress, that the former is made the necessary basis 
of the latter, for the federal senators and President are to be 
appointed by the State legislatures; and that hence all fears 
of a consolidation are groundless and imaginary. It must be 
confessed as reason and argument would have been foreign to 
the defence of the proposed plan of government, Mr. Wilson 
has displayed much ingenuity on this occasion; he has in- 
volved the subject in all the mazes of sophistry, and by subtil 
distinctions, he has established principles and positions, that 
exist only in his own fertile imagination. It is a solecism in 
politics for two co-ordinate sovereignties to exist together; 
you must separate the sphere of their jurisdiction or after 
running the race of dominion for some time, one would nee- 


Letters of Centinel. No. V. 613 

essarily triumph over the other, but in the meantime the 
subject of it -would be harassed with double impositions to 
support the contention; however, the strife between Congress 
and the States could not be of long continuance, for the 
former has a decisive superiority in the outset, and has more- 
over the power by the very constitution itself to terminate it 
when expedient. 

As this necessary connection, as it has been termed, between 
the State governments and the general government, has been 
made a point of great magnitude by the advocates of the new 
plan, as it is the only obstacle alleged by them against a con- 
solidation, it ought to be well considered. It is declared by 
the proposed plan, that the federal senators and the electors 
who choose the President of the United States, shall be ap- 
pointed by the State legislatures for the long period of six 
and four years respectively; how will this connection prevent 
the State legislatures being divested of every important, every 
efficient power? may not they, will not they, dwindle into 
mere boards of appointment as has ever happened in other 
nations to public bodies, who, in similar circumstances, have 
been so weak as to part with the essentials of power? Does 
not history abound with such instances ? And this may be 
the mighty amount of this inseparable connection which is 
so much dwelt upon as the security of the State governments. 
Yet even this shadow of a limit against consolidation may be 
annihilated by the imperial fiat without any violation of even 
the forms of the constitution. Article ist, section 4th, has 
made a provision for this, when the people are sufficiently 
fatigued with the useless expense of maintaining ^^ forms 
of departed power and security, and when they shall pray to 
to be relieved from the imposition. This section cannot be 
too often repeated, as it gives such a latitude to the designing, 
as it revokes every other part of the constitution that may be 
tolerable, and as it may enable the administration under it, 
to complete the system of despotism; it is in the following 
words, viz: "The times, places and manner of holding elec- 
tions for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in 
each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 


6 14 Letters of Centinel. No. V. 

any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to 
the place of choosing senators.'''' The only apparent restric- 
tion in this clause is as to the place of appointing senators, 
but even this may be rendered of no avail, for as the Con- 
gress have the control over the time of appointment of both 
senators and representatives, they may, under the pretence 
of an apprehension of invasion, upon the pretence of the tur- 
bulence of what they may style a faction, and indeed pre- 
tences are never wanting to the designing, they may postpone 
the time of the election of the senators and the representatives 
from period to period to perpetuity; thus they may, and if 
they may, they certainly will, from the lust of dominion, so 
inherent in the mind of man, relieve the people from the 
trouble of attending elections by condescending to create 
themselves. Has not Mr. Wilson avowed it in fact? Has he 
not said in the convention that it was necessary that Congress 
should possess this power as the means of its own preservation? 
Otherwise, says he, an invasion, a civil war, a faction, or a 
secession of a minority of the assembly, might prevent the 
representation of a State in Congress. 

The advocates of the proposed government must be hard 
driven when they represent that because the legislatures of 
this and the other states have exceeded the due bounds of 
power, notwithstanding every guard provided by their con- 
stitutions; that because the lust of arbitrary sway is so power- 
ful as sometimes to get the better of every obstacle; that 
therefore we should give full scope to it, for that all restric- 
tion to it would be useless and nugatory. And further, when 
they tell you that a good administration will atone for all the 
defects in the government, which, say they, you must neces- 
sarily have, for how can it be otherwise? your rulers are to 
be taken from among yourselves. My fellow citizens, these 
aspiring despots must indeed have a great contempt for your 
understandings when they hope to gull you out of your lib- 
erties by such reasoning; for what is the primary object of 
government, but to check and control the ambitious and de- 
signing? How then can moderation and virtue be expected 
from men who will be in possession of absolute sway, who will 


Letters of Centinel. No, VI. 615 

have the United States at their disposal? They would be 
more than men, who could resist such temptation! their 
being taken from among the people would be no security; 
tyrants are of native growth in all countries, the greatest 
bashaw in Turkey has been one of the people, as Mr. Wilson 
tells you the president-general will be. What consolation 
would this be when you shall be suffering under his oppres- 
sion ? CenTinei,. 
Philadelphia, Nov. 30, 1787. 

CenTinei,, No. VI.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. 

" Man is the glory, jest, and riddle of the world." 

Pope. 

Incredible transition! the people who, seven years ago, 
deemed every earthly good, every other consideration, as 
worthless, when placed in competition with liberty, that 
heaven-born blessing, thatzestof all others; the people, who, 
actuated by this noble ardor of patriotism, rose superior to 
every weakness of humanity, and shone with such dazzling 
lustre amidst the greatest difl&culties; who, emulous of 
eclipsing each other in the glorious assertion of the dignity 
of human nature, courted every danger, and were ever ready, 
when necessary, to lay down their lives at the altar of liberty: 
I say the people, who exhibited so lately a spectacle that 
commanded the admiration, and drew the plaudits of the 
most distant nations, are now reversing the picture, are now 
lost to every noble principle, are about to sacrifice that in- 
estimable jewel, liberty, to the genius of despotism. A golden 
phantom held out to them by the crafty and aspiring despots 
among themselves, is alluring them into the fangs of arbi- 
trary power; and so great is their infatuation, that it seems 
as if nothing short of the reality of misery necessarily atten- 
dant on slavery, will rouse them from their false confidence, 
or convince them of the direful deception — but then alas! it 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Preedom," 
Dec. 26, 1787. 


6i6 Letters of Centinel. No. VI. 

will be too late, the cliains of depotism will be fast rivetted 
and all escape precluded. 

For years past, the harpies of power have been industri- 
ously inculcating the idea that all our difficulties proceed 
from the impotency of Congress, and have at length suc- 
ceeded to give to this sentiment almost universal currency 
and belief: the devastations, losses and burthens occasioned 
by the late war; the excessive importations of foreign mer- 
chandise and luxuries, which have drained the country of its 
specie and involved it in debt, are all overlooked, and the in- 
adequacy of the powers of the present confederation is 
erroneously supposed to be the only cause of our 'difficulties; 
hence persons of every description are revelling in the antici- 
pation of the halcyon days consequent on the establishment 
of the new constitution. What gross deception and fatal de- 
lusion! Although very considerable benefit might be derived 
from strengthening the hands of Congress, so as to enable 
them to regulate commerce, and counteract the adverse re- 
strictions of other nations, which would meet with the com- 
currence of all persons; yet this benefit is accompanied in the 
new constitution with the scourge of despotic power, that will 
render the citizens of America tenants at will of every species 
of property, of every enjoyment, and make them the mere 
drudges of government. The gilded bait conceals corrosives 
that will eat up their whole substance. 

Since the late able discussion, all are now sensible of great 
defects in the new constitution, are sensible that power is 
thereby granted without limitations or restriction; yet such 
is the impatience of the people to reap the golden harvest of 
regulated commerce, that they will not take time to secure 
their Liberty and happiness, nor even to secure the benefit of 
the expected wealth ; but are weakly trusting their every con- 
cern to the discretionary disposal of their future rulers: are 
content to risk every abuse of power, because they are pro- 
mised a good administration, because moderation and self- 
denial are the characteristic features of men in possession of 
absolute sway. What egregious folly! What superlative 
ignorance of the nature of power does such conduct discover! 


Letters of Centinel. No. VI. 617 

History exhibits this melancholy truth, that slavery has 
been the lot of nearly the whole of mankind in all ages, and 
that the very small portion who have enjoyed the blessings 
of liberty, have soon been reduced to the common level of 
slavery and misery. The cause of this general vassalage 
may be traced to a principle of human nature, which is more 
powerful and operative than all the others combined; it is 
that lust oi dominion that is inherent in every mind, in a 
greater or less degree; this is so universal and ever active a 
passion as to influence all our ancestors; the different situa- 
tion and qualifications of men only modifies and varies the 
complexion and operation of it. 

For this darling pre-eminence and superiority, the mer- 
chant, already possessed of a competency, adventures his all 
in the pursuit of greater wealth; it is for this that men of 
all descriptions, after having amassed fortunes, still persevere 
in the toils of labor; in short, this is the great principle of 
exertion in the votaries of riches, learning, and fame. 

In a savage state, pre-eminence is the result of bodily 
strength and intrepidity, which compels submission from all 
such as have the misfortune to be less able; therefore the 
great end of civil government is to protect the weak from the 
oppression of the powerful, to put every man upon the level 
of equal liberty; but here again the same lust of dominion by 
different means frustrates almost always this salutary inten- 
tion. In a polished state of society, wealth, talents, address 
and intrigue are the qualities that attain superiority in the 
great sphere of government. 

The most striking illustration of the prevalence of this 
lust of dominioBi is, that the most strenuous assertors of lib- 
erty in all ages, after successfully triumphing over tyranny, 
have themselves become tyrants, when the unsuspicious 
confidence of an admiring people has entrusted them with 
unchecked power. Rare are the instances of self-denial, or 
consistency of conduct in the votaries of liberty when they 
have become possessed of the reins of authority ; it has been 
the peculiar felicity of this country, that her great Deliverer 
did not prove a Cromwell nor a Monk. 


6i8 Letters of Centinel. No. VI. 

Compare the declarations of the most zealous assertors of 
religious liberty, whilst under the lash of persecution, with 
their conduct when in power; you will find that even the 
benevolence and humility inculcated in the gospels, prove no 
restraint upon this love of domination. The mutual con- 
tentions of the several sects of religion in England some 
ages since, are sufficient evidence of this truth. 

The annals of mankind demonstrate the precarious tenure 
of privileges and property dependent upon the will and 
pleasure of rulers; these illustrate the fatal danger of relying 
upon the moderation and self-denial of men exposed to the 
temptations that the Congress under the new constitution 
will be. The lust of power or dominion is of that nature as 
seeks to overcome every obstacle, and does not remit its ex- 
ertions whilst any object of conquest remains; nothing short 
of the plenitude of dominion will satisfy this cursed demon. 
Therefore, liberty is only to be preserved by a due responsi- 
bility in the government, and by the constant attention of 
the people; whenever that responsibility has been lessened 
or this attention remitted, in the same degree has arbitrary 
sway prevaled. 

The celebrated Montesquieu has warned mankind of the 
danger of an implicit reliance on rulers; he says that "a 
perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, is absolutely requisite 
in all free states," and again, "that slavery is ever preceded 
by sleep. ' ' 

I shall conclude this number with an extract from a speech 
delivered by I^ord George Digby^ afterwards Earl of Bristol^ 
in the English Parliament, on the triennial bill in the year 
1641, viz : " It hath been a maxim among the wisest legislators 
that whoever means to settle good laws must proceed in them 
with a sinister opinion of all mankind ; and suppose that who- 
ever is not wicked, it is for want only of the opportunity. It 
is that opportunity of being ill, Mr. Speaker, that we must 
take away, if ever we mean to be happy, which can never be 
done but by the frequency of parliaments. 

"No State can wisely be confident of any public minister's 
continuing good, longer than the rod is held over him. 


Letters of Centinel. No. VIZ. 619 

"Let me appeal to all those that were present in this house 
at the agitation of the petition of right. And let them tell 
themselves truly of whose promotion to the management of 
public affairs do they think the generality would, at that 
time, have had better hopes than of Mr. Nay and Sir Thomas 
Wentworth; both having been at that time and in that busi- 
ness, as I have heard, most keen and active patriots, and the 
latter of them, to the eternal aggravation of his infamous 
treachery to the commonwealth be it spoken, the first mover 
and insister to have this clause added to ih& petition of right, 
viz: 

"That for the comfort and safety of his subjects his Majesty 
would be pleased to declare his will and pleasure, that all his 
ministers should serve him according to the laws and statutes 
of the realm. 

"And yet, Mr. Speaker, to whom now can all the inunda- 
tions upon our liberties, under pretence of law, and the late 
shipwreck at once of all our property, be attributed more than 
to Noy, and all those other mischiefs whereby this monarchy 
hath been brought almost to the brink of destruction so much 
to any as to that grand apostate to the commonwealth, the 
now Weutenant of Ireland, Sir Thomas Wentworth? I,et 
every man but consider those men as once they were." — 
British I^iberties, page 184 and 185. Centinel. 

Philadelphia, December 23, 1787. 

Centinei, No. VII.* 

To the PEOPI.E of Pennsylvania. Friends and Fellow 

Citizens : 

The admiring world lately beheld the sun of liberty risen 
to meridian splendor in this western hemisphere, whose cheer- 
ing rays began to dispel the glooms of even trans-atlantic 
despotism ; the patriotic mind, enraptured with the glowing 
scene, fondly anticipated an universal and eternal day to the 
orb of freedom; but the horizon is already darkened and the 
glooms of slavery threaten to fix their empire. How transitory 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Dec. 29, 1787. 


620 Letters of Centinel. No. VII. 

are the blessings of this life! Scarcely have four years elapsed 
since these United States, rescued from the domination of 
foreign 4espots by the unexampled heroism and perseverance 
of its citizens at such great expense of blood and treasure, 
when they are about to fall a prey to the machinations of a 
profligate junto at home, who seizing the favorable moment 
when the temporary and extraordinary difiiculties of the peo- 
ple have thrown them ofi" their guard and lulled that jealousy 
of power so essential to the preservation of freedom, have 
been too successful in the sacrilegious attempt; however I am 
confident that this formidable conspiracy will end in the con- 
fusion and infamy of its authors; that if necessary, the aveng- 
ing sword of an abused people will humble these aspiring 
despots to the dust, and that their fate, like that of Charles 
the First of Kngland, will deter such attempts in future, and 
prove the confirmation of the liberties of America until time 
shall be no more. 

One would imagine by the insolent conduct of these harpies 
of power that they had already triumphed over the liberties 
of the people, that the chains were riveted and tyranny estab- 
lished. They tell us all further opposition will be vain, as 
this state has passed the Rubicon. Do they imagine the free- 
men of Pennsylvania will be thus trepanned out of their lib- 
erties, that they will submit without a struggle? They must 
indeed be inebriated with th^ lust of dominion to indulge 
such chimerical ideas. Will the act of one-sixth of the peo- 
ple and this too founded on deception and surprise bind the 
community ? Is it thus that the altar of liberty, so recently 
crimsoned with the blood of our worthies, is to be prostrated 
and despotism reared on its ruins ? Certainly not. The sol- 
emn mummery that has been acting in the name of the people 
of Pennsylvania will be treated with the deserved contempt; 
it has served indeed to expose the principles of the men con- 
cerned, and to draw a line of discrimination between the real 
and affected patriots. 

Impressed with an high opinion of the understanding and 
spirit of my fellow citizens, I have in no stage of this busi- 
ness entertained a doubt of its eventual defeat; the mo- 


Letters of Ceniinel. No. VIII, 621 

mentary delusion, arising from an unreserved confidence 
placed in some of the characters whose names sanctioned this 
scheme of power, did not discourage me: I foresaw that this 
blind admiration would soon be succeeded by rational inves- 
tigation, which, stripping the monster of its gilded covering, 
would discover its native deformity. 

Already the enlightened pen of patriotism, aided by an 
able public discussion, has dispelled the mist of deception, 
and the great body of the people are awakened to a due sense 
of their danger, and are determined to assert their liberty, if 
necessary by the sword, but this mean need not be recurred 
to, for who are their enemies? A junto composed of the 
lordly and high-minded gentry of the profligate and the needy 
office-hunters; of men principally who in the late war 
skulked from the common danger. Would such characters 
dare to face the majesty of a free people? No. All the con- 
flict would be between the offended justice and generosity of 
the people, whether these sacrilegious invaders of their dear- 
est rights should suffer the merited punishment or escape 
with an infamous contempt? 

However, as additional powers are necessary to Congress, 
the people will no doubt see the expediency of calling a con- 
vention for this purpose as soon as may be by applying to 
their representatives in assembly at their next session to ap- 
point a suitable day for the election of such Convention. 

Philadelphia, December 37, 1787. Centinel. 

Cbntinei,, No. VIII.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

Under the benign influence of liberty, this country, so re- 
cently a rugged wilderness and the abode of savages and wild 
beasts, has attained to a degree of improvement and greatness, 
in less than two ages, of which history furnishes no parallel. 
It is here that human nature may be viewed in all its glory; 
man assumes the station designed him by the creation, a 
happy equality and independency pervades the community, 

*Froin "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Jan. 2, 1788. 


632 Letters of Centinel. No. VIII. 

it is here the human mind, untrammeled by the restraints of 
arbitrary power, expands every faculty: as the field to fame 
and riches is open to all, it stimulates universal exertion, and 
exhibits a lively picture of emulation, industry and happi- 
ness. The unfortunate and oppressed of all nations, fly to 
this grand asylum, where liberty is ever protected, and in- 
dustry crowned with success. 

But as it is by comparison only that men estimate the 
value of any good, they are not sensible of the worth of those 
blessings they enjoy, until they are deprived of them; hence 
from ignorance of the horrors of slavery, nations, that have 
been in possession of that rarest of blessings, liberty, have 
so easily parted with it: when groaning under the yoke of 
tyranny what perils would they not encounter, what con- 
sideration would they not give to regain the inestimable jewel 
they had lost; but the jealously of despotism guards every 
avenue to freedom, and confirms its empire at the expense of 
the devoted people, whose property is made instrumental to 
their misery, for the rapacious hand of power seizes upon 
every thing; despair presently succeeds, and every noble 
faculty of the mind being depressed, and all motive to in- 
dustry and exertion being removed, the people are adapted to 
the nature of the government, and drag out a listless exis- 
tence. 

If ever America should be enslaved it will be from this 
cause, that they are not sensible of their peculiar felicity, that 
they are not aware of the value of the heavenly boon, com- 
mitted to their care and protection, and if the present con- 
spiracy fails, as I have no doubt will be the case, it will be 
the triumph of reason and philosophy, as these United States 
have never felt the iron hand of power, nor experienced the 
wretchedness of slavery. 

The conspirators against our liberties have presumed too 
much on the maxim that nations do not take the alarm, un- 
til they feel oppression; the enlightened citizens of America 
have on two memorable occasions convinced the tyrants of 
Europe that they are endued with the faculty of foresight, 
that they will jealously guard against the first introduction of 


Letters of Centinel. No. VIII. 623 

tyranny, however speciously glossed over, or whatever ap- 
pearance it may assume. It was not the mere amount of the 
duty on stamps^ or tea that America opposed, they were con- 
sidered as signals of approaching despotism, as precedents 
whereon the superstructure of arbitrary sway was to be reared. 
Notwithstanding such illustrious evidence of the good 
sense and spirit of. the people of these United States, and 
contrary to all former experience of mankind, which demon- 
strates that it is only by gradual and imperceptible degrees 
that nations have hitherto been enslaved, except in case of 
conquest by the sword, the authors of the present conspiracy 
are attempting to seize upon absolute power at one grasp; 
impatient of dominion they have adopted a decisive line of 
conduct, which, if successful, would obliterate every trace of 
liberty. I congratulate my fellow citizens that the infatuated 
confidence of their enemies has so blinded their ambition 
that their defeat must be certain and easy, if imitating the 
refined policy of successful despots, they had attacked the 
citadel of liberty by sap, and gradually undermined its out- 
works, they would have stood a fairer chance of effecting 
their design ; but in this enlightened age thus rashly to at- 
tempt to carry the fortress by storm, is folly indeed. They 
have even exposed some of their batteries prematurely, and 
thereby unfolded every latent view, for the unlimited power 
of taxation would alone have been amply sufficient for every 
purpose ; by a proper application of this, the will and pleasure 
of the rulers would of course have become the supreme law 
of the land ; therefore there was no use in portraying the ul- 
timate object by superadding the form to reality of supremacy 
in the following clause, viz : That which empowers the new 
Congress to make all laws that may be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution any of their powers, by virtue of 
which every possible law will be constitutional, as they are 
to be the sole judges of the propriety of such laws, that which 
ordains that their acts shall be the supreme law of the land, 
anything in the laws or constitution of any State to the con- 
trary notwithstanding; that which gives Congress the absolute 
control over the time and mode of its appointment and elec- 


624 Letters of Centinel. No. VIII. 

tion, -whereby, independent of any other means, they may 
establish hereditary despotism; that which authorizes them 
to keep on foot at all times a standing army; and that which 
subjects the militia to absolute command, and to accelerate 
the subjugation of the people, trial by jury in civil cases and 
the liberty of the press are abolished. 

So flagrant, so audacious a conspiracy against the liberties 
of a free people is without precedent. Mankind in the dark- 
est ages have never been so insulted; even then, tyrants found 
it necessary to pay some respect to the habits and feelings of 
the people, and nothing but the name of a Washington could 
have occasioned a moment's hesitation about the nature of 
the new plan, or saved its authors from the execration and 
vengeance of the people, which eventually will prove an ag- 
gravation of their treason ; for America will resent the impo- 
sition practiced upon the unsuspicious zeal of her illustrious 
deliverer^ and vindicate her character from the aspersions of 
these enemies of her happiness and fame. 

The advocates of this plan have artfully attempted to veil 
over the true nature and principles of it with the names of 
those respectable characters that by consummate cunning 
and address they have prevailed upon to sign it, and what 
ought to convince the people of the deception and excite 
their apprehensions, is that with every advantage which edu- 
cation, the science of government and of law, the knowledge 
of history and superior talents and endowments, furnish the 
authors and advocates of this plan with, they have from its 
publication exerted all their power and influence to prevent 
all discussion of the subject, and when this could not be pre- 
vented they have constantly avoided the ground of argument 
and recurred to declamation, sophistry and personal abuse, 
but principally relied upon the magic of names. Would this 
have been their conduct, if their cause had been a good one ? 
No, they would have invited investigation and convinced the 
understandings of the people. 

But such policy indicates great ignorance of the good sense 
and spirit of the people, for if the sanction of every conven- 
tion throughout the union was obtained by the means these 


Letters of Centinel. No. VIII. 625 

men are practising; yet their triumph would be momentary, 
the favorite object would still elude their grasp; ior a good 
government founded on fraud and deception could not be 
maintained without an army sufficiently powerful to compel 
submission, which the well-born of America could not 
speedily accomplish. However the con-fplexion of several of 
the more considerable States does not promise even this 
point of success. The Carolinas, Virginia, Maryland, New 
York and New Hampshire have by their wisdom in taking a 
longer time to deliberate, in all probability saved themselves 
from the disgrace of becoming the 'dupes of this gilded bait, 
as experience will evince that it need only be properly ex- 
amined to be execrated and repulsed. 

The merchant, immersed in schemes of wealth, seldom ex- 
tends his views beyond the immediate object of gain; he 
blindly pursues his seeming interest, and sees not the latent 
mischief; therefore it is, that he is the last tO' take the alarm 
when public liberty is threatened. This may account for the 
infatuation of some of our merchants, who, elated with the 
imaginary prospect of an improved commerce under the new 
government, overlook all danger: they do not consider that 
commerce is the hand-maid of liberty, a plant of free growth 
that withers under the hand of despotism, that every concern 
of individuals will be sacrificed to the gratification of the men 
in power, who will institute injurious monopolies and shackle 
commerce with every device of avarice; and that property of 
every species will be held at the will and pleasure of rulers. 

If the nature of the case did not give birth to these well 
founded apprehensions, the principles and characters of the 
authors and advocates of the measure ought. View the mo- 
nopolizing spirit of the principal of them. See him convert- 
ing a band, instituted for common benefit, to his own and, 
creatures' emoluments, and by the aid thereof, controlling 
the credit of the state, and dictating the measures of govern- 
ment. View the vassalage of our merchants, the thraldom 
of the city of Philadelphia, and the extinction of that spirit 
of independency in most of its citizens so essential to freedom. 
View this Collosus attempting to grasp the commerce of 
40 


626 Letters of Centinel. No. IX. 

America and meeting with a sudden repulse — in the midst of 
his immense career, receiving a shock that threatens his very 
existence. View the desperate fortunes of many of his coad- 
jutors and dependants, particularly the bankrupt situation of 
the principal instrument under the great man in promoting 
the new government, whose superlative arrogance, ambition 
and rapacity, would need the spoils of thousands to gratify; 
view his towering aspect — he would have no bowels of com- 
passion for the oppressed, he would overlook all their suffer- 
ings. Recollect the strenuous and unremitted exertions of 
these men, for years past, to destroy our admirable Constitu- 
tion, whose object is to secure equal liberty and advantages 
to all, and the great obstacle in the way of their ambitious 
schemes, and then answer whether these apprehensions are 
chimerical, whether such characters will be less ambitious, 
less avaricious, more moderate, when the privileges, property, 
and every concern of the people of the United States shall lie 
at their mercy, when they shall be in possession of absolute 
sway? Centinel. 

Philadelphia, December 29, 1787. 

Centinel, No. IX.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. 'Fellow Citizens^ 

You have the peculiar felicity of living under the most per- 
fect system of local government in the world; prize then this 
invaluable blessing as it deserves. Suffer it not to be wrested 
from you, and the scourge of despotic power substituted in its 
place, under the specious pretence of vesting the general gov- 
ernment of the United States with necessary power; that this 
would be the inevitable consequence of the establishment of 
the new constitution, the least cbnsideration of its nature and 
tendency is sufficient to convince every unprejudiced mind. 
If you were sufficiently impressed with your present favored 
situation, I should have no doubt of a proper decision of the 
question in discussion. 

The highest illustration of the excellence of the constitution 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom." 
Jan. 8, 1788. 


Letters of Centinel. No. IX. 627 

of this commonwealth, is, that from its first establishment, the 
ambitious and profligate have been united in a constant con- 
spiracy to destroy it; so sensible are they that it is their great 
enemy, that it is the great palladium of equal liberty, and the 
property of the people from the rapacious hand of power. The 
annals of mankind do not furnish a more glorious instance 
of the triumph of patriotism over the lust of ambition aided 
by most of the wealth of the State. The few generally pre- 
vail over the many by uniformity of council, unremitted and 
persevering exertion, and superior information and address; 
but in Pennsylvania the reverse has happened; here the well- 
born have been bafiled in all their efforts to prostrate the altar 
of liberty for the purpose of substituting their own insolent 
sway that would degrade the freemen of this State into servile 
dependence upon the lordly and great. However it is not the 
nature of ambition to be discouraged ; it is ever ready to im- 
prove the first opportunity to rear its baneful head and with 
irritated fury to wreak its vengeance on the votaries of liberty. 
The present conspiracy is a continental exertion of the well- 
born of America to obtain that darling domination, which 
they have not been able to accomplish in their respective 
States. Of what complexion were the deputies of this State 
in the general convention? Six out of eight were the invet- 
erate enemies of our inestimable constitution, and the princi- 
pals of that faction that for ten years past have kept the peo- 
ple in continual alarm for their liberties. Who are the advo- 
cates of the new constitution in this State ? They consist of 
the same faction, with the addition of a few deluded well- 
meaning men, but whose number is daily lessening. 

These conspirators have come forward at a most favorable 
conjuncture, when the state of public affairs has lulled all 
jealousy of power: Emboldened by the sanction of the 
august name of a Washington^ that they have prostituted to 
their purpose, they have presumed to overleap the usual 
gradations to absolute power, and have attempted to seize at 
once upon the supremacy of dominion. The new instrument 
of government does indeed make a fallacious parade of some 
remaining privileges, and insults the understandings of the 


628 Letters of Centinel. No. IX, 

people with the semblance of liberty in some of its artful and 
deceptive clauses, which form but a flimsy veil over the 
reality of tyranny, so weakly endeavored to be concealed 
from the eye of freedom. For, of what avail are the few in- 
adequate stipulations in favor of the rights of the people, 
when they may be eJBFectually counteracted and destroyed by 
virtue of other clauses, when these enable the rulers to re- 
nounce all dependence on their constituents, and render the 
latter tenants at will of every concern? The new constitu- 
tion is in fact a carte blanche^ a surrender at discretion to the 
"vmUand pleasure of our rulers: as this has been demonstrated 
toDe*the case, by the investigation and discussion that have 
taken place, I trust the same good sense and spirit which 
have hitherto enabled the people to triumph over the wiles 
of ambition, will be again exerted for their salvation. The 
accounts from various parts of the country correspond with 
my warmest hopes, and justify my early predictions of the 
eventual defeat of this scheme of power and office making. 

The genius of liberty has sounded the alarm, and the dor- 
mant spirit of her votaries is reviving with enthusiastic 
ardor; the like unanimity which formerly distinguished 
them in their conflict with foreign despots, promises to 
crown their virtuous opposition on the present occasions, 
with signal success. The structure of despotism that has 
been reared in this state, upon deception and surprise, will 
vanish like the baseless fabric of a dream and leave not a 
trace behind. 

The parasites and tools of power in Northampton County 
ought to take warning from the fate of the Carlisle junto, lest 
like them, they experience the resentment of an injured peo- 
ple. I would advise them not to repeat the imposition of a 
set of fallacious resolutions as the sense of that county, when 
in fact, it was the act of a despicable few, with Alexander 
Paterson at their head, whose achievements at Wyoming, as 
the meaner instrument of unfeeling avarice, have rendered 
infamously notorious; but yet, like the election of a Mr. 
Sedgwick for the little town of Stockbridge, which has been 
adduced as evidence of the unanimity of the western counties 


Letters of Centinel. No. IX. 629 

of Massachusetts State in favor of the new Constitution, when 
the fact is far otherwise, this act of a few individuals will be 
sounded forth over the continent as a testimony of the zeal- 
ous attachment of the county of Northampton to the new 
Constitution. By such wretched and momentary deceptions 
do these harpies of power endeavor to give the complexion of 
strength to their cause. To prevent the detection of such 
impositions, to prevent the reflection of the rays of light from 
State to State, which, producing general illumination, would 
dissipate the mist of deception, and thereby prove fatal to 
the new Constitution, all intercourse between the patriots of 
America is as far as possible cut off; whilst on the other 
hand, the conspirators have the most exact information, a 
common concert is everywhere evident; they move in unison. 
There is so much mystery in the conduct of these men, such 
systematic deception and fraud characterizes all their meas- 
ures, such extraordinary solicitude shown by them to precipi- 
tate and surprise the people into a blind and implicit adoption 
of this government, that it ought to excite the most alarming 
apprehensions in the minds of all those who think their privi- 
leges, property, and welfare worth securing. 

It is a fact that can be established, that during almost the 
whole of the time that the late convention of this State was 
assembled, the newspapers published in New York by Mr. 
Greenleaf, which contains the essays written there against the 
new government, such as the patriotic ones of Brutus, Cin- 
cinnatus, Cato, etc. , sent as usual by the printer of that place 
to the printers of this city, miscarried in their conveyance, 
which prevented the republication in this State of many of 
these pieces; and since that period great irregularity prevails, 
and I stand informed that *H^rinters in New York complain 
that the free and independent newspapers of this city do not 
come to hand; whilst on the contrary we find the devoted 
vehicles of despotism pass uninterrupted. I would ask what 
is the meaning of the new arrangement at the post-office 
which abridges the circulation of newspapers at this momen- 
tous crisis, when our every concern is dependent upon a 
proper decision of the subject in discussion. No trivial ex- 


630 Letters of Centinel. No. X. 

cuse will be admitted; the Centinel will, as from the first ap- 
proach of despotism, warn his countrymen of the insidious 
and base strategems that are practicing to hoodwink them out 
of their liberties. 

The more I consider the manoeuvres that are practicing, the 
more am I alarmed — foreseeing that the juggle cannot long 
be concealed, and that the spirit of the people will not brook 
the imposition, they have guarded as they suppose against any 
danger arising from the opposition of the people and rendered 
their struggles for liberty impotent and ridiculous. What 
otherwise is the meaning of disarming the militia, for the 
purpose as it is said of repairing their muskets at such a par- 
ticular period? Does not the timing of the measure deter- 
mine the intention? I was ever jealous of the select militia, 
consisting of infantry and troops of horse, instituted in this 
city and in some of the counties, without the sanction of law, 
and ofEcered principally by the devoted instruments of the 
well bom^ although the illustrious patriotism of one of them 
has not corresponded with the intention of appointing him. 
Are not these corps provided to suppress the first efforts of 
freedom, and to check the spirit of the people until a regular 
and sufficiently powerful military force shall be embodied to 
rivet the chains of slavery on a deluded nation? What con- 
firms these apprehensions is the declaration of a certain major, 
an active instrument in this business, and the echo of the 
principal conspirators, who has said he should deem the cut- 
ting off of five thousand men, as a small sacrifice, a cheap 
purchase for the establishment of the new Constitution. 

Philadelphia, January 5, 1788. Cetinel. 

Centinel No. X.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

What illustrious evidence and striking demonstration does 
the present momentous discussion afford of the inestimable 
value of the liberty of the press ? No doubt now remains, 
but that it will prove the rock of our political salvation. 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Jan. 12, 1788. 


Letters of Centinel. No. X. 631 

Despotism, witn its innumerable host of evils, by gliding 
through the mist of deception, had gained some of the prin- 
cipal works, had made a lodgment in the very citadel of 
liberty before it was discovered, and was near carrying the 
fortress by surprise; at this imminent alarming crisis the cen- 
tries from the watch-towers sounded the alarm, and aroused 
the dormant votaries of liberty to a due sense of their danger; 
who, with an alacrity and spirit suited to the exigence, an- 
swered to the call, repulsed the enemy, dislodged it from 
most of its acquisitions, and nothing is now wanting to a 
total rout and complete defeat, but a general discharge from 
the artillery of freedom. As the shades of night fly before 
the approach of the radiant sun, so does despotism before the 
majesty of enlightened truth ; wherever free discussion is al- 
lowed, this is invariably the consequence. Since the press 
has been unshackled in Pennsylvania, what an astonishing 
transition appears in the sentiments of the people! Infatua- 
tion is at an end, execration and indignation have succeeded 
to blind admiration and mistaken enthusiasm. The rampant 
insolence of the conspirators is prostrated, black despair has 
taken possession of many of them, their countenances pro- 
claim their defeat, and express serious apprehension for their 
personal safety from the rising resentment of injured freemen. 
James, the Caledonian, lieutenant general of the myrmidons 
of power, under Robert, the cofferer, who, with his aid-de- 
camp, Gouvero, the cunning man, has taken the field in Vir- 
ginia. I say James, in this exigence summonses a grand 
council of his partisans in this city and represents in the 
most pathetic moving language, the deplorable situation of 
affairs, stimulates them to make a vigorous effort to recover 
the ground they have lost and establish tlieir empire; that for 
this purpose a generous contribution must be made by all 
those who expect to taste the sweets of power, or share in the 
fruits of dominion, in order to form a fund adequate to the 
great design, that may put them in possession of the darling 
object; then recommends that a committee be appointed of 
those who are gifted with Machiavelian talents of those who 
excel in ingenuity, artifice, sophistry and the refinements of 


633 Letters of Centinel. No. X. 

falsehood, who can assume the pleasing appearance of truth 
and bewilder the people in all the mazes of error; and as the 
talk will be arduous, and requires various abilities and talents, 
the business ought to be distributed, and different parts as- 
signed to the members of the committee, as they may be 
respectively qualified; some by ingenious sophisms to explain 
away and counteract those essays of patriotism that have 
struck such general convictions; some to manufacture ex- 
tracts of letters and notes from correspondents, to give the 
complexion of strength to their cause, by representing the 
unanimity of all corners of America in favor of the new con- 
stitution; and others to write reams of letters to their tools in 
every direction, furnishing them with the materials of propa- 
gating error and deception; in short, that this committee 
ought to make the press groan and the whole country rever- 
berate with their productions ; thus to overpower truth and 
liberty by the din of empty sound and the delusion of false- 
hood. 

The conspirators, deceived by their first success, grounded 
on the unreserved confidence of the people, do not consider 
that with the detection of their views all chance of success is 
over; that suspicion once awakened is not so soon to be 
lulled, but with eagle eye will penetrate all their wiles, and 
detect their every scheme, however deeply laid or speciously 
glossed. The labors of their committee will be unavailing: 
the point of deception is passed, the rays of enlightened pa- 
triotism have diffused general illumination. However, this 
new efibrt will serve to show the perseverance of ambition 
and the necessity of constant vigilance in the people for the 
preservation of their liberty. 

Already we recognize the ingenuity and industry of this 
committee; the papers teem with paragraphs, correspondents, 
etc. , that exhibit a picture which bears no resemblance to the 
original. If we view this mirror for the representation of 
the sentiments of the people, a perfect harmony seems to pre- 
vail : every body in every place is charmed with the new Con- 
stitution— considers it as a gift from heaven, as their only ' 
salvation, etc., etc., etc., and I am informed expresses are 


Letters of Centinel. No. XI. 633 

employing to waft the delusion to the remotest corners. Such 

a scene of bustle, lying, and activity, was never exhibited 

since the days of Adam. The contributions to the grand 

fund are so great, that it is whispered a magazine of all the 

apparatus of war is to be immediately provided, and if all 

other means fail, force is to be recurred to, which they hope 

will successfully terminate the disagreeable discussion of the 

rights of mankind, of equal liberty, etc. , and thus establish 

a due subordination to the well born few. 

Centinel. 
Centinei, No. XI.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

The arguments upon which the advocates of the new con- 
stitution the most dwell, are the distresses of the community, 
the evils of anarchy, and the horrible consequences that 
would ensue from the dissolution of the union of the States, 
and the institution of separate confederacies or republics: 
The unanimity of the federal convention, and the sanction of 
great names, can be no further urged as an argument after 
the exposition made by the attorney-general of Maryland, f 
who was a member of that convention; he has opened such a 
scene of discord and accommodation of republicanism to des- 
potism as must excite the most serious apprehensions in every 
patriotic mind. The first argument has been noticed in the 
preceding essays; wherein it is shown that this is not the 
criterion whereby to determine the merits of the new consti- 
tution; that notwithstanding the reality of the distresses of 
the people, the new constitution may not only be inadequate 
as a remedy, but destructive of liberty, and the completion 
of misery. The remaining two arguments will be discussed 
in this number; their futility elucidated; and thus the 
medium of deception being dissipated, the public attention, 
with undirected, undiminished force, will be directed to the 
proper object, will be confined to the consideration of the 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Jan. 16, 1788. 

t Luther Martin. See his Genuine Information for the people of Mary- 
land, etc., etc. 


634 Letters of Centtnel. . No. XI. 

nature and construction of the plan of government itself, the 
question will then be, whether this plan be calculated for 
our welfare, or misery; whether it is the temple of liberty, or 
the structure of despotism? and as the former, or the latter, 
shall appear to be the case, to adopt or reject it accordingly, 
otherwise to banish the demon of domination by suitable 
amendments and qualifications. 

The evils of anarchy have been portrayed with all the im- 
agery of language in the glowing colors of eloquence; the 
affrighted mind is thence led to clasp the new Constitution as 
the instrument of deliverance, as the only avenue to safety 
and happiness. To avoid the possible and transitory evils of 
one extreme, it is seduced into the certain and permanent 
misery necessarily attendant on the other. A state of an- 
archy from its very nature can never be of long continuance; 
the greater its violence the shorter the duration; order and se- 
curity are immediately sought by the distracted people beneath 
the shelter of equal laws and the salutary restraints of reg- 
ular government, and if this be not attainable absolute power 
is assumed by the one, or a few, who shall be the most enter- 
prising and successful. If anarchy, therefore, were the in- 
evitable consequence of rejecting the new Constitution, it 
would be infinitely better to incur it, for even then there 
would be at least the chance of a good government rising out 
of licentiousness; but to rush at once into despotism because 
there is a bare possibility of anarchy ensuing from the rejec- 
tion, or from what is yet more visionary, the small delay that 
would be occasioned by a revision and correction of the pro- 
posed system of government is so superlatively weak, so 
fatally blind, that it is astonishing any person of common 
understanding should suffer such an imposition to have the 
least influence on his judgment; still more astonishing that 
so flimsy and deceptive a doctrine should make converts 
among the enlightened freemen of America, who have so 
long enjoyed the blessings of liberty; but when I view 
among such converts men otherwise pre-eminent it raises a 
blush for the weakness of humanity that these, her brightest 
ornaments, should be so dimsighted to what is self-evident 


Letters of Centinel. No. XL 635 

to most men, that such imbecility of judgment should appear 
where so much perfection was looked for; this ought to teach 
us to depend more on our own judgment and the nature of 
the case than upon the opinions of the greatest and best of 
men, who, from constitutional infirmities or particular situa- 
tions, may sometimes view an object through a delusive me- 
dium, but the opinions of great men are more frequently the 
dictates of ambition or private interest. 

The source of the apprehensions of this so much dreaded 
anarchy would upon investigation be found to arise from the 
artful suggestions of designing men, and not from a rational 
probability grounded on the actual state of affairs ; the least 
reflection is sufficient to detect the fallacy to show that there 
is no one circumstance to justify the- prediction of such an 
event. On the contrary a short time will evince, to the utter 
dismay and confusion of the conspirators, that a perseverance 
in cramming down their scheme of power upon the freemen 
of this State will inevitably produce an anarchy destructive 
of their darling domination, and may kindle a flame prejudi- 
cial to their safety; they should be cautious not to trespass too 
far on the forbearance of freemen when wresting their dearest 
concerns, but prudently retreat from the gathering storm. 

The other specter that has been raised to terrify and alarm 
the people out of the exercise of their judgment on this great 
occasion, is the dread of our splitting into separate confedera- 
cies or republics, that might become rival powers and conse- 
quently liable to mutual wars from the usual motives of con- 
tention. This is an event still more improbable than the 
foregoing; it is a presumption unwarranted, either by the 
situation of afiairs, or the sentiments of the people; no dis- 
position leading to it exists; the advocates of the new consti- 
tution seem to view such a separation with horror, and its 
opponents are strenuously contending for a confederation that 
shall embrace all America under its comprehensive and salu- 
tary protection. This hobgoblin appears to have sprung 
from the deranged brain of Publius*z. New York writer, who, 

* The signature under which Hamilton, Jay and Madison issued the Essays 
that form The Federalist. 


636 Letters of Centinel. No. XL 

mistaking sound for argument, has with Herculean labor ac- 
cumulated myriads of unmeaning sentences, and mechanically 
endeavored to force conviction by a torrent of misplaced 
words; he might have spared his readers the fatigue of wad- 
ing through his long-winded disquisitions on the direful 
effects of the contentions of inimical states, as totally inap- 
plicable to the subject he was professedly treating; this 
writer has devoted much time, and wasted more paper in 
combating chimeras of his own creation. However, for the 
sake of argument, I will admit that the necessary conse- 
quence of rejecting or delaying the establishment of the new 
constitution, would be the dissolution of the union, and the 
institution of even rival and inimical republics; yet ought 
such an apprehension, if well founded, to drive us into the 
fangs of despotism? Infinitely preferable would be occasional 
wars to such an event; the former, although a severe scourge, 
is transient in its continuance, and in its operation partial, 
but a small proportion of the community are exposed to 
its greatest horrors, and yet fewer experience its greatest 
evils; the latter is permanent and universal misery, without 
remission or exemption : as passing clouds obscure for a time 
the splendor of the sun, so do wars interrupt the welfare of 
mankind; but despotism is a settled gloom that totally ex- 
tinguishes happiness, not a ray of comfort can penetrate to 
cheer the dejected mind; the goad of power with unabating 
rigor insists upon the utmost exaction, like a merciless task- 
master, is continually inflicting the lash, and is never satiated 
with the feast of unfeeling domination, or the most abject 
servility. 

The celebrated Lord Kaims, whose disquisitions on human 
nature evidence extraordinary strength of judgment and depth 
of investigation, says that a continual civil war, which is the 
most destructive and horrible scene of human discord, is pre- 
ferable to the uniformity of wretchedness and misery attend- 
ant upon despotism; of aSS. possible evils, as I observed in my 
first number, this is the worst and the most to be dreaded. 

I congratulate my fellow citizens that a good government, 
the greatest earthly blessing, may be so easily obtained, that 


Letters of Centinel. No. XII. Sj^j 

our circumstances are so favorable, that nothing but the folly 
of the conspirators can produce anarchy or civil war, which 
would presently terminate in their destruction and the per- 
manent harmony of the state, alone interrupted by their am- 
bitious machinations. 

In a former number I stated a charge of a very heinous 
nature, and highly prejudicial to the public welfare, and at 
this great crisis peculiarly alarming and threatening to lib- 
erty. I mean the suppression of the circulation of the news- 
papers from State to State by the of— c — rs of the P — t 
O — ce, who in violation of their duty and integrity, have 
prostituted their of — ces to forward the nefarious design of 
enslaving their countrymen, by thus cutting oif all communi- 
cation by the usual vehicle between the patriots of America; 
I find that notwithstanding that public appeal, they perse- 
vere in this villainous and daring practice. The newspapers 
of the other States that contain any useful information are 
still withheld from the printers of this State, and I see by the 
annunciation of the editor of Mr. Greenleafs patriotic New 
York paper, that the printers of that place are still treated in 
like manner. This informs his readers that but two southern 
papers have come to hand, and that they contain no informa- 
tion, which he affects to ascribe to the negligence of the p — t 
boy, not caring to quarrel with the p — t m — t— r g — 1. 

Centinel. 

Philadelphia, January 12, 1788. 

Centinei, No. XII. * 
To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

Conscious guilt has taken the alarm, thrown out the signal 
of distress, and even appealed to the generosity of patriotism. 
The authors and abettors of the new Constitution shudder at 
the term conspirators being applied to them, as it designates 
their true character, and seems prophetic of the catastrophe; 
they read their fate in the epithet. 

In despair they are weakly endeavoring to screen their 

* From " The Independent Gazetter, or The Chronicle of Freedom," Jan. 
23, 1788. 


638 Letters of Centinel. No. XII. 

criminality by interposing the shield of the virtues of a 
Washington, in representing his concurrence in the proposed 
system of government as evidence of the purity of their in- 
tentions;, but this impotent attempt to degrade the brightest 
ornament of his country to a base level with themselves will 
be considered as an aggravation of their treason, and an in- 
sult on the good sense of the people, who have too much 
discernment not to make a just discrimination between the 
honest mistaken zeal of the patriot and the flagitious machi- 
nations of an ambitious junto, and will resent the imposition 
that Machiavelian arts and consummate cunning have prac- 
ticed upon our illustrious chief. 

The term conspirators was not, as has been alleged, rashly 
or inconsiderately adopted; it is the language of dispassionate 
and deliberate reason, influenced by the purest patriotism; 
the consideration of the nature and construction of the new 
Constitution naturally suggests the epithet; its justness is 
strikingly illustrated by the conduct of the patrons of this 
plan of government, but if any doubt had remained whether 
this epithet is merited, it is now removed by the very uneasi- 
ness it occasions; this is a confirmation of its propriety. 
Innocence would have nothing to dread from such a stigma, 
but would triumph over the shafts of malice. 

The conduct of men is the best clue to their principles. 
The system of deception that has been practiced; the con- 
stant solicitude shown to prevent information diffusing its 
salutary light are evidence of a conspiracy beyond the arts 
of sophistry to palliate; or the ingenuity of falsehood to in- 
validate; the means practiced to establish the new Constitu- 
tion are demonstrative of the principles and designs of its 
authors and abettors. 

At the time, says Mr. Martin (deputy from the State of 
Maryland in the general convention), when the public prints 
were announcing our perfect unanimity, discord prevailed to 
such a degree that the minority were upon the point of ap- 
pealing to the public against the machinations of ambition. 
By such a base imposition, repeated in every newspaper and 
reverberated from one end of the union to the other, was the 


Letters of Centinel. No. XII. 639 

people lulled into a false confidence, into an implicit reliance 
upon the wisdom and patriotism of the convention; and when' 
ambition, by her deceptive wiles, had succeeded to usher 
forth the new system of government with apparent unanimity 
of sentiment, the public delusion was complete. The most 
extravagant fictions were palmed upon the people, the seal 
of divinity was even ascribed to the new Constitution; a 
felicity more than human was to ensue from its establishment; 
overlooking the real cause of our difficulties and burthens, 
which have their proper remedy, the people were taught that 
the new Constitution would prove a mine of wealth and 
prosperity equal to every want, or the most sanguine desire; 
that it would eflFect what can only be produced by the exer- 
tion of industry and the practice of economy. 

The conspirators, aware of the danger of delay, that allow- 
ing time for a rational investigation would prove fatal to 
their designs, precipitated the establishment of the new Con- 
stitution with all possible celerity; in Massachusetts the depu- 
ties of that convention, who are to give the final fiat in behalf 
of that great State to a measure upon which their dearest con- 
cerns depend, were elected by express in the first moments of 
blind enthusiasm ; similar conduct has prevailed in the other 
States as far as circumstances permitted. 

If the foregoing circumstances did not prove a conspiracy, 
there are others that must strike conviction in the most un- 
suspicious. Attempts to prevent discussion by shackling the 
press ought ever to be a signal of alarm to freemen, and con- 
sidered as an annunciation of meditated tyranny; this is a 
truth that the uniform experience of mankind has established 
beyond the possibility of doubt. Bring the conduct of the 
authors and abettors of the new constitution to this test, let 
this be the criterion of their criminality, and every patriotic 
mind must unite in branding them with the stigma of con- 
spirators against the public liberties. No stage of this busi- 
ness but what has been marked with every exertion of influ- 
ence and device of ambition to suppress information and 
intimidate public discussion; the virtue and firmness of some 
of the printers rose superior to the menaces of violence and 


640 Letters of Centinel. No. XII. 

the lucre of private interest; when every means failed to 
shackle the press, the free and independent papers were at- 
tempted to be demolished by withdrawing all the subscrip- 
tions to them within the sphere of the influence of the con- 
spirators; fortunately for the cause of liberty and truth, these 
daring high-handed attempts have failed except in one 
instance, where, from a peculiarity of circumstances, ambition 
has triumphed. Under the flimsy pretense of vindicating 
the character of a contemptible drudge of party, rendered 
ridiculous by his superlative folly in the late convention, of 
which the statement given in the Pennsylvania Herald was 
confessedly a faithful representation, this newspaper has been 
silenced * by some hundreds of its subscribers (who it seems 
are generally among the devoted tools of party, or those who 
are obliged from their thraldom to yield implicit assent to 
the mandates of the junto) withdrawing their support from 
it; by this stroke the conspirators have suppressed the publi- 
cation of the most valuable debates of the late convention, 
which would have been given in course by the editor of that 
paper, whose stipend now ceasing, he cannot afford without 
compensation the time and attention necessary to this business. 
Every patriotic person who had an opportunity to hearing 
that illustrations advocate of liberty and his country, Mr. 
Findley, must sensibly regret that his powerful arguments 
are not to extend beyond the confined walls of the State- 
House, where they could have so limited an effect; that the 
United States could not have been his auditory through the 
medium of the press. I anticipate the answer of the conspi- 
rators; they will tell you that this could not be their motive 
for silencing this paper, as the whole of the debates were 
taken down in short-hand by another person and published, 
but the public are not to be so easily duped, they will not re- 
ceive a spurious as an equivalent for a genuine production; 
equal solicitude was expressed for the publication of the 
former as for the suppression of the latter— the public will 
judge of the motives. 

* The Herald it is said is to he discontinued the z^d instant {the editor is 
already dismissed"). 


Letters of Centinel. No. XII. 641 

That investigation into the nature and construction of the 
new constitution, which the conspirators have so long and 
zealously struggled against, has, notwithstanding their par- 
tial success, so far taken place as to ascertain the enormity of 
their criminality. That system which was pompously dis- 
played as the perfection of government, proves upon exami- 
tion to be the most odious system of tyranny that was ever 
projected, a many-headed hydra of despotism, whose compli- 
cated and various evils would be infinitely more oppressive 
and afflictive than the scourge of any single tyrant: the ob- 
jects of dominion would be tortured to gratify the calls of 
ambition and the cravings of power of rival despots contend- 
ing for the sceptre of superiority; the devoted people would 
experience a distraction of misery. 

No wonder then that such a discovery should excite uneasy 
apprehensions in the minds of the conspirators, for such an 
attempt against the public liberties is unprecedented in his- 
tory; it is a crime of the blackest dye, as it strikes at the hap- 
piness of millions and the dignity of human nature, as, it was 
intended to deprive the inhabitants of so large a portion of 
the globe of the choicest blessings of life and the oppressed 
of all nations of an asylum. 

The explicit language of the Centinel during the empire 
of delusion was not congenial to the feelings of the people, 
but truth when it has free scope is all powerful, it enforces 
conviction in the most prejudiced mind ; he foresaw the con- 
sequences of an exertion of the good sense and understanding 
of the people, and predicted the defeat of the measure he ven- 
tured to attack, when it was deemed sacred by most men and 
the certain ruin of any who should dare to lisp a word 
against it: he has persevered through every discouraging ap- 
pearance, and has now the satisfaction to find his country- 
men are aware of their danger and are taking measures for 
their security. 

Since writing the foregoing. I am informed that the 

printer of the Pennsylvania Herald is not quite decided 

whether he will drop his paper; he wishes, and perhaps will 

be enabled, to perseverve; however, the conspirators have 

41 


643 Letters of Centinel. No. XIII. 

efiFected their purpose; the editor is dismissed and the debates 
of the convention thereby suppressed. 

Centinel. 

Centinel, No. XIII.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

The conspirators are putting your good sense, patriotism 
and spirit to the severest test. So bold a game of deception, 
so decisive a stroke for despotic power, was never before at- 
tempted among enlightened freemen. Can there be apathy 
so indiflFerent as not to be roused into indignation, or prejudice 
so blind as not to yield to the glaring evidence of a flagitious 
conspiracy against the public liberties ? The audacious and 
high-handed measures practiced to suppress information, and 
intimidate discussion, would in any other circumstances than 
the present, have kindled a flame fatal to such daring invaders 
of our dearest privileges. 

The conspirators having been severely galled and checked 
in their career by the artillery of freedom, have made more 
vigorous and successful efforts to silence her batteries, while 
falsehood with all her delusions is making new and greater 
exertions in favor of ambition. On the one hand, every 
avenue to information is as far as possible cut off"; the usual 
communication between the states, through the medium of 
the press, is in a great measure destroyed by a new arrange- 
ment at the Post OflBce — scarcely a newspaper is suffered to 
passt by this conveyance, and the arguments of a Findley, a 
Whitehill and a Smilie, that bright constellation of patriots, 
are suppressed, and a spurious publication substituted ; and on 
the other hand the select committee are assiduously employed 
in manufacturing deception in all its ensnaring colors, and 
having an adequate fund at their command, they are delug- 
ing the country with their productions. The only newspaper 
that circulates extensively out of the city is kept running over 
with deceptive inventions. Doctor Puff", the paragi-aphist, 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Jan. 30, 1788. 

tFor the truth of this charge I appeal to the printers. 


Leutrs of Centinel. No. XIII. 643 

has scarcely slept since his appointment, having received 
orders to work double tides; beneath his creative pen thous- 
ands of correspondents rise into view, who all harmonize in 
their sentiments and information about the new constitution; 
but the chief reliance is on James the Caledonian, who can to 
appearance destroy all distinction between liberty and despot- 
ism, and make the latter pass for the former, who can bewilder 
truth in all the mazes of sophistry, and render the plainest 
propositions problematical. He, chameleon-like, can vary his 
appearance at pleasure, and assume any character for the pur- 
poses of deception. In the guise of a Conciliator^ in the 
Independent Gazetteer, he professes great candor and moder- 
ation, admits some of the principal objections to the new 
constitution to be well founded and insidiously proposes a 
method to remove them, which is to consider the first Con- 
gress under the new constitution as a convention, competent 
to supply all defects in the system of government., This is 
really a discovery that does honor to his invention. What ! a 
legislative declaration or law a basis upon which to rest our 
dearest liberties ? Does he suppose the people have so little 
penetration as not to see through so flimsy a delusion, that 
such a security would amount to no more than the will and 
pleasure of their rulers, who might repeat this fundamental 
sanction whenever ambition stimulated ? In the feigned char- 
acter of A Freeman., he combats the weighty arguments of the 
minority of the late convention, by a mere play upon words, 
carefully avoiding the real merits of the question; and we 
moreover trace him in a variety of miscellaneous productions 
in every shape and form ; he occasionally assists Doctor Puff 
in the fabrication of extracts of letters, paragraphs, correspon- 
dents, etc., etc. 

So gifted and with such a claim of merit from his extraor- 
dinary and unwearied exertions in the cause of despotism, 
who so suitable or deserving of the office of Chief Justice of 
the United States? How congenial would such a post be to 
the principles and dispositions of James! Here he would be 
both judge and jury, sovereign arbiter in law and equity. In 
this capacity he may satiate his vengeance on patriotism for 


644 Letters of Centinel. No. XIII. 

the opposition given to his projects of dominion. Here he 
may gratify his superlative arrogance and contempt of man- 
kind, by trampling upon his fellow creatures with impunity, 
here he may give the finishing stroke to liberty, and silence 
the offensive complaints of violated justice and innocence, by 
adding the sanction of his office to the rapacity of power and 
the wantonness of oppression; there will be no intervening 
jury to shield the innocent, or procure redress to the injured. 
Fellow citizens, although the conspirators and their abet- 
tors are not sufficiently numerous to endanger our liberties 
by an open and forcible attack on them, yet when the char- 
acters of which they are composed and the methods they are 
practicing are considered, it ought to occasion the most serious 
alarm, and stimulate to an immediate, vigorous, and united 
exertion of the patriotic part of the community for the security 
of their rights and privileges. Societies ought to be insti- 
tuted in every county, and a reciprocity of sentiments and 
information maintained between such societies, whereby the 
patriots throughout Pennsylvania, being mutually enlightened 
and invigorated, would form an invincible bulwark to liberty, 
and by unity of counsel and exertion might the better pro- 
cure and secure to themselves and to unborn ages the blessings 
of a good federal government. Nothing but such a system of 
conduct can frustrate the machinations of an ambitious junto, 
who, versed in Machiavellian arts, can varnish over with the 
semblance of freedom the most despotic instrument of govern- 
ment ever projected; who cannot only veil over their own 
ambitious purposes, but raise an outcry against the real pa- 
triots for interested views, when they are advocating the cause 
of liberty and of their country by opposing a scheme of arbi- 
trary power and office making; who can give the appearance 
of economy to the introduction of a numerous and permanent 
standing army, and the institution of lucrative, needless of- 
fices to provide for the swarms of gaping, almost famished 
expectants, who have been campaigning it for ten years with- 
out success against our inestimable State Constitution, as a 
reward for their persevering toils, but particularly for their 
zeal on the present occasion, and also as a phalanx to tyranny; 


Letters of Centinel. No. XIII. 645 

and who, notwithstanding the testimony of uniform experi- 
ence, evinces the necessity of restrictions on those entrusted 
with power, and a due dependence of the deputy on the con- 
stituent being maintained to ensure the public welfare; who, 
notwithstanding the fate that liberty has ever met from the 
remissness of the people and the persevering nature of ambi- 
tion, who, ever on the watch, grasps at every avenue to su- 
premacy. I say, notwithstanding such evidence before them 
of the folly of mankind, so often duped by similar arts, the 
conspirators have had the address to inculcate the opinion 
that forms of government are no security for the public lib- 
erties; that the administration is everything; that, although 
there would be no responsibility under the new Constitution 
— no restriction on the powers of the government, whose will 
and pleasure would be literally the law of the land, yet that 
we should be perfectly safe and happy. That as our rules 
would be made of the same corrupt materials as ourselves, 
they certainly could not abuse the trust reposed in them, but 
would be the most self-denying order of beings ever created; 
with your purses at their absolute disposal, and your liberties 
at their discretion, they would be proof against the charms 
of money and the allurements of power. However, if such 
Utopian ideas should prove chimerical, and the people should 
find the yoke too heavy, they might at pleasure alleviate or 
even throw it off. In short, the conspirators have displayed 
so much ingenuity on this occasion, that if it had not been 
for the patriotism and firmness of some of the printers, which 
gave an opportunity to enlightened truth to come forward, 
and by her invincible powers to detect the sophistry and ex- 
pose the fallacy of such impositions, liberty must have been 
overcome by the wiles of ambition, and this land of freemen 
have become the miserable abode of slaves. 

Centinel. 
Philadelphia, January 36, 1788. 


646 Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 

Centinei-, No. XIV.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

I am happy to find the comment that I have made upon 
the nature and tendency of the new constitution, and my 
suspicions of the principles and designs of its authors, are 
fully confirmed by the evidence of the Honorable I/UTHER 
Martin, esquire, late deputy in the general convention. 
He has laid open the conclave, exposed the dark scene with- 
in, developed the mystery of the proceedings, and illustrated 
the machinations of ambition. His public spirit has drawn 
upon him the rage of the conspirators, for daring to remove 
the veil of secrecy, and announcing to the public the medi- 
tated, gilded mischief: all their powers are exerting for his 
destruction, the mint of calumny is assiduously engaged in 
coining scandal to blacken his character, and thereby to in- 
validate his testimony; but this illustrious patriot will rise 
superior to all their low arts, and be the better confirmed in 
the good opinion and esteem of his fellow-citizeus, upon 
whose gratitude he has an additional claim by standing forth 
their champion at a crisis when most men would have 
shrunk from such a duty. Mr. Martin has appealed to gen- 
eral Washington for the truth of what he has advanced, and 
undaunted by the threats of his and his country's enemies, is 
nobly persevering in the cause of liberty and mankind. I 
would earnestly recommend it to all well meaning persons to 
read his communication, as the most satisfactory and certain 
method of forming a just opinion on the present momentous 
question, particularly the three or four last continuances, as 
they go more upon the general principles and tendency of the 
new constitution. I have in former numbers alluded to some 
passages in this publication; I shall in this number quote 
some few others, referring to the work itself for a more 
lengthy detail. The following paragraphs are extracted from 
the continuances republished in the "Independent Gazetteer" 
of the 25th January, and the "Pennsylvania Packet" of the 
ist February instant, viz. 

*Prom "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Feb. 5, 1788. 


Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. Si^y 

" By the eighth section of this article, Congress is to have 
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. 
When we met in convention after our adjournment, to receive 
the report of the committee of detail, the members of that 
committee were requested to inform us what powers were 
meant to be vested in Congress by the word duties in this 
section, since the word imposts extended to duties on goods 
imported, and by another part of the system no duties on ex- 
ports were to be laid. In answer to this inquiry we were in- 
formed, that it was meant to give the general government the 
power of laying stamp duties on paper, parchment and vel- 
lum. We then proposed to have the power inserted in ex- 
press words, lest disputes hereafter might arise on the sub- 
ject, and that the meaning might be understood by all who 
were to be aflFected by it; but to this it was objected, because 
it was said that the word stamp would probably sound odi- 
ously in the ears of many of the inhabitants, and be a cause 
of objection. By the power of imposing stamp duties the 
Congress will have a right to declare that no wills, deeds, or 
other instruments of writing, shall be good and valid, with- 
out being stamped — that without being reduced to writing 
and being stamped, no bargain, sale, transfer of property or 
contract of any kind or nature whatsoever shall be binding; 
and also that no exemplifications of records, depositions, or 
probates of any kind shall be received in evidence, unless 
they have the same solemnity. They may likewise oblige all 
proceedings of a judicial nature to be stamped to give them 
eflFect — those stamp duties may be imposed to any amount 
they please — and under the pretense of securing the collection 
of these duties, and to prevent the laws which imposed them 
from being evaded, the Congress may bring the decision of 
all questions relating to the conveyance, disposition and 
rights of property, and every question relating to contracts be- 
tween man and man, into the courts of the general govern- 
ment— their inferior courts in the first instance and the 
superior court by appeal. By the power to lay and collect 
imposts, they may impose duties on any or every article of 
commerce imported into these states, to what amount they 


648 Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 

please. By the power to lay excises, a power very odious in 
its nature, since it authorizes officers to go into your houses, 
your kitchens, your cellars, and to examine into your private 
concerns, the Congress may impose duties on every article of 
use or consumption ; on the food that we eat — on the liquors 
we drink — on the clothes we wear^-on the glass which en- 
lightens our houses — on the hearths necessary for our warmth 
and comfort. By the power to lay and collect taxes, they 
may proceed to iiirect taxation on every individual, either by 
a capitation tax on their heads, or an assessment on their 
property. By this part of the section, therefore, the govern- 
ment has a power to lay what duties they please on goods im- 
ported— to lay what duties they please afterwards on what- 
ever we use or consume — to impose stamp duties to what 
amount they please, and in whatever cases they please — 
afterwards to impose on the people direct taxes, by capitation 
tax, or by assessment, to what amount they choose, and thus 
to sluice them at every vein as long as they have a drop of 
blood, without any control, limitation or restraint — while all 
the officers for collecting these taxes, stamp duties, imposts 
and excises, are to be appointed by the general government, 
under its direction, not accountable to the states; nor is there 
even a security that they shall be citizens of the respective 
states, in which they are to exercise their offices ; at the same 
time the construction of every law imposing any and all 
these taxes and diities, and directing the collection of them, 
and every question arising thereon, and on the conduct of the 
officers appointed to execute these laws, and to collect these 
taxes and duties so various in their kinds, are taken away 
from the courts of justice of the different states, and confined 
to the courts of the general government, there to be heard 
and determined by judges holding their offices under the ap- 
pointment, not of the states, but of the general government. 
"Many of the members, and myself in the number, thought 
that the states were much better judges of the circumstances 
of their citizens, and what sum of money could be collected 
from them by direct taxation, and of the manner in which it 
could be raised with the greatest ease and convenience to 


Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 649 

their citizens, than the general government could be; and 
that the general government ought not in any case to have 
the power of laying direct taxes, but in that of the delin- 
quency of a state. Agreeable to this sentiment, I brought in 
a proposition on which a vote of the convention was taken. 
The proposition was as follows: 'And whenever the legislature 
of the United States shall find it necessary that revenue should 
be raised by direct taxation, having appointed the same by 
the above rule, requisitions shall be made of the respective 
states to pay into the continental treasury their respective 
quotas within a time in the said requisition to be specified, 
and in case of any of the states failing to comply with such 
requisition, then and then only, to have power to devise and 
pass acts directing the mode and authorizing the collection of 
the same.' Had this proposition been acceded to, the dan- 
gerous and oppressive power in the general government of 
imposing direct taxes on the inhabitants, which it now enjoys 
in all cases, would have been only vested in it in ca,se of the 
non-compliance of a state, as a punishment for its delin- 
quency, and would have ceased that moment that the state 
complied with the requisition. But the proposition was re- 
jected by a majority, consistent wilh their aim and desire of 
increasing the power of the general government as far as pos- 
sible, and destroying the powers and influence of the states. 
And though there is a provision that all duties, imposts and 
excises shall be uniform, that is, to be laid to the same 
amount on the same articles in each state, yet this will not 
prevent Congress from having it in their power to cause them 
to fall very unequal and much heavier on some states than on 
others, because these duties may be laid on articles but little 
or not at all used in some states, and of absolute necessity for 
the use and consumption of others, in which case the first 
would pay little or no part of the revenue arising therefrom, 
while the whole or nearly the whole of it would be paid by 
the last, to wit: The states which use and consume the arti- 
cles on which the imposts and excises are laid. ' ' 

Another extract, viz: 

"But even this provision, apparently for the security .jaf 


650 Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 

the State governments, inadequate as it is, is entirely left at 
the mercy of the general government, for by the fourth sec- 
tion of the first article, it is expressly provided, that the Con- 
gress shall have a power to make and alter all regulations 
concerning the time and manner of holding elections for sen- 
ators— a provision expressly looking forward to, and I have 
no doubt designed for the utter extinction and abolition of 
all State governments. Nor will this, I believe, be doubted 
by any person, when I inform you that some of the warm ad- 
vocates and patrons of the system in convention, strenuously 
opposed the choice of the senators by the State legislatures, 
insisting that the State governments ought not to be intro- 
duced in any manner so as to be component parts of, or in- 
struments for, carrying into execution the general govern- 
ment. Nay, so far were the friends of the system from pre- 
tending that they meant it or considered it as a federal system, 
that on the question being proposed, 'that a union of the 
States merely federal ought to be the sole object of the exer- 
cise of the powers vested in the convention,' it was negatived 
by a majority of the members, and it was resolved 'that a 
national government ought to be formed.' Afterwards the 
word 'national ' was struck out by them, because they thought 
the word might tend to alarm; and although now they who 
advocate the system pretend to call themselves federalists, in 
convention the distinction was just the reverse: those who 
opposed the system, were there considered and styled the fed- 
eral party; those who advocated it, the anti-federal. 

"Viewing it as a national, not a federal government; as 
calculated and designed not to protect and preserve, but to 
abolish and annihilate the State governments, it was opposed 
for the following reasons: — It was said that this continent 
was much too extensive for one national government, which 
should have sufficient power and energy to pervade and hold 
in obedience and subjection all its parts, consistent with the 
enjoyment and preservation of liberty; that the genius and 
habits of the people of America were opposed to such a gov- 
ernment; that during their connection with Great Britain, 
they had been accustomed to have all their concerns trans- 


Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 651 

acted within a narrow circle — their colonial districts; they 
had been accustomed to have their seats of government near 
them, to which they might have access without much incon- 
venience, when their business should require it; that at this 
time we find if a county is rather large, the people complain of 
the inconvenience, and clamor for a division of their county, 
or for a removal of the place where their courts are held, so 
as to render it more central and convenient; that in those 
States, the territory of which is extensive, as soon as the 
population increases remote from the seat of government, the 
inhabitants are urgent for a removal of the seat of their gov- 
ernment, or to be erected into a new State. As a proof of 
this, the inhabitants of the western parts of Virginia and 
North Carolina, of Vermont and the province of Maine, were 
instances; even the inhabitants of the western parts of Penn- 
sylvania, who it was said already seriously look forward to 
the time when they shall either be erected into a new State, 
or have their seat of government removed to the Susque- 
hanna. If the inhabitants of the different States consider it 
as a grievance to attend a county court, or the seat of their 
own government, when a little inconvenient, can it be sup- 
posed they would ever submit to have a national government 
established, the seat of which would be more than a thousand 
miles removed from some of them? It was insisted that gov- 
ernments of a republican nature are those best calculated to 
preserve the freedom and happiness of the citizen; that gov- 
ernments of this kind are only calculated for a territory but 
small in its extent; that the only method by which an exten- 
sive continent like America could be connected and united 
together consistent with the principles of freedom, must be 
by having a number of strong and energetic State govern- 
ments for securing and protecting the rights of the individ- 
uals forming those governments, and for regulating all their 
concerns, and a strong, energetic federal government over 
those States for the protection and preservation, and for regu- 
lating the common concerns of the States; it was further in- 
sisted, that even if it was possible to effect a total abolition 
of the State governments at thi's time, and to establish one 


652 Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 

general government over the people of America, it could not 
long subsist, but in a little time would again be broken into 
a variety of governments of a smaller extent, similar in some 
manner to the present situation of this continent: the princi- 
pal difference in all probability would be that the govern- 
ments, so established, being effected by some violent convul- 
sions, might not be formed on principles so favorable to lib- 
erty as those of our present State governments; that this 
ought to be an important consideration to such of the states 
who had excellent governments, which was the case with 
Maryland and most others, whatever it might be to persons 
who, disapproving of their particular State government, 
would be willing to hazard everything to overturn and de- 
stroy it. These reasons, sir, influenced me to vote against 
two branches in the legislature, and against every part of the 
system which was repugnant to the principles of a federal 
government. Nor was there a single argument urged, or 
reason assigned, which to my mind was satisfactory, to prove 
that a good government on federal principles was unattain- 
able— the whole of their arguments only proving, what none 
of us controverted, that oiir federal government as originally 
formed was defective, and wanted amendment. However, a 
majority of the convention hastily and inconsiderately, with- 
out condescending to make a fair trial, in their great wisdom, 
decided that a kind of government which a Montesquieu and 
a Price have declared the best calculated of any to preserve 
internal liberty, and to enjoy external strength and security, 
and the only one by which a large continent can be connected 
and united consistent with the principles of liberty, was 
totally impracticable, and they acted accordingly. ' ' 

After such information, what are we to think of the declar- 
ations of Mr. Wilson, who assured our state convention that 
it was neither the intention of the authors of the new consti- 
tution, nor its tendency, to establish a consolidated or national 
government, founded upon the destruction of the State govern- 
ments, that such could not have been the design of the general 
convention he said was certain, because the testimony of ex- 
perience, the opinions of the most celebrated writers, and the 


Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 653 

nature of the case demonstrated in the clearest manner that 
so extensive a territory as these United States include could 
not be governed by any other mode than a confederacy of re- 
publics consistent with the principles of freedom, and that 
their own conviction was that nothing short of the supremacy 
of despotism could connect and bind together this country 
under one government? Has any one a doubt now re- 
maining of the guilt of the conspirators! 

The O rs of the P — t O — ce, fearful of the consequences 

of their conduct, are taking measures to invalidate the charge 
made against them. As this is a matter of the highest im- 
portance to the public, it will be necessary to state the charge 
and the evidence. In two of my former numbers, I asserted 
that the patriotic newspapers of this city and that of New 
York miscarried in their passage, whilst the vehicles of des- 
potism, meaning those newspapers in favor of the new con- 
stitution, passed as usual; and it was particularly asserted 
that the patriotic essays of Brutus, Cincinnatus, Cato, etc., 
published at New York, were withheld during the greatest 
part of the time that our state convention sat; and in a late 
number, I further asserted that since the late arrangement at 
the P — t O — ce, scarcely a newspaper was suffered to pass by 
the usual conveyance, and for the truth of this last charge I 
appealed to the printers; however, I understand this last is 
not denied or controverted. When the dependence of the 
printers on the P — t O — ce is considered, the injury they may 
sustain by incurring the displeasure of these of — ^rs, and when 
to this is added that of the complexion of the printers in re- 
spect to the new constitution, that most of them are zealous 
in prompting its advancement, it can scarcely be expected 
that they would volunteer it against the P — t O — rs, or refuse 
their names to a certificate exculpating the o — rs ; accordingly 
we find that most of the printers have signed a certificate that 
the newspapers arrived as usual prior to the first of January, 
when the new arrangement took place; however, the printer 
of the Freeman's Journal when applied to, had the spirit to 
refuse his name to the establishment of a falsehood, and upon 
being called upon to specify the missing papers, particularly 


ScA Letters of Centinel. No. XIV. 

during the sitting of the State convention, he pointed out and 
offered to give a list of a considerable number, instancing no 
less than seven successive Greenleaf's patriotic New York 
papers, besides others occasionally withheld from him; Colo- 
nel Oswald was out of town when his family was applied to, 
or, I have no doubt, he would have observed a similar con- 
duct. But there is a fact that will invalidate any certificate 
that can be procured on this occasion, and is alone demon- 
strative of the suppression of the patriotic newspapers. The 
opponents to the new constitution in this state were anxious 
to avail themselves of the well-written essays of the New 
York patriots, such as Brutus, Cincinnatus, Cato, etc., and 
with that view were attentive to have them republished here 
as soon as they came to hand, and especially during the sit- 
ting of our state couvention, when they would have been the 
most useful to the cause of liberty by operating on the mem- 
bers of that convention ; a recurrence to the free papers of this 
city at that period, will show a great chasm in these republi- 
cations, owing to the miscarriage of Greenleaf's New York 
papers. Agreeable to my assertions it will appear that for the 
greatest part of the time that our state convention sat, scarcely 
any of the number of Brutus, Cincinnatus, Cato, etc. , were re- 
published in this city ; the fifth number of Cincinnatus, that 
contained very material information about the finances of the 
union, which strikes at some of the principal arguments in 
favor of the new constitution, which was published at New 
York the 29th November, was not republished here until the 
15th December following, two or three days after the conven- 
tion rose, and so of most of the other numbers of this and the 
other signatures; so great was the desire of the opponents here 
to republish them, that the fourth number of Cincinnatus was 
republished so lately as in Mr. Bailey's last paper, which with 
other missing numbers were procured by private hands from 
New York, and in two or three instances, irregular numbers 
were republished. The new arrangement at the P — t O — ce, 
novel in its nature, and peculiarly injurious by the suppres- 
sion of information at this great crisis of public affairs, is a 
circumstance highly presumptive of the truth of the other 
charge. Centinel. 


Letters of Centinel. No. XV. 655 

Centinei., No. XV.* 
To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

There are few of the maxims or opinions we hold, that are 
the result of our own investigation or observation, and even 
those we adopt from others are seldom on a conviction of 
their truth or propriety, but from the fascination of example 
and the influence of what is or appears to be the general 
sentiment. The science of government being the most ab- 
struse and unobvious of all others, mankind are more liable 
to be imposed upon by the artful and designing in systems 
and regulations of government, than on any other subject: 
hence a jealousy of innovation confirmed by uniform exper- 
ience prevails in most communities; this reluctance to 
change has been found to be the greatest security of free 
governments, and the principal bulwark of liberty; for the 
aspiring and ever-restless spirit of ambition would otherwise, 
by her deceptive wiles and ensnaring glosses, triumph over 
the freest and most enlightened people. It is the peculiar 
misfortune of the people of these United States, at this awful 
crisis of public affairs, to have lost this useful, this absolutely 
necessary jealousy of innovation in government, and thereby 
to lie at the mercy and be exposed to all the artifices of am- 
bition, without this usual shield to protect them from imposi- 
tion. The conspirators, well aware of their advantage, have 
seized the favorable moment, and by the most unparalleled 
arts of deception, have obtained the sanction of the conven- 
tions of several states to the most tyrannic system of govern- 
ment ever projected. 

The magic of great names, the delusion of falsehood, the 
suppression of information, precipitation and fraud have been 
the instruments of this partial success, the pillars whereon 
the structure of tyranny has been so far raised. Those influ- 
ential vehicles, the newspapers, with few exceptions, have 
been devoted to the cause of despotism, and by the subser- 
viency of the P O , the usefulness of the patriotic 

*Froni "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Feb. 22, 1788. 


656 Letters of Centinel. No. XV. 

newspapers lias been confined to the places of their publica- 
tion, whilst falsehood and deception have had universal cir- 
culation, without the opportunity of refutation. The feigned 
unanimity of one part of America, has been represented to 
produce the acquiescence of another, and so mutally to im- 
pose upon the whole by the force of example. 

The adoption of the new constitution by the convention 
of the state of Massachusetts, by a majority of nineteen out 
of near four hundred members, and that too qualified by a 
number of propositions of amendment, cannot aflFord the 
conspirators much cause for triumph, and especially when all 
the circumstances under which it has been obtained are con- 
sidered. The late alarming disorders which distracted that 
state, and even threatened subversion of all order and gov- 
ernment, and were with difl[iculty suppressed, occasioned the 
greatest consternation among all men of property and rank. 
In this disposition even the most high-toned and arbitrary 
government became desirable as a security against licentious- 
ness and agrarian laws; consequently the new constitution 
was embraced with eagerness by men of these descriptions, 
who in every community form a powerful interest, and, added 
to the conspirators, office hunters, etc., etc., made a formid- 
able and numerous party in favor of the new constitution. 
The elections of the members of convention were, moreover, 
made in the first moments of blind enthusiasm, when every 
artifice was practiced to prejudice the people against all those 
who had the enlightened patriotism to oppose this system of 
tyranny. Thus was almost every man of real ability, who 
was in opposition, excluded from a seat in this convention. 
Consequently the contest was very unequal: well-meaning 
though uninformed men were opposed to great learning, elo- 
quence, and sophistry, in the shape of lawyers, doctors, and 
divines, who were capable and seemed disposed to delude by 
deceptive glosses and specious reasoning. Indeed, from the 
specimens we have seen of the discussion on this occasion, 
every enlightened patriot must regret that the cause of liberty 
has been so weakly although zealously advocated — that its 
champions were so little illuminated. In addition to these 


Letters of Centinel. No. XVI. 657 

numerous advantages in the convention, the friends of the 
new constitution had the weight and influence of the town 
of Boston to second their endeavors, and yet, notwithstand- 
ing all this, were near losing the question, although delu- 
sively qualified. Is this any evidence of the excellency of 
the new constitution? Certainly not. Nor can it have any 
influence in inducing the remaining states to accede. They 
will examine and judge for themselves, and from their wis- 
dom in taking due time for deliberation, I have no doubt will 
prove the salvation of the liberties of the United States, 

CenTinBL. 
Philadelphia, February 20th, 1788. 

Centinel, No. XVI.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

The new constitution, instead of being the panacea or cure 
of every grievance so delusively represented by its advocates, 
will be found upon examination like Pandora's box, replete 
with every evil. The most specious clauses of this system of 
ambition and iniquity contain latent mischief, and pre- 
meditated villainy. By section 9th of the ist article, "No 
ex post facto law shall be passed." This sounds very well 
upon a superficial consideration, and I dare say has been read 
by most people with approbation. Government undoubtedly 
ought to avoid retrospective laws as far as may be, as they 
are generally injurious and fraudulent: yet there are occa- 
sions when such laws are not only just but highly requisite. 
An ex post facto law is a law made after the fact, so that the 
Congress under the new constitution are precluded from all 
control over transactions prior to its establishment. This 
prohibition would screen the numerous public defaulters, as 
no measure could be constitutionally taken to compel them to 
render an account and restore the public moneys; the unac- 
counted millions lying in their hands would become their 
private property. Hitherto these characters from their great 
weight and numbers have had the influence to prevent an in- 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Feb. 26, 178S. 
42 


6c8 Letters of Centinel. No. XVI. 

vestigation of their accounts; but if this constitution be estab- 
lished, they may set the public at defiance, as they would be 
completely exonerated of all demands of the United States 
against them. This is not a straiiied construction of this 
section, but the proper evident meaning of the words, which 
not even the ingenuity or sophistry of the Caledonian can 
disguise from the meanest capacity. However if this matter 
admitted of any doubt, it would be removed by the following 
consideration, viz. , tliat the new constitution is founded upon 
a dissolution of the present articles of confederation and is an 
original compact between those states, or rather those indivi- 
duals, who accede to it; consequently all contracts, debts and 
engagements in favor or against the United States, under the 
old government, are cancelled unless they are provided for in 
the new constitution. The framers of this constitution ap- 
pear to have been aware of such consequence by stipulating 
in article 6th, that all debts contracted, and engagements 
entered into before the adoption of this constitution- shall be 
valid against the United States under the new constitution, 
but there is no provision that the debts, etc., due to the 
United States, shall be valid or recoverable. This is a strik- 
ing omission, and must have been designed, as debts of the 
latter description would naturally occur and claim equal at- 
tention with the former. This, article implied, cancels all 
debts due to the United States prior to the establishment of 
the new constitution. If equal provision had been made for 
the debts due to the United States, as against the United 
States, the ex post facto clause would not have so pernicious 
an operation. 

The immaculate convention that is said to have possessed 
the fullness of patriotism, wisdom and virtue, contained a 
number of the principal public defaulters; and these were the 
most influential members and chiefly instrumental in the 
framing of the new constitution. There were several of this 
description in the deputation from the state of Pennsylvania, 
who have long standing and immense accounts to settle, and 
MILLIONS perhaps to refund. The late Financier alone, in 
the capacity of chairman of the commercial committee of 


Letters of Centinel. No. XVI. 659 

Congress, early in the late war, was entrusted with millions of 
public money, which to this day remain unaccounted for, nor 
has he settled his accounts as Financier. The others may also 
find it a convenient method to balance accounts with the pub- 
lic; they are sufficiently known and therefore need not be 
designated. This will account for the zealous attachment of 
such characters to the new constitution and their dread of in- 
vestigation and discussion. It may be said that the new Con- 
gress would rather break through the constitution than sufier 
the public to be defrauded of so much treasure, when the bur- 
thens and distresses of the people are so very great; but this 
is not to be expected from the characters of which that Con- 
gress would in all probability be composed, if we may judge 
from the predominant influence and interest these defaulters 
now possess in many of the states. Besides, should Congress 
be disposed to violate the fundamental articles of the consti- 
tution for the sake of public justice, they would be prevented 
in so doing by their oaths, * but even if this should not prove 
an obstacle, if it can be supposed that any set of men would 
perjure themselves for the public good, and combat an host 
of enemies on such terms, still it would be of no avail, as there 
is a further barrier interposed between the public and these 
defaulters, namely, the supreme court of the union, whose 
province it would be to determine the constitutionality of any 
law that may be controverted; and supposing no bribery or 
corrupt influence practiced on the bench of judges, it would 
be their sworn duty to refuse their sanction to laws made in 
the face and contrary to the letter and spirit of the constitu- 
tion, as any law to compel the settlement of accounts and 
payment of moneys depending and due under the old confed- 
eration would be. The ist section of 3d article gives the 

♦Article VI. "The senators and representatives before mentioned and 
the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial 
officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound 
by oath to support this constitution." Were ever public defaulters so effec- 
tually screened! Not only the administrators of the general government, 
but also of the state governments, are prevented by oath from doing justice 
to the public; and the legislature of Pennsylvania could not without perjury 
insist upon the delinquent states discharging their arrears. 


66o Letters of Centinel. No. XVII. 

supreme court cognizance of not only thd laws, but of all cases 
arising under the constitution, which empowers this tribunal 
to decide upon the construction of thfe constitution itself in 
the last resort. This is so extraordinary, so unprecedented 
an authority that the intention in vesting of it must have 
been to put it out of the power of Congress, even by breaking 
through the constitution, to compel these defaulters to restore 
the public treasure. 

In the present circumstances these sections of the new con- 
stitution would be also productive of great injustice between 
the respective states; the delinquent states would be exoner- 
ated from all existing demands against them on account of 
the great arrearages of former requisitions, as they could not 
be constitutionally compelled to discharge them. And as the 
majority of the states are in this predicament, and have an 
equal voice in the senate, it would be their interest, and in 
their power by not only the constitution, but by a superiority 
of votes, to prevent the levying of such arrearages. Besides 
the constitution, moreover, declares that all taxes, etc., shall 
be uniform throughout the United States, which is an ad- 
ditional obstacle against noticing them. 

The , state of Pennsylvania in such cases would have no 
credit for her extraordinary exertions and punctuality hereto- 
fore; but would be taxed equally with those states which for 
years past have not contributed anything to the common ex- 
penses of the union; indeed, some of the states have paid 
nothing since the revolution. Centinel. 

Philadelphia, 23d February, 1788. 

Centinei,, No. XVII.* 
To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citizens. 

In my last number I exposed the villainous intention of 
the framers of the new constitution, to defraud the public out 
of the millions lying in the hands of individuals by the con- 
struction of this system, which would, if established, cancel 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Marcii 24, 1788. 


Letters ofCentinel. No. XVII. 66 1 

all debts now due to the United States. I also showed that 
thereby the delinquent states would be exonerated of all 
arrearages due by them on former requisitions of Congress; 
and to prove that the cancelling of all public dues was pre- 
meditated in regard to individuals, I stated that the general 
convention contained a number of the principal public 
defaulters, and that these were the most influential members, 
and chiefly instrumental in framing the new constitution: 
in answer to which, the conspirators have, by bold assertions, 
spurious vouchers, and insufiicient certificates, endeavored to 
exculpate one member, and to alleviate the weight of the 
charge of delinquency against another. In the face of a re- 
solution of Congress of the 20th June, 1785, declaring their 
intention of appointing three commissioners, to settle and ad- 
just the receipts and expenditures of the late financier, the 
conspirators have asserted that his accounts were finally 
settled in November, 1784, for which they pretend to have 
vouchers, and by a pompous display of certain resolutions of 
Congress, respecting a particular charge of fraud against him, 
as commercial agent to the United States, they vainly hope 
to divert the public attention from his great delinquency, in 
never accounting for the millions of public money entrusted 
to him in that line. When we consider the immense sums 

of money taken up by Mr. M sf as commercial agent, to 

import military supplies, and even to trade in behalf of the 
United States, at a time when the risk was so great, that in- 
dividuals would not venture their property; that all these 

transactions were conducted under the private firm of W g 

and M , which afforded unrestrained scope to peculation 

and embezzlement of the public property, by enabling Mr. 

M s to throw the loss of all captures by the enemy, at 

that hazardous period, on the public, and converting most of 
the safe arrivals (which were consequently very valuable) in- 
to his private property; and when we add to these considera- 
tions the principles of the man, his bankrupt situation at the 
commencement of the late war, and the immense wealth he 
has dazzled the world with since, can it be thought unreason- 
able to conclude, that the principal source of his afiluence 

* See Append'x. 


662 Letters of Centinel. No. XVII. 

was the commercial agency of the United States, during the 
war? — not that I would derogate from his successful ingenuity 
in his numerous speculations in the paper moneys, Havannah 
monopoly and job, or in the sphere of financiering. * 

The certificate published in behalf of general M-fll-n, the 
quartermaster gen — 1, will not satisfy a discerning public, or 
acquit him of the charge of delinquency, as this certificate was 
procured to serve an electionering purpose, upon a superficial 
and hasty inspection of his general account, unchecked by 
the accounts of his deputies, whose receipts and expenditures 
had not been examined, and consequently, by errors, collusion 
between him and them, or otherwise g 1 M-fil-n may re- 
tain a large balance in his hands ; in such case a quietus may 
have been thought expedient to continue his afiiuence. 

For the honor of human nature, I wish to draw a veil over 
the situation and conduct of another weighty character, whose 
name has given a false lustre to the new constitution, and 
been the occasion of sullying the laurels of a Washington^ by 
inducing him to acquiesce in a system of despotism and vil- 
lainy, at which enlightened patriotism shudders. 

The discovery of the intended fraud, which for magnitude 
and audacity is unparalleled, must open the eyes of the de- 
luded to the true character and principles of the men who had 
assumed the garb of patriotism with an insidious design of 
enslaving and robbing their fellow citizens, of establishing 
those odious distinctions between the well-born and the great 
body of the people, of degrading the latter to the level of 
slaves and elevating the former to the rank of nobility. 

The citizens of this state, which is in advance in its pay- 
ments to the federal treasury, whilst some of the others have 
not paid a farthing since the war, ought in a peculiar manner 
to resent the intended imposition and make its authors expe- 
rience their just resentment; it is incumbent upon them in a 
particular manner to exert themselves to frustrate the meas- 
ures of the conspirators, and set an example to those parts of 
the union who have not enjoyed the blessing of a free press 
on this occasion, but are still enveloped in the darkness of 
delusion, and enthralled by the fascination of names. 
* See Appendix. 


THOMAS MIFFLIN, 
Nat. 1744 -Ob. 1800. 


Jfhm ma ahfmail ^tai/Mtf in t^jhwsatsum' af^laxJ.! 


Letters of Centinel. No. XVII. 663 

Could it have been supposed seven years ago, that, before 
the wounds received in the late conflict for liberty were 
scarcely healed, a postmaster-general and his deputies would 
have had the daring presumption to convert an establishment 
intended to promote and secure the public welfare into an 
engine of despotism, by suppressing all those newspapers that 
contain the essays of patriotism and real intelligence, and 
propagating instead thereof falsehoods and delusion? Such 
a supposition at that time would have been treated as chi- 
merical; but how must our indignation rise when we find 
this flagitious practice is persevered in, after being publicly 
detected ! Must not the bribe from the conspirators be very 
great to compensate the postmaster-general and his deputies 
for the loss of character and infamy consequent upon such 
conduct, and for the danger they incur of being impeached 
and turned out of office? 

The scurrilous attack of the little Fiddler upon Mr. Work- 
man of the university, on a suspicion, perhaps unfounded, of 
his being the author of a series of essays under the signature 
of Philadelphiensis^ is characteristic of the man. He has ever 
been the base parasite and tool of the wealthy and great, at 
the expense of truth, honor, friendship, treachery to bene- 
factors— nay, to the nearest relatives : all have been sacrificed 
by him at the shrine of the great. He ought, however, to 
have avoided a contrast with so worthy and highly respected 
a character as Mr. Workman, who had an equal right with 
himself to offer his sentiments on the new constitution; and 
if he viewed it as a system of despotism, and had talents to 
unfold its nature and tendency, he deserves the thanks of 
every patriotic American, if he has exerted them under the 
character of Philadelphiensis. His not being above four 
years in the country can be no objection. The celebrated 
Thomas Paine wrote his Common Sense before he had been 
two years in America, which was not the less useful or ac- 
ceptable upon that account. The public have nothing to do 
with the author of a piece: it is the merits of the writing that 
are alone to be considered. Mr. Workman, prior to his com- 
ing to America, was a professor in an eminent academy in 


664 Letters of Centinel. No. XVIII. 

Dublin. Little Francis should have been cautious in giving 
provocation, for insignificance alone could have preserved 
him the smallest remnant of character. I hope he will take 
the hint, or such a scene will be laid open as will disgrace 
even his patrons; the suit of clothes, and the quarter cask of 
wine, will not be forgot. CentineL. 

Philadelphia, March 19th, 1788. 

Centinei,, No. XVIII.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Fellow Citisens. 

The measures that are pursuing to effect the establishment 
of the new constitution, are so repugnant to truth, honor, 
and the well-being of society, as would ' disgrace any cause. 
If the nature and tendency of this system were to be judged 
of by the conduct of its framers and patrons, what a picture 
of ambition and villainy would present itself to our view! 
From the specimens they have already given, anticipation 
may easily realize the consequences that would flow from the 
new constitution, if established; we may bid adieu to all the 
blessings of liberty, to all the fruits of the late glorious asser- 
tion of the rights of human nature, made at the expense of 
so much blood and treasure. Yet such is the infatuation of 
many well meaning persons, that they view with indifference 
the atrocious villainy which characterizes the proceedings 
of the advocates of the new system. The daring, and in 
most parts of the United States, the successful methods prac- 
tised to shackle the press, and destroy the freedom of discus- 
sion, the silencing the Pennsylvania Herald, to prevent the 
publication of the invaluable debates of the late convention 
of this state; the total suppression of real intelligence, and of 
the illuminations of patriotism, through the medium of the 
post-office; the systematic fraud and deception that pervade 
the union; the stigmatizing, and by every art which ambi- 
tion and malice can suggest, laboring to villify, intimidate 
and trample under foot every disinterested patriot who, per- 

*From "Tlie Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
April 9, 1788. 


Letters of Centinel. No. XVIII. 665 

ferring his country's good to every other consideration, has 
the courage to stand forth the champion of liberty and the 
people; and the intercepting of private confidential letters 
passing from man to man, violating the sacredness of a seal, 
and thus infringing one of the first privileges of freemen — 
that of communicating with each other: I say all these are 
overlooked by the infatuated admirers of the new system, 
who, deluded by \h^ phantom of wealth and prosperity, pro- 
fit not by the admonitory lesson which such proceedings 
afibrd, are deaf to the calls of patriotism, and would rush 
blindly into the noose of ambition. 

However, to the honor of Pennsylvania, a very large 
majority of her citizens view the subject in its true light, and 
spurn the shackles prepared for them, They will in due 
time convince the aspiring despots and avaricious oifice-hun- 
ters, that their dark intrigues, and deep concerted schemes 
of power and aggrandizement, are ineffectual ; that they are 
neither to be duped nor dragooned out of their liberties. 
The conspirators, I know, insolently boast that their strength 
in the other states will enable them to crush the opposition 
in this; but let them not build upon that which is in its 
nature precarious and transient, which must fail them the 
moment the delusion is dispelled. Their success in the other 
states is the fruit of deceptions that cannot be long supported. 
Indeed, the audacity and villainy of the conspirators on the 
one hand, and the frantic enthusiasm and easy credulity of 
the people on the other, in some of the states, however well 
attested and recorded in the faithful page of history, will be 
treated by posterity as fabulous. 

The great artifice that is played off on this occasion, is the 
persuading the people of one place, that the people every- 
where else are nearly unanimous in favor of the new system, 
and thus endeavoring by the fascination of example and 
force of general opinion to prevail upon the people every 
where to acquiesce in what is represented to them as the gen- 
eral sentiment. 

Thus as one means of deception has failed them, they have 
adopted another, always avoiding rational discussion. When 


666 Letters of Centinel. No. XVIII. 

the glare of great names, the dread of annihilation if the new 
system was rejected or the adoption of it even delayed, were 
dissipated by the artillery of truth and reason ; they have re- 
curred to the one now practising, the intimidating and im- 
posing influence of imaginary numbers and unanimity that 
are continually reverberated from every part of the union, by 
the tools and vehicles of the would-be despots ; and in which 
they have had astonishing success. The people in the Bast- 
ern States have been taught to believe that it is all harmony 
to the Southward; and in the Southern States they are dis- 
couraged from opposition by the unanimity of the Eastern 
and Northern States; nay, what will appear incredible, con- 
sidering the distance, a gentleman of veracity just returned 
from New York, assures that the conspirators have had the 
address to inculcate an opinion there that all opposition had 
ceased in this state, notwithstanding the evidence of the con- 
trary is so glaring here; this gentleman further informs, that 
so entirely devoted is the post-of5ce, that not a single news- 
paper is received by the printers of that place from this city 
or elsewhere; and a Boston newspaper, come by private hand, 
announces to the public, that for some months past, the 
printers there have received no newspapers to the Southward 
of New Haven, in Connecticut, where the press is muzzled, 
and consequently cannot injure the cause; that all intelli- 
gence of the occurrences in the other States is withheld from 
them; and that they know more of the state of Europe, than 
of their own country. 

Notwithstanding many thousand copies of the Reasons of 
Dissent of the minority of the late convention of this state 
were printed and forwarded in every direction, and by various 
conveyances, scarcely any of these got beyond the limits of 
this state, and most of them not until a long time after their 
publication. The printer of these Reasons, by particular de- 
sire, addressed a copy of them to every printer in the union, 
which he sent to the Post Office to be conveyed in the mail 
as usual, long before the new arrangement., as it is called, 
took place; and yet we since find that none of them reached 
the place of their destination. This is a full demonstration 


Letters of Centinel. No. XVIII. 667 

of the subserviency of the Post Office, and a striking evidence 
of the vigilance that has been exerted to suppress information. 
It is greatly to be regretted that the opposition in Massachu- 
setts were denied the benefits of our discussion that the un- 
answerable dissent of our minority did not reach Boston in 
time to influence the decision of the great question by their 
convention as it would in all probability have enabled patriot- 
ism to triumph; not that I would derogate from the good 
sense and public spirit of that state, which I have no doubt 
would in common circumstances have shone with equal splen- 
dor, but this was far from being the case; the new constitution 
was viewed in Massachusetts through the medium of a Shays, 
the terrors of his insurrection had not subsided; a government 
that would have been execrated at another time was embraced 
by many as a refuge from anarchy, and thus liberty deformed 
by mad riot and dissention, lost her ablest advocates. 

As the liberties of all the states in the union are struck at 
in common with those of Pennsylvania, by the conduct of 
the Post Master General and deputies, I trust that the example 
which her I^egislature * has set by instructing her delegates 
in Congress on this subject, will be followed by the others, 
that with one accord they will hurl their vengeance on the 
venal instruments of ambition, who have presumed to pros- 
trate one of the principal bulwarks of liberty. In a confed- 
erated government of such extent as the United States, the 
freest communication of sentiment and information should 
be maintained, as the liberties, happiness and welfare of the 
union depend upon a concert of counsels ; the signals of alarm 
whenever ambition should rear its baneful head, ought to be 
uniform. Without this communication between the members 
of the confederacy the freedom of the press, if it could be 
maintained in so severed a situation, would cease to be a 
security against the encroachments of tyranny. The truth of 
the foregoing position is strikingly illustrated on the present 
occasion ; for want of this intercommunity of sentiment and 
information, the liberties of this country are brought to an 

* The application to Congress from our Legislature was made upon the 
complaint of all the printers of newspapers in the city of Philadelphia. 


668 Letters of Centinel. No. XVIII. 

awful crisis; ambition has made a great stride towards domin- 
ion, has succeeded through the medium of muzzled presses 
to delude a great body of the people in the other states, and 
threatens to overwhelm the enlightened opposition in this by 
external force. Here, indeed, notwithstanding every nerve 
was strained by the conspirators, to muzzle or demolish every 
newspaper that allowed free discussion, two printers have 
asserted the independency of the press, whereby the arts of 
ambition have been detected, and the new system has been 
portrayed in its native villainy; its advocates have long since 
abandoned the field of argument, relinquished the unequal 
contest, and truth and patriotism reign triumphant in this 
state; but the conspirators trust to their success in the other 
states for the attainment of their darling object, and therefore 
all their vigilance' is exerted to prevent the infectious spirit 
of freedom and enlightened patriotism communicating to the 
rest of the union — all intercourse is as far as possible cut off. 
To rectify the erroneous representation made in the other 
states of the sentiments of the people in this respecting the 
new constitution, I think it my duty to state the fact as it 
really is. — Those who favor this system of tyranny are most 
numerous in the city of Philadelphia, where perhaps they 
may be a considerable majority. In the most eastern coun- 
ties they compose about oue-fourth of the people, but in the 
middle, northern and western counties not above a twentieth 
part, so that upon the whole the friends to the new constitu- 
tion in this state are about one-sixth of the people. The fol- 
lowing circumstance is an evidence of the spirit and decision 
of the opposition. — An individual, unadvisedly and without 
concert, and contrary to the system of conduct generally 
agreed upon, went to the expense of printing and circulating 
an address to the legislature, reprobating in the strongest 
terms the new constitution, and praying that the deputies of 
this state in the federal convention, who in violation of their 
duty acceded to the new constitution, be called to account 
for their daring procedure. This address, or petition, was 
signed by upwards of four thousand citizens in only two 
counties, viz., Franklin and Cumberland; and if the time 


Lcllers of Ccntinel. No. XVI IT. 669 

liad admitted, prior to the adjournment of the legislature, 
there is reason to believe that this high-toned application 
would have been subscribed by five-sixth of the freemen of 
this state. The advocates of the new constitution, availing 
themselves of this partial measure of two counties, have as- 
serted it to be the result of a general exertion, which is so 
evidently false that it can only deceive people at a distance 
from us, for the counties over the mountain are nearly unani- 
mous in the opposition. In Fayette at a numerous county 
meeting, there appeared to be but two persons in favor of the 
constitution ; in Bedford county, in the mountains, there are 
not above twenty; in Huntingdon adjoining, about 30; in 
Dauphin, in the middle countr)', not 100; in Berks, a large 
eastern county that has near 5,000 taxable inhabitants, not 
more than 50, and so of several others, and yet no petitions 
were circulated or signed in these counties. The system of 
conduct alluded to is the forming societies in every county in 
the state, who have committees of correspondence. These 
are now engaged in planning a uniform exertion to emanci- 
pate this state from the thraldom of despotism. A convention 
of deputies from every district will in all probability be agreed 
upon as the most eligible mode of combining the strength of 
the opposition, which is increasing daily both in numbers 
and spirit. 

The Centinel, supported by the dignity of the cause he ad- 
vocates, and sensible that his well-meant endeavors have 
met the approbation of the community, views with ineffable 
contempt the impotent efforts of disappointed ambition to de- 
preciate his merit and stigmatize his performances, and with- 
out pretending to the spirit of divination, he thinks he may 
predict that the period is not far distant when the authors 
and wilful abettors of the new constitution will be viewed 
with detestation by every good man, whilst the Centinels of 
the present day will be honored with the esteem and confi- 
dence of a grateful people. 

Great pains have been taken to discover the author of these 
papers, with a view, no doubt, to villify his private charac- 
ter, and thereby lessen the usefulness of his writings, and 


670 Letters of Centinel. No. XIX. 

many suppose they have made the discovery, but in this they 
are mistaken. The Centinel submits his performances to the 
public judgment, and challenges fair argumentation ; the in- 
formation he has given from time to time, has stood the test 
of the severest scrutiny, and thus his reputation as a writer, 
is established beyond the injury of his enemies. If it were 
in the least material to the argument or answered any one 
good purpose, he would not hesitate a moment in using his 
own signature; as it would not, but on the contrary, point 
where the shafts of malice could be levelled with most effect, 
and thus divert the public attention from the proper object, 
to a personal altercation, he from the first determined that the 
prying eye of party or curiosity should never be gratified 
with his real name, and to that end to be the sole depository 
of the secret. He has been thus explicit to prevent the repe- 
tition of the weakness of declaring off, when charged with 
being the author, and to put the matter upon its true footing; 
however, it may flatter his vanity, that these papers should 
be ascribed to an illustrious patriot, whose public spirit and 
undaunted firmness of mind, eclipse the most shining orna- 
ments of the Roman commonwealth, in its greatest purity 
and glory whose persevering exertions for the public welfare, 
have endeared him to his country, whilst it has made every 
knave and aspiring despot, his inveterate enemy, and who 
has never condescended to deny any writings that have been 
ascribed to him, or to notice the railings of party. 

Centinel. 
Philadelphia, April 5th, 1788. 

Centinei, No. XIX.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends, Countrymen 
and Fellow Citizens. 

When I last addressed you on the subject of the new con- 
stitution, I had not a doubt of its rejection. The baneful 
nature and tendency of this system of ambition had been so 
fully exposed that its most zealous advocates were constrained 

* "Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom;' Oct. 7, 1788. 


Letters of Centinel. No. XIX. 671 

to acknowledge many imperfections and dangers,- and seem- 
ingly to acquiesce in the necessity of amendments. How- 
ever, by the time this general conviction had taken place in 
the minds of the people, so many states had adopted the con- 
stitution and the public anxiety was so great to have an 
eiEcient government that the votaries of power and ambition 
were enabled by adapting their language and conduct to the 
temper of the times, to prevail upon a competent number of 
the states to establish the constitution without previous alter- 
ation upon the implied condition of subsequent amendments, 
which they assured would certainly be made, as every body 
was agreed in their propriety. 

My knowledge of the principles and conduct of these men 
for many years past left me no room to doubt of their insin- 
cerity on this occasion. I was persuaded that all their pro- 
fessions of moderation and assurance of future amendments, 
were founded in deception, that they were but the blind of 
the moment, the covered way to dominion and empire. Like 
a barrel thrown to the whale, the people were to be amused 
with fancied amendments until the harpoon of power should 
secure its prey and render resistance ineffectual. Already the 
masque of ambition begins to be removed and its latent fea- 
tures to appear in their genuine hue, disdaining any further 
veil from policy; the well-born^ inebriated with success, and 
despising the people for their easy credulity, think it unnec- 
essary to dissemble any longer; almost every newspaper ridi- 
cules the idea of amendments and triumphs over the deluded 
people. Ye patriots of America, arouse from the dangerous 
infatuation in which ye are lulled, and while it is yet time, 
strain every nerve to rescue your country from the servile 
yoke of bondage and to preserve that liberty which has been 
so recently vindicated at the expense of so much blood and 
treasure. Upon the improvement of the present moment de- 
pends the fate of your country; you have now a constitutional 
opportunity afforded you to obtain a safe and a good govern- 
ment by making choice of such persons to represent you in 
the new congress, as have congenial sentiments with your- 
selves. Suffer not, ye freemen of America, the well-born^ or 


672 Letters of Centinel. No. XIX. 

their servile minions^ to usurp the sacred trust — to impose 
themselves upon you as your guardians; for whatever pro- 
fessions they may make, or assurances they may give you, 
depend upon it they will deceive you: like the wolf in sheep's 
clothing, they will make you their prey. Treat with con- 
tempt the slanderous arts of the well-born to prejudice you 
against your true friends, and convince them on this great 
occasion, by your good sense, union and vigor, that you are 
not to be duped out of your liberties by all the refinements of 
Machiavellian policy. The future government of these 
United States will take its tone from the complexion of the 
first congress ; upon this will greatly depend whether despotic 
sway, or the salutary influence of a well-regulated govern- 
ment shall hereafter rule this once happy land. As the leg- 
islature of this state have appointed the last Wednesday in 
November next for the election of the eight representatives 
from this state in the new congress, you ought to be prepared 
for that all-important day; and as success is only to be en- 
sured by unanimity among the friends of equal liberty, local 
and personal predilections and dislikes should give place to 
the general sentiment. Whatever ticket may be agreed to by 
the majority of the opposition to the new constitution in its 
present shape ought to be supported by all those who are sin- 
cere in wishing for amendments. I trust that all prejudices 
and antipathies arising from the late war, or from difference 
of religion, will be sacrificed to th'e great object of the public 
welfare, and that all good and well-meaning, men of whatever 
description will harmonize on this occasion. For among the 
various practices and stratagems of the well-born, the princi- 
pal one, and upon which they will the most rely for success, 
will be the endeavor to divide you, and thus by scattering 
your suffrages between various candidates, to frustrate your 
object. 

From the mode of appointment, the Senate of the general 
government will be chiefly composed of the well-born^ or 
their minions, and when we consider the great and various 
powers which they will possess, and their permanency, it 
ought to operate as an additional stimulus with you to obtain 


Letters of Centinel. No. XX. 673 

faithful representatives in the other branch of legislature, to 
shield your privileges and property from the machinations of 
ambition and the rapacity of power. The Senate, besides 
their proper share in the Legislature, have great executive 
and judicial powers — their concurrence is made necessary to 
all the principal appointments in government. What a fruit- 
ful source of corruption does not this present! in the capacity 
of Legislators they will have the irresistible temptation to in- 
stitute lucrative and needless offices, as they will in fact, have 
the appointment of the officers. 

When I consider the nature of power and ambition, when I 
view the numerous swarm of hungry office-hunters, and their 
splendid expectations, anticipation exhibits such a scene of 
rapacity and oppression, such burthensome establishments to 
pamper the pride and luxury of a useless herd of officers, such 
dissipation and profusion of the public treasure, such conse- 
quent impoverishment and misery of the people that I trem- 
ble for my country. 

Such evils are only to be averted by a vigorous exertion of 
the freemen of America, to procure a virtuous, disinterested, 
and patriotic House of Representatives. That you may all 
view the importance of this election in its true light, and im- 
prove the only means which the constitution affiards you for 
your preservation, is the fervent wish of 


Philadelphia, October 3d, 1788. 


Centinel. 


Centinki, No. XX.* 

To the Citizens of Philadelphia. 

I congratulate my fellow citizens on the dawn of returning 
independence of sentiment evinced at the last election; may 
its ennobling influence stimulate to further and more effectual 
exertions; may the dictates of the well-born junto be treated 
on every occasion, with the contempt they experienced in re- 
gard to the late choice of councillor for this city. 

Blinded by prejudice industriously fomented, influenced by 

*Froin "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Nov. 13, 1788. 
43 


574 Letters of Centinel. No. XX. 

sordid motives of private interest, or intimidated by appre- 
hensions of being ruined in their professions, a great majority 
of the citizens of Philadelphia have suffered themselves to be 
made the scaffold upon which the well-born junto have as- 
cended to the government of this state, and thereby to a pre- 
dominancy in that of the United States. For several years 
past the essential privilege of freemen, that of electing their 
legislators has been reduced to unsubstantial form, to a mere 
farce, the appointment being really made by the junto, pre- 
vious to the legal election. The situation of this city has 
been similar to that of Rome, under the emperors, who art- 
fully gratified the people with the forms of that liberty which 
they had enjoyed under the republic; continuing their 
ostensible representatives and officers, although in fact they 
were the creatures of the emperors and entirely subservient to 
them. Thus you have been amused with the show of annual 
elections, and the name of representatives without the reality. 

It may be useful to take a retrospect of the means by which 
this well-born junto, who ten years ago could not muster 
more than eighty-two devoted adherents in the state of Penn- 
sylvania, have now become so formidable as to threaten the 
liberties of all America. 

The first consideration that this review presents is, the 
policy by which the junto have attached to their party the 
weighty interest of the Quakers and Tories. In the late 
arduous contest with Great Britain, wherein the lives and 
fortunes of the Whigs were dependent upon the uncertain 
issue of the war, and in the course of which so much barbarity 
and devastation were committed by the British; it is not to 
be wondered at that those persons who were disaffected to the 
common cause, who refused to share the dangers or contrib- 
ute to the expenses of the war, and on the contrary were 
justly suspected to be aiding and assisting a cruel and vin- 
dictive foe, should in consequence thereof, incur the resent- 
ment of the Whigs and be treated rather as enemies to their 
country than as fellow citizens. Hence the test-law, which 
was made to draw the line of discrimination, and to exclude 
from our councils those who were inimical to our cause; 


Letters of Centinel. No. XX. 675 

hence too the violence and severity with which the disaffected 
were treated; which has laid the foundation of the most im- 
placable resentments and lasting prejudices. 

The junto^ considering that persons so situated and under 
the influence of such feelings, would make zealous adherents 
if they could be flattered with hopes of protection from what 
they deemed oppression and persecution, and still more so if 
they could be flattered with the pleasing prospect of a repeal 
of the test-law, and thereby having it in their power to assert 
their rights and vindicate their sufferings; the y««if<? accord- 
ingly made the most liberal offers of their services to the dis- 
affected, and as their dislike and dread of the Whigs was 
the cement of union, the basis upon which the well-born 
meant to build their meditated schemes of profit and ag- 
grandisement, Galen, and such minions were employed to 
aggravate the feelings and confirm the resentments of the dis- 
affected by such misrepresentations of the principles and de- 
signs of the Whigs as to keep the former under continual 
apprehension of violence and rapine;* this persuasion had the 

* It is astonisliing to think how successful this artifice has been. The dis- 
affected were too highly prejudiced against the constitutional Whigs by the 
odious light in which they were continually represented by the well-born 
and their minions, as they were brought to consider them as the most vio- 
lent, unprincipled, and abandoned of men, who were conspiring against the 
lives, property, and happiness of all other classes of people. Under such 
impressions two very worthy quakers, Robert Smith and Jonathan Morris, 
were, after the repeal of the test-law, elected members of the legislature for 
Chester county. But what was the astonishment of these honest men, when, 
in pursuing the dictates of their conscience and judgment, they found that 
in almost every vote they harmonized with the constitutionalists, and dif- 
fered with those men they had been so highly prejudiced in favor of, whose 
corrupt principles and views they had now a demonstration of. Often have 
I heard them express their ardent wish, that all those of their constituents 
who were under the same delusion that they had been, might have the same 
opportunity of seeing and judging for themselves. But the upright conduct 
of these men was so highly displeasing to the junto, that at the next election 
they were turned out. Indeed, during the course of the year that they were 
in the assembly, they were continually warned of the consequences of dar- 
ing to exercise their judgment, and voting against the measures of the well- 
bom; but they virtuously answered that they would not purchase a seat in 
the legislature at the expense of their integrity and the duty they owed their 
country. 


676 Letters of Centinel. No. XX. 

desiied effect, it riveted the disaffected so closely to the in- 
terests of the junto that they zealously and implicitly sup- 
ported all their measures without attending to their nature or 
consequences. At length the liberal Whigs seeing the im- 
position that was practicing on the disaffected, that they were 
made the dupes of a set of interested designing men, resolved 
to convince them that their apprehensions were groundless 
by repealing the test-law, which excluded so many of them 
from the right of suffrage, and thereby putting them in a 
situation to judge and act for themselves; the junto who had 
gained so much by the subordinate situation of the disaffected, 
were alarmed at the proposition and accordingly opposed it, 
which so incensed their allies that, at an election which took 
place soon after for a censer in the room of Col. Miles, re- 
signed, not one of them could be persuaded to vote, and of 
course the constitutionalists carried the election; however 
the junto retrieved \h\s faux pas afterwards, by the zeal they 
showed in procuring the repeal of the test-law. 

I was always against the policy of continuing the test-law 
one hour longer than was absolutely necessary for the preser- 
vation of the country from a threatening enemy, as the his- 
tory of other nations had taught me the injurious consequences 
of depriving a large proportion of the community of the im- 
portant privileges of citizenship. I was aware that ambition 
always availed itself of such distinctions among the people to 
accomplish their common ruin; that the grievous oppression 
and misery which the Irish nation have experienced for some 
centuries past, have arisen from the unequal situation of the 
people in respect to the government — from the depressed sub- 
ordinate state in which the Roman Catholics have been held, 
who, not having a common interest in and attachment to the 
government, but on the contrary highly embittered by the 
odious light in which they were regarded, and the severity 
with which they were treated, occasioned continual appre- 
hensions to the Protestants for their safety. And this alien- 
ated state of the people, and their reciprocal enmities and 
suspicions, put it in the power of the English ministry, by 
playing one party off against the other, to keep the whole 


Letters of Centinel. No. XX. 677 

under the most submissive subjection. However, the situa- 
tion of the Irish nation is much improved since the liberality 
and harmony of sentiment that the late war gave birth to: 
their common danger from foreign invasion evinced the folly 
of their prejudices, and the necessity of union. The Irish 
now act in a great measure as one people, and in consequence 
thereof their affairs have assumed a different aspect. Eng- 
land has been obliged to relinquish many of her injurious 
monopolies and partial restrictions on the Irish commerce, 
and oppressive arrangements in their government. Tyranny 
has fled before the united voice of that people who were so 
lately enslaved by their internal divisions. 

Another great engine of influence has been the Bank^ which 
having the power of controlling the credit of every person 
concerned in trade, of course governed the mercantile inter- 
est, and made it entirely subservient to the views of the well- 
born junto. 

It has been, moreover, the policy of the junto from the be- 
ginning to ruin, by every device of calumny and exertion of 
influence, the character and circumstances of every leading 
patriot — well knowing that the people are only important 
and powerful when united under confidential leaders; and as 
this policy was supported by a numerous and weighty, party, 
and pursued with unremitted perseverance, the ablest and 
most influential patrons of the people fell victims to it. 
Character after character was successively attacked and 
hunted down by the dogs of party, with the most unfeeling 
rancour; even the death of the victim did not assuage their 
gall. In this barbarous game of policy, Galen bore away the 
palm, and shone conspicuous beyond all the imps of the well- 
born. He boasted that the superior malignity of his pen had 
deprived the illustrious and patriotic Reed of his existence, 
and in his fate had made a signal example to deter others 
from emulating his virtues, and standing forth the advocates 
of the privileges of the people, which is so highly criminal in 
the eyes of the well-born. 

By such means have the well-born attained to their present 
power and importance, to a situation which has enabled 


678 Letters of Centinel. No. XX. 

them to dictate and procure the establishment of a form of 
government for the United States, which, if not amended, 
will put the finishing stroke to popular liberty and confirm 
the sway of the well-born. Whilst the fate of the new con- 
stitution was doubtful, great was the assumed moderation, 
specious were the promises of its advocate. The despotic 
principles and tendency of this system of government were so 
powerfully demonstrated as to strike conviction in almost 
every breast, but this was artfully obviated by urging the 
pressing necessity of having an energetic government and as- 
surance of subsequent amendments. The people were more- 
over told, "you will have the means in your own power to 
prevent the oppression of government, viz: the choice of 
your representatives to the federal legislature, who will be 
the guardians of your rights and property, your shield against 
the machinations of the well-born.^'' 

But how changed the language, how different the conduct 
of these men since its establishment! — they are taking effect- 
ual measures as far as in their power to realize the worst pre- 
dictions of the opponents to the new constitution. — Having 
secured the avenue to offices under the new congress by the 
appointment of the senators, they are now exerting all their 
influence to carry the election of the representatives in the 
federal legislature, and thereby get the absolute command of 
the purse-strings to confirm their domination; every artifice 
is practicing to delude the people on this great occasion, 
which in all probability will be the last opportunity they will 
have to preserve their liberties, as the new congress will have 
it in their power to establish despotism without violating the 
principles of the constitution. The proposed meeting at 
L/ancaster is a high game of deception; under the appearance 
of giving the people an opportunity to nominate their repre- 
sentatives, the minions of ambition are to be palmed upon 
them. Ostensible deputies are to be sent from every county 
for this purpose, who, if we may judge from those already 
appointed, will take especial care to prevent the nomination 
of men who have congenial feelings with the people, as such 
would prove troublesome obstacles in the way of ambition; 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXI. 679 

the intention is to monopolize both branches of the legisla- 
ture and make the government harmonize with the aggrand- 
izement of the well-born and their minions. 

The deputies appointed to go from this city characterize 
the juggle and designate the intention more strikingly than 
is in the power of language to express or the ingenuity of 
artifice to conceal; the man who confessedly has had a 
principal share in the framing of a constitution that is 
universally allowed to be dangerously despotic, and therefore 
to require great amendments; the man who in every stage of 
its adoption has been its greatest advocate; whose views of 
aggrandizement are founded upon the unqualified execution 
of this government, whose aristocratic principles, aspiring 
ambition, and contempt of the common people have long dis- 
tinguished him; I say this man is now selected as one of that 
body who are to dictate the choice of the people — to point 
out faithful representatives who are to check ambition and 
defend their rights and privileges. If the people sufier them- 
selves to be thus fooled upon so momentous an occasion, they 
will deserve their fate. But I am persuaded they will discern 
the fraud and act becoming freemen, that they will give their 
suffrages to real patriots and genuine representatives. 

Philadelphia, October 23d, 1788. CenTinei.. 

Centinei,, No. XXI.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends and Country- 
men. 

France exhibits at this moment one of the most interesting: 
scenes to human nature, and peculiarly instructive to the citi- 
zens of the United States; — a people who for many centuries 
had been accustomed to yield implicit obedience to the man- 
dates of royalty, who never presumed to judge of the pro- 
priety of any measure of government, but whose highest glory 
was to recommend itself to the idol on the throne by the 
most obsequious services, to sacrifice every manly feeling, 
every consideration whether of self or country, at the shrine 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Nov. 8, 1788. 


68o Letters of Centinel. No. XXI. 

of liis grandeur; I say this people, so long obsequious and 
subservient to the will and pleasure of a despot, seem to have 
imbibed a new nature, to be animated with the noblest, most 
enlightened sentiments of patriotism, and in opposition to a . 
court supported by a standing army of 300,000 mercenaries, 
is asserting its rights and privileges. Various causes have 
concurred to produce this astonishing revolution of sentiments 
and conduct in the people of France: perhaps the divine 
writings of a Montesquieu laid the foundation, and doubtless 
the able, animated discussion of the native rights of mankind 
occasioned by the late contest between America and Britain, 
must have been very instrumental in effecting this general 
illumination and inspiring this ardent love of liberty in 
France. But it is probable from the strength which arbitrary 
power had acquired by custom and long-established habits of 
obedience, that it might have continued in uninterrupted 
exercise for a long time to come, if the French court had not 
precipitated its destruction by an extraordinary stretch of 
power, which struck at all the remaining privileges of the peo- 
ple, and aimed at the unqualified establishment of despotism. 

The French, enlightened to their native rights had availed 
themselves of institutions and provincial privileges, hitherto 
enjoyed but in name, to check the despotism of power, which, 
insensible of the great change of sentiment that had taken 
place in France, was so rash as to attempt the enforcement of 
new arrangements and impositions, itstead of adhering to the 
old establisments that time and custom had sanctioned. The 
French nation, already prepared, wanted but a suitable occa- 
sion to vindicate their rights: this was now afforded by the 
indiscretion of the court, and they embraced it by reviving 
the exercise of the long-dormant privilege of their parliaments 
to negative the arrets of the court, by refusing to register 
such of them as they disapproved, without which they could 
not be legally executed. 

The French court, finding their projects of power and do- 
minion frustrated by the patriotism of these local parliaments, 
who, from their vicinity and near connection with the people, 
were greatly influenced by the common feelings and interest, 


Letters of Ccntincl. No. XXL 68 1 

came to the bold resolution of annihilating them at one stroke, 
and substituting in lieu of them one general parliament, or 
court ^ pleniere^ under the specious pretence of reinstating the 
public finances and credit, deranged and prostrated by the 
late expensive war and the peculations of the ministers of 
state. 

But the French nation had too much discernment to be thus 
imposed on: they saw the object and tendency of the newcon- 
stitntion, or court pleniere ; they were sensible that a parlia- 
ment so remote from the people would be wholly subservient 
to the views of the court, however despotic they might be; 
they had experienced the fidelity, the patriotism, and the 
fellow-feeling of their provincial parliaments too much to ac- 
quiesce in their annihilation; and accordingly they opposed 
this decisive step of the court with a spirit and unanimity that 
has appalled its despotic spirit, and suspended, if not frus- 
trated, the intended innovation. 

What a surprising familarity there is in this project of the 
French court and that of our would-be despots I The Caesars 
of this country, having been bafiled in all their attempts upon 
the liberties of the separate states, by the patriotism and vig- 
ilance of the representatives of the people in the state legisla- 
tures, they have availed themselves a peculiar crisis of trade 
and public aflFairs, of the universal wish to vest Congress with 
competent powers, to procure the establishment of a general 
government, or court pleniere^ that will from its constitution 
grasp all powers and silently abrogate the state governments. 

In the conduct and example of the French provincial par- 
liaments we have a striking illustration of the great utility 
and indeed necessity of local or provincial governments be- 
ing vested with competent power to prevent the oppression 
of the general government, who being so far removed from 
the people, would possess neither the means or the disposition 
to consult and promote their interests and felicity. The pro- 
vincial parliaments of France, although infinitely inferior in 
their constitution and independency to our state legislatures, 
have proved an efficient obstacle to the extension of arbitrary 
power, and in all probability will be the instruments of pro- 


682 Letters of Centinel. No. XXI. 

curing a constitution of government that will secure the en- 
joyment of the inestimable blessings of liberty to every citizen 
of France. 

Our grandees, apprehensive that the opposition making by 
the French nation to the abolition of their provincial parlia- 
ments, and against the establishment of the new constitution, 
or court pleniere, might from similarity of principles and 
circumstances, open the eyes of the Americans to the despo- 
tism aimed at in our new constitution or court pleniere, has 
endeavored to conceal the true nature of the convulsions by 
which France is at present agitated; and in this view, in con- 
tradiction to the most authentic information both public and 
private, they have industriously circulated the idea that the 
designs of the French court are patriotic and in favor of thf. 
people, and that the opposition to their measures proceeds 
from a set of interested men, who wish to exempt themselves 
from the common burthens; but where is the American 
patriot who credits this representation, when he sees a 
Fayette, an Armand, among the foremost in this opposition, 
when he beholds the magnanimity and heroism displayed by 
this opposition who, fearless of the frowns and persecution of 
the court, presevere in the defense of their rights, esteeming 
banishment, imprisonment, loss of offices and emoluments, 
highly honorable when incurred in such a cause? 

Galen, who in common with those of his party, had exper- 
ienced the galling mortification of being defeated in every at- 
tempt to overthrow our invaluable state constitution, declared 
in the Convention, "that he rejoiced at the prospect which 
the establishment of the new constitution affiarded of the 
state governments being laid at the feet of Congress. ' ' This 
sentiment, which the Doctor had indiscreetly suffered to es- 
cape from him in the hour of insolence and triumph, was 
afterwards ingeniously explained away, lest the people should 
be apprised of the real object in view by this premature dis- 
covery; for James the Caledonian, the principal framer and 
advocate of the new constitution, had been obliged to confess, 
that so extensive a country as the United States include, 
could not be governed on the principles of freedom by one 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXII. 683 

consolidated government, but that such a one must neces- 
sarily be supremely despotic. 

My next number will be on the subject of the immense 
sums of public money unaccounted for, now ascertained by 
a late investigation of Congress, which perhaps will be the 
most effectual method of elucidating the principles of a num- 
ber of the great advocates of the new constitution, and enable 
the public to form a better judgment of one of the men lately 
appointed by the legislature of this State to a seat in the 
Federal Senate and of some of the men proposed as Federal 
representatives, who will be found to be but puppets to this 
great public defaulter. Centinel. 

Philadelphia, November 6, 1788. 

Centinbi,, No. XXII.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends and Fellow 
Citizens. 

It was my intention to appropriate this number to the con- 
sideration of the enormous sums of public money unaccounted 
for by individuals, now ascertained by a late investigation of 
Congress; but accidentally meeting with an address to the 
freemen of Pennsylvania, signed Lucullus, published in the 
Federal Gazette of November 6th, I thought no time should 
be lost in detecting the atrocious falsehoods, and counter- 
acting the baneful poison contained in that address. In a 
former number I noticed the base policy practised by the Re- 
publicans^ as they styled themselves, of imitating and preju- 
dicing that part of the community who were disaffected to 
our cause in the late war against the constitutional Whigs, by 
the grossest calumny and misrepresentation of their conduct 
and principles, and thereby duping the disaffected into the 
support of measures, which their dispassionate judgment 
would have reprobated as highly injurious to the common 
welfare. That address is a continuation of the same policy, 
and from characteristic features, is known to be the produc- 
tion of Galen, who has done more to destroy the harmony of 

*From "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Nov. 14, 1788. 


684 Letters of Centinel. No. XXII. 

Pennsylvania, and forward the vassalage of her citizens to the 
rich and aspiring than all the other firebrands of party and 
instruments of ambition. 

We are now hastening, to a crisis that will determine the fate 
of this great country — that will decide whether the United 
States is to be ruled by a free government, or subjected to the 
supremacy of a lordly and profligate few. Hitherto the grat- 
ification of party spirit and prejudice was attended with the 
ruin of the honest Whigs and the emolument and aggrandize- 
ment of the Republicans at the common expense; but now it 
would be attended with the loss of all liberty and the estab- 
lishment of a general thraldom — men of all descriptions, ex- 
cept our rulers, would equally wear the fetters, and experience 
the evils of despotism ; it therefore behooves every man who 
has any regard for the welfare and happiness of his country, 
of himself, or his posterity, to endeavor to divest himself of 
all prejudices that may bias or blind his judgment on this 
great occasion. In confidence of a dispassionate perusal and 
consideration, I will now take up the address and expose its 
fallacy. It begins, "You will be called upon on the last Wed- 
nesday of the present month to give your votes for eight per- 
sons to represent you in the Legislature of the United States. 
You never were called upon to exercise the privilege of elect- 
ing rulers upon a more important occasion. Two tickets will 
be ofiered you. The one will contain men who will support the 
new constitution in its present form : the other ticket will con- 
tain men who will overset the government under the specious 
pretext of amending it." Here is a plain, explicit avowal 
that the new constitution is to be supported in its present 
form] I hop's this declaration will open the eyes of those peo- 
ple who have been deluded by the deceitful promises of 
amendments, and that being thereby convinced of the fallacy 
of the reiterated assurances of amendments, they will now 
embrace the only method left of obtaining them, by giving 
their suffrages and influence to the other ticket. The bug- 
bear raised to intimidate the people from voting for this 
ticket, viz: "that the design is to destroy the government 
under the specious pretext of amending it," I trust will be 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXII. 685 

treated with the deserved contempt, and that this low device 
will only confirm the people the more in their determination 
to support men favorable to amendments. The address pro- 
ceeds, "To give you just ideas of the anti-federal ticket, I 
shall only add that it was composed and will be supported by 
persons who violated the rights of conscience by imposing a 
wicked and tyrannical test-law vc^on the Quakers, Mennonists, 
and other sects of Christians who hold war to be unlawful." 
In regard to the test-law, I shall only observe that the cir- 
cumstances of the times justified, nay, made it indispensably 
necessary; that it was a dictate of common sense and agree- 
able to the great law of self-preservation to draw a line of 
discrimination, and exclude from our councils and places of 
power and trust those persons who were inimical to our cause; 
and that such has been, and must ever be, from the nature 
of things, the practice of all nations when engaged in civil 
war. However, I am clearly of opinion that sound policy 
dictates the repeal of such laws as soon as it can be done con- 
sistent with the public safety, to prevent men of such princi- 
ples and views of Galen and his party from availing them- 
selves of the irritated feelings of the non-jurors and their 
friends, to compass designs prejudicial to the public liberties 
and welfare. 

The tender law stands next in the catalogue of crimes. 
' ' Who ruined half the widows, orphans and aged citizens in 
the State, by an unjust and cruel tender law?" In order to 
form a judgment of the propriety of this law, we must recur 
to the occasion of making it. When the thirteen late pro- 
vinces, now States of America, in Congress assembled, came 
to the resolution of supporting their liberty and independence 
by the sword, they found it necessary to anticipate the re- 
sources of the country by emitting bills of credit; and as the 
value and eificiency of this means depended on their being 
received in all transactions equal to gold and silver money 
of like denominations, a legal compulsion to ensure this cur- 
rency to them was then deemed essentially necessary, and ac- 
cordingly Congress recommended the measure to the several 
States, who, in compliance therewith, passed laws making 


686 Letters of Centinel. No. XXII. 

the continental money a legal tender. This paper money was 
the sinew of the war, and as such was to be cherished — upon 
its credit depended our. political salvation. However, it is 
my decided opinion that Congress was mistaken in suppos- 
ing that the credit of paper money could be supported by 
making it a legal tender: it is adequate funds of redemption 
being provided, and public confidence only that can stamp 
the value of money on paper. 

But why censure the Government of Pennsylvania for laws 
that were made ministerially, in compliance with the recom- 
mendation of Congress? May not every government in the 
union be stigmatized on the same principle, as they all passed 
similar laws? Moreover, with what consistency can the Re- 
publicans adduce the tender laws as a crime against the 
Constitutionalists^ when the former were the authors of the 
most oppressive of them, when they renewed these laws after 
they had been suspended by the Constitutionalists? A recur- 
rents to the minutes of the assembly and the laws of the State 
will fully establish this fact. It will thereby appear that the 
assembly elected in October 1779, who were to a man Consti- 
tutionalists, suspended the operation of the laws making the 
continental money a legal tender for three months, by their 
act passed on the 31st May, 1780, which was further continued 
by their act of the 22d of September following; and by the 
succeeding assembly, which were Republicans^ it was con- 
tinued without limitation. Thus the legal tender of the con- 
tinental money was first suspended by the Constitutionalists; 
and this same assembly passed a law, on the 25th March, 

1780, for emitting ;^ioo,ooo in bills of credit, founded on the 
City Lots and Province Island, without mading them a legal 
tender. 

It will also appear by the minutes of Assembly and laws, 
that the Republicans afterwards, viz., on the 9th of April, 

1781, emitted the enormous sum of ;^5oo,ooo in bills of credit, 
at a time when the public exigencies did not require or justify 
this oppressive emission of paper money, and could only be 
accounted for by the scene of profitable speculation that was 
made on this money by the Cofferer and his friends; and this 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXII, 687 

paper the Republicans made a legal tender, with heavy for- 
feitures and penalties in case of refusal. 

The Republicans moreover made the ;^ioo,ooo island 
money emitted by the Constitutionalists a legal tender, al- 
though the fund of redemption was so abundantly adequate, 
the consequence of which was a greater depreciation. And 
these tender laws were not made in pursuance of recommen- 
dations of Congress, but were the original acts of the Repub- 
licans. 

If the tender laws have been so cruel and wicked, so destruc- 
tive as "to ruin half the widows, orphans, and aged citizens 
in the state," how came the immaculate Republicans to renew 
them at so late a period in the war, when they must have 
been fully informed of their operation, and when they had not 
so good a plea to justify them ? What unparalleled impudence 
to charge the Constitutionalists with the hardships and evils 
of laws that they, the Republicans, were instrumental in re- 
viving and continuing! And yet as extravagant and incon- 
sistent as this charge is, the prejudice and credulity of party 
spirit has implicitly believed it. Although the Republican 
party devised and made the last tender laws for their private 
emolument, although they reaped the rich harvest of specula- 
tions on the public credit by means of these laws, yet the 
Constitutionalists must bear all the odium of them. 

The Doctor has exhibited a most exaggerated picture of 
the grievous consequences of the militia law; he says "that 
wagons have been sold for 3s. gd, cows for gd, etc. Whoever 
reprobates the militia law, must on the same principle repro- 
bate the late glorious contest for liberty; for any person the 
least acquainted with the transactions of the war, must know 
that the militia were very instrumental to our success; a law 
was therefore necessary to form and call forth this militia 
when requisite. If, in the execution of a general system, 
hardships have happened to individuals, they are to be con- 
sidered as private misfortunes, not public oppressions ; or if 
collectors and other officers have prostituted this law to pri- 
vate gain, they are to be stigmatized, not the law or its 
framers. 


688 Letters of Centinel. No. XXII. 

The address continues, "who have pocketed, or squan- 
dered away as much confiscated property as would have paid, 
if it had been properly disposed of, half the debt of the 
state ! ' ' This is a charge easily made, but until the mere as- 
sertion of an anonymous writer is deemed sufficient to sub- 
stantiate the fact, the public will expect better evidence. I 
call upon the doctor to name the instances, point out the per- 
sons, and produce the proof of this peculation on the con- 
fiscated property; and in answer to the other part of the 
charge, viz : ' ' that it was squandered, ' ' I will say it is equally 
groundless, whether as to the appropriation that was made of 
this property, or as to the premature disposition of it; for if 
we may judge from the temper and conduct of succeeding 
houses of assembly, it is evident that had the sales of this 
property been postponed, they would never have taken place, 
as it would have been restored to the original owners. 

The address proceeds, "who have banished specie and 
credit from the state, by their last emission of paper money. 
Who have nearly ruined the state by assuming and funding 
the debts of the United States, whereby they have checked 
our agriculture, commerce and manufactures, and driven 
many thousands of farmers and mechanics to Kentucky and 
Niagara." If an honest, just compliance with public en- 
gagements, if the support of public credit, so prized by every 
wise nation and inviolably maintained by the enlightened 
government of Great Britain, as its great resource in time of 
need, is considered criminal in Pennsylvania, the funding law 
and the last emission of paper money cannot be vindicated; 
but I am persuaded the people of this state have too high a 
sense of justice and too much discernment to their permanent 
interests for this doctrine to become popular. 

"Who have burdened the state with expensive' establish- 
ments and salaries, thereby encouraging idleness, dependence 
and servility among our citizens." This is a groundless as- 
sertion and base calumny. 

"Who have violated the constitution of the state by 
sacrilegiously robbing an institution of learning and charity 
of its charter and funds." I refer my readers to the reasons 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXII. 689 

of the majority of the council of censors, for a complete refu- 
tation of this charge. 

"Who by the number and weight of their taxes, have re- 
duced landed property to one fourth of its former value, and 
thereby forced many ancient and respectable farmers and 
merchants, possessed of large visible estates, to submit to the 
operations of laws which have reduced them from well- 
earned affluence or independence to poverty and misery.'^ 
How lost to all sense of truth and decency must the Doctor 
be to ascribe the evils of the oppressive taxes to the Constitu- 
tionalists., when he knows his party were the authors of them ? 
Does he forget the enormous tax of 1782, imposed by his 
friend Mr. Morris^ which vastly exceeded the ability of the 
people to pay, amounting to ;^425,ooo in specie besides the 
paper money ? — a tax that has been productive of more dis- 
tress and mischief than the aggregate of all the previous and 
subsequent taxes, and is the efficient cause of our present 
difficulties in taxation; and does the Doctor forget the other 
numerous taxes imposed by the same party, some of them to 
favor their speculations in the paper moneys? 

' ' Who have opposed the adoption of the Federal govern- 
ment by the grossest falsehoods, by the abuse of the best 
characters in the United States, and by an attempt to excite 
a civil war. ' ' A review of the discussion of the new consti- 
tution will expose the fallacy of this charge; whilst sound 
reason and well-supported arguments were made use of by 
the opposition, scurrility and abuse of every person who dared 
to object to the new constitution, were lavished by the Fed- 
eralists., and if there was any danger of a civil war, it arose 
from their violence and precipitance in forcing down the gov- 
ernment without giving the people time or opportunity to ex- 
amine or judge for themselves. 

"Who aim at nothing but power or office — who have no- 
thing to lose, and everything to hope, from a general convul- 
sion." This comes very consistently from a party which 
abounds in needy office hunters, whose staunch federalism 
and obsequious services are founded on, and stimulated by, 
the ravishing prospect of sharing in the great loaves and 
fishes of the United States, under the new constitution. 
44 


690 Letters of Centinel. No. XXII. 

"Whose private characters are as profligate as their public 
conduct has been oppresive, dishonest, and selfish, and who, 
instead of aiming to share in the honors of the new govern- 
ment, should retire in silent gratitude for having escaped 
those punishments to which their numerous frauds, oppres- 
sions and other crimes, have justly exposed them." If I was 
disposed to recriminate — there is an ample field — I would be- 
gin with the cofferer., the head of the other party, and trace 
his character through the numerous speculations on the pub- 
lic, from his appointment to the c 1 a y of the United 

States, to his resignation as f r; I would delineate the cor- 
rupt principles and conduct of the rest of the party down to 
the herd of base parasites and minions, the Doctor included, 
who would make a conspicuous figure in the black picture. 
On the other hand, I challenge the Doctor or his associates to 
sully the integrity, the disinterested conduct of the leaders of 
the constitutional party, by any colorable charge of pecula- 
tion or abuse of the public trusts so often confided to them, 
lyike the virtuous Fabricius, they retired from offices of the 
highest eminence and opportunities of embezzling the public 
treasure, with unpolluted hands and native integrity; so far 
from growing rich in the public service, they have impaired 
their own fortunes by their zeal and contributions for the 
public welfare; and instead of receiving applause for their 
patriotism, they are loaded with obloquy, are vilified and 
stigmatized with that poverty which is their greatest glory, 
and by the very men too who charge them with peculating 
on the public. How ungenerous and inconsistent! At the 
same time I must confess, that there have been villains of the 
constitutional party, for perfection is not to be expected on 
this side eternity. But it has been the good fortune of this 
party, that the instances have been rare and of an inferior 
kind; they did not ascend to the principals of the party, to 
the great influential leading characters, who gave the com- 
plexion and tone to the measures of government. 

The foregoing remarks upon the first part of the address 
apply equally to the remainder, and prove the fallacy and 
turpitude of the whole of it. Centinei.. 

Philadelphia, November 12th, 1788. 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXIII. 691 

Centinbi,, No. XXIII.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends and Fellow 
Citizens. 

I have promised a number on the subject of the enormous 
sums of public moneys unaccounted for by individuals, now 
ascertained by a late investigation of Congress, but find so 
extensive a field opened, as to require many numbers to treat 
of the several parts in a proper manner; I shall, therefore, 
confine my remarks at present to one paragraph of it. This 
investigation, after being long suppressed, has at length 
reached the public eye, and is of such magnitude and ex- 
hibits such immense peculations on the public treasure 
by men who now assume the lead in this and some other 
of the state governments, and are among the most distin- 
guished patrons of the new constitution, as to demand the 
serious attention of the citizens of the United States at this 
peculiar crisis of public afiairs. 

Unawed by that power and influence, that false glare of 
reputation and by that clamor and partiality of party spirit, 
which for many years had rendered the characters of the great 
public defaulters sacred and impervious to public scrutiny, 
the Centinel., regardless of consequences in such a cause, im- 
peached them at the bar of the public; he charged them with 
the receipt of millions of public money, for which they had 
not accounted ; and notwithstanding he produced sufficient 
documents to substantiate the charge — such was the shame- 
less effrontery of these men and their minions on the one 
hand, and the confirmed prejudice and partiality of the pub- 
lic on the other hand, that the Centinel was deemed a libeller., 
a calumniator of some of the best and most illustrious char- 
acters in the United States. So immaculate was the Cofferer 
considered, that the epithets of rascal, villian etc., were 
lavished upon every person who dared to assert anything to 
his prejudice, and the cry of a cruel persecution was raised 
against the Centinel and others for endeavoring to compel 
him to disgorge the public treasure. 

*Prom "The Independent Gazetteer; or, The Chronicle of Freedom," 
Nov. 20, 1788. 


693 Letters of Centinel. No. XXIII. 

Congress have now confirmed the charges adduced by the 
Centinel against Mr. Robert Morris and the other great pub- 
lic defaulters, so that if any person hereafter advocates the 
principles and measures of these men, he will thereby ac- 
knowledge congenial sentiments and proclaim his own char- 
acter— the public will be equally aware of the one as of the 
other. 

In my seventeenth number, there is the following para- 
graph: "When we consider the immense sums of public 
money taken up by Mr. Morris, as commercial agent, to im- 
port military supplies, and even to trade in behalf of the 
United States, at a time when the risk was so great that in- 
dividuals would not venture their property; that all these 
transactions were conducted under the private firm of Willing 
and Morris^ which afforded unrestrained scope to peculation 
and embezzlement of the public property, by enabling Mr. 
Morris to throw the loss of all captures by the enemy at that 
hazardous period on the public, and converting most of the 
safe arrivals (which were consequently very valuable) into his 
private property; and when we add to these considerations, 
the principles of the man^ his bankrupt situation at the com- 
mencement or the war, and the immense wealth he has 
dazzled the world with since, can it be thought unreasonable 
to conclude that the principal source of his wealth was the 
commercial agency of the United States during the war? — not 
that I would derogate from his successful ingenuity in his 
numerous speculations in the paper moneys, Havannah mo- 
nopoly and job, or in the sphere of financiering." 

And in a piece which I wrote under the signature of "0«^ 
of the People^'''' published in the Independent Gazetteer of 
April 17th last, I referred to a report of a committee of Con- 
gress of the nth of February, 1779, to prove that Mr. Morris 
was a member of the secret or commercial committee, and 
that this committee had authorized and entrusted him solely 
with the purchasing of produce in the diflFerent states, and 
exporting the same on the public account, and that all such 
contracts were made by him under the private firm of Wil- 
ling and Morris. 


Letters of Centinel No. XXIII. 693 

Mr. Morris, being absent in Virginia when the Centinel 
made the foregoing charge against him, his friends and 
minions undertook the vindication of his character; they as- 
serted that he had rendered his accounts as commercial agent, 
and that they were settled; but Mr. Morris, sensible that the 
ground which his advocates had taken for his justification was 
not tenable, and that their officious zeal had led them to 
make assertions that could easily be disproved, was obliged 
to confess that he had not settled, nor even rendered his ac- 
counts as commercial agent, at the distant period of ten years 
after his transactions in that capacity; but with his usual in- 
genuity endeavored to apologize for not doing it, as will 
appear by a recurrence to his address to the public, dated 
Richmond, March 21st, and published in the Independent 
Gazetteer of April 8th last. 

I will make an extract of this address containing Mr. Mor- 
ris's acknowledgment of receiving the public money and his 
not settling his accounts. It is as follows, viz. : " At an early 
period of the revolution, I contracted with the committees to 
import arms, ammunition and clothing, knd was employed to 
export American produce, and make remittances on account 
of the United States, for the purpose of lodging funds in 
Europe. To effect these objects, I received considerable 
sums of money. The business has been performed, but the 
accounts are not yet settled." 

Having stated the charge formerly made against Mr. Mor- 
ris and the evidence that was then in my power to establish 
it, I will now add a quotation from the late investigation 
made by Congress, extracted from their journals of the 30th 
September last, viz. : ' ' Your committee turning their atten- 
tion to an act of Congress on the 2 2d of May last, directing 
the board of treasury to call upon all such persons as had been 
entrusted with public money, and had neglected to account 
for the same, and such other persons as had made partial or 
vague settlements, without producing proper vouchers, were 
desirous to obtain a particular statement of the accounts 
which are in the above predicament; but they are sorry to 
find that such a detail is too lengthy to be here inserted. 


694 Letters of Cenlinel. No. XXHI. 

Some of those accounts are stated in the file of papers marked 
papers respecting unsettled accounts^ which is herewith sub- 
mitted. From the general aspect of those accounts, your 
committee are constrained to observe, that there are many 
strong marks of the want of responsibility or attention in the 
former trasactions respecting the public treasures. No less 
a sum than 2,122,600 dollars has been advanced to the secret 
committee of Congress, before August 2d, 1777, and a con- 
siderable part of this money remains to be accounted for 
otherwise than by contracts made with individuals of their 
own body, while those individuals neglect to account." 

Thus it appears that a considerable part of the enormous 
sum of two millions, one hundred twenty-two thousand and 
six hundred dollars, nearly equal to specie, which was ad- 
vanced to the secret committee of Congress, remains unac- 
counted for, otherwise than by contracts made with indivi- 
duals of their own body, while those individuals 7ieglected to 
account. And who those individuals are is evident from the 
report of the committee of Congress on the nth of February, 
1779, before quoted, 'and from other records of Congress. By 
them it appears, that after the death of Mr. Ward, who was 
the first chairman and agent of the secret committee, which 
happened very early, before this committee had transacted 
much business, that Mr. Robert Morris was solely entrusted 
by the secret committee with the disposition of the public 
money advanced to them, and that all his transactions as 
commercial agent, were conducted by him under the private 
firm of Willing and Morris. 

Eleven years have now elapsed since Mr. Morris was en- 
trusted with the disposition of near two millions of specie 
dollars, and no account of this immense sum has yet been 
rendered by him. What conclusion must every dispassion- 
ate person make of this delinquency ? Is it not more than 
probable that he has converted the public money to his own 
property, and that, fearful of detection, and reluctant to re- 
fund, he has, and will, as long as he is able, avoid an inves- 
tigation and settlement of these long standing accounts? 

I will ask, did the majority of the late assembly evince 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXIIL 695 

either wisdom or virtue, when they appointed this man to a 
seat in the/ederal senate, or will the people evidence any re- 
gard to their own interests if they give their sufTrages to his 
creatures, who are now proposed as federal representatives? 
Under the administration of such men, is it rational to expect 
that public defaulters will be called to account, or that future 
peculation and pocketing of the public money will be discour- 
aged or detected? 

I intend in future numbers to notice the other numerous 
instances of public defaulters, and to show that if it had not 
been for the immense peculations and pocketing of the pub- 
lic moneys by individuals, and those among our most distin- 
guished Federalists, that the people would not have been 
burdened with above one-third of the present national debt 
and consequent taxes. 

The following article of the last report of the committee of 
congress on the finances, will be the subject of my next num- 
ber, viz. : ' ' Your committee were desirous to discover in what 
manner the large sums of money received in France have 
been accounted for, but the subject of this inquiry seems to 

be involved in darkness. 

Livres s. d. 

The amount of the several receipts is 47,111,859 12 8 

Of this sum there has been sent 
over or drawn for and ex- 
pended in America 26,246,727 5 5 

Salaries of foreign ministers 1,160,183 

27,406.910 5 5 

There remains 19,704,949 7 3 

"The documents for the expenditures of this balance have 
never been produced at the treasury. They must be in 
France if there are any such papers. A full inquiry into the 
premises now claims the attention of the board of treasury. 
Some time must be expended in making the necessary inves- 
tigation, but the result may be of important service to the 
United States." 

In the investigation of this article, which informs us of a 
deficiency of upwards of nineteen millions of livres specie, 
however it may offend, I must expose the names of the men 
who have received this money. Centinel. 

Philadelphia, November 17, 1788. 


696 Letters of Centihel. No. XXIV. 

Centinel, No. XXIV.* 

To the People of Pennsylvania. Friends and Fellow 

Citizens. 

This number was appropriated to the investigation of that 
article of the last report of a committee of Congress, which 
informs us of a deficiency of Nineteen Millions of livres 
Specie, in the moneys entrusted to our Commissioners in 
France^ the principal of whom was the Honorable Ben- 
jamin Franklin the sanction of whose name has given 
such weight and success to the new constitution; but I shall 
be obliged to postpone the discussion of this subject in order 
to notice Mr. Morris's answer published in the Independent 
Gazetteer of this morning to my last number. 

Mr. Morris, presuming upon the strength and continuance 
of those prejudices which his ingenuity and address had so 
successfully raised, and which for many years had blinded 
the public to his real principles and conduct, and enabled 
him to prosecute his schemes of profit and aggrandizement to 
an immense extent, without detection or jealousy, has now 
the effrontery to treat the serious, well founded charges of 
the Centinel, and a report of a committee of Congress, 
with supercilious contempt, and to suppose that his unsup- 
ported assertions in a matter where he is so deeply interested, 
will be implicitly believed by that public whose property, to 
the amount of millions, he was entrusted with above eleven 
years ago, and for which he has not yet accounted. 

Mr. Morris says, "On the repeated slanders of my enemies, 
so far as they can affect myself, I look down with silent con- 
tempt; but as I have been lately honored with a high trust in 
the federal government, and as an attempt is made to wound 
the federal cause by attacks on my reputation and the con- 
duct of those who appointed me to a seat in the senate, my 
attachment to that cause^ and my respect for my fellow citizens, 
lead me to inform them that I have lately been at New York 
for the purpose of bringing forward a settlement of my ac- 
counts with the United States, and they are now in a train 

* From Independent Gazetteer, Nov. 24, 1788. 


Letters of Centinel. No. XXIV. 697 

of investigation, and that I shall do everything in my power 
to obtain a final settlement of them before the meeting of 
Congress under the new constitution. " 

Is it slander to call upon a public officer to account for the 
disposition of millions of public money entrusted to him 
above eleven years ago? Or is it slander to denominate such 
a man a public defaulter? Can any reasonable or honest ob- 
stacle have so long delayed the settlement of his accounts, 
especially when we consider the abilities and accuracy of this 
man in accounts, and his persevering diligence and assiduity 
to business? Is it now probable that he really means to 
render his accounts, when we advert to the unsuccessful ex- 
ertions of a series of the greatest characters in Congress to 
compel him to account, and who for more than eleven years 
have been baffled in all their virtuous and patriotic attempts 
by the predominant influence and the machinations of this 
man and his minions? What have become of the labors of 
Manhetm, where Mr. Morris retired at a gloomy and doubt- 
ful crisis of public affairs under the avowed pretence of pre- 
paring these very accounts for settlement? Where is the 
man besides Mr. Morris, who can thus act and preserve any 
character or confidence, or who with so serious and weighty 
a charge against him would continue to be preferred to the 
highest honors and trusts of his country, with the power of 
screening past delinquencies, and the opportunity of further 
speculations; or who would be supported and justified by so 
numerous and powerful a party? 

As an instance of Mr. Morris's dangerous influence, and 
also of his reluctance to have his accounts, even as superin- 
tendent of finance, investigated, it may be observed that the 
public spirited men in Congress on the 21st of June, 1785, 
procured, with great difficulty, against the strenuous opposi- 
tion and low subterfuges of Mr. Morris's friends and minions, 
a resolution of that honorable body to this effect, that three 
commissioners be appointed to examine the receipts and ex- 
penditures of the late superintendent of finance; but this res- 
olution was the only consequence of this virtuous effort, for 
Mr. Morris has been able to prevent any Commissioners being 


698 Letters of Centinel. No. XXIV. 

appointed in pursuance of this resolution entered into above 
three years since. It is true that very lately the disinterested 
part of Congress, strengthened by the attacks made by the 
Centinel and others upon the- great public defaulters, and the 
consequent clamor of the people, have, against the secret in- 
clination of a majority of Congress, obtained resolutions and 
appointments of officers to compel the public defaulters to 
account and restore the public moneys; but the efficacy of 
these resolutions and appointments entirely depends on the 
complexion of the Congress under the new constitution; for 
if the great public defaulters and their minions be elected, it 
would be ridiculous to suppose that they would countenance 
scrutiny into the conduct of themselves and patrons. Mr. 
Morris, sensible that if he can carry his creatures who are 
proposed as representatives in the new Congress, he may 
laugh at and really contemn any future attempts to call him 
to account, has, therefore, at the eve of the approaching de- 
cisive election promised to settle and account for the immense 
sums of public money that he received above eleven years ago, 
and even assures that he has been at New York lately on this 
business and that his accounts are in a train of investigation. 
But like the Manheim investigation promised as seriously 
eight or nine years ago, the present will prove to have no 
other existence than in the deception of the moment, and 
this train will be found delusive and without end. 

My fellow citizens, suffer not yourselves to be thus contin- 
ually imposed on by a man whose whole career in public life 
has been marked by delinquencies in money concerns; but 
make choice of such men to represent you as will secure 
your liberties and property. And as you are now well ac- 
quainted with the principles and views of Mr. Morris, you 
are enabled to form a proper opinion of Messrs. Fitssimons, 
Clymer, etc., who for ten years past have been the devoted 
instruments and partisans of Mr. Morris, and participators in 
his numerous speculations. Centinel. 

Philadelphia, Saturday Noon, November 22d, 1788. 


BENJAMnsr FRANKLIN. 
Aet-84j. 


^m.tkc'OTt^ifuB^jbftirUlM^if^ 6ke'^ffS3essi<>nyij/'i^ffisivricalSaize^of/*efm^